Saudi Arabia: Contender for Superpower State in a New World Order

By Tahreem Alam, Masters in International Affairs ‘23

Saudi Arabia has taken key economic issues into its own hands, worrying its Western
counterparts and prompting reactions from the Biden administration. These actions are
reflected in Saudi Arabia’s oil policies, which is increasingly pursuing its own interest and
often seen at an expense to the U.S.

OPEC+, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, announced that the cartel would cut oil production
by around 1.2 million barrels a day, or 1 percent of global production.

The justification behind these slightly-dramatic decisions continue to indicate Saudi Arabia’s
perception of themselves in the global order, which is a regional leader acting on its own
sovereignty.

Last fall, Saudi Arabia, a member of OPEC+, decided to cut oil production by 2 million
barrels during a time when the US pushed Saudi Arabia to produce more oil. Saudi Arabia
argued that the agreement was solely an economic one for the sake of recovering from
COVID-era losses and stabilizing the economy in the face of an impending global recession;
however, the US argued this move was political in nature and not purely for economic self-
interest.

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy referred to key system narratives to take its position: most
importanyl, (1) the role of OPEC+ in the global market; (2) international economic pressures;
and (3) Western vs. Eastern/Global South influence in combating the US narrative of this
problem. System narratives are essentially ways of understanding how countries interact with
one another.

Additionally, several issues were used to help prop this argument, including the Ukraine-
Russia conflict, the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy and oil prices in the past
two years, and domestic economic issues Saudi Arabia faces following recent years of low oil
prices.

This chart provides an example of how Saudi Arabia might see itself in this political chess
game for a superpower role:

Battle of the Narratives – Saudi Arabia and OPEC +

Master & Identity NarrativesSystem NarrativesIssue Narratives
Normal country pursuing self-interest  

Hegemonic power  

Responsibility to care for citizens  

Leader in Arabian Gulf  

State not playing in the hands of others



Rearrangement of power dynamics  

System functions on OPEC rules and decisions  

Battle for control of the global economy (superpower western state vs. Global South)  









 
Ukraine-Russia War  

Oil deal is an economic issue unrelated to political goals in the U.S.  

Need for making up lost revenue from COVID-19 oil prices  

High oil prices will stabilize Saudi economy and inflation  

Economic issues from global pandemic foundation of oil prices  

Purely economic decision in the face of a global recession rise

The Role of the US

In spite of Saudi Arabia’s recent moves, the West still holds far greater influence over the
region from a social and economic standpoint (China, another global power in the region, has
made in not making the US an enemy). However, this doesn’t mean that the US shouldn’t
acknowledge the rapidly-changing power dynamics in regional state conflicts.

It’s difficult to offer plausible diplomatic advice to this matter, especially since Saudi Arabia
is ignoring the global status quo and US-Western opinion for oil production. Ignoring these
developments could lead to long-term side effects of a decreased position of power in the
global arena, which the US might just have to accept anyway as the world moves away from
a Western-centric hegemonic system.

Time will tell if this is a blip in the drawn-out shift to a multipolar world, or if Saudi Arabia
has succeeded in placing itself as a contender for a future superpower status.

The full report is available here.


The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University. 

A Fallen France? French Identity Narratives Viewed through the AUKUS Deal

By Jesse Tanson, MA International Affairs ’22

The AUKUS incident between France, the United States, and Australia occurred due to a contract breach between Australia and France. Australian authorities had contracted France to develop shortfin barracuda submarines to meet its maritime defense needs in 2016 for $38.6 billion. As the deal was delayed and costs increased, the Australian government decided to opt for American-built submarines because they have nuclear capabilities. The abandonment of the deal provoked the removal of the French ambassador to the United States, a first in the history of the Franco-American relationship. Ambassador Etienne returned to Paris for a brief period before returning to his post. The event prompted conversations about alliances and France’s role in the world.

France in the U.S.’ world?

The projection of power was key to the formation of modern France. As an empire, France saw its power expand throughout the world and the country was synonymous with influence.

Until WWII, France saw itself as a world power, influential militarily and culturally. However, its leadership in the world waned as the United States became the world superpower following WWII when the US helped the French fight the Germans, hurting Paris’ pride. Furthermore, the U.S. had obtained nuclear weapons and spread its culture globally, ousting France from the top position. To reclaim its identity as a top contender in a U.S.-dominated world, France developed its own nuclear arms program. In other words, Charles de Gaulle saw it necessary for France to arm itself with nuclear weapons to reassert its dominance in the new world order.

Similarlyfor President Macron, nuclear power is equal to French world leadership. Macron announced a nuclear buildup of 14 generators to reduce carbon emissions and reliance on foreign energy, namely from Russia. Now France also hopes to best the United States and China in the nuclear power race. If France can become Europe’s top nuclear power producer, it can position itself as a worthy adversary of the United States.

Paris still holds onto its former colonies as trade partners, but increased Chinese involvement in the region may drive away French business. The AUKUS deal represented another defeat to French power, prompting it to react strongly. Paris needed to show resolve in the face of its people, Europe, and the world.

