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Terrorism: Countering the Boko Haram extremist narratives in Nigeria

April 14, 2022May 9, 2022Africa, Disinformation, Women, Youth9 Comments

By Adeniyi Funsho, MA Media and Strategic Communications ’22

The latest bombing attack of the Abuja-Kaduna bound train by Boko Haram speaks to the continuous reign of terrorism, and extremist narratives against Nigeria. The latest attack is coming off the back of countless others that spread from the northeast to as far as the south of Nigeria. Nigeria, a former British colony has gone through several turbulent moments in its history as a nation leading to it becoming a democratic state, running a democratic system. As a nation, its master narrative is rooted in its diverse culture, tribes, religions, and hard-fought democracy. One threat to Nigeria’s master narrative is Boko Haram, an Islamic group founded by Mohammed Yusuf, which grew out of a cell of Muslim clergies and followers in Maiduguri, a state in the northeastern region of Nigeria. Since 2009, Boko Haram has been disrupting both the economic, and social life of Nigerians with a total of over 34,000 deaths, the latest killing of passengers traveling in a train bound for Kaduna adds to the increasing number of deaths by the terrorist group.

*Courtesy of Vanguard News: Abuja-Kaduna bound train attacked by Boko Haram killing over 15 passengers and over 200 wounded*.

Boko Haram translates to ‘no to western education,’ and western ideologies describe the archetype of its master narrative as a group that is completely opposed to westernization. Unlike other ethnic militias, Boko Haram does not appropriate its ethnic Kanuri nationalist rhetoric to demand national representation for the northeast region within the Nigerian democratic system; instead, Boko Haram’s goal is the pursuit of an Islamic caliphate, a political structure, and a system of government based on Tawid ‘God’ law. Boko Haram is in opposition to what it calls ‘man-made’ laws of western democracy and the westernized culture under which the Nigerian system operates. Most importantly, however, we need to understand that Boko Haram’s narratives are founded on the “Salafi-jihadi” movement of Islam, a modern-day movement traceable to the middle east which developed roots connecting it to northern Nigeria. Their beliefs are predicated on a “Quran-only” doctrine, that strongly rejects westernized culture, and systems, owing to that reason the earliest people that first came into contact with the group branded them ‘Boko Haram’ a narrative that describes their utopia of ‘no to education’.

Specifically, Boko Haram’s Salafi-jihadi “Quran-only” identity reveals the ‘Islamist extremism’ ideology of the group, how they think, how they organize, the goals they pursue, and the reason why their narrative and activities are engrained in tough-talk and violent videos laundered through the media ecology. We get an understanding of their strategic narrative and the reason why they see an Islamic state as jihadism, and the only solution to resolve their issues with Nigeria. Boko Haram’s narratives for an Islamic state which previously appeared to have been ignored by the Nigerian state and international audiences got international attention when in April 2014, it ransacked the small town of Chibok, Maiduguri, and kidnapped 276 Chibok schoolgirls returning from school. In its messaging to Nigeria and the rest of the world, Boko Haram released a video via YouTube showing the girls as a ransom for the release of its members, and demands for an Islamic state. Nigeria’s counternarrative of peace and the use of Islamic commands on education as an appeal to Boko Haram to release the girls failed. However, it succeeded in destroying the conditions that make Boko Haram’s narratives plausible, communicable, and intelligible. It galvanized international and local nonstate actors, and media to frame the counternarrative of #BringBackOurGirls emphasizing the urgency for their unconditional release and their immutable right to education.

*Courtesy of Channels News: Images of Chibok Schoolgirls that escaped from Boko Haram’s Kidnapping Camp*

In order for Nigeria to counter Boko Haram’s extremist narratives, it should frame Boko Haram in a way that counters the group as following a false narrative of the ideology of true Islam. Framing should be crafted on peace and not violence, and Nigeria should heighten its frames on Islam as a religion that entertains peace ‘salam’ as its identity and one that abhors violence. Most importantly, Nigeria’s frames should heighten the sayings of the Islamic prophet on education and the ones whereby he implored its followers to live in peace and tolerance with their neighbors.

This should be supported by strategic use of the media ecology to counter the Boko Haram identity narrative of ‘no to education’. Nigeria’s counternarrative to Boko Haram should be based on the true Islamic authority of the prophet of Islam as he expressed his love for knowledge and enjoined his followers to seek education even if it were to be as far as China!

