The Ethics of Arendt’s Co-responsibility 

 

Abstract

This paper is an examination of Hannah Arendt’s concept of co-responsibility in the context of understanding the tragedies surrounding World War II. Arendt’s concept of co-responsibility is ethically ambiguous and highly criticized because there is much debate around the subjectivity of measuring participation and resulting accountability for an event. However, Arendt proposes such a concept to encourage a discourse of restoration among victimized groups and society as a whole. The nuances of co-responsibility are explored through the examination of three case studies of this relationship: the Jews and antisemitism, Nazi officers and the Holocaust, and “superfluous” men and imperialism. Although it is unfair to blame a victimized group for a tragedy, it is still important to evaluate their role in creating the conditions for that event to take place. Every person involved in a tragedy must recognize their contribution and be held accountable accordingly in order to prevent a similar event from occurring in the future.

 

The Ethics of Arendt’s Co-responsibility

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt describes the idea of co-responsibility as an approach to understanding how to deal with the tragedies surrounding World War II. Arendt’s discussion of the events spans from the early 17th century to directly after World War II. There is much debate around the ethics of co-responsibility because of the subjectivity of measuring how much a particular group contributed to an event. In the case of World War II, co-responsibility is ethical to an extent, varying with the levels of contribution and interaction each group had with those who are directly responsible for such events. Many have a difficult time finding a justification for deeming a victimized group as one that is co-responsible for an event. Although it is unfair to blame a victimized group for a tragedy, it is still important to evaluate their role in creating the conditions for that event to take place. This paper will illustrate the nuances of co-responsibility through the exploration of three instances of this concept: the Jews and antisemitism, Nazi officers and the Holocaust, and “superfluous” men and imperialism. Each of these relationships has different circumstances and outcomes that will serve to illuminate the complexities and ambiguities of co-responsibility.

Definitions

There is a distinction to be made between responsibility and co-responsibility. Responsibility is a state of being held accountable for something because of direct involvement in that thing. The definition of  responsibility stems from a logical framework, searching for and blaming someone who is a direct cause of some event. On the other hand, co-responsibility is an unevenly shared responsibility for an event because of an indirect contribution to that outcome. The definition of co-responsibility stems from a moral framework, searching for someone to blame who should feel responsible without necessarily making a direct contribution to the event or outcome. Although Halliburton’s definition of co-responsibility does not require a party to have this subjective feeling of responsibility for an event, Halliburton argues someone who is co-responsible “does not cause but rather provides the necessary condition” for an event to take place (2002, 266). It is important to note that those who are responsible and those who are co-responsible cannot be equally blamed for an event. “Moral responsibility transcends the realm of individually accountable actions” (Huber, 1993, 575). In other words, because tragedies, like those surrounding World War II, cannot be boiled down to one decision or event that happened, all of those involved must take their fair, yet unequal, share of the blame. For example, Adolf Hitler would be someone who is responsible for the Holocaust and other outcomes of World War II because Hitler was directly involved in orchestrating those events. Sympathizers to the Nazi movement are co-responsible for the Holocaust because they supported and emboldened Hitler, but they did not have any involvement in or knowledge of the decision-making process  (Halliburton, 2002, 267). If nobody is held accountable or to the proper degree, then the issues at hand cannot be resolved.

The difference between responsibility and co-responsibility is important, especially in the aftermath of World War II, because framing one group as the victim and another as the culprit, or blaming ‘the system’ partially absolves responsible groups of their guilt. This distinction is particularly crucial in the resolution process because a society cannot remedy an issue without properly and completely deciding who should face what consequences. Bilsky defines the concept of political guilt as the co-responsibility of citizens for actions done as an agent of the state (Bilsky, 2017, 17). For example, in light of the concept of political guilt, officers in Nazi bureaucracy cannot be absolved of their guilt for the outcomes of actions done on behalf of the state. If officers were to point to the fact that they were following orders, then they would erase any moral, individual agency in bureaucratic settings (Bilsky, 2017, 26). With events that have as large a scope as this, it is difficult to point to one person as someone who should individually be held responsible for that event. That is why it is vital that those involved in the event must recognize that through their actions, they could prevent the same or an even worse event from happening in the future.

