“Infected” Olympic Games

By Saori E., MA Media & Strategic Communication

COVID-19 is rampant in the world today. The virus, which originated in Wuhang, China, is being successfully contained in China. However, its neighboring country, Japan, is struggling to prevent people from getting infected with the new virus partly because of the government’s different ways of controlling their message compared to China. The reality and government’s message should always be balanced out to mitigate issues.

Effects of COVID-19 in Japan

On March 14, the President of Japan, Abe, enacted the Special Measures Act, which allowed him to issue an Emergency Declaration. Once the Emergency Declaration is issued, it would enable the government to regulate public behavior by law.

In Japan’s case, the government aims to build a stronger economic environment through the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Because of this, the president hesitated to undertake the process for an emergency declaration. This declaration would hinder industries involved in Olympic preparation which were supposed to host the Olympics this summer, and lead to the delay of the preparation. However, since the Tokyo Olympics is likely to be postponed to 2021 in any event, the government decided to issue this declaration.

Comparison of The Governmental Reaction To COVID-19

The governments of China and Japan have reacted differently to the Coronavirus with their measures reflecting each country’s priorities, those which ended as a success and failure respectively. China maintained the balance of reality and message by controlling the reality itself to fit with their ideal message, whereas Japan did not change their message even when the reality changed.

China:

The Chinese government’s major priority was to prevent their people from causing panic resulting in the government losing trust and to maintain the national stability. Their reaction to the COVID-19 was forceful, which manipulated the reality to balance out with the message that the government was willing to spread to their people. The way China took control of the reality was as follows:

  1. No restrictions on people from travelling around the world during the Lunar New Year holiday
  2. Management of major social media such as Wechat and Weibo to prohibit people from spreading false news

Since the rise of COVID-19 was right before the Lunar New Year holiday, the government did not restrict people from going to other countries because they did not want sudden restriction of travelling to cause panic for people going overseas. Such an action by the government could lead to the rise of a negative impression towards the government by Chinese citizens.

Additionally, the Chinese constitution clearly states that although people have rights of freedom of expression on online networks, the government can infringe upon this in order to maintain the safety of the people; this enables the government to encroach into people’s privacy more than other countries. This allowed them to warn their people that they will be punished if they spread false information.

This focus on the organization of people was due to the China’s priority of maintaining the people’s trust in the government. The fact that the government was able to manage people’s movements resulted in the decrease in infection. The match of the reality and message supported the government’s original priority which is to prevent people from causing panic.

Japan:

The Japanese government’s major message for the people has always been based on their focus on fiscal reconstruction, and the Tokyo 2020 Olympics was their major priority for that. They did not change this way of messaging even when COVID-19 went rampant, and as a result, the changing reality undermined the government’s message. The policies that Japan issued along with their message to maintain Japan’s economic level and not controlling the reality is shown as of below.

  1. No restrictions for Chinese tourists visiting Japan during Lunar New Year holidays.
  2. No legal penalty for spreading false information online

The Abe cabinet has been focusing on the fiscal reconstruction from the beginning of their tenure, and in order to do so, he has been trying to build a stronger relationship with China. Because of this, Japan could not restrict the Chinese tourists from coming to Japan during the Luna New Year holidays even if they knew the risk of accepting people from China with regard to COVID-19. Rejecting people from China at the end of January would not have given a good impression for the Chinese government.

The Japanese government was focusing too much on economic aspects and did not restrict online information. This caused false information to spread, and the government was not able to deliver their message effectively. Because of the flooding information online, various realities were created and Japan was not able to clearly deliver its message to the people.

Even when the reality was changing, Japan kept on sending out messages based on their focus on economic aspects, which led to the unbalance of reality and messaging, resulting not only to the loss of control in COVID-19 but also the postponement of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics itself.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

 

The Battle of Messaging: Indonesian Palm Oil and the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED II)

By Oryza Astari, M.A. International Affairs ‘20

Rainforest Action Network’s “Indonesia, Climate Change, and Rainforests” report describes destruction of Indonesia’s rainforests as one of the leading causes of climate change. Furthermore, Greenpeace describes Indonesia as one of the “top tier emitters of global greenhouse gas emissions” due to deforestation.

This environmental narrative—accepted widely by the international community and particularly by the European Union (EU)—conflicts with Indonesia’s own version of the story.

On March 25, the Tanah Merah project in Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua officially began, as it cleared out rainforests to make way for palm oil. Mongabay and the Gecko Project, two media companies that focus on conservation, report that the project is estimated to generate US$6 billion in timber and create a large palm oil plantation “almost twice the size of London.” Clearing Papuan rainforests will emit immeasurable amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, exacerbating the climate crisis.