For more on the topic by the author, please click here.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Dueling Messages: anti-Turkish Narrative and Counter-narrative in the Libyan War

April 7, 2021May 4, 2021Disinformation, Europe18 Comments

By Richard Outzen, retired U.S. army officer

Experts have come to recognize that international competition in the Internet era includes a continuous struggle to define conflicts and outcomes through messaging on social and mass media. When actors define a situation by publishing messages – data, images, words for framing and narrative – they are competing to shape interpretations among target audiences. This battle of narratives, or contestation, is not primarily a search for truth or reporting of fact; it is the interplay of stylized stories that incorporate facts and interpretations to persuade for political purposes. Armies, diplomats, and corporations help states determine outcomes in international relations, but so, too, do narratives.

Developments in Libya during 2020 exemplify how narrative contestation can complement or eclipse other tools of statecraft during interstate conflicts. At the beginning of 2020 one side in Libya – Khalifa Hafter’s LNA, backed by France, the United Arab Emirates, and Russian mercenaries – sought to convince world leaders that only the fall of Tripoli could bring stability. The other side – The Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkey and recognized by the United Nations – sought to defeat Hafter and to convince Libyans and world leaders that only a compromise settlement could end the war.

Turkish intervention in Spring 2020 led to Hafter’s defeat, a new ceasefire, and calls to resume negotiations. The LNA and its allies unleashed a blistering critique of Turkish actions, arguing that Turkey’s role was illegitimate and illegal, and the Turks should have no role in Libya’s future. The stakes were high: if major international players saw Turkey and the GNA as theproblem and Hafter as the solution, their military success would be irrelevant. What happened instead was military de-escalation, a UN-brokered agreement, elections, and a unity government.

Formation of the Narratives

France, supported by Egypt and the Gulf, attacked Ankara’s role in Libya as a “dangerous game,” a tragedy for which Turkey bore “historic and criminal responsibility,” and as a risky intervention likely to backfire. Egypt, Greece, and the Gulf monarchies (minus Qatar) issued a Cairo Declaration calling for Libyan unification on Hafter’s terms, with departure of Turkish and Turkish-supported forces. Turkish President Erdogan was portrayed as irresponsible, dangerous, and extremist.

Ankara’s counternarrative relied on three key factors: assertion of Turkey’s historical ties to Libya, UN-conferred legitimacy of the GNA, and portraying Hafter and his backers the real aggressors. Image 2 below shows an image popular in Turkey and Tripoli – Ataturk in Tripolitania during the 1912 war against Italy.

Turkey emphasized Turkish ties to Libya. Pictures of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) assisting Libyan fighters against Italian forces in 1912 were used to reinforce the narrative.

Projection of the Narratives

The U.S. Department of Defense Africa Center’s study of messaging by both sides in the Libyan Civil War noted that foreign disinformation campaigns created a “fog of disinformation” around the fighting. The LNA relied on a Russian-supported disinformation campaign designed to obscure, confuse, and overwhelm Libyan digital spaces. Saudi and Emirati networks of fake Twitter accounts began lionizing Hafter in 2019. Egyptian firms and the Russian Wagner group employed digital experts familiar with Libya to sow disinformation resonant with local audiences.

GNA backers, notably Turkey and Qatar, relied on traditional state-backed television and media. Two factors made this effective. First, given mounting empirical evidence linking Hafter to mass killings and other abuses, the GNA/Turkey felt less need to manufacture outrage. Second, local Libyan influencers – individuals, academics, and militia affiliates – already provided rebuttal of the more outlandish pro-Hafter, anti-GNA/anti-Turkish messaging. Turkey also benefited from the impressive visuals associated with drone strikes against Hafter’s forces.

Bags containing bodies are pictured during the exhumation by members of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA’s) missing persons bureau, in what Libya’s internationally recognized government officials say is a mass grave, in Tarhouna city, Libya October 27, 2020. Picture taken October 27, 2020. REUTERS/Ayman Al-Sahili

Turkey and GNA published images of effective drone attacks on LNA forces to bolster the counter-narrative of professional, precise defensive operations.

Reception of the Narratives

Because key international players ignored the characterizations of Turkey as the real villain in Libya, the United States and Russia, Italy and the United Kingdom and Germany continued to treat Turkey as a partner in resolving the conflict, and dismissed the Cairo Declaration. By August, the “rogue Turkey” narrative had petered out. Washington-based think tanks panned the Cairo Declaration and attempts to bypass the UN, while other observers ridiculed Macron’s statements of execration against Turkey.

Miskimmon, Roselle and O’Loughlin provide a useful framework for analyzing narrative contestation. For a narrative to dominate in a contested information environment, it must outperform rival narratives in formation, projection, and reception. The chart below applies the framework to narrative contestation in Libya in 2020.