Case Studies

Co-responsibility is an ethically ambiguous topic because of the unresolved issues in the  language surrounding it. In Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt is vague when making the distinction between co-responsibility and responsibility; the author also does not mention who should decide which groups fall under each category. This lack of clarity has been a source of controversy in the years since the book was published. Arendt defines “collective responsibility in terms of a liability predicated on political association that does not impute blame” (Schapp, 2001, 749). Even though one’s level of collective responsibility often corresponds with their political associations, Arendt dismisses guilt in politics. The publicity surrounding feelings of collective guilt distorts and transforms those feelings into those of collective sorrow, causing the masses to feel pity for some group instead of finding solutions to a problem (Schapp, 2001, 749). “Arendt’s conception of political responsibility… opens the way for understanding how ‘ordinary citizens’ might assume political responsibility for past wrongs while resisting their identification as guilty subjects by a discourse of restorative reconciliation” (Schapp, 2001, 749). Making the distinction between responsibility and co-responsibility provides an opportunity for more actions of restorative justice to take place, enabling citizens and societies as a whole to effectively cope with tragic events and their contribution to them.

The Jews and Antisemitism

One could argue co-responsibility is ethical to an extent because the groups involved actively participated in what took place. Participation, however, requires some level of individual agency, or the extent to which an individual can change their own environment, which, as previously mentioned, may “provide the necessary conditions” for an event to take place (Halliburton, 2002, 266). In the case of the Jews and antisemitism, Arendt argues the Jews benefited from remaining separate from society, but this separation ultimately cleared the way for antisemitism to arise.

As a part of a strategy of self-preservation, the Jews developed and maintained their own culture and traditions in addition to having special privileges granted by the state. Arendt argues some privileged and successful Jews further separated themselves from the community as a strategy of self-preservation on an individual level; these privileged Jews designated themselves as separate from ‘the Jew’ in the stereotypical sense in order to become involved and thrive in regular society. Another part of this ‘strategy’ was that part of the Jewish religious doctrine was that the Jews believed they were chosen by God and should self-govern. This belief in chosenness was eventually perverted by the antisemitic pan-movements, who drew inspiration from the transnational organization of the Jewish community; unlike the leaders of the antisemetic pan-movements, the Jews had no intention of destroying the state or society in which they lived in order to gain power. The Jews ultimately created a community to fall back on whenever the state or society failed them. Although Arendt argues the Jews provided the ‘necessary conditions’ for antisemitism, which would contribute to their level of co-responsibility, it must be emphasized that they did not become involved because they wanted to support antisemitism.

Conversely, the Jews were one group among many that were victimized during this time, having no other choice but to participate in what was going on. Even though they contributed to the tragedies of WWII, it is important to recognize they had different intentions than those who were making larger decisions. The Jews had no way of knowing that their support of the nation-state and other inspiration for antisemitic pan-movements would ultimately lead to their downfall. Specifically when discussing the co-responsibility of the Jews, Arendt fails to:

make a distinction… between how Jews have responded to antisemitism and their responsibility for antisemitism. [A]t the core of her argument lay a refusal on the one hand to blame the Jews for antisemitism and on the other to rationalise Jewish responses to antisemitism. (Spencer & Fine, 2018, 76)

One of the major criticisms of Arendt’s discussion of Jewish co-responsibility was that she focused on the “transgressions of Jews” instead of recognizing that the Jews “could not by themselves defeat the forces of antisemitism” (Spencer & Fine, 2018, 75-76). In focusing on the failures of the Jews in this way, Arendt ignores the fact that the Jews had a more limited position in society than what Arendt implies.