Cargill’s problems with palm oil

The EU, an international leader in international environmental efforts, introduced its latest Renewable Energy Directive, dubbed RED II, in response to the deforestation in Indonesia. RED II introduces a new approach to biofuels based on the concept of indirect land use change (ILUC). ILUC is the transformation of carbon-rich forests, wetlands, and peatlands, into land(s) used to produce crops for biofuels, resulting in the vast release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The EU argues that ILUC risks “negating” the savings that result from the use of biofuels; thus, the use of such “high risk” crops as palm oil will be phased out by 2030.

Below, I will present the Indonesian perspective on the issue, followed by the EU response to the Indonesian narrative. Finally, I will conclude by presenting the winner of the narrative battle.

The Indonesian government’s strategy in its narrative battle against the EU involves evoking emotional content and controlling the process of the project.

First, Indonesian officials invoke inflammatory words when describing RED II. Such words evoke a particular narrative that engages audiences on an emotional level, bringing out emotions such as anger or even disappointment, particularly for the Indonesian audience. For instance, Former Trade Minister Enggartiasto Lukita called the move protectionist, arguing that the policy is aimed to support European biofuels producers of rapeseed and sunflower oils.

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahendra Siregar concurred, calling it a “‘structured and systematic’ campaign to block palm oil” from competing with European-grown biofuels. Vice Minister Siregar furthered his argument by concluding that the environmental concern of RED II was simply a façade, a “guise,” for protectionism.

Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo took it a step further, calling the policy an “act of trade war.” Not only is President Jokowi evoking emotional content, he is also controlling the process of projection.

President Jokowi took the lead by repeatedly calling the EU policy a “palm oil ban.” His position, as the highest government official and the leader of the country, lends legitimacy and credibility to his message. As such, his cabinets followed his lead, and began invoking similar inflammatory words such as “discrimination” and “protectionism,” as illustrated above.

Furthermore, President Jokowi’s invocation of “trade war” puts the focus on EU-Indonesian trade on palm oil, rather than the environmental issue. In 2018, the European bloc reportedly consumed more than 7 million tons in palm oil biofuels, with 65 percent used as energy. It is evident that palm oil biofuels trade is lucrative both for the European bloc and Indonesia, pointing to the EU’s hypocrisy on the palm oil issue. Thus, the obvious response—and remedy—for Indonesia, after months of failed negotiations with EU officials, was to bring a lawsuit to the World Trade Organization in December 2019.

In response, the EU focuses their narrative argument on the epistemological and informational content. RED II was accompanied by a report with available, consistent, scientific data from 2008 to 2015. The European Commission reiterates that it arrived at the decision based on the given scientific data, which shows that palm oil has been associated with high risk of deforestation.

Furthermore, the EU invokes the identity narrative of an “Energy Union”—a bloc with a strong commitment to sustainability—in its response to Indonesia. This invocation strengthens the EU’s position, as it illustrates to the audience that the policy is harmonious with the EU’s values and identity as a champion of energy and the climate targets.

While the WTO suit will take years to be decided, in the battle of messaging between Indonesia and the EU, the winner is clear. The EU’s new policy is harmonious with its identity; its claims backed by nine years’ worth of scientific evidence. The relationship between the EU identity and scientific, enlightenment thinking makes for a cohesive, persuasive message that is consistent with the EU’s narrative.

On the other hand, Indonesia’s counter-messaging campaign on the “palm oil ban,” although strong for the local audience, has been unsuccessful. Indonesia’s lack of response on deforestation claims is dissonant with the wider environmental messaging, which have been accepted by the scientific community and international audience. More importantly, Indonesia’s latest Papua shows that its loss was not simply due to the EU’s more persuasive message, but because its narrative simply does not match its reality.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Message & Culture Clash in the Age of Covid-19

By Leah Bacon, M.A Strategic Communication and Media ’20

On March 14, 2020 Rwanda’s Ministry of Health reported its first positive case of Covid-19. The country was the first African nation to issue a two-week lockdown. This included the closure of schools and places of worship, prohibiting large gatherings and unnecessary movements, and preventing all domestic/foreign travel, in order to mitigate the transmission of the virus.

Prime Minister, Dr. Edouard Ngirente issued a public notice on March 6th, that the country was taking the necessary preparation measures to “deal with the possible outbreak,” while also “urging all Rwandans” to play a role in fighting the virus. Rwanda is the second most densely populated country in Africa with a population of over 11 million people. Therefore, it comes to no surprise that the East African country is experiencing a rise in new cases—with 89 confirmed cases as of April 4th.

Picture of Kigali (Credit: Dr. Antoine R. Gasasira)

However, missing from discussion in the Western world regarding Covid-19 is how the message is conveyed and interpreted in various countries with vastly different social/cultural norms and resources.

In an age of globalization, media outlets are “global in scope,” “interconnected,” and “overlapping. Therefore, information is able to span national and cultural boundaries with high-rates of fluidity and speed. Although the messages are reaching a global audience, this audience is not interpreting the messages in the same way. Instead, how these messages are translated (or not translated) then becomes out of the control of the original media elites or spokespersons.