Aspect of Narrative Contestation	French Narrative	Turkish Counter-Narrative
Formation/Content	Turkey portrayed as aggressive, irresponsible, and extremist; no legitimate role in the future of Libya.	Turks focused on historical ties with Libya, on UN recognition of GNA government, and on LNA as actual aggressor/war crimes perpetrator.
Projection	Russian-supported disinformation campaign, supported by UAE/Egypt, plus public statements from Cairo/Paris.	Turkey/GNA relied on traditional state media plus local non-government influencers. Utilized string of impressive military victories, enabled by Turkish drones.\
Reception	Failed to persuade significant portion of GNA supporters in Libya or international actors outside.	Libyan and European social influencers (e.g. Wolfram Lacher, Emadeddin Bali) and European leaders maintained critical, but balanced approach toward Turkey and the GNA.

Verdict

The narrative to anathematize the GNA and Turkish intervention failed. A friend of Turkey became interim head of government, while Hafter was marginalized, while key international actors moved toward a compromise settlement that did not exclude Turkey. The key takeaway from Libya’s 2020 battle of narratives is that sometimes “less is more” – a torrent of disinformation and malediction won’t convince skeptical observers when your armies are losing territory and moral high ground at the same time.

For an in-depth analysis of Turkish narratives and recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy, Click Here.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Main photo: Macron, the Russian Wagner Group, and other Hafter patrons constructed a narrative based on the extremism of the GNA and Turkey.

U.S. Pro-Democracy Narratives on Bolivian Coup are Heavily Contested Due to Their Anti-Democratic Results

April 2, 2021April 5, 2021Disinformation, Global Communication, Latin America13 Comments

By Ben Gutman, MA Global Communication ’22

Throughout the Cold War, U.S. presidential administrations and other federal departments weaponized the idea of anti-communism to dominate media frames and discourage dissent. U.S. government officials have successfully employed a “spread of democracy” frame to justify proxy wars, covert intervention, and regime change against leftist Latin American governments with developing democratic processes. This frame has facilitated the projection of the U.S. master narratives of American exceptionalism and free-market capitalist individualism onto other sovereign nations.

One useful way of understanding narrative contests is Entman’s Cascading Activation Model, which describes how government frames are pushed down to other elites, news organizations, and the public. Entman uses the real-world cascading waterfall metaphor to highlight the hierarchical stratification of the cascade, which makes it easier to spread frames down the cascade rather than up.

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and an increase in U.S. interventionism in the Middle East, the U.S. paid less attention to Latin America. This allowed many Latin American countries like Bolivia to develop their democratic political systems. The strengthening of Bolivian representative democracy was highlighted by President Evo Morales’ creation of the Plurinational state in 2009, which guaranteed political representation to all indigenous Bolivians. A relatively healthy democratic process in a socialist state with control of valuable natural resources like Bolivia, presented multiple narrative contestation problems throughout the U.S. government’s quest for regime change, despite access to elite institutions used to spread its frame of choice: election fraud.

Narrative used to justify U.S-backed coup in Bolivia met with undeniable contestation

First, the U.S. state narrative found pervasive contestation through informational content produced by academics, progressive journalists, and non-profit organizations within the Western and Bolivian media ecology. On Oct 20, 2019, the U.S. proxy Organization of American States (OAS) issued a report alleging “intentional manipulations” and “serious irregularities” in the Bolivian presidential election of Evo Morales.

Screenshot of the misinformation that fueled the 2019 coup

These claims were immediately debunked and repeatedly proven to be a false narrative designed to endorse an anti-democratic seizure of power. The election fraud narrative was in congruence with mainstream media motivation and uncritically re-published by the New York Times. On Nov 10, 2019, Jeanine Áñez’ white supremacist, Christian neo-fascist dictatorship took power in a military junta.

Second, despite U.S. domination over Western media infrastructure, viral social media content of violent government oppression contested the pro-democracy U.S. narrative. Throughout eleven months of economic mismanagement, extreme corruption, and brutal repression against indigenous protesters resulting in dozens of extrajudicial murders, the U.S. state narrative grew less and less compelling. However, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continued to voice strong support for the military coup and the “return of democracy”, the OAS continued to deny its involvement, and Western mainstream media continued to whitewash the Áñez regime’s crimes.

While the messaging campaign was successful in its short-term regime change goals, it was unsuccessful in its impact on Bolivian public opinion and international solidarity with the Bolivian people. Mass public uprisings and grassroots worker movements forced new elections and on Oct 18, 2020 another socialist, Luis Arce, was elected.