A stab in the back?


French Minister of Foreign Affairs Yves Le Drian (Community Commons)

The immediate ending of the $38.6 billion deal shocked the world, not least of all the French. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Yves Le Drian called the dropping of France in the deal “a stab in the back.” Following a conversation with the Australian Prime Minister, President Macron alleged that he was lied to about the failed submarine deal. The U.S. actions attacked France’s falling self-image. The deal demonstrated to France that it would be a second-choice partner, behind the United States. As it struggled to reclaim its lost glory, France found its plans thwarted by U.S. enterprise. Furthermore, the failure of the deal demonstrates the American hegemony against which France has fought for several decades. In France’s view, the United States violated norms in pursuit of its interests, slighting its European allies in favor of its Anglophone partnerships. The submarines France intended to sell to Australia were non-nuclear, per agreements to half nuclear proliferation. From this perspective, France sees the United States as violating agreements established by democracies with shared values. Thus the AUKUS deal struck to the heart of France’s identity of a nuclear power with global trade ambitions. 

A Simple Mistake?

The AUKUS deal represented a breach of trust for the French and larger European community, an opportunity to better arm itself for Australia, and another means to secure the indo-pacific for the United States. To resolve the issue, President Joe Biden met with President Emmanuel Macron. The two heads of state addressed the deal, with the American leader referring to the turn of events as “clumsy.” President Biden claimed that he was under the impression that France was aware of the switching of clients. The difference in perspective reveals differences in the larger identity narratives of the two countries. France’s concern was its image as a world power, which has dwindled in recent history. The deal, for France, would have returned lost prestige to the country. France falls behind the United States and Russia as the third-largest weapons exporter globally. The United States, possessing the title of the world’s greatest superpower, merely acted in line with its own identity; it sought to ensure security. The fact that France was caught in crossfires was a blunder, as President Biden explained.


US President Biden and French President Macron (AP Photo)

Reinforced Cooperation?

Though the AUKUS affair ended with the return of French Ambassador Etienne and the two sides found an agreement, what would this mean for France? France successfully defended itself against the United States and was successful in obtaining an admission of guilt from the American president.

For more on the topic by the author, please click here.


The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University. 

Sustaining Free Trade Through Narrative Diplomacy: New Zealand & the US

By Alexia Ross, MA Media and Strategic Communication ’22

New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, is preparing for upcoming economic talks with the Biden White House.

New Zealand is a country that the global community does not often associate with international conflict. While not a regular participant in clashes between the world’s dominant forces, New Zealand faces increasing concerns about the impacts of transnational conflicts on its economy. New Zealand is highly import-dependent, with international trade making up over 60% of the country’s economic activities. With rising global tensions that threaten to impact trade routes, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, New Zealand officials are beginning to raise alarms about potential economic and supply implications.

New Zealand’s prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, is putting the protection of free trade at the top of the country’s foreign affairs agenda. She plans to meet with leaders from several key economic powers in the coming months. In early 2022, New Zealand cemented a free trade agreement with the United Kingdom that will bolster bilateral trade and reinforce strong relations between the countries that should, in theory, support continued economic collaboration even in times of international crisis.

Ardern is expected to meet with US officials in May to lock down another vital ally in free trade potentially. The US is New Zealand’s third-biggest trade partner, providing goods like cars and medical equipment. In preparation for this meeting, Ardern’s communication’s team should strategically leverage compelling narratives in her statement to the general US audience, thereby gaining public support for a bilateral trade deal between the two democratic nations.

An Opportunity Connection with US Public

Strategic narratives are an essential tool for appealing to potential allies, allowing governments to find common ground and values to nurture the relationship with the public of target nations. Ardern and her team could pursue a strong trade agreement to safeguard New Zealand’s trade-based economy by leveraging a number of narrative genres that both invoke a sense of shared identity between the nations and touch on some more US-centric narratives.

There are three main narrative structures that Ardern must consider in her speech:

  • Master and identity narratives that draw on a nation’s history and self-identifying characteristics;
  • System narratives that characterize a nation’s relationship with the rest of the world;
  • And issue narratives that address current events in the nations

The following chart showcases trade narratives that the US and New Zealand share, making them prime examples of values that Ardern should draw on when speaking to the US public.

Shared US & New Zealand Trade Narratives

Identity/Master NarrativeSystem NarrativeIssue Narrative
Leaders in production industry  

Participant in Global Markets
Global economic hierarchy  

Maintaining trans-national trade patterns

Free Trade  

Capitalism  

Alliance of Democratic Nations    

Rising China  

Growing concerns over China and its tensions with global powers  

Russia/Ukraine conflict impacting international trade, connotations for future  

Global supply chain challenges

A Path Forward

New Zealand is approaching this meeting with a backdrop of positive history with the US. A readout of a 2021 call between Biden and Ardern noted, “They discussed our interest in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and President Biden underscored the enduring U.S. commitment to the region.”