One reason interpretations vary, is messages are filtered through master narratives unique to each population. Master narratives can be defined as transnational narratives that are deeply embedded in a particular culture and are systemically reproduced (See: Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism). In the case of Rwanda, issues stem from the failure of global messaging and two of the country’s master narratives—which are rooted with historical significance:

  • Survivor Narrative: How can victims and survivors of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi understand the severity of Covid-19 when so many individuals have lived through the horrific events of the genocide?
  • Rwanda-First Narrative: The country’s messaging is centered around the strength and perseverance of the Rwandan people to do their part in curving the spread of this virus. But how do we prevent the class-based differences from emerging? Is messaging about social distancing and the importance of hand-washing being delivered to (and understood by) the more rural areas or to people with little education?

The first master narrative, the “Survivor Narrative,” plays a significant role in the country’s success in reconstruction post-genocide. It is a narrative of perseverance and strength, which has allowed the country to move forward and prosper. However, in the age of Covid-19, some Rwandans are skeptical of the severity of the virus due to the fact that so many of its people already suffered from atrocities that are incomprehensibly worse. Further arguments can be made for other countries who have suffered through war, conflict, displacement and starvation. These countries are not necessarily down-playing Covid-19, but there seems to be a disconnect between the West’s messaging on best practices (such as washing one’s hands, using hand sanitizer, or social-distancing) and what is actually available or realistic to more vulnerable populations.

Refugee Camp for Rwandans in Zaire following the 1994 Genocide (Credit: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)

 

The “Rwanda-First Narrative” is used in the discourse of some of the country’s media. One article highlighted that “common practice” in Rwanda is to greet with handshakes and hugs, so social distancing was initially not well-received. The country’s leading English newspaper The New Times, published an article titled, “As usual, Rwanda takes the bull by the horns with vigour and rigour.” This article praises the government and entities (doctors, police, etc.) trying to enforce the precautions of Covid-19, but in the same article the author writes, “of course, there are nasties among us who are inexplicably bent on self-exposure.” I am reflective of how difficult social distancing would be in the capital city of Kigali’s outdoor market Kimironko, which is home to hundreds of vendors, or the thousands of individuals whose livelihood depends on their motorcycles (“motos”) taxi-like service. If the messaging does not reach these individuals or if its importance is not completely understood the country will face additional burdens.

Alexander Nshimiyimana posing at his stand at the Kimironko Market (Credit: Alexander Nshimiyimana)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moto-Drivers, Muhanga-Gitarama, Rwanda (Credit: Adam Jones, Ph.D)

Since messages are global and “absolute control over the message is impossible,” each country must be vigilant in their messaging and understanding of the varying groups that make up their audience, in order to make strides in halting this global pandemic.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Terminating the Visiting Forces Agreement: A Philippine Independence Story

By Barbara Alberts, M.A. Media and Strategic Communication ’20

In February, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte announced he intended to terminate the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States. The VFA allowed the United States to station military forces in Philippine military bases, and the two militaries to execute joint military exercise and operations in the country. The U.S. military presence in the Philippines was also seen as a “security blanket” for the Philippines against China’s growing naval presence in the South China Sea. The termination would leave the United States with no legal or operational standing in the Philippines, but for some politicians in the Philippines, the ending of the agreement is seen as a step toward an independent Philippines divorced from the United States and its fate.

The image of the U.S. as a protector and ally of the Philippines has been rejected recently by Philippines government officials, citing the U.S. military as an unwelcome presence on the islands that perpetuates the idea of the United States as the Philippines’ colonizer rather than ally. The desire for independence from the United States that resulted in Duterte’s decision to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement has roots in a deep master narrative of independence in the Philippines. A master narrative is a, “transhistorical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture,” (Halverson 2011). According to Halverson, “our understanding of ourselves…who we are, what we are here for, what makes us unique, and so on, is entirely bound up in the narratives we grow up hearing and the stories we connect to them,” (Halverson 2011). When it comes to public diplomacy and communication with the Philippines, understanding the master narrative of independence in the Philippines is the first step in helping understand Duterte’s foreign policy decisions as they relate to the United States.

Independence: A Philippines Master Narrative

Since Duterte took office in 2016, he has been vocal about the Philippines becoming more independent from the United States. However, his decision to terminate the VFA is also part of a slow-moving process the Philippines has taken to distance itself militarily from the United States which began in the 1990s.

CREDIT: Manila coastal plan, United States Marines Corps

Historically, the United States has exerted its power through its military bases on the Philippines. U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay, located about two and a half hours outside of Manila, was one of the US’s largest overseas military bases before it was decommissioned in 1992, when the Philippines Senate rejected a treaty that would have seen the United States provide $203 million in aid in exchange for a 10-year lease on the base. At the time, Philippine senators saw American military presence in the Philippines, “as a vestige of colonialism and an affront to Philippine sovereignty,” (Sanger 1991).

