Saudi Arabia: Contender for Superpower State in a New World Order

By Tahreem Alam, Masters in International Affairs ‘23

Saudi Arabia has taken key economic issues into its own hands, worrying its Western
counterparts and prompting reactions from the Biden administration. These actions are
reflected in Saudi Arabia’s oil policies, which is increasingly pursuing its own interest and
often seen at an expense to the U.S.

OPEC+, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, announced that the cartel would cut oil production
by around 1.2 million barrels a day, or 1 percent of global production.

The justification behind these slightly-dramatic decisions continue to indicate Saudi Arabia’s
perception of themselves in the global order, which is a regional leader acting on its own
sovereignty.

Last fall, Saudi Arabia, a member of OPEC+, decided to cut oil production by 2 million
barrels during a time when the US pushed Saudi Arabia to produce more oil. Saudi Arabia
argued that the agreement was solely an economic one for the sake of recovering from
COVID-era losses and stabilizing the economy in the face of an impending global recession;
however, the US argued this move was political in nature and not purely for economic self-
interest.

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy referred to key system narratives to take its position: most
importanyl, (1) the role of OPEC+ in the global market; (2) international economic pressures;
and (3) Western vs. Eastern/Global South influence in combating the US narrative of this
problem. System narratives are essentially ways of understanding how countries interact with
one another.

Additionally, several issues were used to help prop this argument, including the Ukraine-
Russia conflict, the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy and oil prices in the past
two years, and domestic economic issues Saudi Arabia faces following recent years of low oil
prices.

This chart provides an example of how Saudi Arabia might see itself in this political chess
game for a superpower role:

Battle of the Narratives – Saudi Arabia and OPEC +

Master & Identity NarrativesSystem NarrativesIssue Narratives
Normal country pursuing self-interest  

Hegemonic power  

Responsibility to care for citizens  

Leader in Arabian Gulf  

State not playing in the hands of others



Rearrangement of power dynamics  

System functions on OPEC rules and decisions  

Battle for control of the global economy (superpower western state vs. Global South)  









 
Ukraine-Russia War  

Oil deal is an economic issue unrelated to political goals in the U.S.  

Need for making up lost revenue from COVID-19 oil prices  

High oil prices will stabilize Saudi economy and inflation  

Economic issues from global pandemic foundation of oil prices  

Purely economic decision in the face of a global recession rise

The Role of the US

In spite of Saudi Arabia’s recent moves, the West still holds far greater influence over the
region from a social and economic standpoint (China, another global power in the region, has
made in not making the US an enemy). However, this doesn’t mean that the US shouldn’t
acknowledge the rapidly-changing power dynamics in regional state conflicts.

It’s difficult to offer plausible diplomatic advice to this matter, especially since Saudi Arabia
is ignoring the global status quo and US-Western opinion for oil production. Ignoring these
developments could lead to long-term side effects of a decreased position of power in the
global arena, which the US might just have to accept anyway as the world moves away from
a Western-centric hegemonic system.

Time will tell if this is a blip in the drawn-out shift to a multipolar world, or if Saudi Arabia
has succeeded in placing itself as a contender for a future superpower status.

The full report is available here.


The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University. 

ICC Probe Investigating Israel: The Divergent Narratives Within

By Basil Awartani, M.A. Media & Strategic Communication, 2021

Two years ago, International Criminal Court prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that the court had uncovered evidence of war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. Based on these initial findings, Bensouda called for a thorough investigation into the incidents. Initially this process was delayed when the Israeli government challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction over the matter, arguing that the court does not have the authority to make such a ruling in the Palestinian Territories, which do not qualify as a sovereign state. In early February, 2021, this objection was overruled, clearing the way for the Hague chief prosecutor to open the war crimes probe. This announcement triggered backlash from Israeli officials who argued that the ruling was an attack on Israeli sovereignty but was welcomed by Palestinians hoping to hold Israel accountable in criminal court.

The competing strategic narratives put forward by Israeli and Palestinian leaderships play a critical role in shaping both policy and media response to the ICC probe. Strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors. Another important element in interpreting events through the lens of a particular narrative is framing. According to Robert M. Entman “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definitional, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment.”

I use Entman’s model to illustrate Israel and Palestine’s divergent strategic narratives regarding the ICC probe which is critical to understanding their respective positions on the issue. Further, Entman’s framing model is also essential for understanding the ideological and strategic underpinning of Israel’s stance, which it maintains even in the face of substantial evidence. Entman’s model has four moves: problem, cause, evaluation, and solution.  Depending on one’s narrative, different elements are assigned to each move as illustrated in the example below.

Palestinian Narrative

In a statement, the Palestinian Authority’s foreign ministry welcomed the ICC investigation and considered it a “long-awaited step that serves Palestine’s tireless pursuit of justice and accountability.” Hamas, a Gaza-based militant group, also welcomed the decision, though they, too, are under investigation. Overall, the ICC investigation is consistent with the Palestinian narrative and is considered part of the solution.