Continued pro-coup regime narrative hampers Bolivian drive towards justice

Despite frame contestation from influential voices in the Western media ecology and emotional-triggering online content displaying the coup regime’s savagery, the vast majority of mainstream publications continued to reinforce a damaged and hypocritical pro-democracy U.S. narrative. On March 13, 2021, Bolivian authorities arrested Áñez and charged the coup leader with terrorism and sedition, the same charges previously levied by Áñez against former president Morales. Two days later, the OAS released a statement expressing concern “about the abuse of judicial mechanisms” as a “repressive instrument of the ruling party”.

This narrative of “rule-breaking” and “revenge”, revolving around the Áñez arrest, functioned as another anti-democratic assault against an elected socialist government and its ability to exercise sovereign control over its rule of law. On March 18 the Washington Post Editorial Board wrote that “Mr. Arce appears to have reverted to a more one-sided and vengeful leadership style characteristic of Mr. Morales” and referred to Áñez as the “conservative then-interim president”.

A March 15 CNN analysis mentions the invalidation of the 2019 election results, but fails to include any reference to the invalidation of the report used to invalidate the election results. The article continues with a section titled “vague charges” that characterizes the charges against Áñez as “broad” with “proof scant”. However, an Áñez decree that gave immunity to all deployed military personnel culminated in the massacre of more than thirty protesters, in addition to a plethora of other human rights abuses.

The blatant dishonesty and bad faith framing from mainstream media sources on Bolivia is rooted in the U.S. government and OAS’s persistent use of the same pro-democracy narratives that yield anti-democratic results. The OAS has never admitted to its role in the 2019 coup, has never apologized to the Bolivian people, and has even continued to spread misinformation on the Bolivian political process. Unfortunately, Biden’s State Department under Secretary of State Antony Blinken has continued to weaponize the U.S. master narratives of “democracy” and “human rights” to persecute a perceived hostile government for its role in attempting to deliver justice for the victims of the coup’s violent crackdown.

Recommendation

The Biden administration’s State Department should stop reinforcing a heavily contested framing of the Áñez arrest as a human rights and due process issue. This frame has cascaded to mainstream media, which continued an unconvincing pro-coup regime narrative. This narrative violates the Arce government’s sovereign democratic right to prosecute Áñez in accordance with Bolivian law and helps deny Áñez’ victims justice, but also adds to an increasing resentment from Latin Americans towards “pro-democracy” US interventionism.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

A Tug-of-War: How Spain is Caught in the Middle of a Narrative Power Battle between the United States and China

April 27, 2020Asia, China, Disinformation

By Hunter Gilfillian, M.A. in International Affairs ‘20

In recent months, a battle of United States and Chinese narratives has gained traction in the land of Don Quixote. Although, instead of windmills, the new “giants” are satellites, economics, and security.

Currently, Spain is caught in the middle of a narrative “tug-of-war” between the United States and China regarding Chinese technological investment in Spain’s fifth generation (5G) networks. In response to Chinese efforts to develop and maintain its technological footprint in the Western Mediterranean, the United States has responded with an “offensive” narrative, one that places more pressure on Spain. Conversely, China is producing a “defensive” counter-narrative combatting that of the United States, resulting in a large-scale battle of narratives.

Offense

On one side of the narrative battle, ring is the United States. Threatened by investment of Chinese technology in the networks of a key European ally, the United States is maximizing a “great power” narrative in terms of its international relationship with Spain and China.

Normally, the United States does not need to warn its European allies, especially those of which it has a long and shared history. Recently, however, the United States utilized a “great power” narrative when it issued clear and concise feelings about Spain’s relationship with Chinese technology firms. In February 2020, United States officials warned Spanish officials and telecommunications executives of a potential withdrawal of sharing sensitive information with Spain should Chinese technology firms, like Huawei, continue to be involved in local markets. Issuing these types of warnings toward a friendly nation is a tool that a “great power” can utilize in a narrative context. Spain would likely not issue a similar warning to the United States. Nonetheless, while the United States’ actions and warnings are rooted in trying to protect its ally and other partners against potential threats to security from China, this type of narrative places Spain in an awkward position.

A potential effect of the utilization of a “great power” narrative is an indirect and unwanted strengthening of the Chinese counter-narrative against the United States in Spain. International warnings and this type of narrative may harm an already fragile Spanish favorability view of the United States given that favorable views from Spain decreased from 59% to 42% from the end of the Obama presidency to the end of 2018 according to the Pew Research Center. This would arguably help China in its approach toward the issue further down the road, something the United States does not want.

