Tag: Public Diplomacy

The Power of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in Disasters

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The disaster left in Tacloban City, the Philippines after Typhoon Yolanda. Credit: theaustralian.com.au
The disaster left in Tacloban City, the Philippines after Typhoon Yolanda. Credit: theaustralian.com.au

Of course, one cannot compare the typhoon that has left 4,000 dead and 12,000 injured in the Philippines with the tornadoes in the U.S. which resulted in less death and damage this weekend. But the common ingredient is the critical importance of timely information before, during and after a crisis.  Natural disasters come quickly.  How prepared people are for the onslaught of deadly winds and bad weather is often directly related to how much accurate and timely information they received beforehand.

If ever we doubt the role of governments in providing information, think about what happens if local, provincial, state, federal, national or international information is lacking.  An individual with an iPhone is important, but the view is limited.  We need the local weatherman and local radio supported by the national weather service.  Individuals can assist, but also important is an organized large-scale governmental response, rescue and assistance coordinated by local, state and federal officials with—when necessary—militaries capable of doing the heavy lifting, literally and figuratively.

We need good public diplomacy and public affairs to reach people with good information. That takes resources, training, and professionalism.  We need to keep investing in that architecture and personnel today and tomorrow.

Annual Roberts Lecture Covers Benghazi, Iran, and Future of U.S. Diplomacy

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Amb. Thomas Pickering (right) engages in conversation with Frank Sesno (left), director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, for the 3rd Annual Walter Roberts Lecture. Credit: Alexei Agaryshev.
Amb. Thomas Pickering (right) engages in conversation with Frank Sesno (left), director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, for the 3rd Annual Walter Roberts Lecture. Credit: Alexei Agaryshev.

On Tuesday, distinguished ambassador Thomas Pickering spoke at GWU’s School of Media and Public Affairs (on his birthday, no less!) about his experience on the advisory panel that investigated the 2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, as well as Russia, Iran, and the future of U.S. public diplomacy.

The talk was part of the Third Annual Walter Roberts Lecture, which brings in prominent figures in public diplomacy practice and academia to speak on relevant issues of the times.

Tara Sonenshine, who spoke at the Second Annual Walter Roberts Lecture, responded in a blog post on her sentiments in introducing the ambassador. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and current Professor of Practice at GWU, PJ Crowley, was also in attendance, as well as Frank Sesno, director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, who led the conversation with the ambassador.

Some tweets from the event:

Thank you to all who attended. Please visit our website for a video and transcript of the event here.

Public Diplomacy on the Front Lines of U.S. Foreign Policy

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Kamran (actor Najebullah Sadiq) is the hardened but principled veteran police officer on Eagle Four, an Afghan TV show that its creators hope will have a positive effect on Afghans' attitudes toward the real police. Credit: Tolo TV/ Wakil Kohsar
Kamran (actor Najebullah Sadiq) is the hardened but principled veteran police officer on Eagle Four, an Afghan TV show that its creators hope will have a positive effect on Afghans’ attitudes toward the real police. Credit: Tolo TV/ Wakil Kohsar

Advocates of official U.S. public diplomacy have long defended the value of its programs and argued for resources to do even more.  But what exactly could be accomplished with such resources if they were, indeed, available?

In fact, we may already have an answer to that question, albeit in the context of a single country at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy—Afghanistan.  Even as the United States has invested considerable resources in its military presence and development programs, so, too, has it devoted additional resources to a public diplomacy “surge” in support of overall U.S. goals in that country.

Public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan deploy the tried-and-true models that we employ all around the world, including: educational, youth, and professional exchange programs; English language programs; establishment of American Spaces; and, cultural exchange and preservation.  The U.S. Embassy in Kabul also deploys additional public diplomacy resources to support non-traditional programs leveraging public diplomacy expertise, technological innovation, and local partners to further advance key U.S. interests in that critical country.