ProblemCauseEvaluationSolution
Israeli human rights abusesMilitary occupation and a culture of impunityAn independent ICC investigation is a step-forward towards justiceAccountability through the ICC

Israel/Netanyahu’s Narrative

Legal ramifications aside, the ICC probe cuts deep through one of Israel’s primary identity narratives which holds that they are a humane actor in this conflict, defending themselves against unprovoked aggression. To accept the ICC probe in any shape or form would cause dissonance within many of Israel’s narratives.

ProblemCauseEvaluationSolution
ICC probeAntisemitism/unfairly singling out Israel   Palestinians politicizing the courtPalestinian Authority is not a state   Israel is not a member of the court.   The probe is an affront to Israeli sovereignty. Not cooperate with the ICC, fight the decision.

This chart demonstrates how Israel’s framing of the ICC probe reinforces its own narrative. The Israeli government has different channels/messengers to disseminate and re-enforce such state narratives. One of its chief messengers is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“The court established to prevent atrocities like the Nazi Holocaust against the Jewish people is now targeting the one state of the Jewish people.”

-Bibi Netanyahu

By tying the ICC to the horrors of the Holocaust, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu invokes one of the key events shaping Israel’s master narratives. He condemns the ICC probe, calling it “undiluted antisemitism” and vows to fight the decision. By invoking such an emotional frame Netanyahu not only targets foreign publics but also domestic Israeli audiences, framing himself as the protector of Israel against a hostile world.

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, tackles the issue using a legal framework, citing the fact that Israel is not a member of the court and that the Palestinian Authority is not a state to de-legitimize the probe. This defense differs from the former (Netanyahu’s) because it acknowledges that the emotional frame is not itself enough to defend against a robust legal argument. The two approaches have different purposes but intersect over the issue of Israel’s right to a state and state sovereignty. 

Dissonance between the US and Israeli master-narratives.

In May 2020 the Trump administration warned the ICC against asserting jurisdiction over Israel, saying the US will “exact consequences” for any “illegitimate” investigations. This threat materialized in September 2020 when the Trump administration sanctioned ICC senior officials including chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, accusing the court of “illegitimate attempts” to subject Americans to its jurisdiction. The US has traditionally treated Israel as a strategic partner, aligning itself with the narrative that frames Israel as a victim rather than an aggressor. 

The Biden administration inherited this issue and maintains Trump’s opposition to the ICC probe into Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza. Unlike the Trump administration, however, current U.S. President Joe Biden has vowed to make human rights and multilateralism central to his approach to international affairs. This stance made it difficult for the Biden administration to oppose the ICC as aggressively as Trump because sanctioning a court responsible for investigating human rights abuses is inconsistent with the US identity narrative that promotes human rights as a pillar of U.S. foreign policy.

Biden’s Dilemma

The existence of two contradictory narratives presents a challenge for the Biden administration. While the US has framed itself as an ally of Israel committed to upholding the country’s sovereignty, it does not want to appear as if it is coercing an international court to not investigate human rights abuses. For the time being, Biden tries to take a middle road, publishing a press release opposing the ICC investigation but ending the Trump era sanctions against the ICC.

In the end, the case of the ICC probe leaves the Biden administration trying to reconcile policy that is not inconsistent with its current identity narrative. As the State Department stated in its announcement ending sanctions against ICC personnel, “We believe…that our concerns about these cases would be addressed through engagement with all stakeholders in the ICC process rather than through the imposition of sanctions.”          

For a detailed analysis by the author on the subject, Click Here.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University. 

How ISIS seduces European Muslim women–and what Europe can do about it

Why are so many Muslim women in Europe susceptible to ISIS propaganda? Many of them join ISIS to commit jihad, or violence in the name of the “sustained struggle” to advance Islamic extremism. In 2014, about 18 percent of all European ISIS members were female. As of August 2017, experts believe the total number of women is more than 550. But are women brainwashed by the Islamic State or choosing jihad of their own free will?

Many Muslim women in Europe are enticed by ISIS’s recruitment videos and social media presence. ISIS portrays the Caliphate as a utopian land where ISIS’s very narrow view of Islam is strictly enforced. ISIS uses Hollywood-level video production and a social media strategy which rivals any Silicon Valley startup. On social media, women members of ISIS promise their women viewers a fulfilling life married to a devout Muslim man in the Caliphate. These women leave discrimination and alienation in Europe to support jihadis in Syria—or to take jihad into their own hands.