United States and China, Image by Iecs on Wikimedia Commons (CC by 3.0)

Defense

Comparatively, China has produced a defensive counter-narrative in response to the United States. When asked about Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s comments on China’s espionage, information stealing, and link to the technology company, Huawei, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hua Chunying, compared Secretary Pompeo to that of a fictional character in a Chinese short story. Spokesperson Chunying said, “unlike her harmless monologue, Mr. Pompeo keeps repeating poisonous lies.”

China is attempting to change and control the narrative through its response. This type of response produces a counter-narrative where China shifts the blame from itself to another country, despite any accusations or evidence. While this may seem like an offensive tactic, China’s action is in response to the United States, allowing it to take a defensive position in the narrative battle.

Furthermore, a defensive position allows China to continue bolstering its counter-narrative against the United States. Recently, Chinese technology company, Huawei, played a soft power role through its delivery of medical supplies to countries like Spain during the COVID-19 pandemic. These types of good acts by Chinese companies have the potential to strengthen China’s counter-narrative toward the United States as this type of action is a key public diplomacy instrument. Building a rapport with the Spanish government and people during times of a crisis undoubtedly have beneficial effects for diplomatic relations whether this is the intention of China or not.

This narrative battle between the United States and China is not only recognized in theory, but also in the heart of international relations as well. Huawei’s role, and ultimately China at large, was noted by the European Union’s Foreign Policy Chief, Josep Borrell, saying, “there is a global battle of narratives going on in which timing is a crucial factor,” and “China is aggressively pushing the message that, unlike the US, it is a responsible and reliable partner.”

If the United States wants to succeed in this battle of narratives, it may need to balance its approach toward Spain and its call for security in Europe in a more positive tone. While the counter-narrative produced by China is bolstered by technology and soft power approaches at the moment, the United States’ long and shared history with Spain is a force to be reckoned with. However, for the time being Spain is stuck in the middle of this narrative “tug-of-war” between the United States and China, so time will tell how “giants” in the land of Don Quixote will affect this narrative battle.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

President Donald Trump’s impeachment could ruin U.S. influence in Ukraine—but it won’t. Here’s why.

April 13, 2020April 16, 2020Disinformation, Europe, public diplomacy

By Joli McSherry, MA Global Communication, ’20

On July 25, 2019, President Donald Trump had a good, normal call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The rest—forgive the cliché—is now history. We know that this call led to the President Trump’s eventual impeachment and acquittal, which is both a cause and a symptom of the continued fracturing of the American public and political institutions. We already know the impact on the American public, but what about the impact America’s very important strategic partner in Eastern Europe and our characteristically friendly relationship with its people? Could this be a dangerous blow to the relationship? Fortunately, President Trump does not have to be, nor should he be, the sole diplomatic messenger. And the United States, dealing with its own conflicting national narrative as its public becomes more deeply divided, is at an advantage: Ukrainians understand what it is like to call a country that is fractured by two opposite narratives home.

As a young country sharing a long history with its aggressor, Ukraine deals with dual competing narratives for the same stories and events. One is the pro-Ukrainian, pro-West narrative, which emphasizes a shared Ukrainian fight for freedom, as well as the drive to stand against and overcome oppression. This narrative is woven into prominent figures and events, such as nationalist revolutionaries Stepan Bandera and Ivan Mazepa, and the devastating Holodomor genocide where Ukrainians were starved out by the Soviet Union. However, take those same events and one can see the pro-Russia, anti-West narrative: Ukraine and Russia’s shared history is to be honored through their bond, and those who reject the bond (as Bandera and Mazepa did) are defectors and traitors.

The narrative used by the U.S. diplomatic system focuses, obviously, on reaching those pro-West Ukrainians who favor their own democratic state, free from Russian meddling. Despite Trump’s own words and behaviors, Ukrainians who are sympathetic to European integration will be particularly responsive to the messages that continue to be put forth by a plurality of the U.S. government and population, working to see its own unrelenting desire for freedom, independence, and democracy overcome its internal ills. This resonates with the Ukrainian master narrative of overcoming oppression. All the U.S. diplomatic system must do to avoid endangering relations with the Ukrainians is continue to hold steady and show Ukrainians that nothing in the context of the relationship has changed. As far as public influence goes, the golden rule of successful public diplomacy is that it must be rooted in truth. The United States, casting an inconsistent president aside, undoubtedly has that covered.