The Jews took what few opportunities were offered to them. For example, for much of European history, the Jews were only given career opportunities in the financial sector because Christianity regarded working with money as sinful. As Jews flourished in this field, by the 18th century many powerful Jewish bankers and financiers were able to help finance the state, eventually causing an association between the state and the Jew. As the nation-state began to fail in the 19th century and prior to World War II, “each class of society which came into a conflict with the state as such became antisemetic because the only social group which seemed to represent the state were the Jews” (Arendt, 1966, 25). In other words, any hatred towards the state transformed into hatred for the Jew. Jewish financiers became apprehensive towards taking part in the political ventures of imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as they were afraid of enhancing the growing antisemitism that arose when they financed the state previously. As a result, Jewish financiers were eventually left out of the benefits of imperialism.

Spencer and Fine argue that the response of victims–in this case, the Jews–is only important if such a response affects the outcome of the overall situation. If so, then those who decide who is co-responsible should focus on “how Jewish responses to antisemitism were forged and whether they closed off or opened up the potential for solidarity from other people” (Spencer & Fine, 2018, 76). Spencer and Fine argue that Arendt, or anyone who decides if the Jews are co-responsible for antisemitism, should take into account the fact that the Jews did not have the means to improve their situation or move up in society. “For it is in the nature of genocide that the targeted group alone rarely has the resources to defend itself against the power of perpetrators equipped with a monopoly of the means of coercion and backed by popular mobilisation.” (Spencer & Fine, 2018, 76). To further this point, Harrison argues that the Jews could only be deemed co-responsible if it is shown that the interests of each individual Jew were not those of the country of his citizenship but were a part of a vast Jewish conspiracy (2020, 87). In other words, Jews could be co-responsible for antisemitism if their goal was to be hated and excluded from society in the first place, which would explain why they did not take much action to stop the rise of antisemitism. Because this is not the case, Harrison argues co-responsibility of the Jews for antisemitism is invalid. Overall, Arendt’s argument of Jewish co-responsibility is ambiguous because of the debate over what Arendt uses to constitute the basis for determining co-responsibility in this situation. Even though Arendt’s decision to propose the application of co-responsibility to the Jews and the Holocaust is highly criticized, Arendt did so to encourage a discourse of restoration among victimized groups, such as the Jews, to evaluate their role in preventing an event like the Holocaust from occurring in the future.

Nazi Officers and the Holocaust

Officers in the Nazi bureaucracy also had an active role in the outcomes of World War II. The Nazi movement recruited many officers from the peasantry, hoping to serve their country as a way to make up for their failures in other avenues of life. Prior to World War II, there were limited opportunities for social mobility, so many people began looking for ways to survive in a society with  growing wealth inequality. One of these opportunities presented itself in the form of joining the military and police forces, which provided basic necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter, in return for fighting in support of the totalitarian movement.

However, while serving the Nazis, officers committed heinous acts and crimes against humanity. In their other works, Arendt criticizes Adolf Eichmann, one of the major organizers of the Holocaust, for excusing his actions as he was a ‘cog in the machine.’ Arendt holds that Eichmann should still be punished:

[f]or even if [Eichmann] did not intend wrong he nevertheless violated the status of every human being, including his own, not only by supporting the extermination of a specific people or peoples, but by violating the plurality ‘of mankind in its entirety’. (Kohn, 2002, 648)

Eichmann perverted “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” by supporting the idea that one race, the Aryan race, should rule the world (Arendt, 1958, 7). Because this idea was central to the totalitarian movements of the time, Eichmann cannot excuse himself as a minor contributor to the Holocaust and, therefore, should be held accountable for his actions accordingly.

It is understandable that an officer would avoid insubordination under a regime that would punish such an act with death. “[T]he ability to make a conscientious choice is eliminated [in concentration camps]. Prisoners are made to choose not between good and evil but between evil and evil” (Kohn, 640). Yet, excusing an officer as being simply a ‘cog in the machine’ absolves them of punishment and removes individual agency for their actions. The level of punishment for each person may vary by their level of contribution to the entire event or movement. Because evaluating levels of contribution can be subjective, the method of determining levels of punishment and the institution that should enforce such punishment are both currently still undecided. However, even if those officers did not decide to give certain orders, someone ultimately had to carry out those actions and should be held accountable.