But why are ISIS recruitment efforts so effective? Answering this question requires an overview of how Muslim women are excluded from European society. For example, many French people do not consider a Muslim immigrant living in France to be “French, ” regardless of citizenship. A “French” identity includes Western clothing, language fluency, and a desire to assimilate. The French government and mainstream media view national identity narrowly—“traditional” so as not to make white French citizens uncomfortable.

Immigrant Muslim women are marginalized and their religion, way of dressing, and race are always at the forefront of their minds. They are forced to define their “Muslim” identity as incompatible with their “French” identity. Many choose to perceive themselves as “Muslim” rather than “French” in a nation that shows them time and time again that they do not belong. Taub calls this phenomenon “identity choice.”

ISIS uses these cleavages created by the French government to target French Muslim women who want to wear religious coverings and marry a devout Muslim man without being cast as a social pariah. Recruiters appeal to women fascinated by extremism and enamored with escaping France to join the Caliphate. By creating media channels apart from the French mainstream, ISIS can control the slant and message of their posted content to target and lure.

The divergence of media outlets can explain why recruitment videos spread like wildfire.

Model for Blog Post

The fork in the road: ISIS creates a sophisticated rival of mainstream media, which garners attention from the women who embrace this romanticized extremism

 

However, ISIS’s savvy productions only explain part of the phenomenon.

ISIS’s chosen messenger? Other women.

British women recruiters are master strategists at romanticizing life under ISIS: they catch more flies with honey than they do with vinegar. ISIS women reach out to other women by creating News Frames of the propaganda. Through a process called framing, they shape and interpret the content of ISIS videos and social media posts to win the upper hand in reaching French Muslim women—their target audience.

The most powerful way to frame ISIS propaganda is to create a utopian image of the Caliphate that is consistent with what many Muslim women have already determined to be their ideal society.

Women recruiters can frame ISIS propaganda to convince a woman that joining is in her own best interest. Here’s three ways how:

 

  1. They display their elite status in the Caliphate as wives and mothers and invite other women to emulate them.

 

  1. They provide detailed instructions on how to use weapons, travel to Syria, and even commit jihad.

 

  1. They distort the concept of women’s “empowerment” to mean challenging western gender norms and joining all-women brigades.

 

By glorifying this active role for women, recruits develop an affinity for a Caliphate ready to welcome them with open arms.

Despite its recent territory losses, ISIS still manages to release a few recruitment videos. Nations committed to countering violent extremism cannot fight fire with fire: instead of sensationalizing the videos and perpetrators to the public, European officials and mainstream media outlets must disseminate content that exposes these recruitment tactics that put women at risk.

In addition, French society must broaden their definition of “European” to include Muslim immigrants. In order for this shift in public opinion to occur, European mainstream media needs a new approach: discussing Muslim women as French citizens or residents, not permanent outsiders. Media accomplish this goal by at the News Frames stage of the model above.

Elected officials in Europe must rise to their higher calling as public servants and unite citizens of all religions and national origins under a new “European” identity. Factionalism may be good for getting votes, but this tactic has succeeded at the expense of Muslim women’s livelihoods. This is the most difficult and far-reaching change to implement, as the model suggests.

If France better integrates its immigrant communities, French Muslim women can emerge from the margins of society. ISIS’s power to prey upon these women diminishes when women can practice their religion, wear garments of their choosing, and access education and employment opportunities.

ISIS’s glossy social media images will lose their luster for the many women they once seduced. The news frames won’t be as effective for Muslim women immigrants once Europe stops treating them as “the other.”

Caveat: The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not necessarily express the views of either The Institute of Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or The George Washington University.

The Many Narrative Failings of Trump’s Jerusalem Decision

TrumpBen
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump meet at the United Nations General Assembly.

By Joshua Axelrod

Jerusalem is a city with a long, complicated history that means something different yet equally profound to many groups.

With that in mind, it is no wonder that President Donald Trump’s choice to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the United States’ embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was met with almost unanimous global condemnation, with everyone from Palestinian leadership to Pope Francis blasting the move.

To fully grasp the international community’s overwhelmingly negative reaction to Trump’s decision, one must be reminded why three presidential administrations continually chose to forgo moving the U.S. embassy in Israel, and what Trump upending five decades of U.S. foreign policy symbolizes to the rest of the world.

Jerusalem Embassy Act

After the 1967 Six Day War, Israel emerged with full control of Jerusalem. Most of the world chose not to recognize Israel’s claim on East Jerusalem, including the U.S. The lack of progress in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and the controversy surrounding Jerusalem’s jurisdiction led the U.S. to keep its embassy in Tel Aviv.

In 1995, Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act, which set a deadline for the U.S. to move its embassy to Jerusalem. There was a baked-in loophole, however, that allowed a six-month delay on the relocation if the president “determines … that such suspension is necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States.”

Then-President Bill Clinton was the first to sign the waiver delaying the embassy move. His administration argued at the time that “a premature focus on Jerusalem” could “undermine negotiations and complicate the chances for peace.”