While U.S. soft power has been on a steady decline since President Trump’s 2016 election, the United States has long held influence on Ukrainian public opinion, particularly when the choice at hand is America vs. Russia (a 2019 International Republican Institute public opinion survey gives a detailed picture of Ukrainians’ opinions of the two). This is in large part because the United States invested early emphasizing the role it can play in fulfilling the fledgling Eastern European country’s desire for freedom and democracy. The United States has continued to firmly promote a narrative of support and shared objectives with Ukraine even during times of turmoil; the pithy “Crimea is Ukraine” refrain is a great example. It has then backed these messages up by conducting a robust public diplomacy effort connecting with and engaging the Ukrainian people, and targeting some of the most pressing issues Ukrainians face, like an eager civil society and independent media, both desperate for more resources to foster their own fight to maintain freedom and stability.

In short, the United States has long talked the talk and walked the walk. Since Ukraine broke free from the Soviet Union, the United States has stood behind the strongest and most effective narrative that a freshly post-Soviet state with often insurmountable historical ties to Russia can expect to have: the right to an independent, democratic Ukraine. This would take a while to undo. Contemporarily, as America struggles to get its own domestic narratives in order in a Trump world, the use of this narrative to advance foreign policy goals in Ukraine has not waivered. The “partners in freedom and democracy” narrative holds strong, even as both countries deal with the calamities caused by President Trump. As the president’s own drama unfolded, the U.S. State Department faithfully told Ukrainians: Ukraine is so important to us; we share your values of freedom and progress; we have a shared adversary; and we will not let that enemy impinge on your right to a secure, democratic, and prosperous state.

While there is concern over a growing distance between Ukrainians and the United States in light of recent events, thanks to the decision to not stray from the strong U.S. narrative promoting friendship and cooperation among a shared goal between the two states and their people, the Ukrainian peoples’ disillusionment with America will likely not last. Despite some political decisions that left Ukrainians questioning America’s commitment, Ukraine holds an identity narrative that leaves it feeling something of an underdog truly in need of support in its fight to maintain their right to exist in the manner it feels it deserve. The country needs support, and the U.S. has positioned itself to still spread the idea its strong and unwavering support despite any of its own internal ills. In fact, those ills may help the cause—Ukrainians know well what it is like to be fractured by an internal divide. The fact that the U.S. continues to maintain its commitment despite this can only mean positive things for the relationship going forward.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

The Battle for Georgia: How Strategic Narratives Inform and Impact a Geopolitical Struggle

April 13, 2020May 11, 2020Disinformation, Europe, public diplomacy

By Jenna Presta, BA in Political Communication ’19, MA in Media & Strategic Communication ‘21

In the 1990s, the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared their independence and intentions to secede from Georgia. Neither of these territories is widely internationally recognized as an independent state. However, in 2008 Russia moved troops into the regions, declaring them to be independent. Georgia, backed by most Western nations, declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be occupied territories. Russia’s destabilizing moves point to more than a display of dominance. They have consequences for Georgia’s larger place in the international system and its identity as a nation. These are shaped by and build upon strategic narratives.

There are several layers of narratives that grant this territorial standoff a greater meaning. Narratives are the frameworks by which we understand the world around us. When it comes to international affairs, narratives can describe and shape a particular issue, the identity of a nation, or even the international system itself. These all help to shape and explain Georgia’s resistance to Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also relevant to this issue are master narratives, which are those embedded within the historical memory of a nation or people. Master narratives do not have to be taught; they are passed down through a culture. Two of Georgia’s most salient master narratives are (1) the struggle for sovereignty against an imperial power and (2) the rebirth of Georgia as an independent, self-governing state. These narratives often operate in tandem; rebirth following struggle. These master narratives explain why Georgians perceive Russia’s presence within its internationally recognized borders as a continuation of the historical aggression the Georgian state has experienced from Russia and the Soviet Union. Georgia’s historical memory catalogues the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an affront to its sovereignty, rendering Russian narratives ineffectual.

This perspective feeds into Georgian identity narratives, which are those that describe Georgia’s identity as a country. These identity narratives depict Georgia as a strong, independent, and unified state which governs itself. Identity narratives can also constrain a nation’s behavior. Georgia, for example, values self-governance and is a nascent democracy, and thus is expected to behave as such. Additionally, Georgian nationalism has become increasingly important since it seceded from the Soviet Union in the 1991 referendum. This helps to explain why Georgia views the Abkhazia and South Ossetia controversy as an occupation of their territories, rather than accepting Russia’s narrative of support for independent states.