The desire for separation from the United States is part of a greater master narrative in the Philippines of independence. In the Philippines, independence is a deeply rooted value, and gaining it has been a constant battle throughout its history. There is an abundance of independence stories in the Filipino culture. First, it was the quest to gain independence from Spain, which initially colonized the islands. Then, it was the struggle to shake the United States’ rule of the land. After the Philippines gained true independence from the United States in 1946, the drive for independence turned inward during the Marcos regime from 1965-1986, which ended when he was ousted during the People Power Revolution and Corazon Aquino took office. Now, the focus has shifted outward again, with Duterte seeking military independence from the United States.

Conclusions and Recommendations 

Populism in the Philippines has been trending upward since Duterte took office (Bieber 2018), and despite the majority of Philippines citizens preferring a stronger relationship with the United States over China, and nearly 70% of Philippines citizens believing the United States would defend them from China, Duterte has spurned any sort of U.S. involvement in the Philippines.

CREDIT: U.S. Navy, 24 November 1992, PH2 FARRINGTON, Public Domain

With memories of colonization still felt in the Philippines today, moving forward, the United States should make a concerted effort to approach any treaties, agreements, or negotiations with the Philippines as an interaction between two independent countries. The United States would benefit from emphasizing Philippine independence, and respecting the country’s movement toward independence. In terms of future military agreements, should the United States propose a new military partnership, they need to frame it as partnership between equals. The United States cannot achieve its military goals in the South Pacific without the cooperation of the Philippines, and the Philippines has benefitted from U.S. military presence in keeping China’s naval presence in the South China Sea at bay as well as helping with counterterrorism efforts in the country’s southern islands. By understanding the Philippines master narrative of independence, the United States can better communicate with their oldest ally in Asia.

CREDIT: Photo by U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Peter Reft

 

 Works Cited

Bieber, Florian. “Is Nationalism on the Rise? Assessing Global Trends.” Ethnopolitics, vol. 17, no. 5, 2018, pp. 519–540., doi:10.1080/17449057.2018.1532633.

Goodall, Jr, H.L., and Steven R. Corman. “What Is a Master Narrative.” Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, by J. Halverson, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 1–9.

Sanger, David E. “Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 28 Dec. 1991, www.nytimes.com/1991/12/28/world/philippines-orders-us-to-leave-strategic-navy-base-at-subic-bay.html.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

President Donald Trump’s impeachment could ruin U.S. influence in Ukraine—but it won’t. Here’s why.

By Joli McSherry, MA Global Communication, ’20

On July 25, 2019, President Donald Trump had a good, normal call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The rest—forgive the cliché—is now history. We know that this call led to the President Trump’s eventual impeachment and acquittal, which is both a cause and a symptom of the continued fracturing of the American public and political institutions. We already know the impact on the American public, but what about the impact America’s very important strategic partner in Eastern Europe and our characteristically friendly relationship with its people? Could this be a dangerous blow to the relationship? Fortunately, President Trump does not have to be, nor should he be, the sole diplomatic messenger. And the United States, dealing with its own conflicting national narrative as its public becomes more deeply divided, is at an advantage: Ukrainians understand what it is like to call a country that is fractured by two opposite narratives home.

As a young country sharing a long history with its aggressor, Ukraine deals with dual competing narratives for the same stories and events. One is the pro-Ukrainian, pro-West narrative, which emphasizes a shared Ukrainian fight for freedom, as well as the drive to stand against and overcome oppression. This narrative is woven into prominent figures and events, such as nationalist revolutionaries Stepan Bandera and Ivan Mazepa, and the devastating Holodomor genocide where Ukrainians were starved out by the Soviet Union. However, take those same events and one can see the pro-Russia, anti-West narrative: Ukraine and Russia’s shared history is to be honored through their bond, and those who reject the bond (as Bandera and Mazepa did) are defectors and traitors.

 

The narrative used by the U.S. diplomatic system focuses, obviously, on reaching those pro-West Ukrainians who favor their own democratic state, free from Russian meddling. Despite Trump’s own words and behaviors, Ukrainians who are sympathetic to European integration will be particularly responsive to the messages that continue to be put forth by a plurality of the U.S. government and population, working to see its own unrelenting desire for freedom, independence, and democracy overcome its internal ills. This resonates with the Ukrainian master narrative of overcoming oppression. All the U.S. diplomatic system must do to avoid endangering relations with the Ukrainians is continue to hold steady and show Ukrainians that nothing in the context of the relationship has changed. As far as public influence goes, the golden rule of successful public diplomacy is that it must be rooted in truth. The United States, casting an inconsistent president aside, undoubtedly has that covered.

While U.S. soft power has been on a steady decline since President Trump’s 2016 election, the United States has long held influence on Ukrainian public opinion, particularly when the choice at hand is America vs. Russia (a 2019 International Republican Institute public opinion survey gives a detailed picture of Ukrainians’ opinions of the two). This is in large part because the United States invested early emphasizing the role it can play in fulfilling the fledgling Eastern European country’s desire for freedom and democracy. The United States has continued to firmly promote a narrative of support and shared objectives with Ukraine even during times of turmoil; the pithy “Crimea is Ukraine” refrain is a great example. It has then backed these messages up by conducting a robust public diplomacy effort connecting with and engaging the Ukrainian people, and targeting some of the most pressing issues Ukrainians face, like an eager civil society and independent media, both desperate for more resources to foster their own fight to maintain freedom and stability.