His administration’s official stance was that moving the embassy to Jerusalem would imply that the U.S. recognizes Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem. They believed that whether such a move coincided with an official change in U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem or not, it would still cause global confusion on where the U.S. stood and potentially incite violence throughout the Middle East.

That notion never changed during the Clinton administration, and with peace talks remaining largely unsuccessful for the next two decades, then-Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama continually chose to sign the waiver and maintain the status quo. Even Trump continued the tradition at first, signing the waiver in June 2017.

The Great Disruptor

Trump either did not know or chose to ignore how his proclamation would play abroad, nor did he seem cognizant of the reasons why Clinton, Bush and Obama continually chose to delay the embassy move.

Unfortunately, he had no reason to honor his predecessors’ policies or incentive to pacify the international community, as the only folks he has ever shown an interest in pandering to are his ever-faithful and deeply-populist political base.

Populists, by definition, don’t care about foreign policy; to them, the only affairs that matter are domestic. The only members of Trump’s base who may be concerned with Jerusalem are the many evangelicals he mobilized, who probably would prefer that Israel control the Holy City.

Pleasing those folks is enough to assure him that he is doing a good job. If Trump continues to push his “America First” agenda and placate his evangelical supporters, he will stay in their good graces, consequences be damned.

Potential Fallout

The only party this move placated was Israel, which believes it has had legal dominion over Jerusalem since the Six Day War. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been open about his desire to make Jerusalem Israel’s “eternal capital,” so of course he hailed Trump’s decision as a “great service for peace.”

The Palestinian community unsurprisingly balked at Trump’s announcement. Demographically, East Jerusalem is predominantly Arab, with many Palestinian residents who feel they have been treated poorly since Israel stripped them of their international recognition as a country. That has fostered a belief that East Jerusalem, at the very least, rightfully should be under Palestinian control.

Most terrorist groups are, naturally, more sympathetic to the Palestinians’ claim on Jerusalem than Israel’s.

After Trump’s proclamation, ISIS smugly reminded the world that “60 years and Jerusalem has been in the hands of the Jews, and it is only now that people cry when the Crusaders announced today as their capital.”

Trump played right into ISIS’ hands, and chances are good his decision will factor into its recruitment tactics going forward. He is providing terrorist groups with all the motivation they need to continue their violent campaigns.

Exhibit A: The Israeli Shin Bet security service released statistics that showed the number of terrorist attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza tripled from November to December 2017 — right after Trump made his Jerusalem decision public.

That information is only correlative, but the fact it could be plausibly construed as a result of Trump’s precedent-destroying negligence is a troubling sign for how this saga will play out going forward.

 

Caveat: The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not necessarily express the views of either The Institute of Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or The George Washington University.

Why ISIS is Winning

isisfighters
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria fighters marching Raqqa, Syria. Source

 

With an estimated 27,000 foreign fighters joining the Islamic State and its cause, one can’t help but wonder: what is the driving force behind the support? This article aims to provide an answer, as well as a solution to the underlying problem.

What is ISIS?

For those who are unfamiliar with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its major debut happened in 2014, when the Islamic State successfully captured key Iraqi cities, defeated Iraqi government forces, and proclaimed itself as a worldwide Caliphate. Ever since then, there has been a massive push by the Islamic State towards its ultimate goal – the apocalypse.

Contrary to popular belief, ISIS follows a strict medieval form of Islam , which is why it practices very extreme war tactics like crucifixions, beheadings, and slavery. In the Islamic State’s interpretation of the Koran, the apocalypse will bring an end of the world. The prophesy also reads that a reestablished God’s Kingdom on Earth, the Caliphate, will fight a decisive battle at Dabiq against the infidels, where Jesus will join the Caliphate and end the war.

While most ISIS recruits come from the immediate territories captured by ISIS, i.e. Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has a very sophisticated recruitment system in place that draws supporters from around the world.

Recruitment Methods

Islamic State uses sophisticated propaganda tactics to persuade potential recruits and promote their cause. ISIS targets specific groups of people and uses tailored media for different parts of the world. Dabiq, now Rumiyah, is a magazine in English, which caters to English speaking audience, while Dar Al-Islam does the same for French speakers, and Istok for Russian speakers. By diversifying its media, ISIS can influence its targets with regionally-relevant propaganda, which has stronger effect then general propaganda does.

From propaganda videos, to infographics, to extensive social media campaigns, and even a news channel – every piece of propaganda ISIS creates is top quality. By creating visually appealing propaganda that reflects popular media – like video games, TV shows, and pop culture – ISIS is reaching a wide audience and successfully communicating its ideas in a very powerful way.

ISIS associates terrorism with positive ideas and thoughts, and in its methods, uses terror to seduce, not terrorize. Since modern age audience is so susceptible to action and violence, it’s also susceptible to Islamic State’s media. 