When speaking to the US public in favor of a new trade deal, Prime Minister Ardern will want to draw out commonalities in free-market values. Ardern and her team should utilize a narrative of the importance of a “free, democratic, secure and prosperous world” in light of any range of global complications, and highlight how this partnership plays into the US’s existing frames of economic collaboration with a diverse grouping of nations

New Zealand can leverage current events as a tool for persuasion – arguing that firm partnerships can ensure that global trade is grounded and can remain stable in tumultuous circumstances. Tensions in the Indo-Pacific trade system due to conflict between China and other global superpowers, like the US, are of regional and global concern to Kiwis and Americans alike. By noting the risks for both the US and New Zealand’s economic freedoms if China was to disrupt trade in the region, Ardern could stoke strong emotional support for a trade agreement.

Utilizing a few more US-centric frames may also be helpful in developing public support for the partnership. For example, the US knows that it is a global superpower and acknowledges its role in global affairs. There is an expectation that US leaders will protect the reputation of the country as economic and humanitarian leaders. By touching on these identity narratives in her statement, Ardern would draw on the public’s desire to see its government showcase American values on the global stage.

Through the strategic use of narratives, Prime Minister Ardern could stoke pressure from a broad US audience, initiating an extra nudge that could push the Biden Administration to formalize a new trade agreement between the nations. For these reasons and more, Ardern’s messaging to the US public must be deliberate, highlighting why this deal is essential to both countries’ economic agendas.

For more on the topic by the author, please click here.


The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University. 

Strategic Communications and Foreign Policy: A Conversation with an NSC Press Spokesperson

Emily Horne in Conversation with Janet Steele, ESIA, October 2016
Emily Horne in conversation with Janet Steele, ESIA, October 2016

In a conversation moderated by IPDGC’s program director Janet Steele, National Security Council Press Spokesperson Emily Horne answered questions about her role in the NSC, its media strategy, and elaborated to students about her career path. Students, faculty, and industry professionals attended this event and were invited to join in for the second half of the conversation.

Emily Horne is currently an Assistant Press Secretary and Director for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council, where she serves as spokesperson for a range of foreign policy issues and advises White House and other senior U.S. government officials on media and strategic communications. Before joining the National Security Council she was the director of communications for General John Allen, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, where she built the communications strategy for the Obama Administration’s counter-ISIL efforts and traveled to over 30 countries supporting international efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL. She has also served as Spokesperson for the State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, including temporary tours as spokesperson for the U.S. Embassies in Sri Lanka and Nepal. She began her career in government as an unpaid intern in the State Department’s Office of the Historian.

Making Sense of US Commitment to Afghanistan through Public Diplomacy

The recent decision by Afghan President Karzai to postpone signing a security arrangement on the continued presence of U.S. troops is apt to confuse an already confused Afghan and American public about the future bilateral relationship that will define post-2014. It is hard for any casual observer or media consumer to make sense out of the daily conflicting stories on whether or not American engagement in Afghanistan will be sustained next year. One of the key challenges of public diplomacy is to match rhetoric with actions on the ground and make a convincing argument to citizens.

An issue where the U.S. has stepped up its promises and rhetoric as well as its policy is around standing by Afghan women and girls—a promise we should keep. It is in America’s interest to see women-–a large segment of Afghan society–educated, trained, active and engaged in securing peace in a country in which we have invested a dozen years of money and lives. The women of Afghanistan are the loudest champions of peace and reconciliation in that troubled land.

Good public diplomacy and good policy are reflected in the announcement just a few months ago from the U.S. Agency for International Development a new, five-year $200 million assistance program for Afghan women called “Promote,” a sign of U.S. seriousness of purpose. The announcement, made in a speech by USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah at the U.S. Institute of Peace in July underscored the continued American commitment to success in Afghanistan—success that Shah argued is “fundamentally grounded in a society that creates opportunity for women and girls.”  The new USAID program will propel the education, training and promotion of young women in Afghan government, business and civil society, building on successes as measured in the rise of girls enrolled in Afghan schools.

Screen capture from a video featuring an expert panel on women's empowerment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace, July 18, 2013. Source: YouTube
Screen capture from a video featuring an expert panel on women’s empowerment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace, July 18, 2013. Source: YouTube

That announcement was echoed recently at Georgetown University by Secretary of State Kerry, standing with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former First Lady Laura Bush—another good example of bipartisan public diplomacy.

In the first few months of 2014, President Obama will have opportunities to clear up any fog about American ambitions for Afghanistan, including with the State of the Union in February—the ultimate public diplomacy opportunity.  (Twelve years ago in 2002, George W. Bush used his State of the Union speech to signal America’s commitment to Afghan women and to underscore signs of progress: “The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today, women are free and are part of Afghanistan’s new government.”)

Another place to make the case for US-Afghan relations is on social media–a growing platform for public diplomacy around the world. Today, Afghan women and girls are using social media to make their anxiety about the future known. Zahra is a 23-year old Afghan woman, and currently an undergraduate student at the American University of Afghanistan studying business administration. She shared her anxiety on the website WhyDev, which is dedicated to the Voice of Afghanistan’s youth:

“I live in fear more and more as each day passes and it gets closer to 2014.