Narratives related to the international system are especially important in this situation as they demonstrate the aforementioned line between “occupation” and “independent states.” Georgia and most of the West have invested in narratives which demonstrate the importance of international institutions. They argue that the international community should be the forum for recognizing nations, and that, therefore, Russia’s occupation of Georgian territory violates international norms. This further influences the perspective of Georgians by characterizing Russia’s moves as an infringement, thereby decreasing the power of their narratives. These separate narratives all come together to emphasize the sovereignty and independence of Georgia as a self-governing state, in turn shaping Georgia’s – and most of the West’s – response to Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This situation further impacts Georgia’s larger place in the international system. As a relatively young democracy, Georgia is seen by many as torn between allying itself with the West and with Russia/Eurasia. Where Georgia chooses to align itself has real consequences, as narratives do shape and constrain behavior. A Georgia in a Western alliance may behave quite differently than a Georgia in a Russian alliance. In the fight for Georgia’s allegiance and national identity, Russia attempts to cast a shadow on partnership with the West in order to bring Georgia into the sunlight of a Eurasian bloc. Its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is supported by propaganda campaigns asserting that aligning with the EU, US, or NATO will corrupt the traditions and identity of Georgia as a state. This taps into narratives related to Georgian nationalism, sovereignty and independence to create an overwhelmingly negative picture of a Western Georgia.

Despite these efforts, polling data collected by NDI shows that the overwhelming majority of Georgians do support EU and NATO membership. This could point to the salience of the Georgian narratives I’ve described here. Russian propaganda efforts do not seem to be enough to override Georgia’s historical memory, or its vision of itself as a sovereign nation that is part of a greater system. It is clear how the various narratives surrounding Russia’s presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia feed into a larger picture of Georgia’s place in international affairs – and vice versa.

> The author has also written a case study of the battle of narratives over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

Facebook Meets Global Agitprop

June 22, 2018January 11, 2019Cultural Diplomacy, Disinformation, Global Communication, IPDGC, public diplomacyLeave a Comment

By Rob Cline and Olivia Dupree

Facebook has come under fire by Washington lawmakers and the American public in recent months for their apparent involvement in the 2016 election. It has been discovered that Russian disinformation operations paid for targeted Facebook ads that promoted Donald Trump and sowed divisions in the electorate by touching on cultural wedge issues.

Facebook’s leadership failed to identify and curve these propaganda operations on their site, raising questions about the company’s ability to independently maintain a truthful and fair media platform for Americans to get information.

While this problem seems uniquely American, we need to point out that Facebook is a global website. Nations across the world have experienced Russian disinformation campaigns through Facebook over the past two years. It has been discovered that the Brexit campaign in the UK was plagued by Russian social media influence, as well as the French presidential campaign.

While it’s majorly important that Russian intelligence is interfering in the elections of Western democracies, there are places in the world where groups utilize Facebook for much more dangerous outcomes. In Myanmar, the militant government in power is engaging in ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslims. This brutal violence against the Rohingya has been fueled, in part, by misinformation and anti-Rohingya propaganda spread on Facebook.

In countries like Myanmar, social and governmental instability means that traditional news outlets like newspapers and cable TV have much less sway with the public, something both Patricia Kabra and Louisa Williams spoke to when visiting our class. Without these forms of media, the public forum moves to open social media platforms like Facebook. Facebook has become the primary news source for most citizens of Myanmar.

This sets up a huge problem: Facebook creates a massive, open public sphere and leaves everyone else to deal with the consequences. As the New York Times put it: “Correcting misinformation is a thorny philosophical problem for Facebook, which imagines itself as a neutral platform that avoids making editorial decisions.” Unfortunately, like we saw with fake news in the US presidential election, people seem to have a willingness to accept what they see on Facebook as true. This means the government of Myanmar has been extremely successful in alienating the Rohingya through misinformation campaigns.

For PD practitioners, this represents an information crisis. On one hand, Facebook is an essential tool in the modern age to reaching broad audiences that you would normally not reach with traditional media. On the other hand, Facebook is an untrimmed landscape ripe for misinformation and deceit by those who want to manipulate public opinion.

Battling social media disinformation will likely become a common practice of public diplomats around the globe. US envoys who want to maintain the US’s image abroad will most likely have to deal with Russian backed anti-American propaganda campaigns. Additionally PD practitioners will have to learn how to deal with the social and political upheaval that comes when disinformation campaigns are successful in their host countries.

Resource: Facebook as a Tool of Global Propaganda
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/business/facebook-misinformation-
abroad.html?_r=0&referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author(s). They do not necessarily express the views of either The Institute of Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or The George Washington University.