Vulnerability

Now, why does the Islamic State make such a great effort to target Muslims across the globe? Short answer: it is easy to influence people who do not feel accepted in society.

You see, Islamic terrorism is all about polarization.

In its propaganda campaigns, the Islamic State targets minority Muslims, who have been oppressed by society. That is also the reason regionally-catered propaganda is so effective.

https://akirk.carto.com/viz/9694dcca-353e-11e5-8d22-0e0c41326911/embed_map

 

The map above shows estimated statistics on foreign recruits who had joined the Islamic State. By using that data, the percentage of recruits who joined ISIS out of total Muslim population can be derived.

chart2

As it is evident from the graph, it is striking that it is countries with a minority Muslim population that have the greatest percentage of fighters joining the Islamic State. This is caused by the pressure the society puts on Muslims. By alienating the Muslim population in Muslim minority countries, great tension is created. Muslims do not feel welcome, feel underrepresented, discriminated against, and seek ways to be recognized. ISIS propaganda acts on those vulnerabilities  making people believe in an ideal society, where they feel welcome and valued.

On the other hand, there is a much lower percentage of Muslims joining the Islamic State from Muslim majority countries. Again, same principles are applied here: Muslims do not feel alienated, undervalued, or underrepresented. They have a voice in their government, are involved in political, social, or even their own radical groups. There is no reason for them to join ISIS unless they truly believe in the cause.

The Islamic State propaganda targets Muslims who lack a sense of unity, and the statistics prove that ISIS tactics are working.

Residents of Iraq and Syria are a bit of a different story, since they felt oppressed by their governments and ISIS promised to raise their quality of life. Since Iraq and Syria are zones of current conflict, it’s much more difficult to gauge residents’ reasons for joining the Islamic State, but judging by the sheer number of refugees fleeing from those countries, it is easy to say that ISIS is not that popular in Iraq and Syria.

Solution

To undermine ISIS recruitment efforts, Muslims, overall, need to be treated fairly. If Muslim minorities got the treatment they deserve, there would be no need for violence and extremism. By creating anti-Muslim policies and by alienating the religion, radical responses are created.

By incorporating Muslims into society through public office, cultural exchange programs, clubs, and sports teams, the sense of undervalue decreases. People who once were angry with the way Muslims were treated, felt alone, or felt segregated against, will have less of a need to join a radical organization – they will feel like their voice is finally heard.

Speaking of being heard, instead of shunning away refugees, give them a voice and safety they try to obtain. If refugees share their first-hand experiences with the Caliphate and with ISIS, many will realize how different the reality is from an image ISIS is trying to sell.

 

Caveat: The views expressed in this blog are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.

master narratives of islamic extremism ISIS ISIL

People of the Book: What Explains the Rise of Extremism in The Muslim World?

 

master narratives of islamic extremism ISIS ISIL
Islamic master narratives are blamed for the rise of terrorism at home and abroad. However, these assertions do not explain the seeming explosion of extremism. (Koran Image: CC BY 2.0 | Flickr: Crystalina, Video Still: Islamic State Video)

Perhaps one of the defining characteristics of religion is that it provides a structure for adherents to process the world around them. For the world’s Muslims, who have been rocked by isolated waves of violent extremism in recent decades, their religion provides a rich cultural history that is interwoven with grand narratives of holy wars, martyrs, and heroes. Scholars and public diplomacy officials are quick to point to these more violent narratives as the root cause of Islamic extremism—but these assertions do not explain why Islam, of all the world’s religions, has been most affected. These explanations, whether intentionally or not, ignore or minimize the effects of eroding political and religious control centers and rising global secularism that have acutely affected Muslim population centers.

The Rationale for Muslim Extremism

It is hard to fault scholars for trying to simplify the origins of this outbreak to a narrative susceptibility of the Muslim faith. In public diplomacy, where words are actions, exploring the cultural schema of a foreign community is an important exercise that can ensure that no communication further emboldens the very extremists that a communicator is trying to undermine. Of course, religions of all types include stories of war, conflict, and worldly struggles that have cosmic ramifications. And the overwhelming majority of religious scholars acknowledge that some of these cultural master narratives – especially the Abrahamic faiths of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism – provide a framework for individuals to process events that can run counter to western secular values. One needs only to look to the overt religious themes of Islamic State beheading videos or the hate mongering screed that fills Aryan Nations message boards to see what a religious narrative used to mobilize extremism looks like.

aryan nations members salute flag
Three Aryan Nations members salute with a banner that incorporates religious and patriotic symbols in this undated photograph from a website purporting to represent the group. (Image: Susan Hillman | aryannationsworldwide1488.org)

However, the Muslim world has been suffering from the acute effects of power vacuums of religion and state that have left room for extremist groups to grow accompanied by a rising global secularism that has increasingly alienated devout Muslims. In the midst of this societal turmoil, isolated pockets of fundamentalist believers and psychologically disturbed malcontents are prone to radicalization and acts of violence.

