Brazil’s Rising Tides

By Grace Martinez, Masters in Media and Strategic Communication ‘23

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and President Joe Biden walk next to the Rose Garden after their
meeting at the White House in Washington, D.C. (Jonathan Ernst/Pool via AP)

On Friday, February 10th — Brazil’s newly elected president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, met with President Joe Biden at the White House in Washington, D.C. The two heads of state spoke of the multilateral relations between the two countries and of their shared interests as the ‘largest democracies in the Western Hemisphere’. The story sold to the public was one of partnership and prosperity, and the presidents spoke of their joint plans for peace, security, and respect. And the visit was a success. Namely for one individual in particular: Brazilian President Lula da Silva.

Now in his third term as president (first in-office 2003–2010), President Lula da Silva has a clear vision for Brazil; as a new world order emerges, Brazil is positioning itself to be seen as an emerging global power. The country views itself as a representative at-large for developing countries—also, a diplomatic leader, defender of multilateralism, and friend to all.

In a speech Lula da Silva gave at the World Economic Forum (2010)[1], he outlined the country’s vision:

“I have lately seen many international publications say that Brazil is fashionable nowadays. Allow me to say that, although that is a kind expression, it is not appropriate. Fashions are fleeting, ephemeral things. Brazil wishes to be and will be a permanent player in the new world scene. Brazil, however, does not wish to be a new force in an old world. The Brazilian voice wants to announce, loud and clear, that a new world can be built. Brazil wishes to aid in the construction of this new world…”

The bolded sentences above represent Brazil’s narrative, and how they view themselves fitting into the new world order. So, for Brazil the meeting at the White House was a major step toward achieving its two main goals of creating a new, widely accepted identity abroad and having a greater role to play in shaping the future world order. So, why is the country’s path forward still so complicated?

Contradicting Motives

Brazil views its narrative as being dependent on idea that they are a friend to all. To be seen as a diplomatic leader, emerging power, and as a country with international influence, a close relationship with the United States is critical. But alternatively, Brazil wants the freedom to pursue its own interests even as they interfere in the country’s relationships with countries located in North American and Europe. Brazil’s actions take on a narrative of their own, one that contradicts the idea that they are friendly with everyone. This is exemplified by Brazil’s close alliances with both the United States and Iran.

Earlier this year, Brazil’s personal interests were put on display when the country allowed the Iranian warship, IRIS Makran, to dock in their waters’. Brazil ignored requests from the United States and several other western countries to block the presence of the Iranian warship in the Western Hemisphere, with these countries citing that it granted their unfriendly military a strategic foothold.

Photo caption: Iranian warship, IRIS Makran, docked off the Brazilian coast (AP Photo/Silvia Izquierdo)

For Brazil, a close relationship with Iran is viewed as a way to help developing countries in Africa and the Middle East. President Lula da Silva has placed a high value on the partnership between the two countries because Iran helps Brazil to identify as a representative at-large for developing countries and showcases the economic and political influence they have globally.

The way Brazil’s narrative creates conflicting relationships with such as the U.S. causes confusion and unnecessarily puts the country’s motives into question. This flaw is detrimental to the overall goals of the country, instead of building trust and showcasing power, the convergence of values makes Brazil look ineffectual and untrustworthy. 

Moving Forward

At this moment, Brazil’s is focused on becoming a permanent player in the new world order and acting as a pseudo representative-at-large for developing countries. The country’s identity narrative is that they are a friend to all, but its long been observed that rising powers are often in conflict with existing ones – as is exemplified by the tensions between U.S. and Brazil regarding Iran.

Brazil find itself in a grey area between where they want to be and where they are. When you are working to gain power it is important to have alliances everywhere, but as you take on a new identity in the new world order conflict will rise – often surrounding the decisions you have to make. Brazil is still able to relate to its old identity while pushing for others to accept its new one but for how long and at what cost. In the end, the country’s growing list of contradictions will harm its narrative.

Here is the full report.


The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

[1] Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the World Economic Forum – Davos, January 29th, 2010. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. (n.d.).