Everybody is talking about civil war again. Everybody has a plan to leave Afghanistan; they want to have a better life. .. Today, in our office, my colleague said she put her house on the market and wants to go to Australia. “But how?”, I asked. She said –like everybody else that goes… “With an invitation? Do you know somebody there? Will they send you invitation letter?

We are getting crazy thinking about 2014 and civil war. We can’t enjoy our time right now as it passes. We are losing our time as these fears enter our mind…

I fear what will happen. The only image that I have of the  Taliban is of men with a huge turbans, big weapons, Afghan clothes and lots of beards and mustaches. They do not like educated women like me. They want to kill those girls who go to universities or schools…. I am confused. What will be Afghanistan’s future?”

Zahra, like many Afghan girls, wants to know that America’s investment in Afghanistan doesn’t end as the troops leave.  Education for Afghan girls has improved in Afghanistan from the 1990s when the Taliban pretty much prohibited it. Today, according to the World Bank and USAID, close to a third of Afghan girls attend primary school. Around 120,000 young women have completed secondary school. In total, at least 200,000 Afghan women now have at least a diplomacy from secondary school, some form of a university degree or some equivalent study. But leaves two-thirds of Afghan girls, waiting for a chance.

In the end, time will tell what the Afghan government will do for its own society, what international foundations and funders will provide, and how committed the United States and the international community can afford to remain in the lives of the Afghan people, in particular its women and girls.  For now, the challenge is to keep hope alive and prevent backsliding.  Promises are important to keep. 

War Fatigue vs. the President’s Syria Strike

All alone on Syria?

When President Barack Obama delivered his September 10, 2013 speech on Syria, his policy aim was articulated clearly:

after careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the national security interests of the United States to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons through a targeted military strike.

This speech had a more immediate target however: the American public’s reluctance to support a limited and narrow strike on Syria.  Polls showed substantial public opposition despite the horrific images of chemical weapon attack victims in Ghouta just weeks before.  Support for a Syria attack was lower than it was with previous, similarly “limited” actions in Grenada (1983), Kosovo (1999), Haiti (1994) and Libya (2011).

Facing the apparent unpopularity of the proposed military action, the President decided to seek Congressional authorization rather than taking unilateral moves against Syrian military capacity.

His speech was meant to turn the tide in support of Congress’s approval.  While there is survey evidence that the speech persuaded some of those who watched it, it still only led to an aggregate split in public opinion.  Striking Syria simply did not resonate with a majority of Americans even though an estimated 32 million viewers tuned in and many more read and heard his arguments.

We know that the President’s power to persuade the public on foreign affairs is strongest when there is an elite consensus back his policies.  While there were voices of dissent in the House, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ultimately endorsed what the President sought: a resolution authorizing military action against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government.  This signified a growing elite consensus.

TV news media were largely supportive of the President. As Robert Entman has proposed in the “cascading activation” model, lower-tier elites, and news media, echo the policy frames of the upper echelons in the executive branch.  After Obama first proposed a strike was necessary in late August, cable news channels were far more likely to feature pro-intervention messages than views opposed, according to a content analysis conducted by Pew Research. This is evidence of news media echoing officialdom.

Yet, House opposition to the President’s proposed course of action was considerable.  Factions in both parties, both liberal Democrats and libertarian Republicans, voiced objections to the attack. It was not certain that the resolution would have passed through the House. At the time of the speech, CNN estimated 179 “no” votes to 25 “yes” votes. 223 were yet undecided.  This can’t be chalked up to deeper partisan polarization.  Members of Congress reported hearing universal opposition from their constituents. The public’s complaints overwhelmed the President’s position and undermined the dominant theme of news media coverage.

A Russia-proposed chemical weapons deal ultimately postponed consideration of a Congressional resolution, thereby preventing a test of whether the President was going to win on this.  Still, we witnessed a unique case of public opinion opposition to, and mobilization against, a President’s proposed foreign military action.

Perhaps it can be attributed to something deeper in American political culture. As Charles M. Blow suggested in The New York Times, “America may have lost its stomach for military intervention.”  After war of more than a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans may just be tired of getting into new skirmishes that could easily lead to deeper commitments.  Just five years into the Iraq war, US news media were barely covering it and Americans tired of hearing about it.  There is scant mention and public discussion of the war in Afghanistan today.

The idea of “war fatigue” is not a novel one.  It was widely believed that after the Vietnam War a syndrome set in: Americans were thought to be more likely to oppose to new wars out of a risk aversion resulting from the costly, bloody and protracted conflict in Vietnam.  Marvin Kalb argued the current form of this syndrome was apparent just from President Obama’s nominations of John Kerry and Chuck Hagel as secretaries of state and defense, respectively.

Curious about whether American views on the previous wars impacted their positions on the proposed Syria strike, I ran a study to measure what impacted American opinion. I tried to figure out how important various factors were: demographics, support for the president, prior positions on the Iraq war and how attentive they were to the President’s September 10th speech — to see how the President’s persuasive powers stacked up against war fatigue.