Power Vacuums of Religion and State

While Western governments are not entirely immune to the effects of eroding public trust, Islamic nations — particularly those states where groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda have staked out a presence — have been racked by wars, coups and general unrest that involve complex structural problems in governance, demographics, and economics. Against this general backdrop of instability is an increasingly violent schism between various sects of Islam (namely fundamentalist Sunni and Shia groups) that can now reach a global audience with their specific brands of Islam.

At one time, the splintering effects of sectarianism were mitigated by the Muslim caliphs. As secular and spiritual leaders, they defined the faith for their followers and fulfilled a spiritual need for an Allah-sanctioned ruler on earth who could separate “right” interpretations from apostasy. Nominally secular governments took the caliphs place in the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, some even providing religious leadership in the form of state sanctioned imams who work closely with political leaders to align state policy with the Koran. Even today, the close relationship  between government and religion is supported by a plurality among Muslims in these nations who want to see religious leaders take on more political control.

middle-east-north-africa-social-hostilities-pew
Image: Pew Research Center

However, when these secular governments fail to keep the peace in the Middle East, the power vacuums are often filled with religious extremists– especially in nations where government’s implicit support for harsh treatment of religious minorities, “heretics” and “apostates” is present.  Weak or oppressive governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in Syria and Iraq have been blamed for the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIL.

Rising Secularism and Group Identification Pressures

At the same time, devout Muslims are facing a world that is increasingly ignorant of and outright hostile towards religion. Western nations with high percentages of Christian residents like the U.S., U.K., and Germany embrace religious freedom and tolerate religious practice. There are correspondingly low rates of radicalization in these countries. However, nations like France, which enshrines secularism and the exclusion of ecclesiastical control and influence in its constitution, are moving towards a new paradigm where liberalism and secularization means rejection of the “close-mindedness” and “backwards” thinking that accompanies religious practice. Muslims, who are cast as demeaning women and are a rapidly growing demographic in Europe, have been a visible target of reforms that ban full body Islamic religious dress like the niqab or the “burkini.” Other Abrahamic religions have largely discarded these practices, or their religious dress has been normalized over centuries of exposure. These same conservative Muslims are being asked to condemn fundamentalist extremists’ faith and “moderate” their behavior. This in-group, out-group mentality, and the disdain for religious peoples that accompanies it, alienate Muslims who themselves are fundamentalists, but have come to different conclusions about what their faith requires. Charismatic extremist groups like ISIL use this forced black/white, secular/religious paradigm to recruit fundamentalists and other disaffected Westerners who are drawn to the meaning and sense of purpose that a religious group can offer in an increasingly relativistic world.

muslim woman niqab france 2010
A Muslim woman wears a niqab in France in this 2010 photo. Image: CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 | Flickr User anw-fr

 A Rational Conclusion to Fundamentalist Oppression

After making the leap to extremism, fundamentalist adherents can easily rationalize acts of war and terrorism to further their geo-political goals as God’s will for their movement. For the Islamic State, this means conquering territory and drawing the west into a war that their members believe will trigger the apocalypse. For Al-Qaeda before them, it meant using terrorism to draw concessions from Western military forces abroad. Misguided attempts by the west to fight this extremism have only further inflamed tensions that excite members to join and fight.

Western nations must be vigilant in their efforts to minimize further impact of these global trends that have bolstered the rise of Islamic extremism and must be wary of ignoring these problems at home. Banning religious dress, forcing secularism, and otherwise alienating religious groups will only lead to more extremism, as France has seen after multiple local ordinances banning conservative Muslim dress became international news.

The rise of Islamic extremism is a lesson for the world’s leaders: Wherever people feel oppressed, ignored, and alienated in their own country; or where government leaves a vacuum of power, control, or support; there is ample opportunity for charismatic groups to provide the solution.

The views expressed in this blog are the author’s only and do not necessarily reflect those of George Washington University.

We’re Giving the ISIL Media Campaign Too Much Credit

Demonstrators in support of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) carry al-Qaida flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, 225 miles (360 kilometers) northwest of Baghdad, Iraq, June 16, 2014. Source: Voice of America
Demonstrators in support of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) carry al-Qaida flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, 225 miles (360 kilometers) northwest of Baghdad, Iraq, June 16, 2014. Source: Voice of America

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, commonly referred to as ISIL, ISIS or just IS, has certainly displayed not just surprising military prowess, but also significant communication skill as it has grown into a meaningful force in a vital region of the world. Buttressed by successes on the ground in Syria and Iraq, it has positioned itself in the Islamic world as a rival to al Qaeda and perhaps even its successor.