U.S. Pro-Democracy Narratives on Bolivian Coup are Heavily Contested Due to Their Anti-Democratic Results

By Ben Gutman, MA Global Communication ’22

Throughout the Cold War, U.S. presidential administrations and other federal departments weaponized the idea of anti-communism to dominate media frames and discourage dissent. U.S. government officials have successfully employed a “spread of democracy” frame to justify proxy wars, covert intervention, and regime change against leftist Latin American governments with developing democratic processes. This frame has facilitated the projection of the U.S. master narratives of American exceptionalism and free-market capitalist individualism onto other sovereign nations.

Entman’s Cascading Activation Model

One useful way of understanding narrative contests is Entman’s Cascading Activation Model, which describes how government frames are pushed down to other elites, news organizations, and the public. Entman uses the real-world cascading waterfall metaphor to highlight the hierarchical stratification of the cascade, which makes it easier to spread frames down the cascade rather than up.  

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and an increase in U.S. interventionism in the Middle East, the U.S. paid less attention to Latin America. This allowed many Latin American countries like Bolivia to develop their democratic political systems. The strengthening of Bolivian representative democracy was highlighted by President Evo Morales’ creation of the Plurinational state in 2009, which guaranteed political representation to all indigenous Bolivians. A relatively healthy democratic process in a socialist state with control of valuable natural resources like Bolivia, presented multiple narrative contestation problems throughout the U.S. government’s quest for regime change, despite access to elite institutions used to spread its frame of choice: election fraud. 

Narrative used to justify U.S-backed coup in Bolivia met with undeniable contestation

First, the U.S. state narrative found pervasive contestation through informational content produced by academics, progressive journalists, and non-profit organizations within the Western and Bolivian media ecology. On Oct 20, 2019, the U.S. proxy Organization of American States (OAS) issued a report alleging “intentional manipulations” and “serious irregularities” in the Bolivian presidential election of Evo Morales.

Screenshot of the misinformation that fueled the 2019 coup

These claims were immediately debunked and repeatedly proven to be a false narrative designed to endorse an anti-democratic seizure of power. The election fraud narrative was in congruence with mainstream media motivation and uncritically re-published by the New York Times. On Nov 10, 2019, Jeanine Áñez’ white supremacist, Christian neo-fascist dictatorship took power in a military junta.

Second, despite U.S. domination over Western media infrastructure, viral social media content of violent government oppression contested the pro-democracy U.S. narrative. Throughout eleven months of economic mismanagement, extreme corruption, and brutal repression against indigenous protesters resulting in dozens of extrajudicial murders, the U.S. state narrative grew less and less compelling. However, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continued to voice strong support for the military coup and the “return of democracy”, the OAS continued to deny its involvement, and Western mainstream media continued to whitewash the Áñez regime’s crimes.

While the messaging campaign was successful in its short-term regime change goals, it was unsuccessful in its impact on Bolivian public opinion and international solidarity with the Bolivian people. Mass public uprisings and grassroots worker movements forced new elections and on Oct 18, 2020 another socialist, Luis Arce, was elected.

Continued pro-coup regime narrative hampers Bolivian drive towards justice

Despite frame contestation from influential voices in the Western media ecology and emotional-triggering online content displaying the coup regime’s savagery, the vast majority of mainstream publications continued to reinforce a damaged and hypocritical pro-democracy U.S. narrative. On March 13, 2021, Bolivian authorities arrested Áñez and charged the coup leader with terrorism and sedition, the same charges previously levied by Áñez against former president Morales. Two days later, the OAS released a statement expressing concern “about the abuse of judicial mechanisms” as a “repressive instrument of the ruling party”.

This narrative of “rule-breaking” and “revenge”, revolving around the Áñez arrest, functioned as another anti-democratic assault against an elected socialist government and its ability to exercise sovereign control over its rule of law. On March 18 the Washington Post Editorial Board wrote that “Mr. Arce appears to have reverted to a more one-sided and vengeful leadership style characteristic of Mr. Morales” and referred to Áñez as the “conservative then-interim president”.