How ISIS seduces European Muslim women–and what Europe can do about it

April 20, 2018December 19, 2018Disinformation, Europe, Global Communication, Middle East, public diplomacy, Social Media, WomenLeave a Comment

Why are so many Muslim women in Europe susceptible to ISIS propaganda? Many of them join ISIS to commit jihad, or violence in the name of the “sustained struggle” to advance Islamic extremism. In 2014, about 18 percent of all European ISIS members were female. As of August 2017, experts believe the total number of women is more than 550. But are women brainwashed by the Islamic State or choosing jihad of their own free will?

Many Muslim women in Europe are enticed by ISIS’s recruitment videos and social media presence. ISIS portrays the Caliphate as a utopian land where ISIS’s very narrow view of Islam is strictly enforced. ISIS uses Hollywood-level video production and a social media strategy which rivals any Silicon Valley startup. On social media, women members of ISIS promise their women viewers a fulfilling life married to a devout Muslim man in the Caliphate. These women leave discrimination and alienation in Europe to support jihadis in Syria—or to take jihad into their own hands.

But why are ISIS recruitment efforts so effective? Answering this question requires an overview of how Muslim women are excluded from European society. For example, many French people do not consider a Muslim immigrant living in France to be “French, ” regardless of citizenship. A “French” identity includes Western clothing, language fluency, and a desire to assimilate. The French government and mainstream media view national identity narrowly—“traditional” so as not to make white French citizens uncomfortable.

Immigrant Muslim women are marginalized and their religion, way of dressing, and race are always at the forefront of their minds. They are forced to define their “Muslim” identity as incompatible with their “French” identity. Many choose to perceive themselves as “Muslim” rather than “French” in a nation that shows them time and time again that they do not belong. Taub calls this phenomenon “identity choice.”

ISIS uses these cleavages created by the French government to target French Muslim women who want to wear religious coverings and marry a devout Muslim man without being cast as a social pariah. Recruiters appeal to women fascinated by extremism and enamored with escaping France to join the Caliphate. By creating media channels apart from the French mainstream, ISIS can control the slant and message of their posted content to target and lure.

The divergence of media outlets can explain why recruitment videos spread like wildfire.

The fork in the road: ISIS creates a sophisticated rival of mainstream media, which garners attention from the women who embrace this romanticized extremism

However, ISIS’s savvy productions only explain part of the phenomenon.

ISIS’s chosen messenger? Other women.

British women recruiters are master strategists at romanticizing life under ISIS: they catch more flies with honey than they do with vinegar. ISIS women reach out to other women by creating News Frames of the propaganda. Through a process called framing, they shape and interpret the content of ISIS videos and social media posts to win the upper hand in reaching French Muslim women—their target audience.

The most powerful way to frame ISIS propaganda is to create a utopian image of the Caliphate that is consistent with what many Muslim women have already determined to be their ideal society.

Women recruiters can frame ISIS propaganda to convince a woman that joining is in her own best interest. Here’s three ways how:

They display their elite status in the Caliphate as wives and mothers and invite other women to emulate them.

They provide detailed instructions on how to use weapons, travel to Syria, and even commit jihad.

They distort the concept of women’s “empowerment” to mean challenging western gender norms and joining all-women brigades.

By glorifying this active role for women, recruits develop an affinity for a Caliphate ready to welcome them with open arms.

Despite its recent territory losses, ISIS still manages to release a few recruitment videos. Nations committed to countering violent extremism cannot fight fire with fire: instead of sensationalizing the videos and perpetrators to the public, European officials and mainstream media outlets must disseminate content that exposes these recruitment tactics that put women at risk.

In addition, French society must broaden their definition of “European” to include Muslim immigrants. In order for this shift in public opinion to occur, European mainstream media needs a new approach: discussing Muslim women as French citizens or residents, not permanent outsiders. Media accomplish this goal by at the News Frames stage of the model above.

Elected officials in Europe must rise to their higher calling as public servants and unite citizens of all religions and national origins under a new “European” identity. Factionalism may be good for getting votes, but this tactic has succeeded at the expense of Muslim women’s livelihoods. This is the most difficult and far-reaching change to implement, as the model suggests.

If France better integrates its immigrant communities, French Muslim women can emerge from the margins of society. ISIS’s power to prey upon these women diminishes when women can practice their religion, wear garments of their choosing, and access education and employment opportunities.

ISIS’s glossy social media images will lose their luster for the many women they once seduced. The news frames won’t be as effective for Muslim women immigrants once Europe stops treating them as “the other.”

Caveat: The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not necessarily express the views of either The Institute of Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or The George Washington University.