To the extent the Islamic State is engaged in an information war with al Qaeda, whose leadership threw ISIL out of the club for being too violent, it is definitely winning.

But a number of national security commentators have gone so far as to suggest the Islamic State is winning a propaganda war with the United States and the West. This is giving the Islamic State too much credit.

Exposure and influence are two different things.

The Islamic State is communicating effectively. It has shown remarkable sophistication in its media campaign. Its latest video, featuring British journalist John Cantlie in Shakespearian fashion asking his audience to “lend its ears” to hear the “other side” of the ISIL story is “diabolical” as one commentator suggested.

ISIL does seem to be growing in strength – at least for the moment. Its ranks include true believers in the formation of a Caliphate and others who see it as the lesser of evils compared to the governments of Iraq and Syria. It has shown an ability to attract a meaningful number of young men from Europe and the United States.

This is advertising. And as a relatively small but nonetheless a sadly compelling niche, the ISIL brand is advancing. Hopefully, as more and more people realize how unappealing the product really is, ISIL will steadily lose market share over time.

But in its outreach beyond the Muslim world, where the propaganda rubber hits the strategic road, the “information effect” of the media campaign is the opposite of what ISIL claims it wants.

In theory, the Islamic State message to the West is, “Leave us alone.” But the net effect of recent videos, particularly the gruesome murders of James Foley and Steven Sotloff, has been the formation of a coalition of countries dedicated to confronting and defeating the movement both militarily and politically.

Propaganda or strategic communication, its modern corollary, is supposed to create an information environment that enables a broader strategy to succeed. ISIL’s communications have actually crystallized international public opinion in opposition to its movement.

Sunni-led countries are prepared to take direct action in support of the Shia-led government in Baghdad, something that rarely occurred over the previous decade. Western countries that were previously reluctant to get re-involved in Iraq, including the United States, are now conducting air strikes against ISIL forces.

It is also possible the Islamic State is trying to draw America back into an active military conflict in the Middle East, trying to reinvigorate perceptions of a Western “war against Islam.” But here again, Washington, London and other capitals are committed to helping regional forces in Iraq and Syria against ISIL, ensuring this is appropriately framed as a struggle within Islam.

Strategic communications is not about the channel or the connection but the effect. If an information campaign actually makes it harder to win the war, it’s a strategic failure, not a success.

Making Sense of US Commitment to Afghanistan through Public Diplomacy

The recent decision by Afghan President Karzai to postpone signing a security arrangement on the continued presence of U.S. troops is apt to confuse an already confused Afghan and American public about the future bilateral relationship that will define post-2014. It is hard for any casual observer or media consumer to make sense out of the daily conflicting stories on whether or not American engagement in Afghanistan will be sustained next year. One of the key challenges of public diplomacy is to match rhetoric with actions on the ground and make a convincing argument to citizens.

An issue where the U.S. has stepped up its promises and rhetoric as well as its policy is around standing by Afghan women and girls—a promise we should keep. It is in America’s interest to see women-–a large segment of Afghan society–educated, trained, active and engaged in securing peace in a country in which we have invested a dozen years of money and lives. The women of Afghanistan are the loudest champions of peace and reconciliation in that troubled land.

Good public diplomacy and good policy are reflected in the announcement just a few months ago from the U.S. Agency for International Development a new, five-year $200 million assistance program for Afghan women called “Promote,” a sign of U.S. seriousness of purpose. The announcement, made in a speech by USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah at the U.S. Institute of Peace in July underscored the continued American commitment to success in Afghanistan—success that Shah argued is “fundamentally grounded in a society that creates opportunity for women and girls.”  The new USAID program will propel the education, training and promotion of young women in Afghan government, business and civil society, building on successes as measured in the rise of girls enrolled in Afghan schools.

Screen capture from a video featuring an expert panel on women's empowerment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace, July 18, 2013. Source: YouTube
Screen capture from a video featuring an expert panel on women’s empowerment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace, July 18, 2013. Source: YouTube

That announcement was echoed recently at Georgetown University by Secretary of State Kerry, standing with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former First Lady Laura Bush—another good example of bipartisan public diplomacy.

In the first few months of 2014, President Obama will have opportunities to clear up any fog about American ambitions for Afghanistan, including with the State of the Union in February—the ultimate public diplomacy opportunity.  (Twelve years ago in 2002, George W. Bush used his State of the Union speech to signal America’s commitment to Afghan women and to underscore signs of progress: “The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today, women are free and are part of Afghanistan’s new government.”)

Another place to make the case for US-Afghan relations is on social media–a growing platform for public diplomacy around the world. Today, Afghan women and girls are using social media to make their anxiety about the future known. Zahra is a 23-year old Afghan woman, and currently an undergraduate student at the American University of Afghanistan studying business administration. She shared her anxiety on the website WhyDev, which is dedicated to the Voice of Afghanistan’s youth:

“I live in fear more and more as each day passes and it gets closer to 2014.