 

In short, the United States has long talked the talk and walked the walk. Since Ukraine broke free from the Soviet Union, the United States has stood behind the strongest and most effective narrative that a freshly post-Soviet state with often insurmountable historical ties to Russia can expect to have: the right to an independent, democratic Ukraine. This would take a while to undo. Contemporarily, as America struggles to get its own domestic narratives in order in a Trump world, the use of this narrative to advance foreign policy goals in Ukraine has not waivered. The “partners in freedom and democracy” narrative holds strong, even as both countries deal with the calamities caused by President Trump. As the president’s own drama unfolded, the U.S. State Department faithfully told Ukrainians: Ukraine is so important to us; we share your values of freedom and progress; we have a shared adversary; and we will not let that enemy impinge on your right to a secure, democratic, and prosperous state.

While there is concern over a growing distance between Ukrainians and the United States in light of recent events, thanks to the decision to not stray from the strong U.S. narrative promoting friendship and cooperation among a shared goal between the two states and their people, the Ukrainian peoples’ disillusionment with America will likely not last. Despite some political decisions that left Ukrainians questioning America’s commitment, Ukraine holds an identity narrative that leaves it feeling something of an underdog truly in need of support in its fight to maintain their right to exist in the manner it feels it deserve. The country needs support, and the U.S. has positioned itself to still spread the idea its strong and unwavering support despite any of its own internal ills. In fact, those ills may help the cause—Ukrainians know well what it is like to be fractured by an internal divide. The fact that the U.S. continues to maintain its commitment despite this can only mean positive things for the relationship going forward.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Challenges and Vulnerabilities for Public Diplomacy in Guatemala

By Halea Kerr-Layton, MA Global Communication ’21

 

Guatemala, the Central American country home to roughly 17 million people has unique vulnerabilities and challenges for public diplomacy presented by the competing narratives, identities, and experiences of its population.  Specifically, between the indigenous and the non-indigenous, or Ladino, population. The inequality, repression and lack of political representation for the indigenous population presents a particularly unique environment that fans unrest and lends itself to disinformation. Through a brief examination of some of these narratives and realities, these vulnerabilities and challenges will be examined.

An indigenous woman rests along a street. Antigua, Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Two Competing Narratives

Whenever there are competing narratives or realities, there exists a vulnerability that can lead to intense polarization, susceptibility to misinformation and challenges for public diplomacy. Narratives are important socio-political forces in the world that make sense of transhistorical patterns and are deeply rooted and embedded in a particular culture.  Competing narratives represent a formidable cleavage in a society. The cultural narratives in Guatemala reveal extreme inequality and divergent realities for different portions of the population.  The World Bank describes the inequalities and divergent experiences of life in Guatemala saying, “in essence, there are “two Guatemalas, one with well-off, and one poor, one urban and one rural, one Ladino and one Indigenous with large gaps in both social and economic outcomes.” This history of inequality, racism, and discrimination against indigenous peoples in Guatemala constitutes a master narrative that presents a stark vulnerability for public diplomacy in Guatemala.

A Mayan man sells his artwork on the street. Antigua, Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

 

The Maya

The indigenous population in Guatemala, most of whom are Maya, is estimated to comprise roughly 60% of the country’s total population. Despite making up the majority of the population, the Mayan population faces extreme discrimination, repression, lack of political representation and access to resources such as housing and education. Even statistics about the Mayan population are contested as inaccurate due to the inability for many indigenous peoples to participate in data collection. Experts continually criticize the official census as underreporting indigenous inhabitants. The fact that many of the Maya are disadvantaged and are not officially counted, and therefore remain unrecognized by the government, demonstrates a rift between identity narratives in Guatemala.

Child with mother at marketplace. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

War and Repression

The lasting trauma left by domestic wars, indigenous suppression and the history of colonization in Guatemala and much of Central and South America, has implications for successful public diplomacy. Wars create enduring cultural memories and privilege the victors for future governance decisions. Most recently, the Civil War (1960-1996) left legacies of pain, exclusion, and division in Guatemala between the Ladino and the indigenous populations. The ruling military junta at the time committed acts of terror and genocide against the Maya communities in part to destroy the cultural values that ensured cohesion and collective action in Mayan communities.” This narrative of Mayan oppression and slaughter goes back to colonization and remains strong to this day.  In 2018, 26 members of mostly indigenous campesino organizations were killed with almost no acknowledgement or atonement from the government.  Guatemala is considered by human rights activists to be on the verge of a human-rights catastrophe and as desperation for justice mounts, disinformation campaigns are more likely to be successful.