Noah Berlatsky’s thoughtful recent piece in the Atlantic reviews a new documentary film about Afghan Tolo TV and touches on a few of those public diplomacy efforts.  As one of the major Afghan media groups, Tolo TV is also a major partner for U.S. public diplomacy efforts and programs seeking to engage, inform, and influence Afghan public opinion.  Berlatsky notes U.S. Embassy support for Eagle Four, for example, “a high-quality-production action drama” about the Afghan national police force. He also highlights the U.S. objective in supporting the production “to demonstrate that those police forces are courageous, honest, and trustworthy.”

The establishment of security and stability in Afghanistan—one of the most important U.S. foreign policy goals worldwide today—will obviously depend on the capacity of Afghan security forces and, more importantly, the trust the people place in those forces.   Eagle Four, by reaching a mass Afghan audience and profiling real Afghan police officers helping Afghans, is a perfect example of how innovative public diplomacy practitioners, provided with sufficient resources, advances key foreign policy goals.

Berlatsky raises valid points, of course, about whether such a dramatic depiction of the police force might unduly raise public expectations, but we could also be arguing about the value of producing a stale, realistic documentary that reaches and engages only a tiny fraction of Eagle Four‘s considerable viewership.  I would argue that programs like Eagle Four take a risk, but that such risks are appropriate especially in places of conflict where the pay-offs can be so essential to advancing  U.S. national security objectives.

Another key objective of Eagle Four and similar programs in Afghanistan is to promote the development and capacity of the Afghan media sector itself.  The success of Tolo TV, as noted in the Atlantic article, as well as the availability of a multiplicity of television and radio stations, newspapers and magazines—in a country which not too long ago had only one state broadcaster—is a testament to the success of those efforts. Just as we hope that the Afghan security services will ensure long-term stability, so, too, do we believe that Afghan independent media will promote long-term democracy and government accountability in Afghanistan.

Eagle Four is, of course, just one of many such public diplomacy programs that partner with Afghan media, universities, civil society, women’s groups, and many others.  Keen observers and veteran public diplomacy experts will note that some of these programs go well beyond the role of traditional public diplomacy in simply “telling America’s story” but are the proof of what can be accomplished with additional public diplomacy resources.  The innovative U.S. public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan seek to positively engage, inform, and influence the Afghan public and in so doing to help maintain stability, promote democracy, and advance key U.S. foreign policy goals.

Note: Previous articles about Eagle Four were published in the New York Times and on NPR.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.

The U.S. Public Diplomacy Deficit: Look at What We Do

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Pakistani protesters burn a representation of a U.S. flag to condemn a drone attack in the Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan which killed Taliban leader Waliur Rehman, Thursday, May 30, 2013 in Multan, Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban's deputy leader was buried hours after he was killed in a U.S. drone strike, Pakistani intelligence officials and militants said Thursday. (AP Photo/M. Abbass)
Pakistani protesters burn a representation of a U.S. flag to condemn a drone attack in the Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan which killed Taliban leader Waliur Rehman, Thursday, May 30, 2013 in Multan, Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban’s deputy leader was buried hours after he was killed in a U.S. drone strike, Pakistani intelligence officials and militants said Thursday. (AP Photo/M. Abbass)

I join my GWU and IPDGC colleague Tara Sonenshine in saluting Donald M. Bishop for a thoughtful speech on the state of U.S. public diplomacy and the challenges it faces. Let me add my two cents to the discussion.

I agree with the bottom line: public diplomacy is not a sufficiently vital dimension of diplomacy, foreign policy and national security. In an increasingly interconnected world of the Internet, global media, personal media and billions of smartphones, it should be, but isn’t. To be truly influential and effective, public diplomacy must be relevant as policy decisions are being made rather than after the fact.

Structure, story and strategy are contributing factors to the U.S. public diplomacy deficit, but what impacts international perceptions of the United States is less who says what, where and how than what we do. This has always been true, but what has changed from the height of the Cold War is the lens through which our actions are judged and the amount of information available to the average global citizen to continually evaluate American leadership.

