by Jacob Outwin
On October 7, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chiles v. Salazar.[1] The case calls on the Court to decide whether Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy for minors violates a state-licensed counselor’s right to free speech.[2]
Conversion therapy—clinically referred to as sexual orientation and gender identity change efforts (“SOCE”)—is an “attempt[] to change a person’s sexual orientation, gender identity, or related behaviors,” and this practice “stems from the scientifically discredited belief that being LGBTQ+ is a mental illness that should be cured.”[3] There is broad consensus among professional associations calling for an end to SOCE, including the American Psychological Association (“APA”) and American Medical Association (“AMA”).[4] The APA has noted that SOCE not only promotes the continued social stigmatization of members of the LGBTQ community, but it also lacks a scientific basis and leads to increased rates of depression, anxiety, and suicidality in individuals previously exposed to it.[5]
The central issue presented in Chiles first appeared in the federal courts of appeals in 2014.[6] Since then, a total of four circuits have taken up the issue and come to a variety of conclusions.[7] The clearest point of contention between the courts of appeals concerns the appropriate level of scrutiny.[8] The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have applied rational basis review to uphold bans,[9] the Third Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold a ban,[10] and the Eleventh Circuit has applied strict scrutiny to strike down a ban.[11] This disagreement makes sense because SOCE carried out through talk therapy does not appear to fit squarely within the categories of “conduct” or “pure speech.”
Given the shortcoming of existing doctrine, this blog argues that, in resolving the Chiles appeal, the Court should consider a clinical speech exception to the First Amendment to best balance states’ rights with individual liberties.
Continue reading ““Do No Harm” Unless Through Words? Defining a Clinical Speech Exception to the First Amendment”