A March 15 CNN analysis mentions the invalidation of the 2019 election results, but fails to include any reference to the invalidation of the report used to invalidate the election results. The article continues with a section titled “vague charges” that characterizes the charges against Áñez as “broad” with “proof scant”. However, an Áñez decree that gave immunity to all deployed military personnel culminated in the massacre of more than thirty protesters, in addition to a plethora of other human rights abuses.

The blatant dishonesty and bad faith framing from mainstream media sources on Bolivia is rooted in the U.S. government and OAS’s persistent use of the same pro-democracy narratives that yield anti-democratic results. The OAS has never admitted to its role in the 2019 coup, has never apologized to the Bolivian people, and has even continued to spread misinformation on the Bolivian political process. Unfortunately, Biden’s State Department under Secretary of State Antony Blinken has continued to weaponize the U.S. master narratives of “democracy” and “human rights” to persecute a perceived hostile government for its role in attempting to deliver justice for the victims of the coup’s violent crackdown.

Recommendation

The Biden administration’s State Department should stop reinforcing a heavily contested framing of the Áñez arrest as a human rights and due process issue. This frame has cascaded to mainstream media, which continued an unconvincing pro-coup regime narrative. This narrative violates the Arce government’s sovereign democratic right to prosecute Áñez in accordance with Bolivian law and helps deny Áñez’ victims justice, but also adds to an increasing resentment from Latin Americans towards “pro-democracy” US interventionism.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Challenges and Vulnerabilities for Public Diplomacy in Guatemala

By Halea Kerr-Layton, MA Global Communication ’21

 

Guatemala, the Central American country home to roughly 17 million people has unique vulnerabilities and challenges for public diplomacy presented by the competing narratives, identities, and experiences of its population.  Specifically, between the indigenous and the non-indigenous, or Ladino, population. The inequality, repression and lack of political representation for the indigenous population presents a particularly unique environment that fans unrest and lends itself to disinformation. Through a brief examination of some of these narratives and realities, these vulnerabilities and challenges will be examined.

An indigenous woman rests along a street. Antigua, Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Two Competing Narratives

Whenever there are competing narratives or realities, there exists a vulnerability that can lead to intense polarization, susceptibility to misinformation and challenges for public diplomacy. Narratives are important socio-political forces in the world that make sense of transhistorical patterns and are deeply rooted and embedded in a particular culture.  Competing narratives represent a formidable cleavage in a society. The cultural narratives in Guatemala reveal extreme inequality and divergent realities for different portions of the population.  The World Bank describes the inequalities and divergent experiences of life in Guatemala saying, “in essence, there are “two Guatemalas, one with well-off, and one poor, one urban and one rural, one Ladino and one Indigenous with large gaps in both social and economic outcomes.” This history of inequality, racism, and discrimination against indigenous peoples in Guatemala constitutes a master narrative that presents a stark vulnerability for public diplomacy in Guatemala.

A Mayan man sells his artwork on the street. Antigua, Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

 

The Maya

The indigenous population in Guatemala, most of whom are Maya, is estimated to comprise roughly 60% of the country’s total population. Despite making up the majority of the population, the Mayan population faces extreme discrimination, repression, lack of political representation and access to resources such as housing and education. Even statistics about the Mayan population are contested as inaccurate due to the inability for many indigenous peoples to participate in data collection. Experts continually criticize the official census as underreporting indigenous inhabitants. The fact that many of the Maya are disadvantaged and are not officially counted, and therefore remain unrecognized by the government, demonstrates a rift between identity narratives in Guatemala.

Child with mother at marketplace. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

War and Repression

The lasting trauma left by domestic wars, indigenous suppression and the history of colonization in Guatemala and much of Central and South America, has implications for successful public diplomacy. Wars create enduring cultural memories and privilege the victors for future governance decisions. Most recently, the Civil War (1960-1996) left legacies of pain, exclusion, and division in Guatemala between the Ladino and the indigenous populations. The ruling military junta at the time committed acts of terror and genocide against the Maya communities in part to destroy the cultural values that ensured cohesion and collective action in Mayan communities.” This narrative of Mayan oppression and slaughter goes back to colonization and remains strong to this day.  In 2018, 26 members of mostly indigenous campesino organizations were killed with almost no acknowledgement or atonement from the government.  Guatemala is considered by human rights activists to be on the verge of a human-rights catastrophe and as desperation for justice mounts, disinformation campaigns are more likely to be successful.