I asked 265 respondents on two separate days, September 9 and September 13, 2013, whether or not they support a US military intervention in Syria.  I asked different samples, one before the speech and one a few days after.  I found the following (shown in an OLS regression model).

Model

Standardized Coefficients

t

Sig.

Beta

(Constant)

1.469

.143

AGE

.120*

2.142

.033

INCOME

.079

1.350

.178

EDUCATION

-.086

-1.492

.137

RACE

.017

.302

.763

GENDER (Female)

-.180***

-3.213

.001

PID

-.028

-.369

.713

Sharing President Barack Obama’s views in general

.331***

4.456

.000

Became more or less supportive of the US IRAQ war?

.293***

5.211

.000

Watched or saw reports of President Obama’s speech on Syria?

.100

1.794

.074

(Adjusted R2 = .213)

Of traditional demographics, age and gender were significant predictors.  Older individuals and males were more likely to back a strike.  It is worth noting that party identification was not an important factor — when controlling for these other factors — despite being a usual factor in evaluating presidential policy proposals.  While it could be due to the break down in partisan lines on this issue, at least until the Russia deal, it’s likely not a factor because the most powerful variable — generally agreement with Obama on other issues — captures partisan differences. [Without partisan ID, the findings and model fit don’t change much].

Despite being an “anti-war” candidate when he was first elected, Obama enjoys the unwavering backing of loyal supporters.  Being inclined to generally agree with him on issues was an expected, powerful predictor of being with him on Syria.  It was the strongest factor in the model.

As for non-Obamaniac tendencies, war weariness seems to matter. Becoming less supportive of the war on Iraq over time (my gauge of war fatigue) correlates with being less likely to back the strike.  The result is the same, though a bit weaker, if I replace Iraq with Afghanistan, also.  Rather than seeing Syria as a new and distinct issue, this finding suggests people interpret it within the context of prolonged and increasingly unpopular military commitments in the region.

Prior views on Iraq also matter more than does partisanship.  I ran the model with partisan ID, but dropped the tendency to agree with Obama. Declining support for the Iraq war over time was twice as powerful a predictor than was partisanship.

Back to the model above, we can see that changing support for or against the war on Iraq over time was a more powerful predictor than being attentive to the President’s speech.  His ability to persuade the public through strategic political communication was a less potent a force than the unpopularity of the wars of the past decade.  Even if the proposed strike was being sold as limited and narrow, it did little to relieve the public’s fear of deja vu.

Life in Europe vs. US: Charm a Function of History But Also Public Policy

Naia on pl de la paja

This is the second in a series of posts on life, culture, and politics in the U.S. and E.U. by Robert Entman, who spent 2012 as a Humboldt Research Prize Scholar at Freie Universität in Berlin. Read his previous post here

Madrid is the first city we lived in (seven weeks there, seven months Berlin, three months Paris) and is the cleanest of them. Every day, I believe, Plaza de la Paja, the oldest square in Madrid, on which we lived, was hosed down, and garbage collected. Contrary perhaps to stereotype, Berlin was dirtier than Madrid (and Paris dirtier than both). Berlin’s city government is under-funded and among other things this creates a problem with litter, because trash receptacles are tiny and overflow quickly. Saw much less street cleaning and hosing down in Berlin than in Madrid and Paris.

On the other hand, the subway stations and cars in Berlin were very clean. Subway stations in Paris were quite dirty and also full of homeless people sleeping (and in one case having autoerotic sex inside a sleeping bag) at all hours. Paris, too, featured more poop left unscooped and pee everywhere. Despite the Spanish economic crisis, for reasons I certainly don’t understand, Madrid maintained a policy commitment to keeping the city feel clean and pleasant, and that’s good for the economy and the humans living in it.

Madrid is well known for its wacky late-hour dining. This, too, is a part of its felicitous charm. It must have something to do with the sunny and warm climate facilitating life outdoors. Even in January when it’s relatively cold, everyone eats outdoors (blankets provided). There is a public warmth, a visible enjoyment of life and laughter, a sense of community in the restaurants and the crazy long late lunches and dinners.

Lunch tends to start around 1:30 and go to 3:30, dinner around 9 p.m. and go to 11 p.m. and well beyond. After two or three weeks, we got used to late dining hours. Yet even in Berlin, with its far less salubrious climate, people in public are generally friendly and cheerful, and also enjoy their communal repasts thoroughly. Restaurants in all three cities almost all seem to have one sitting; nobody rushes you out. The point is to stay and enjoy the comradeship.

The comity extends to Americans. Essentially everyone in Berlin speaks English without any hesitation or resentment. And Paris? In my view, the most underrated city in Europe when it comes to friendliness. People are just about always friendly, and most spoke English after hearing my terrible French, some good-naturedly ribbing me about my incroyable pronunciation. In this respect, Paris totally defies stereotype. Of course it’s a big, hurried city—it’s not Mayberry. But like Manhattan, it’s easy to find friendliness right beneath the hubbub.

naia restaurant madridMadrid’s English is weakest of the 3 cities but this didn’t detract from the experience. For me, Madrid was #1 in charm, perhaps because of the Plaza de la Paja neighborhood we lived in, but something about all the other squares tucked in every 2-3 blocks in seemingly every neighborhood, the mountains in the background, the sun, the people, the lovely old buildings made Madrid our favorite.