Mayan woman in traditional dress in marketplace. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Poverty and Inequality

Guatemala suffers from persistently high poverty and inequality with the indigenous peoples continuously more disadvantaged.  In 2016, Guatemala ranked as the number 1 most unequal country in Central America and was included in the world’s top ten most unequal countries. While poverty in the country is growing as a whole, the indigenous Mayan population is disproportionately poor in comparison with non-indigeous populations with over 75% of the ingidengous population living in poverty. Geographically, poverty is predominant in rural areas, primarily inhabited by indigenous peoples with 81% of those living in poverty and 91% of those living in extreme poverty living in the countryside.  This physical divide between populations presents a vulnerability to disinformation as narratives about different socio-economic realities will be more distant and less verifiable.

 

A set of homes in rural Guatemala. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Representation and Identity

Social and political exclusion of the indigenous population is a challenge to public diplomacy efforts. Traditional diplomacy often happens at the top level of governments between elected officials and representatives. Political representation for indigenous Guatemalans remains extremely low, which makes diplomacy efforts to include indigenous voices difficult, but vital. The indigenous population has never gained more than 13% of the total seats in Congress. Political participation of indigenous peoples is lower than among non-indigenous populations due to challenges “including language barriers in the election process, lack of information on where the votes should be cast, political clientelism, and even violence.” The increasingly popular theory of identitarian epistemology claims that a specific identity group cannot acquire the knowledge of another, and argues that each identity group has unique rights that pertain to their exclusive body of knowledge. Furthermore, this theory argues that legitimate representation is an act on behalf of a group that the representative is themselves a part of. Therefore, without political participation and representation of indigenous Guatemalans, the government may be deemed illegitimate by some. Therefore, in order to combat disinformation, diplomatic efforts must work to engage with the indigenous population.

Funeral procession in a rural village. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Implications:

These vulnerabilities and challenges to diplomacy are not unique to Guatemala and in fact have implications for larger narratives of shared histories of colonization, racism and inequality that disadvantage indigenous populations. Therefore similar vulnerabilities are applicable by extension to much of South and Central America. These sociological vulnerabilities can be exploited and used for disinformation campaigns. In countries such as Guatemala, with a history of colonization, competing identity narratives and extreme sociological differences, disinformation campaigns will be able to tap into existing narratives about oppressors, victims, inequality and representation.

Antigua, Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton

 

> The author has also written Master Narratives and Their Divergent Interpretations: Challenges and Vulnerabilities for Public Diplomacy in Guatemala.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

The Battle for Georgia: How Strategic Narratives Inform and Impact a Geopolitical Struggle

By Jenna Presta, BA in Political Communication ’19, MA in Media & Strategic Communication ‘21

In the 1990s, the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared their independence and intentions to secede from Georgia. Neither of these territories is widely internationally recognized as an independent state. However, in 2008 Russia moved troops into the regions, declaring them to be independent. Georgia, backed by most Western nations, declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be occupied territories. Russia’s destabilizing moves point to more than a display of dominance. They have consequences for Georgia’s larger place in the international system and its identity as a nation. These are shaped by and build upon strategic narratives.

 

There are several layers of narratives that grant this territorial standoff a greater meaning. Narratives are the frameworks by which we understand the world around us. When it comes to international affairs, narratives can describe and shape a particular issue, the identity of a nation, or even the international system itself. These all help to shape and explain Georgia’s resistance to Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also relevant to this issue are master narratives, which are those embedded within the historical memory of a nation or people. Master narratives do not have to be taught; they are passed down through a culture. Two of Georgia’s most salient master narratives are (1) the struggle for sovereignty against an imperial power and (2) the rebirth of Georgia as an independent, self-governing state. These narratives often operate in tandem; rebirth following struggle. These master narratives explain why Georgians perceive Russia’s presence within its internationally recognized borders as a continuation of the historical aggression the Georgian state has experienced from Russia and the Soviet Union. Georgia’s historical memory catalogues the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an affront to its sovereignty, rendering Russian narratives ineffectual.

This perspective feeds into Georgian identity narratives, which are those that describe Georgia’s identity as a country. These identity narratives depict Georgia as a strong, independent, and unified state which governs itself. Identity narratives can also constrain a nation’s behavior. Georgia, for example, values self-governance and is a nascent democracy, and thus is expected to behave as such. Additionally, Georgian nationalism has become increasingly important since it seceded from the Soviet Union in the 1991 referendum. This helps to explain why Georgia views the Abkhazia and South Ossetia controversy as an occupation of their territories, rather than accepting Russia’s narrative of support for independent states.