‘Superfluous’ Men and Imperialism

Arendt defines the mob as a group of ‘superfluous’ men who had tried and failed to become successful in capitalist society in continental Europe from the Industrial Revolution to the early 20th century. These men were considered “the refuse of all classes,” deemed ‘superfluous’ because their skills and talents were no longer useful as the economy changed with the rise of capitalism (Arendt, 1966, 155). As with those who joined the military and police forces, these men were searching for a way to survive in a society with growing wealth inequality. These ‘superfluous’ men decided to switch gears and follow new career paths and opportunities that served bourgeois imperialist ventures. The mob was preyed upon by the bourgeoisie with promises of riches and job security in an unstable economy. Working these jobs in African colonies provided an opportunity for these men to succeed and redeem themselves after previous failures, allowing them to directly benefit from imperialism and expansionism.

Under the veil of the ‘White Man’s Burden,’ the mob was brainwashed into thinking they were improving instead of decimating the societies in Africa; if they realized what they were doing, Arendt argues oftentimes they were in too deep to do anything about it. However, Robin argues:

Arendt’s account dissolves conflicts of power, interest and ideas in a bath of psychological analysis, allowing her readers to evade difficult questions of politics and economics… Strangest of all, we needn’t worry about moral responsibility: terror makes everyone – from Hitler to the Jews, Stalin to the kulaks – an automaton, incapable of judgment or being judged. (2007, 18-20)

Arendt’s account of mass society during this time period emphasizes the fact that people were bound to be swept up into a ‘mob mentality’; this account, however, removes individual agency and accountability for the actions committed by common people that may have contributed to the events that took place. An ordinary citizen may not have had the intention to do harm; nevertheless, as previously mentioned, ordinary citizens must “assume political responsibility for past wrongs” and take action to rectify the situation through “a discourse of restorative reconciliation” (Schapp, 2001, 749). Until every individual in a society recognizes their contribution to a tragedy, that society cannot move on and will continue to carry around feelings of collective guilt. The only effective way of resolving the situation is to create a dialogue among ‘ordinary citizens’ around restoration, inspiring everyone to take their fair share of the blame and work together to move forward.

            Conclusion

The idea of co-responsibility is ethical to a certain extent because of the variability in circumstances that allow some groups to be held accountable to different degrees. Every person or group involved in a tragedy must be held liable for their contribution to the event, not just those who were directly responsible for the event. However, just because someone contributed to an event does not mean that they intended for that event to happen. Those who decide who is responsible and who is co-responsible must take people’s intentions and levels of participation into account when making that decision. Whoever is qualified to make that decision is still undecided, as this person or group could be informed by a variety of perspectives, influencing which group falls under each category. For the Jews and antisemitism, one must first decide whether the Jewish response to or responsibility for antisemitism is the determining factor for Jewish co-responsibility. One must also decide whether it is reasonable for Arendt to apply the idea of co-responsibility to the Jews in the Holocaust, yet Arendt seems to do so to encourage victimized groups to evaluate their role in preventing such tragedies from occurring in the future.  In the case of Nazi officers and the Holocaust, every officer must recognize their individual contribution to the tragic events that took place, even if they did not have any involvement in the decision-making process. As for the mob and imperialism, every member of society that ‘provided the necessary conditions’ for these events to take place must recognize their contribution and hold themselves accountable accordingly. On an individual level, people must be held accountable for everything from missteps during everyday occurrences to war crimes or other disasters. People must realize when they cannot escape from the consequences of participating in a bad decision, even when their intentions do not necessarily match the outcome. Our society must provide people with the tools to solve a problem like this before it becomes one. On a micro level, people should try to resolve interpersonal issues; on a larger scale, societal structures must change in order to provide more opportunities for resolutions and less chances for people to be boxed into a corner.

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