Berlin: I don’t think you can call Berlin especially charming; fascinating and dynamic for sure. The place was something like 80% destroyed in bombing during WWII. Newer architecture is generally pretty bland. There are nice streets, but nothing like the medieval streets and squares of Madrid or Paris. On the other hand, Berlin’s neighborhoods are very distinctive and that lent some charm and pleasure, very much including Schoneberg where we lived—it was at Rathaus Schoneberg, government offices, that Kennedy gave his “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech.

The conscious zoning policy decisions made in all three cities have enormous impact on the human feel of these cities. Berlin essentially is a planned city from the ground up because of the war history; one can argue with some of the choices but what I loved and admired was the determination to build historical memory into the architecture and layout and thus the lived experience of the city. The other two cities can take advantage of their histories and charming built environment nurtured by public policies that strictly limit building height and cut down on street traffic. Yes, it’s economically inefficient to restrict building height (in DC as well it means higher rents and lower tax revenues), but such efficiency claims rely on implicit assumptions that non-quantifiable utility in the form of air and light and community are less valuable than money. Imagine Paris or Madrid with skyscrapers like Manhattan. I’d argue that a full accounting of economic and other costs and benefits would favor the restrictive zoning.

Another area of policy regulates retail commerce. In all three countries, most stores are closed Sundays—almost no shopping is done. You’re out of luck if you need milk or toilet paper (with some exceptions, e.g. in Berlin, a few larger supermarkets have Sunday afternoon hours). Small shopkeepers in Madrid, and in Berlin and Paris, often keep irregular hours, probably making low incomes but feeling secure because of the (relatively generous) welfare state. In other words, there’s more freedom to be a small businessperson because of the humane safety net (aka big government), which perhaps yields more competition to bigger corporations in the marketplace while allowing worker/owners to set their own hours.

Europe is friendlier to small business entrepreneurship would be my hypothesis. The whole shopping culture is very different in Paris, Madrid and Berlin from the 24/7 US marketplace. Seems healthy to me to curb acquisitiveness or better balance it against the profit/material acquisition motive with other values. Meanwhile, notice that despite the US’s self-image as worshipping small business, these three European countries have way more of it on any given street, in any given village, and do more to encourage it, at least as far as evidence on the ground suggests.

One outgrowth of the public dining and small business cultures: we got to know restaurateurs personally right away. Whereas my family has been eating at 411 West in Chapel Hill or Bullock’s in Durham for decades, nobody has ever greeted us personally. Ever. By the time we’d eaten twice at Naia on the Plaza de la Paja, the staff always waved when we walked by and spoke to us like old friends when we came in. By the way, the lunch special for 11.50 Euros (about $16) included appetizer, main course, dessert, bread, glass of wine, coffee and a digestif. Quality of food was very high, inventive, and fresh. The place consistently ranked in the top 20 of Madrid on Tripadvisor. Similar experience with the wonderful family that ran Gustibus on Rue St. Sebastien in Paris: fantastic food, warm personal service, at prices below the equivalent quality in any US city I’ve been in.

Whereas, of course, the US nurtures chain stores for every food and product. Are the prices truly lower in the US? Do we get to eat more chain store cheeseburgers, more chain store T-shirts and jeans, for less money? More to the point, do we get the goods for fewer hours of labor expended and lesser amount of employment and unemployment-related stress? I don’t really think so, but I’m not pretending to research this.

Furthermore, it’s not at all clear that everything really is cheaper in equivalent US cities. Madrid featured extremely inexpensive produce like red peppers at 5 or 6 for 1 euro on sale (recently in the US, I bought one red pepper on sale at Harris Teeter for $2.50). Or 20 kiwis for 1 euro, i.e. about 6.5 cents each—never less than 25 cents each in US. And the produce is good! The oranges, strawberries, blueberries taste better; even the lettuce. In Madrid at least, much of it seems actually to come from Spain itself or north Africa. In Berlin too, groceries generally seemed less expensive and produce tastier equivalents than the US. This holds even in the chain markets, not just the mom-and-pop stores or outdoor markets. Let’s not even talk about the cheese or bread.

But I was distressed to see that the uniformity of size of bananas and apples etc., bred by agribusiness to maximize revenue per unit, seemed to characterize Paris grocery chains (like Monoprix, which was two doors down from us on Rue St. Sebastien) as in the US. So far, less so in Germany and Madrid, but the forces of globalization and economic efficiency measured strictly in monetary terms do seem to march on.

A Europhile’s Year in Europe: Comparing Politics, Policy and Life to the U.S.