The United States took on a truly heroic leadership role through what Donald Bishop terms the “long twilight struggle.” Without the United States, the world would have a different character and vastly different expectations about the future.

That said, the United States took a number of actions during the Cold War that were in retrospect unwise, unproductive and perhaps even unlawful. When this occurred, there was controversy, but most of the world granted America the benefit of the doubt because they could see an alternative that they consistently judged to be worse. The Berlin Wall was the universal symbol of this dynamic.

During the Cold War, while there was a compelling story to tell about American freedom, progress and prosperity (although given race riots, assassinations, Vietnam and Watergate, there was a gap between perception and reality back then), it was really about them, about the Soviet Union and its violations of emerging international norms.

But since the fall of the wall, the world has changed and this has affected how the United States is viewed now. Actions are no longer about them, but primarily about us. There are competing strategic narratives, but America’s dominates. From our perspective, the narrative may still be the same – we’re the guys in white hats riding to everyone’s rescue – but our analog world is now high definition. The picture is a lot more detailed and nuanced than it once was. Still attractive, but blemishes are more visible.

The United States is seen as falling short of expectations, simultaneously accused as President Obama said at the United Nations as doing too much and too little at the same time. Actions are judged according to the international norms that we promulgated, most of the world has embraced and we are viewed fairly or unfairly as ignoring.

This challenge is far less about public diplomacy than policy.

We preach that other countries have to solve their domestic problems, but recently took the world on a political thrill ride with the global economy stuck in the back seat. This political rancor routinely during the Cold War as well – think Joe McCarthy – but what has changed is the rest of the world now has a front row seat and watched it unfold in real time.

In this environment, there is no way to say, pay no attention to the 536 people wrestling behind the green curtain! No heart, courage or especially brains were apparent. No public diplomacy wizard could put a smiley face on the events of the past 30 days.

The say-do gap exists in the foreign policy realm as well.

We support the United Nations when it serves our interests and ignore it when it doesn’t. We promote the transparent rule of law, but then create a parallel and opaque legal universe at Guantanamo, a prison we promised to close but haven’t. We believe in democracy but then condone a military coup that removes a duly elected (if imperfect) president in Egypt. We criticize China for stealing our military secrets, but argue everyone does it when our hand is discovered in the cookie jar. We say we respect the sovereignty of other countries, but do as we please. We say drone strikes don’t harm civilians even though we know better, or choose not to know. But it doesn’t matter, since drone operations are secret.

All of these policy judgments are tough calls. They may serve our interests, even if they do not always reflect our values. We see these issues in terms of security and stability, while much of the world looks for dignity, justice, opportunity and consistency. They can be explained by politicians, diplomats and lawyers, but not easily advanced through public diplomacy. Absent the overarching frame and context that the Cold War provided, this divide is not easily bridged.

Tara Sonenshine: Response to the “three challenges” of U.S. public diplomacy

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Tara Sonenshine
Tara Sonenshine speaking at the Hip-hop Diplomacy: Connecting through Culture conference in 2012 at GWU.

By Tara Sonenshine

Recently, I read a fascinating speech by Donald M. Bishop, President of the Public Diplomacy Council. He led U.S. public diplomacy in Bangladesh, Nigeria, China, and Afghanistan. He is a trainer, speaker, and mentor in public diplomacy and communication. He also speaks on history and leadership.

His remarks are bold and insightful. I found myself agreeing with many of his individual points – but I take issue with the overall, rather dire view and negative view, that America’s public diplomacy is weak, lacks direction, and increasingly focuses on feel good issues. Ironically, the speech attempts to suggest a more focused, perhaps narrower set of issues for public diplomacy to concentrate on… but in the course of the critique – a multitude of issues and directions are outlined including social media, innovation, countering violent extremism, religious outreach, etc.— a laundry list as long as those the author laments that public diplomacy already faces. All good issues, by the way.