Mayan woman in traditional dress in marketplace. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Poverty and Inequality

Guatemala suffers from persistently high poverty and inequality with the indigenous peoples continuously more disadvantaged.  In 2016, Guatemala ranked as the number 1 most unequal country in Central America and was included in the world’s top ten most unequal countries. While poverty in the country is growing as a whole, the indigenous Mayan population is disproportionately poor in comparison with non-indigeous populations with over 75% of the ingidengous population living in poverty. Geographically, poverty is predominant in rural areas, primarily inhabited by indigenous peoples with 81% of those living in poverty and 91% of those living in extreme poverty living in the countryside.  This physical divide between populations presents a vulnerability to disinformation as narratives about different socio-economic realities will be more distant and less verifiable.

 

A set of homes in rural Guatemala. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Representation and Identity

Social and political exclusion of the indigenous population is a challenge to public diplomacy efforts. Traditional diplomacy often happens at the top level of governments between elected officials and representatives. Political representation for indigenous Guatemalans remains extremely low, which makes diplomacy efforts to include indigenous voices difficult, but vital. The indigenous population has never gained more than 13% of the total seats in Congress. Political participation of indigenous peoples is lower than among non-indigenous populations due to challenges “including language barriers in the election process, lack of information on where the votes should be cast, political clientelism, and even violence.” The increasingly popular theory of identitarian epistemology claims that a specific identity group cannot acquire the knowledge of another, and argues that each identity group has unique rights that pertain to their exclusive body of knowledge. Furthermore, this theory argues that legitimate representation is an act on behalf of a group that the representative is themselves a part of. Therefore, without political participation and representation of indigenous Guatemalans, the government may be deemed illegitimate by some. Therefore, in order to combat disinformation, diplomatic efforts must work to engage with the indigenous population.

Funeral procession in a rural village. Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton.

Implications:

These vulnerabilities and challenges to diplomacy are not unique to Guatemala and in fact have implications for larger narratives of shared histories of colonization, racism and inequality that disadvantage indigenous populations. Therefore similar vulnerabilities are applicable by extension to much of South and Central America. These sociological vulnerabilities can be exploited and used for disinformation campaigns. In countries such as Guatemala, with a history of colonization, competing identity narratives and extreme sociological differences, disinformation campaigns will be able to tap into existing narratives about oppressors, victims, inequality and representation.

Antigua, Guatemala, 2006, d’Layne Kerr-Layton

 

> The author has also written Master Narratives and Their Divergent Interpretations: Challenges and Vulnerabilities for Public Diplomacy in Guatemala.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Venezuela and its ‘’victim’’ narrative

BP

The Washington Post reported a couple of weeks ago that Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, referred to the international coverage of Venezuela and its problems as ‘’propaganda against our country’’ and that international media is waging a ‘’psychological war’’. This language sounds familiar when one thinks about how similar regimes usually refer to the United States and the ‘’West’’ as ‘’interventionist’’ or ‘’imperialistic’’. However, it is not by coincidence that a country like Venezuela, with a tight relation of coexistence with Cuba, would construct such a narrative portraying Venezuela as the ‘’victim’’ of the United States and the West.

As Miskimmon and O’Loughlin argue, Strategic Narratives are ‘’a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors’’. In this shared meaning, the Venezuelan regime aims to extend its influence at home and abroad by portraying the United States and the ‘’West’’ as the bad guys, and countries like Venezuela as the ‘’victims’’. From an initial analysis, the United States’ strategy, from a communications point of view, does not help counter the Maduro regime’s narrative as recent sanctions to key Venezuelan politicians feed the discourse of ‘’victimization’’. However, it is difficult for any country to avoid policies, in such circumstances as Venezuela is facing today, which will not have an impact in the country’s victim narrative.  In my opinion, as the situation in Venezuela keeps deteriorating and the regime’s policies have caused the crisis to become not only political, but most importantly humanitarian, countries’ foreign policies’ towards Venezuela will inevitably become stricter as a response. Although these needed reactions will feed the ‘’victim’’ narrative that the Venezuelan regime will tighten its grip to, as it will not take the blame for what’s happening, weaker or subtle actions by foreign countries are not sufficient any longer.