Narratives related to the international system are especially important in this situation as they demonstrate the aforementioned line between “occupation” and “independent states.” Georgia and most of the West have invested in narratives which demonstrate the importance of international institutions. They argue that the international community should be the forum for recognizing nations, and that, therefore, Russia’s occupation of Georgian territory violates international norms. This further influences the perspective of Georgians by characterizing Russia’s moves as an infringement, thereby decreasing the power of their narratives. These separate narratives all come together to emphasize the sovereignty and independence of Georgia as a self-governing state, in turn shaping Georgia’s – and most of the West’s – response to Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This situation further impacts Georgia’s larger place in the international system. As a relatively young democracy, Georgia is seen by many as torn between allying itself with the West and with Russia/Eurasia. Where Georgia chooses to align itself has real consequences, as narratives do shape and constrain behavior. A Georgia in a Western alliance may behave quite differently than a Georgia in a Russian alliance. In the fight for Georgia’s allegiance and national identity, Russia attempts to cast a shadow on partnership with the West in order to bring Georgia into the sunlight of a Eurasian bloc. Its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is supported by propaganda campaigns asserting that aligning with the EU, US, or NATO will corrupt the traditions and identity of Georgia as a state. This taps into narratives related to Georgian nationalism, sovereignty and independence to create an overwhelmingly negative picture of a Western Georgia.

Despite these efforts, polling data collected by NDI shows that the overwhelming majority of Georgians do support EU and NATO membership. This could point to the salience of the Georgian narratives I’ve described here. Russian propaganda efforts do not seem to be enough to override Georgia’s historical memory, or its vision of itself as a sovereign nation that is part of a greater system. It is clear how the various narratives surrounding Russia’s presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia feed into a larger picture of Georgia’s place in international affairs – and vice versa.

> The author has also written a case study of the battle of narratives over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

4 Reasons Why COVID-19 Won’t Change Italy’s Stance on Migration

By Rachel Pastor, M.A. International Affairs ‘20

Turin, Italy, 2015 © Stefano Guidi

The destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since the 2011 Arab Spring spurred a mass exodus of people fleeing civil war, instability, and authoritarian regimes. As a Mediterranean neighbor with a lengthy coastline, Italy is an attractive destination for North African migrants. Its geographic positioning has led to its outsized role as a receiving and transit country in the current European migration crisis. Due to cultural, security, and economic concerns, Italy has adopted a harsh policy restricting the flow of refugees into the country. The European Union campaign to influence a more relaxed Italian migration policy has been routinely ineffective due to a lack of understanding on the EU’s part. The fragility of the country coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic will harden the line between Italians and migrants. There are four perceived security threats that migration poses to Italian stability and the narratives shaping each perceived threat are likely to solidify after the current health crisis.

  1. Physical Security: Italy vs. Outsiders

A major issue narrative surrounding Italian migration policy is the physical threat refugees pose to the domestic population. The typical Italian identity is founded in the belief of the “benevolent” Italian, a person with Italian heritage raised on the principles of family and hard work, and migrants have thus been identified as the antithesis. The way in which Italy has been impacted by the Coronavirus will affect the population’s ability to separate negative identity narratives from minority populations. The virus is seen to have been inflicted upon the Italian population by “outsiders.” This is already evidenced by the stark decline in Italian patronage at minority-operated stores and restaurants before the lockdown. Any counter narratives aimed at reframing Italian views on migrant populations will find it difficult to penetrate the COVID-19 story informing a larger narrative: if Italy opens its border to migrants, they will bring violence and disease.

  1. Cultural Security: Migrants Threaten the Rebuilding Process

The Italian identity is heavily shaped by its cultural history and blood relations with a view of “Italian” and “other” group divisions. Italian society rewards hard work and bases the foundation of business and political decisions on relationship-building. Italy doesn’t believe it owes migrants anything because, in their view, they have not worked hard to deserve it. More specifically, they have not contributed to Italian society and thus don’t get to reap the benefits. The EU often misunderstands this narrative and frames public diplomacy campaigns around the message that Italy “should” open its borders to migrants, which backfires due to Italy’s view of system roles.

Migrants are also viewed as threats to Italian communities. Families are the foundation of Italian society and the maintenance of Italian family units is often considered the chief concern of all political policies. COVID-19 deaths are severely impacting Italians as they have a large elderly population, many of whom are matriarchs and patriarchs. The social aftermath of the coronavirus will be focused on rebuilding communities and strengthening family systems. Migration is viewed as the biggest risk to Italian communities as refugees are believed to dilute the cultural identity.

  1. Economic Security: Italy Cannot Afford More Financial Stress

Italy’s economy is struggling, and domestic and foreign policies are geared towards strengthening its economic power. The richness of the Italian identity informs the belief that cultural and financial prosperity go hand-in-hand. Fortifying the economy and reducing the national debt will protect the prosperity of the Italian identity, making it a stronger European leader. Prior to COVID-19, the economic migration narrative focused on the financial burden migrants put on the Italian economy. The fact that the virus has brutally impacted Italy’s tourism industry, the main source of its GDP, will not entice Italian lawmakers to consider migration reform.