In short, my reaction to the speech:

1. Yes, public diplomacy should play an important role in diplomacy, foreign policy, and national security.  Agreed.

2. Yes, we need a clearer “doctrine” or set of strategic imperatives to help guide the communications of those doctrines by public diplomacy officers. But the world, post-Cold War, post-9/11, and post post many other issues, does not quite lend itself to easy doctrines of “containment” or “anti-terrorism” or other simple slogans. Global engagement these days has increasingly complex dimensions.

3. Yes, we all want more public diplomacy personnel at posts — and we agree that in this world of constrained resources, we won’t get them.

4. But no — we are not doing just feel good programs. Ninety-two percent of those who participate in some of those programs (take the Study of the U.S. as an example) go on to work in civil society organizations, run for office, and give back to their communities. They do way more than feel good — they do good.  Many of those who participate in exchange programs become prime ministers, presidents, Nobel Prize winners, and leaders. The programs that ECA does are important and it demeans them to talk about them as feel good.  Fulbright is not feel good.  Gilman scholars are serious people.  UGRAD and all the others I can name are critical.

5. Yes, let’s do a better job of communicating about how to deal with religious divides, how to counter violent extremism, how to utilize social media, how to innovate.  And yes, let’s be more than a collection of programs and have a coherent set of strategic imperatives.

But let’s not blame public diplomacy officers for not coming up with the big strategic doctrine. They do, as the author notes, have quite a bit on their plates.

Thank you, Don Bishop, for giving us quite a bit to think about and thank you, truly, for your ongoing service to the country.

Tara Sonenshine is a fellow at the School of Media and Public Affairs at The George Washington University. Previously, she served as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy following a distinguished career in government, non-profit organizations, and the media.

Peace Corps and Public Diplomacy: Missed Opportunities?

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U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry swears in new Peace Corps Volunteers in Antigua, Guatemala, on June 6, 2013. (Credit: State Department, Public Domain)
Secretary of State John Kerry swears in new Peace Corps Volunteers in Antigua, Guatemala, on June 6, 2013. (Credit: State Department, Public Domain)

A recent opinion piece in the Huffington Post raises some interesting issues about the Peace Corps and its relationship to official U.S. public diplomacy efforts overseas.  I’d like to begin by professing my appreciation and admiration for the Peace Corps and the many thousands of volunteers who are serving or have served around the world.  Although I am no development expert and cannot speak to their accomplishments in that regard, I have long appreciated the valuable contributions that Peace Corps volunteers make towards advancing our public diplomacy efforts.

For millions of foreigners around the world, a Peace Corps volunteer is, or was literally, the “face” of the United States, the only direct interaction they may have had with a U.S. citizen in their entire lives. Judging by my personal interaction over a career that has brought me into contact with hundreds of bright, enthusiastic, and dedicated volunteers, I am confident that those interactions are overwhelmingly positive and reflect favorably on the United States.

In addition to highlighting the Peace Corps’ public diplomacy mission in the article, Mr. Machado points out the considerable efforts expended to ensure that the Peace Corps remains an independent entity from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. military.  While I can certainly appreciate the bureaucratic need to maintain such independence, I am also concerned that it comes at the cost of less-than-ideal cooperation and coordination of our shared public diplomacy objectives.  Mr. Machado correctly points out that foreigners rarely draw a distinction between Peace Corps volunteers and other official U.S. representatives. Perhaps we should acknowledge that simple fact and develop better procedures to synchronize our efforts.

In many countries around the world, this is already happening.  The Peace Corps, where it has an on-the-ground presence, is, of course, part of the Country Team led by the U.S. Ambassador. Working together on those teams, Peace Corps Country Directors and Public Affairs Officers have seen the compelling logic of close coordination.  

When I was the Public Affairs Officer at one of my overseas postings, for example, I worked closely with the Country Director to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Peace Corps by profiling a few talented volunteers and on nationally televised news programs.  The programs were viewed by hundreds of thousands of locals who marveled not only at the volunteers’ command of their language, but also of the dialects of the local communities where they worked. In a separate collaboration we partnered volunteers with local American Corners, invigorating those key public diplomacy platforms with English language clubs and other activities.  I know that similar collaboration takes place in many other countries as well.