Since 1999, Hugo Chavez – who is Maduro’s predecessor, leader of the ‘’Bolivarian Revolution’’ and of the ‘’Socialism of the XXI Century’’-, started developing a victim narrative that would grow stronger as his policies converted the country into the dictatorship that it is today. Chavez took direct advice from Fidel Castro and the Cuban regime to shape many policies and characteristics of the Venezuela he wanted to create. Among these, was the victim narrative in which the United States and the West are to blame for a big part of the country’s problems. Although for many years Chavez was able to not only convince a large part of Venezuelans that his policies were ideal and that the United States and the West were at fault for many of the country’s problems, he was also able to gain followers across the region who used the same policies and narrative. However, this is not the case anymore. With Maduro, the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated and the support from countries across the region has decreased, as many blame the Maduro and his regime for the crisis.

Such was the case of last week’s Summit of the Americas, where Bolivia and Cuba were among the few countries that backed up the Venezuelan president and rejected all the other countries’ declarations against the regime. Although Maduro’s allies were loyal to the Venezuelan government in the Summit, there was a majority of opposition to the current policies by the Venezuelan regime, as well as to the upcoming elections for being unconstitutional and in favor of the regime. Maduro was disinvited to the Summit of the Americas by the host country, and although he had previously said that he would still attend, Maduro announced a couple of days before that he would not be attending. Peru disinviting him, the U.S. and regional countries’ declarations during the Summit against the regime and upcoming sanctions by the U.S., EU and other countries from the region, all feed the ‘’victim’’ narrative that the Venezuelan government is using more and more. However, such policies are what neighboring countries should keep doing to allow for democracy to be restored in Venezuela.

The next few months will be crucial to Venezuelans, and to the country’s relations with the region and the world. Moreover, the next few months will be critical for the international community to establish appropriate policies against the Venezuelan regime and in favor of its people.  As Venezuelans are fleeing the country in mass, the crisis keeps deepening and spreading across its borders. It will become very hard for the Venezuelan ‘’victim narrative’’ to keep being successful, especially as so many Venezuelans, now considered refugees, have migrated to the region, the U.S and Europe, and are giving first hand testimony of the miserable conditions in which Venezuelans are living. If Venezuelans were happy and able to lead normal lives in their home country, they wouldn’t be leaving Venezuela to find opportunities elsewhere. Although policies against the Venezuelan regime might seem to help the ‘’victim narrative’’ this narrative is no longer sustainable and foreign countries should follow the steps of those countries that rejected the Venezuelan dictatorship at the Summit of the Americas.

 

DisclaimerThe opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not necessarily express the views of either The Institute of Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or The George Washington University.

U.S. Public Diplomacy In Latin America: Beyond the Narrative of “America First,” “Bad Hombres” and “Nasty Women”

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Photo credit: Agencia Prensa Rural. “Generación de la paz.” June 20, 2016. Acceded from Flickr.

Latin America: The trends beyond the headlines

You wouldn’t know it from President-elect Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric, but Latin America is an immensely important economic and security partner for the United States. Increasingly open and engaged, the region has seen a dramatic shift in the last twenty years away from insecurity and protectionism and toward international cooperation, with deep impacts for the United States. Opening doors for U.S. investments in Argentina, President Mauricio Macri has enacted outward-looking economic and trade policies following decades of protectionist economics. Bringing revenue to U.S. farmers, the North American Free Trade Agreement has more than doubled United States agricultural exports to Mexico, making the country the United States’ third largest agricultural market. Securing peace in the Western Hemisphere after 52 years of conflict, the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia have taken steps to reconcile polarization and to reach a renewed peace agreement following the national plebiscite. Far beyond the picture of illegal immigration Donald Trump paints, Latin America has benefited the United States and will continue to do so. The region has cleaned up its act. If the next U.S. administration wants to continue its strategic and beneficial partnership with its neighbors to the South, it may want to clean up its rhetoric. Public diplomacy can help.