Relief map of Europe and surrounding regions
Photo credit: Wikipedia

This is the first in a series of posts on life, culture, and politics in the U.S. and E.U. by Robert Entman, who spent 2012 as a Humboldt Research Prize Scholar at Freie Universität in Berlin. He has also spent extended periods in Madrid and Paris.

This is an account not only of things done but of thoughts thought, especially those pertinent to my various pet peeves about US politics and life.

Bottom line: I did return with some small added appreciation of the US in some ways, after seeing the US more through European eyes. In particular, the notion they have that the US is freer and more flexible, more open to innovative, creative ideas, seems to have some validity. That’s the flip side of Europe’s possession of a long history—and Europeans’ deep appreciation of it.

It is their historical memory, the constant awareness of cultural heritage and connections that make Europe and Europeans so charming and fascinating to me. (Of course I’m generalizing in calling it “Europe” rather than individual countries but I think this is generally true throughout.). It is Americans’ maddening obliviousness to history of 10 or 20 years ago let alone 300 that drives me nuts, but the downside to Europeans’ quite opposite hyperawareness of history’s presence every day that also apparently makes them somewhat more rigid when asked to change a practice or think up a new solution.

I wouldn’t exaggerate this tendency toward caution about change, not at all, because there’s so much evidence that Europeans can and do accommodate change. Just think about the movement from crazy nationalism to the EU, from fear and distrust of the Iron Curtain to integration (albeit imperfect) of so many Eastern European countries into the West, or the adaptation of wind power and solar power.

Obviously the US has its own enormous prejudices and rigidities and especially ignorance (though I understand a bit better why Americans tend to be ignorant and indifferent to the perspectives of foreigners, at least compared to the average European). (More on that later.) But it did occur to me this year while seeing all the traces of the US everywhere in Europe, from IPhones (indeed all telephones) to Hollywood movies to laptops, and while hearing so many Europeans talk in glowing terms about their trips to New York or Washington or California, and while noting the Starbucks and the McDonald’s which market themselves as a kind of exotic luxury because they’re so American, all this tells me the US does have a degree of openness to innovation, especially commercial/business innovation, i.e. creativity that can earn money, that is unusual in the world. (Two different people in Paris—Paris!—told me DC is their very favorite city, as did somebody else in the enchanting city of Copenhagen, and several in Berlin told me how much more they like NYC.)

Allied to this are such obvious characteristics as the huge size, which makes Europeans marvel at how far you can go and still be in the same country speaking the same language: the big cars, the big houses, the skyscrapers. So that, whereas I come to Europe and love the narrow streets and center cities with their height restricted-buildings, and especially the way everything is smaller from the apartments to the washing machines, waste baskets and cars, Europeans look at the wide open US and its room for everything big and see a kind of dynamic, youthful optimism and openness to just about anything.

It’s not really a contradiction to note at the same time that the Europeans adore America’s open culture and landscapes, they tend to puzzle at the Americans’ political choices. The more politically interested people do have a lot of hostility to the US. At my Buddhist retreat—where everyone is above average in leftist sympathies—outside Lockerbie, Scotland, several people told me they were surprised I am an American because I’m nice and fairly unassuming, rather than arrogant and loud.

But I’d say more dominant is bewilderment at how inanities like denial of climate change and evolution, or scandals over political leaders’ private sex lives, or refusal of gun control, or election/selection for high office of the obviously mediocre like George W. Bush or Sarah Palin, can happen in a place otherwise so seemingly overflowing with intelligence and talent. I guess the hostility comes more from US foreign policy than anything else, whereas the puzzlement comes over the strength, extremity and dogmatism of America’s right wing and its religious conservatives. More on that in a later entry.

20,000 Leagues Across the Sea: Say Hello to Water Diplomacy

king penguins swimming

By Robin Terry

In February of this year, Philip Seib, who is the Director of the Center on Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California, wrote a blog post entitled “Climate Change, Terrorism, and Public Diplomacy” regarding a relatively unheard-of reality that public diplomacy must respond to. This reality was recognized by former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and is being made a top priority by her successor, Secretary John Kerry.  This reality actually makes up three-quarters of our planet’s surface, and yet is one of the most fragile resources in many places in the world.

Water diplomacy is coming into its own as the world’s population mushrooms to 7 billion and counting. Kerry is already making climate change and a focus on oceans a major priority for his tenure at the US Department of State, disregarding climate change skeptics by declaring that the ocean system “is interdependent, and we toy with that at our peril.”

What makes public diplomacy important on this issue is that water is an indisputably essential and globally shared resource. Secretary Kerry recognizes that water diplomacy must be approached with delicacy to build bridges and maintain open communication (dialogue) to share and foster synergy, instead of becoming a battleground over threatened resources and an opportunity for imperialism.  Seib writes, “Public diplomats representing nations such as the United States have long recognized the importance of water diplomacy. For years, the Peace Corps has worked with local communities around the world to ensure safe water supplies….” Global community projects centering around wells and water safety as well as water conservation practices in drought-stricken regions have proven to be effective tactics to bring about economic prosperity and an increased quality of life, and have also had an important public diplomacy impact by generating awareness and urgency, and highlighting cooperation.  But what will bring about lasting change to the big picture?  Will Kerry’s top-down approach to one of life’s most precious and fundamental resources deliver a vital answer?

