Beauty Pageants as an Environmental Public Diplomacy Platform

Miss Philippines tryout

by Katherine Cincotta

The Miss Earth Pageant: A prime example of cultural diplomacy used to increase awareness of environmental issues, or a standard beauty pageant that only pays lip service to environmental issues?

The pageant, held annually in the Philippines, has two primary goals. The first is to “…have its candidates and winners actively promote and get involved in the preservation of the environment and the protection of Mother Earth.” The pageant winner, chosen from a group representing nearly 100 nations, agrees to commit a year of service promoting environmental projects around the world, such as cleaning up beaches or planting trees with a community.

Beauty Pageant Tree photoEnvironmental diplomacy is what first comes to mind when I hear “Miss Earth;” a pageant that showcases the environmental concerns and projects from diverse countries.

In prior years the pageant did a fair job of incorporating environmentalism into its production. The 2008 pageant, for example, included montages of the contestants’ projects, as well as questions directly related to the environment.  In 2012, however, much of the environmental focus in the pageant had been cut down. There were several shorter montages of contestants mentioning their environmental goals briefly. Overall, the pageant generally progresses as any other would, with an assortment of clothing changes, and not much else. The sole question asked of the contestants in the 2012 pageant was: “what would you consider your defining moment as a woman?” Consistent with the rest of the pageant, the word “environment” was barely mentioned in the responses.

The second goal of the pageant is to “…showcase and promote various tourist destinations.” The promotion of diverse destinations would give each location an opportunity to showcase how they are specifically impacted by environmental issues. Thus far attempts to hold the pageant in locations outside of the Philippines have generally fallen through. Going into the thirteenth year of the pageant, Miss Earth has only successfully been held outside of the Philippines once; when it was held in Vietnam in 2010.

As one of the largest pageants in the world, behind Miss World and Miss Universe, Miss Earth has the potential to draw a large audience. In addition to the potential economic benefits, hosting the pageant would allow a country to highlight its culture, as well as its own specific environmental concerns. For example, if the pageant were held in Haiti, the country could convey their struggle with natural disasters and how they have been impacted by climate change.

Beauty Pageant enviro mapClimate change is currently one of the most pressing environmental concerns globally. Many of the countries that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as Bangladesh, Malawi and Madagascar, would benefit from hosting Miss Earth to draw attention to the concerns and cultures of their small country. Assuming the pageant airs internationally, it has the potential to reach millions of viewers. This begs the question, which countries actually broadcast it? The Miss World Pageant is viewed by an estimated 2 billion people a year globally, and over 1 billion watch Miss Universe. The numbers on Miss Earth, meanwhile, are much more difficult to track down. Though the pageant claims to be one of the largest in the world, how many people globally are aware that it exists? What can be done to increase its viewership?

One reason that Miss Earth may not yet have reached its full viewership potential is funding. Of the five main sponsors of the pageant, Hewlett Packard is the most notable. As one of the Top 25 “greenest” companies in the world according to Newsweek, HP has the ability to influence and collaborate on pageant events. If other green corporations were similarly willing to sponsor Miss Earth, the necessary funds may allow the pageant to be held in a variety of locations, and to reach its full potential as an environmental public diplomacy platform. Other companies that made Newsweek’s list include Google and McGraw-Hill, two companies that would be able to use their marketing platforms to help promote the pageant.

In addition to funding, another constraint that would prevent some countries from hosting Miss Earth is Beauty Pageant Afghanistancultural barriers. In particular, many Muslim countries (such as Bangladesh) have outlawed pageants altogether. Though it may not be possible for every country to host the pageant that does not mean citizens of every country cannot get involved. In 2003 Miss Earth made headlines when Miss Afghanistan, Vida Samadzai, became the first Afghan woman to participate in a beauty pageant in 30 years, particular notice was given to her participation in the bikini portion of the pageant. In moderate countries, could it be possible to adapt the pageant to fit cultural norms? As the main goal of the pageant is spreading environmental awareness, could it still be effective? It may be beneficial if the pageant was first held in more liberal and environmentally conscious societies, such as Brazil so that smaller or somewhat more conservative countries could see the benefits that the pageant can bring with it.

Because pageants are popular globally, and young girls aspire to be like pageant contestants, Miss Earth could create a platform for environmental diplomacy, particularly for the younger generations. Perhaps in part due to funding constraints and cultural barriers, the pageant unfortunately has not yet been able to reach its full potential public diplomacy and awareness-raising potential. In turn, the pageant overall currently seem somewhat superficial.

If changes were made, Miss Earth may have the potential to act as a subset of Cosmopolitan Constructivism, which Cesar Villanueva Rivas describes as “constructing long-lasting friendly relations among states by inviting their societies to learn from each other in the construction of cosmopolitan cultural attitudes.”  In other words, with increased funding and more emphasis on environmentalism during the show, the Miss Earth pageant could allow people of different countries and cultures to establish common environmental interests or concerns. Could this realization of shared goals in turn lead to the creation of a platform on which environmental collaboration could take place?