The gaps, the new global players, and PD

In the weeks following the election of a presidential candidate that espoused a vision of isolationism and “America first,” engagement with Latin America has come under fire. In fact, if President-elect Trump sticks by his promises, U.S. bilateral and free trade agreements with countries in Latin America may be rolled back, cultural engagement may wane and investments may suffer. With countries like China and Russia increasingly present in Latin America, gaps may widen that allow for these nations to predominantly influence the political, cultural and economic conversation and realities in the region with potentially far-reaching consequences for the United States.

Whether or not a Trump-led pivot inward becomes a reality, at a time of deep misunderstanding and polarization, U.S. public diplomacy is imperative. Having long sustained relationships, public diplomacy has the potential to not only highlight the plethora of benefits engagement has brought to the United States and to countries in the region, but also assure the United States is seen as more than Donald Trump makes it out to be. Public diplomacy’s ongoing and long-term nature can thus help counter negative perceptions to facilitate the continuation of U.S. ties with the region. If nothing else, public diplomacy must go on.

Rhetoric’s consequences: America alone in the world?

During the 2016 presidential campaign in the United States, Latin American governments and publics bristled at the anti-Hispanic, anti-immigrant and anti-trade narrative the Republican candidate adopted. As a result, weeks after the election, it has been suggested America’s soft power may be a casualty of that toxic narrative. Shashi Tharoor, former Under Secretary General of the United Nations, suggests that while America’s domestic narrative has in the past made up for its foreign policy mishaps, Trump’s narrative of Mexico as a hub of illegal immigration, his suggestion that a Muslim registry be enacted and his overall comments against NAFTA and trade may now lead countries to associate America with “xenophobia,” “misogyny,” “pessimism,” and “selfishness.”

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Photo credit: Gage Skidmore. “Donald Trump.” Accessed on Flickr.

In lieu of the future President’s campaign promises, United States diplomats will have the tough job of shaping a narrative in a world replete with uncertainties. Because candidates tend to act on the promises they make on the campaign trail, the United States is likely to turn inward and to prioritize little about foreign policy with Latin America other than immigration and border security. Consequently, at the end of four years, the United States may no longer be seen as the country of the American dream. From a security standpoint, it may no longer have the influence it wishes to have.

The role of public diplomacy in strengthening ties

Realistically, it is too soon to say just how United States foreign policy and alliances will change when President-elect Trump comes into office.

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U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Roberta Jacobson speaks on U.S. engagement with Cuba. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State

But, in Latin America, U.S. public diplomats can capitalize on shared interests and general positive public opinion of the United States to enhance a public diplomacy strategy that emphasizes the political processes, the strength of civil societies and businesses, and the freedom of speech and press — pillars of North American and Latin American democracies. United States personnel on the ground will surely encounter challenges in creating mutual understanding with Latin America because a say-do gap will inevitably exist. That said, vast sectors of the United States already actively engage with the region: businesses are investing, universities and research institutions have ongoing student, scientific and professional exchange programs, and NGOs already have a robust presence on the ground. In other words, public diplomacy is being conducted by other parties, whether or not we want to call it by that name. The foundation for collaboration is in place. Realistically, that foundation and those shared interests will not disappear overnight.