At the same time, I worry that the perceived need to maintain “distance” between the Peace Corps and the U.S. Department of State may lead us to miss such opportunities to leverage our respective investments in public diplomacy for maximum impact.  The simple reality is that foreign perceptions and opinions of the United States cannot be compartmentalized, but will instead be shaped by a combination of factors, including opinions of U.S. policy and military interventions, American pop culture and American tourists abroad, consumption of U.S. products and services, as well as direct interaction with Peace Corps volunteers and official U.S. public diplomacy programs.  

Let’s recognize this and get on with maximizing opportunities to cooperate and collaborate not only between Peace Corps and the U.S. Department of State, but between all U.S. government agencies.  In fact, to the extent that we share objectives – and I know that we often do – we should do the same with the private and non-governmental sectors as well.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. Government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.

Bruce Gregory’s Public Diplomacy Resources – #65

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GW School of Media and Public Affairs and Georgetown Adjunct Assistant Professor Bruce Gregory compiles an annotated bibliography of Public Diplomacy-related readings and other resources. Intended for teachers of public diplomacy and related courses, here is an update on resources that may be of general interest. Bruce Gregory Suggestions for future updates are welcome and should be directed to Bruce Gregory at BGregory@gwu.edu.

Read the full archive for Bruce Gregory’s Public Diplomacy Resources.

Intended for teachers of public diplomacy and related courses, here is an update on resources that may be of general interest. Suggestions for future updates are welcome.

Michele Acuto, “World Politics by Other Means? London, City Diplomacy and the Olympics,” paper delivered at the International Studies Association, San Francisco, April 2013. Acuto (Program for the Future of Cities, University of Oxford) looks at how global cities participate in world politics as political and “(para)diplomatic” actors. His case study of London’s activities in securing, planning, and managing the 2012 Summer Olympic Games explores the evolving role of cities as diplomatic actors and how sports are used in diplomacy and urban governance. His paper also portrays larger dynamics in multilayered governance, diplomacy, and the complexity of relationships between sub-state, state, and regional actors.

Christina Archetti, “People, Processes & Practices: Agency, Communication and the Construction of International Relations,” paper delivered at the International Studies Association, San Francisco, April 2013. Building on a case study and more than 40 interviews with foreign diplomats and foreign correspondents based in London, Archetti (University of Salford) explores ways in which these official and non-official actors “construct” the United Kingdom, “its images and discourses” in the eyes of foreign publics. She argues an understanding of the micro-processes of diplomats and journalists can illuminate public diplomacy and changes at the macro level in international relations.

Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, (Oxford University Press, 2013). In this comprehensive collection of essays (50 chapters, 941 pages) by leading diplomacy scholars and practitioners from around the world, Cooper (University of Waterloo), Heine (Wilfrid Laurier University), and Thakur (Australian National University) provide a resource that is cutting edge in its focus on theory and practice and relevant to all aspects of 21st century diplomacy. Conceptual frameworks and case studies examine (1) expanding numbers and types of actors, (2) changing diplomacy domains and subjects, (3) levels of diplomatic activity, (4) institutions and mechanisms, and (5) modes, types, and techniques. Chapters of particular relevance to diplomacy’s public dimension include:

— Andrew F. Cooper, “The Changing Nature of Diplomacy.”

— Jorge Heine, “From Club to Network Diplomacy.”

— Jan Melissen (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’), “Public Diplomacy.”

— Patricia M. Goff (Wilfrid Laurier University), “Cultural Diplomacy.”

— Su Changhe (Fudan University), “Soft Power.”

— Joseph S. Nye, Jr., (Harvard University), “Hard, Soft, and Smart Power.”

— Daryl Copeland, (University of Ottawa), “Digital Diplomacy.”