Everybody is talking about civil war again. Everybody has a plan to leave Afghanistan; they want to have a better life. .. Today, in our office, my colleague said she put her house on the market and wants to go to Australia. “But how?”, I asked. She said –like everybody else that goes… “With an invitation? Do you know somebody there? Will they send you invitation letter?

We are getting crazy thinking about 2014 and civil war. We can’t enjoy our time right now as it passes. We are losing our time as these fears enter our mind…

I fear what will happen. The only image that I have of the  Taliban is of men with a huge turbans, big weapons, Afghan clothes and lots of beards and mustaches. They do not like educated women like me. They want to kill those girls who go to universities or schools…. I am confused. What will be Afghanistan’s future?”

Zahra, like many Afghan girls, wants to know that America’s investment in Afghanistan doesn’t end as the troops leave.  Education for Afghan girls has improved in Afghanistan from the 1990s when the Taliban pretty much prohibited it. Today, according to the World Bank and USAID, close to a third of Afghan girls attend primary school. Around 120,000 young women have completed secondary school. In total, at least 200,000 Afghan women now have at least a diplomacy from secondary school, some form of a university degree or some equivalent study. But leaves two-thirds of Afghan girls, waiting for a chance.

In the end, time will tell what the Afghan government will do for its own society, what international foundations and funders will provide, and how committed the United States and the international community can afford to remain in the lives of the Afghan people, in particular its women and girls.  For now, the challenge is to keep hope alive and prevent backsliding.  Promises are important to keep. 

Lessons from the Field?

Cover of the latest report by the Center for International Studies on Public Diplomacy. Source: CSIS.org
Cover of the latest report by the Center for International Studies on Public Diplomacy. Source: CSIS.org

I had the opportunity to attend the public launch of a new report on Public Diplomacy today by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  Entitled “Engaging the Muslim World,” the report is well worth reading and includes a few key highlights that are applicable to public diplomacy practiced by the U.S. worldwide.

The author, Foreign Service officer and public diplomacy practitioner Walter Douglas, noted that the report was intended to fill a gap left by many of the other reports and studies produced by think tanks and academia on the subject of public diplomacy over the last several years – namely, the perspective of PD practitioners in the field.

As a fellow PD practitioner (and colleague of Walter’s), I couldn’t agree more.  As Walter and his report point out, everything from the messages, audiences, tools, programs, partners, and resources that we deploy in our public diplomacy efforts will vary widely depending on the local context and the country that we operate in.  Such variety, moreover, defies easy characterization and generalization by Washington-based observers and policy makers.

Walter also made another important point in his presentation today.  No matter how important and worthwhile we think public diplomacy may be, in the current budget environment we should not expect the United States government or the U.S. Congress to dedicate additional resources to public diplomacy. As a result, we need to focus on using our current resources to maximum effect. This speaks to the need for good strategic planning; identifying, replicating, and scaling best practices; and – in my view – enlisting the field perspectives to make sure our efforts are targeted appropriately in each country and not simply scattershot to broad regions or the world writ large.

Other important points in the report that will come as no surprise to those of us who follow or practice public diplomacy include the value of exchanges, alumni, English teaching, and other traditional programs, as well as the importance of face-to-face diplomacy, vernacular language ability, and the need to get out of our secure embassy compounds and into the local societies that we are trying to reach.

I’d be interested in other reactions to the report and any comments on these or other recurring topics in the public diplomacy field.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.

Annual Roberts Lecture Covers Benghazi, Iran, and Future of U.S. Diplomacy

Amb. Thomas Pickering (right) engages in conversation with Frank Sesno (left), director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, for the 3rd Annual Walter Roberts Lecture. Credit: Alexei Agaryshev.
Amb. Thomas Pickering (right) engages in conversation with Frank Sesno (left), director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, for the 3rd Annual Walter Roberts Lecture. Credit: Alexei Agaryshev.

On Tuesday, distinguished ambassador Thomas Pickering spoke at GWU’s School of Media and Public Affairs (on his birthday, no less!) about his experience on the advisory panel that investigated the 2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, as well as Russia, Iran, and the future of U.S. public diplomacy.

The talk was part of the Third Annual Walter Roberts Lecture, which brings in prominent figures in public diplomacy practice and academia to speak on relevant issues of the times.

Tara Sonenshine, who spoke at the Second Annual Walter Roberts Lecture, responded in a blog post on her sentiments in introducing the ambassador. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and current Professor of Practice at GWU, PJ Crowley, was also in attendance, as well as Frank Sesno, director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, who led the conversation with the ambassador.

Some tweets from the event:

Thank you to all who attended. Please visit our website for a video and transcript of the event here.