All of this is to say that as the new President prepares to enter the White House, U.S. public diplomacy should be more committed than ever to mitigating alienation of foreign audiences and sustaining open-minded two-way conversations. Latin America is moving away from populism at a time when the rest of the world moves toward it. U.S. public diplomacy is ripe to simultaneously reconcile a United States history of interventionism and foster long-term relationships by emphasizing shared interests, by sticking to active sectors of public diplomacy, and by sharing with the world the diversity of viewpoints that exist in the United States. This country has an interest in fostering mutual understanding, maintaining engagement, and sustaining its long-standing partnerships in the region. Beyond the narrative that comprises “America first,” “bad hombres,” and “nasty women,” U.S. public diplomacy remains alive and has the potential to mitigate negative perceptions over the long haul. At a moment of worldwide uncertainty—wars in the Middle East, a debilitating refugee crisis, increasing Russian and Chinese influence, and Britain’s exit from the European Union—Latin America is not only a region at peace but one that is quickly growing. It falls on U.S. public diplomats to bridge divisive narratives fueled by Donald Trump to assure engagement efforts are sustained. This will help guarantee the United States continues to reap the mutually prosperous benefits of collaboration with Latin America.

The views expressed in this posting are the author’s only and do not necessarily reflect those of George Washington University. 

Brazil’s Public Diplomacy Ahead of the World Cup

Dilma Rousseff (left) and FIFA president Sepp Blatter (right) with the World Cup trophy. Source: AP
Dilma Rousseff (left) and FIFA president Sepp Blatter (right) with the World Cup trophy. Source: AP

With only a day until the 2014 FIFA World Cup, international press appear to have a singular focus on all that is going wrong in Brazil and its state of preparation (or lack there of). They are not entirely without merit – eight people have died in the construction and restoration of stadiums, of which delays have been widely reported; protests around the country are unrelenting and increasingly violent, to say nothing of the security in the favelas surrounding São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro that police forces still struggle to control.

Given this, what has Brazil done from a public diplomacy standpoint to counter the perception that it is not quite ready to host the Cup? Not much, it seems. To the extent that virtually every major global news outlet – CNN, the BBC, even their own O Globo newspaper – focuses on the singular narrative of unpreparedness, Brazilians appear to be in accord with that narrative: not only are they unprepared, but they firmly believe that hosting the cup will actually hurt Brazil’s image abroad, according to a recent Pew survey. On Twitter, users are using the hashtag ‘#imaginanacopa’, or ‘imagine the cup’, in tweets to allude the pending “doom” Brazilians predict World Cup will have on their country.

Even President Dilma Rousseff, who is largely defensive to this reaction, is inadvertently focused on the looming chaos as evidenced by her call for increasing funds to security and police forces and admitting to foreign journalists just days before the opening ceremony that things are indeed being done at the last minute:

“Everywhere in the world these big engineering projects always go down to the wire,” she said from a dinner with foreign journalists – her first before the World Cup – at Alvorada Palace in Brasilia. “Those who want to protest will be allowed to do so 100%,” adding that the vast majority of Brazilians will be supporting the Cup and protesters “will not be allowed to interfere or disrupt the tournament.” BBC.com, June 4

She has also taken the step of not speaking at the opening ceremony on Thursday, but largely at the behest of FIFA, which has also received a fair amount of backlash from the Brazilian public. Though the move is probably wise, it is not likely to be enough for Brazil’s public diplomacy to advance as it faces mounting doubt and weariness from both within and outside the country. Perhaps this reflects Rousseff’s somewhat laissez-faire attitude that once the games begin, all will be forgotten. She may have a point: in the 2010 World Cup, reports leading up to the event shed a similar light on the state of security in South Africa. The only legacy it has now is the buzzing sound of vuvuzelas.

Overall, however, Brazil has done a poor job of using a valuable soft power tool like the World Cup to promote its public diplomacy. There are a few opportunities for redemption: 1. The month-long event passes without any major disasters or deaths resulting from the dubious transportation systems, or 2. If Brazil wins the Cup, which, despite being the heavy favorite, some analysts warn that it is not as much as it should be for a home team. Otherwise, Rousseff may have to spend the rest of the year answering the question “Was it worth it?” rather than focusing on economic and foreign policies during her re-election in October. One can only hope that if she does win, public diplomacy lessons learned from managing the World Cup can be applied to the execution of the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro in 2016.