The above post is from Take Five’s new Student Perspective series. Graduate students studying Cultural Diplomacy as Communication at the George Washington University are encouraged to think about themes such as youth, gender, health, climate, free press, and democracy, and write on how these themes relate to cultural diplomacy and to communication.  The posts involve thoughtful commentary on the writer’s chosen theme, linking to class readings and discussions. 

The Book on Iraq and Afghanistan: Lessons Learned

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In Vietnam, the United States fought a counterinsurgent war on behalf of a government lacking popular legitimacy using primarily conventional tactics in support of a flawed strategic objective that turned out to be inconsequential to the broader Cold War struggle against Communism. The primary lesson learned, particularly within the Army, was “never again.”

However, a decade ago, a cadre of officers well schooled in irregular warfare and intrastate conflicts, eventually marshaled by General David Petraeus, scrambled to rearticulate the lost principles of counterinsurgency deliberately buried after Vietnam, incorporate them into a new Army doctrine and apply them (appropriately) in Iraq and (less so) in Afghanistan.

This experience is compellingly detailed in Fred Kaplan’s book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.

Kaplan cautions whether the military is capturing the right lessons or adequately incorporating them into future planning. Coupled with the Obama administration’s understandable reluctance after unwinding two wars to engage in large-scale interventions any time soon, the risk is that the military will walk away from counterinsurgency doctrine when the war in Afghanistan ends next year, just as it did after Vietnam.

The Insurgents offers several strategic lessons regarding the nature of future conflict; how the United States should wage war; and key factors that will determine success or failure.

The first is the preeminence of political rather than military outcomes. As Kaplan relates, Petraeus adopted the dictum that counterinsurgency is 80 percent political and 20 percent military. That is likely to be true with any future intervention.

The United States entered Afghanistan and Iraq knowing what it wanted to eliminate – Osama bin Laden’s sanctuary and Saddam Hussein’s regime – but with only a vague conception of a desired strategic end state. In Iraq, the lack of a post-conflict strategy was not an oversight, but deliberate. In neither case was there a grasp of the political, social and cultural forces in those countries that would shape the eventual outcomes.

 

Regime change is not the end of the war, only the end of the first phase. The desired end state, a government with perceived legitimacy that earns the support of a large cross-section of the local population, is very difficult. This is not only clear from the mixed results achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Libya as well.

An effective plan for the conflict and what happens afterwards requires integrated civilian and military action, a second lesson. This rarely happened over the past 12 years. While there was an effective partnership in Iraq between Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the norm involved civilians and the military pulling in different directions. The worst case involved Paul Bremer’s ill-advised orders regarding the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and de-Ba’athification of the government, uncoordinated steps that fueled if not generated the insurgency.

Future interventions will involve a “whole of government” effort, involving not just soldiers and diplomats, but development experts in wide-ranging fields from agriculture, policing and justice to energy, commerce and communication. Unfortunately, the United States government is not structured to plan or naturally operate that way. As it is, Congress fully funds only one element of national power, the military. Given the military cuts associated with sequestration, Congress over time may be tempted to restore some of them with offsets from non-defense discretionary accounts. If so, this will only widen the gap between military and civilian capabilities.

The third lesson regards time. Wars of insurgency are by nature “slow and messy.” Kaplan questions whether the American people are unwilling to support such long, complicated and costly endeavors.

While this remains a richly debated field of study, the American people gave its leaders 12 years to succeed in Afghanistan and eight years in Iraq. While some have already argued the military has been withdrawn too quickly, the fact is the United States squandered too much time developing workable strategies and putting appropriate levels of resource in place.

Going forward, any intervention will be a race against time. Better strategic planning is an imperative. Given the emerging global media environment, the perceived legitimacy of any action is on the clock with no time to waste.

Given how lethal force can be delivered through more technology and fewer troops, future Presidents will be tempted to solve the time problem by engaging in high-tech wars without mobilizing the American people or the government. But given the proliferation of smartphones with cameras linked to the Internet and social media like Facebook and Twitter, future warfare will still be influenced by public opinion. Governments may choose to ignore the impact, as is happening now in Pakistan, but public pressure can be expected to increase, overseas if not at home.

The final lesson is simple, yet compelling. If we are not confident that military action can be decisive, the most prudent decision may be not to intervene militarily in the first place. This is certainly not easy with various constituencies calling on the United States to “do something.” But the reality is that, if future conflict is mostly political, military action may incur profound costs without actually solving the problem.

This appears to be the one lesson that has been put into practice. The result, right or wrong, is evident in Syria.