Secretary Kerry’s call to rally around the growing problem that is water security is coming out of the gate as a collaborative effort in a deep bay of the Southern Ocean in Antarctica, the Ross Sea.  Secretary Kerry is aiming to create the largest marine protected area on Earth. These lofty ambitions, if successful, will create a foundation of conservation, collaboration, and global security in the frontier of water diplomacy. The biodiversity standing to be given sanctuary amounts to over 16,000 species including whales, penguins, and seals (fauna diplomacy, anyone?) over roughly 890,000 square miles.[1] Secretary Kerry is extending an olive branch of scientific opportunity and setting a conservation precedent that could provide capital for future public diplomacy goals. New Zealand is already on board in establishing the joint proposal and 23 other countries will announce their stance in July.

Antarctica mapWater diplomacy caters to a very specific and absolutely requisite part of every human’s life.  Therefore it is conceivable that a top-down emphasis on water diplomacy that encompasses major public diplomacy elements can have a significant effect.  Other public diplomacy tactics such as educational or culinary diplomacy are collectives of bottom-up, separate attempts to address a big-picture issue. While this does not mean that these tactics are ineffective (I staunchly believe the opposite), it illustrates the diversity of approaches and the deliberate angle that such a fundamental resource, water, demands. Kerry appreciates how important this issue must be treated and is addressing the void that water diplomacy has played in the public diplomacy conversation as of late.

Water diplomacy encompasses national security, climate conservation, multilateral operations, and the (secret weapon) positive animal interest angle on a grand scale. By giving such a large-scale issue the stage and attention it deserves, will Kerry’s top-down approach prove more effective than the project-based approach used by other types of public diplomacy? Will public diplomacy associated with large-scale reform and change increasingly become the answer in our globalized society?

Beyond Zero Sum Cultural Diplomacy

collage

By Max Entman

In a recent speech at the 2012 Institute for Cultural Diplomacy conference, former Canadian Minister of Foreign Trade Stockwell Day argues that cultural diplomacy can be used to advance certain broad principles that can help alleviate poverty around the world. Day posits that the existence of three essential freedoms – of enterprise, of religion, and of self-determined governance – can dramatically increase the likelihood that a given country will help its citizens out of poverty. Day suggests that the promotion of these principles by developed countries in developing countries is a cultural-diplomatic mechanism for sowing seeds of prosperity. Day’s assumption of consensus on these principles may be flawed, but it begs the question: is there a way for states to better coordinate cultural diplomatic efforts to achieve shared goals like poverty alleviation?

One answer to this question would be to create a new network of cultural diplomats that crosses national boundaries. Ideally, this “Conference of Cultural Diplomats” would be a diverse, collaborative network with the primary goal of sharing best practices in channeling cultural diplomatic efforts toward helping people in need. Admittedly, foreign ministries of many countries might have concerns about sharing their approaches with diplomats from other nations. However, cultural diplomacy is not a zero sum game. The whole point of such an initiative would be to find ways that the cultural diplomacy efforts of multiple nations can have positive impacts that are mutually reinforcing, not undermining. Such a network would take years to build, and would likely require the financial and organizational backing of an existing NGO in order to get off the ground. The potential benefits would dramatically outweigh these costs.

In recent years, much has been said about the power of “network public diplomacy,” as enabled by the Internet and other information and communication technologies. However, even advocates for this more relational approach have begun to recognize that it is not a catchall solution for all of the problems facing public and cultural diplomats. Professor Rhonda Zaharna of American University recently identified four fallacies in the prevailing discussion of “network public diplomacy.” In essence, she argues that “network public diplomacy” as an overarching concept is not valuable when it lacks specificity, and further that the network model is not always the best approach in all scenarios. In this spirit, let me be clear about the specific type of network approach I am proposing. In Zaharna’s typology, the “Conference of Cultural Diplomats” would be a “network of collaboration that strives to generate value-added information” for its members and the world at large. It would achieve this by leveraging the insights of its diverse membership. This network structure would not mean a dogmatic adherence to a “network communication” model of public diplomacy by members of the network.

In his 2002 book Elusive Quest for Growth, William Easterly argues that investment in the generation of knowledge has become especially valuable in the age of globalization, as knowledge is more likely than ever to leak from one person to another. These leaks can lead to “virtuous cycles,” which can dramatically speed economic development in poor countries. Cultural diplomats and the governments they represent are in a position to aid the creation of more of the “virtuous cycles” that Easterly discusses. Through networked collaboration, a “Conference of Cultural Diplomats” could amplify the effectiveness of existing cultural diplomacy efforts, while simultaneously spurring innovation. Moving beyond the zero sum cultural diplomacy paradigm will likely be difficult, but the rewards will be worth the trouble.

Max Entman is a graduate student at the George Washington University.   His piece forms part of Take Five’s series of student reflections on aspects of cultural diplomacy as communication.