Venezuela: Public Diplomacy Implications & the US

Thousands of people gathered in central Caracas to protest against the government of Nicolas Maduro. Source: yalibnan.com
Thousands of people gathered in central Caracas to protest against the government of Nicolas Maduro. Source: yalibnan.com

On February 12, multiple peaceful-turned-violent protests erupted in the major cities of Venezuela. These rallies conducted by university students have snowballed into a national conflict between the state and its citizens. The students were pacifically voicing their discontent against the government for the innumerable injustices currently plaguing Venezuela. The mandate to arrest these students turned highly controversial and thus incited the monumental manifestations, teeming with violence, that have taken place over the past few weeks. The nation’s president, Nicolas Maduro, commanded militarized police authorities to inhibit the protests, which has regrettably resulted in many injuries and deaths.

These incidents simply add further lines to the long list of mistreatments of citizens by the Venezuelan Government. Although international media has been scant as the crisis unfolds internally, manifestations and pleas for support have now reached a worldwide audience.

However, as we know there are always two sides of the story. Instead of addressing or planning to resolve the issues tormenting Venezuelan citizens, President Maduro’s tactics included a massive campaign to portray his government, at least attempt to, as victims of a conspiracy plan to overthrow their regime.

Venezuela’s public diplomacy abroad

This week, President Maduro’s administration began strategic movements to diffuse their two important messages: first, that information reaching international audiences regarding the situation in the country has been manipulated and exaggerated by media agents; second, to convince the international public’s opinion that the United States is partly to blame for the instability in the country due to their intervention with internal affairs through supporting the opposition.

These approaches have been used both domestically and internationally. Within Venezuela, it has been easier to manipulate due to the government’s ownership over the majority of communication outlets, and the immense oppression of information over private or international ones.

One of the main global venues used to broadcast these messages are Venezuelan embassies throughout the world; mostly through their social media pages. Additionally, just this week the Venezuelan Chancellor for external affairs, Elias Jaua, has commenced a global tour in search for support of the current government and more broadly the continuation of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Have their public outreach efforts been effective?

The problem with Venezuela’s credibility is the shocking and inspiring number of demonstrations taking place in the country, as well as the increasing momentum gathering world-wide denouncing the events and actions taken by the government. What is being protested against President Maduro’s administration transcends above local needs; citizens demand fundamental democratic principles.

For instance, 1) media repression and the current control of information and media outlets, 2) Oppressing freedom of assembly by using militarized security force against protesters, and 3) jailing his opponents such as the incarceration of opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez. These tactics, historically used by authoritarian regimes, have made it difficult for President Maduro to hide violations and defend his so-called democracy.

The social, political, and economic conditions in Venezuela are favorable to the development and continuation of large-scale protests and discontent with the government. However, it is the hope all Venezuelans to see their government actively working towards the amelioration of the country’s conditions, rather than actively seeking international approval and support of their 15-year failed socialist revolution.

The United States’ role

The structural conflict that has allowed for institutionalized state violence is due in part because all opposition groups or organization voicing the smallest criticism against the Venezuelan government are silenced, rebutted, punished, or censored by the government or its supporters. Thereunto, the United States government is indirectly forced to opt for ambiguous remarks and denunciations against Venezuela; carefully wording its discontent against the actions and the situation as a way to avoid accusations of “invading in internal affairs.”

Yet, even when President Obama’s administration is selective in its statements, Venezuela’s government will take any hint of criticism as a window of opportunity to rally up “anti-imperialistic” sentiments among its supporters and the region. For example on February 17, after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made his remarks about the situation evolving in Venezuela, President Maduro expelled three U.S. diplomats from the country, claiming they were associated with and supported the opposition’s plot. Evidently, the United States responded with the same method. It is worth reminding the reader that the countries have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010, proving the dire diplomatic relationships between the two governments.

The United States’ public diplomacy goals in this complicated situation should focus on defending its image among Venezuelans. Through this, the ultimate long term objective is the improvement of America’s reputation among Latin America’s left-wing countries.

Oriana Piña is a graduate student at the George Washington University pursuing a M.A. in Global Communications, with a concentration in Latin American Studies. She is passionate about democracy, diplomacy, cultural understanding and international affairs. Follow her at @OrianaIntl.