  1. Political Security: EU Interference

Italy identifies as a prominent country, and any perceived threats to sovereignty will fuel intolerant migration policy. The German NGO rescue ship that illegally docked in an Italian port in June 2019, was perceived as an act of force interfering with Italy’s right to determine and enforce its own laws. Italy views itself as a global leader in culture, arts, fashion, and more and thus it should be respected and many EU migration narratives are interpreted as acts of disrespect. Italy promotes the story that the country is at capacity because it was not aided during the influx of maritime migrants. This narrative of abandonment supports feelings of disrespect in the EU sphere.

The inevitable weakness of the Italian state following the pandemic will be a sore spot, and the primary political focus will be to bolster state institutions to maintain respect in the global arena.


Angelos Tzortzinis/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Often dubbed a “war of words,” EU public diplomacy campaigns fall short of accounting for the underlying narratives shaping Italian perspectives. The continued EU messaging approach only further antagonizes Italians and engrains their stance on migration. Any EU reframing of its current public diplomacy efforts to counter Italian narratives is a difficult feat in and of itself. The added layer of a global pandemic further complicates the situation and makes narrative alignment even more crucial following the COVID-19 pandemic.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Social Media Icons

The Do’s and Don’ts of Doing Public Diplomacy on Twitter

By Kaitlyn Angrove, M.A in Media and Strategic Communication ’20

Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have become many people’s main sources of information, connection and entertainment. Their vast user bases and the ability to post almost anything without it being censored or fact checked, gives pundits, politicians and average citizens, the feeling of invincibility. Anyone can post their opinions and “insights” about politics and governance with the chance of it being picked up and reposted by journalists, influential figures or people with large follower counts.

The State Department and Public Diplomacy Actors must now deal with a constant stream of misinformation, disinformation and the highlighting of content that is harmful to one’s agenda. Twitter appears to be a platform in which many PD people and institutions have trouble managing.

As a Media Manager, I often see people struggling with how to navigate Twitter while supporting one’s agency, reinforcing helpful narratives and dispelling harmful rhetoric. These do’s and don’ts aim to alleviate any guesswork that you may have.

  1. DO engage with content posted by people outside of the PD Sphere.

A retweet by the Embassy of Ireland in America.

Tasked with posting on behalf of an Embassy, Government Department or appointed official is no easy task. For many it is natural to spend time retweeting and posting “safe content,” that is posts from other verified embassy accounts, elected and appointment officials from your own government, and posts that have been preapproved by one’s communications team. This pattern makes official accounts look impersonal, cold and out of touch with how Twitter is used by the general public. By searching for specific key words or favorable hashtags, official accounts can highlight tweets that are both favorable to their communications strategies and read as authentic.

  1. DON’T retweet content without investigating the individual’s profile and past tweets.

Just as it is important to post and repost content that comes off as personal and is mission driven, it is imperative that you examine the account that you are reposting from and are highlight to your followers. A Twitter user could post a wonderful comment about a speech that your ambassador gave at a recent event, the impulse would be to retweet that positive account, as is. The problem with doing so is that you must be 100% confident that the all the other public tweets from this user are appropriate and would not bring damage or embarrassment if found. A solution is to take a screenshot of the tweet, blur out the username and then repost the image with your comment. This can protect the privacy of the tweeter who might not have expected the additional attention that an official account retweeting you can bring and protects you from being connected with inappropriate or off brand tweets.

Pixelate usernames using free online tools or photoshop.

  1. DO strategically subtweet

The subtweet is a post that refers to a specific user, topic or tweet by another user without directly mentioning them or tagging them in the tweet. While it is most used as way to be passive aggressive or sly on twitter, the subtweet can have another function for those in public diplomacy. There are times when an embassy, ambassador or government official wants to reply to a tweet directly to correct information or retort the narrative that another user is giving for a series of events. The problem with replying or reposting the tweet with the user information blocked out, is that you then give credence to a narrative or idea that you are trying to disprove! Instead of drawing attention to it, craft a tweet that supports your narrative and incorporates news values i.e. topics that lead to more digital impressions.

  1. DON’T use official accounts to promote political messages that harm the work of PD actors in the field.

 

 

This tweet produced by the official Department of State twitter might play well to an American base, specifically conservatives, but does not take into account preexisting narratives that Muslim Americans and Muslims around the globe may hold. By using the phrase “Islamic Revolution” the state department is suggesting that Islam is the reason behind Iran’s human rights abuses, instead of acknowledging that terror is done around the world in the name of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, etc. An interpretation of Islam that is counter to what millions of Muslims practice around the globe is the reality in Iran. This tweet reinforces the narrative that western governments see Islam as an inherent problem, one that needs to be solved and that its followers need to be freed from.

Here’s what the State Department could have tweeted:

41 years ago, saw a regime change in Iran that has resulted in great harm to many of its people. We will continue to support Iranian Americans and Iranians as a whole as they work towards a government that is more reflective of its people and of democratic values.

While there are dozens more tips that I could share, I will leave you with one last thought.

When tweeting, focus on amplifying messages which support your goals without giving undue credence to those that don’t.

> The author has also written on Strategic Narratives involving Canada and Saudi Arabia. .

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.