— Shawn Powers (Georgia State University), “Media, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics.”

— David Black and Byron Peacock (Dalhousie University), “Sport and Diplomacy.”

— Geoffrey Pigman (University of Pretoria), “The Diplomacy of Global and Transnational Firms.”

Steven R. Corman, ed., Narrating the Exit from Afghanistan, (Center for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, 2013). Corman (Arizona State University) and the scholars and practitioners who contributed to this volume address challenges in the identification, construction, communication, and uses of narratives in the ways wars are remembered and storied. Their focus on narrating ISAF’s exit from Afghanistan is complemented by examination of narratives in other wars (Vietnam, the Cold War, and the Soviet departure from Afghanistan) and conceptual issues in narrative structure and validity.

Nicholas J. Cull, “The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: the Internet in US Public Diplomacy,” International Studies Review, (2013) 15, 123-139. Cull (University of Southern California) provides his version of the adoption of computer and Internet-based technologies in US public diplomacy. He argues the US was “relatively slow to make full use” of Web 2.0 technologies in public diplomacy largely because a risk averse Department of State, which took over the US Information Agency (USIA) in 1999, found it difficult to embrace their advantages and promise. A central theme is the compatibility of digital technologies and networking approaches with USIA’s institutional culture and relational priorities in today’s “new public diplomacy” model. Cull’s account draws on archival research and memories of former practitioners that tend to minimize the resistance to change that also existed in USIA.

El Molinillo, No. 52, March 27, 2013. El Molinillo, the journal of Spain’s Political Communication Association, devotes its March issue to articles on public diplomacy and nation branding. Includes:

— Juan Luis Manfredi (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha), “Estrategia y diplomacia publica: el tiempo de law politica.”

— Teresa La Porte (Universidad de Navarra), “Contribucion de los actors no estatales a la nueva diplomacia publica.”

— Francisco Javier Hernandez Alonso (Universidad CEU San Pablo y del C. U. Villaneuva), “La importancia de lo publico en la nueva diplomacia.”

— Bruce Gregory (George Washington University / Georgetown University),“Entrevista con Bruce Gregory.” Questions and translation by Teresa La Porte and Joyce Baptista, Universidad de Navarra.

Alisher Faizullaev, “Diplomacy and Symbolism,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 8 (2013), 91-114. Fulbright scholar Faizullaev (University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Uzbekistan) examines diplomacy’s use of symbols, rituals, and ceremonies in (1) constructing and communicating meaning, (2) managing and regulating relationships, and (3) affecting collective feelings and motivating people. His article explores such issues as credibility in diplomatic signaling, uses of interactive symbolism in new media and public diplomacy, the relevance of high and low context cultures, language and image symbolism, and limitations of symbolism. He concludes with a call for more research on normative and affective functions of symbolism in diplomacy.

Ali Fisher, Collaborative Public Diplomacy, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). Fisher (InterMedia) bridges the study of networks and collaboration in 20th and 21st century public diplomacy with this contribution to the literature on the relational approach to public diplomacy. His book combines analysis of multi-hub, multi-directional networks in the age of social media with deeply researched case studies of networks of scholars, foundations, and government actors that were instrumental in developing American Studies in Europe during the Cold War. Public diplomacy for Fisher “is the attempt to change the odds of certain behaviors or events occurring.” He uses his historical case studies to argue the importance of collaborative negotiations in dynamic networks and diplomatic strategies that seek to make desirable outcomes more likely.

Bruce Gregory, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Implications of the 2012 US Presidential Campaign for American (‘Public’) Diplomacy,” paper delivered at the International Studies Association, San Francisco, April 2013. This paper argues that public diplomacy is becoming a legacy term and concept even as the public dimension in diplomacy becomes much more important in its study and practice. It examines three questions. (1) Did the election demonstrate enduring characteristics of American exceptionalism and episodic attention to public diplomacy? (2) What do the deaths of a US Ambassador and three other Americans in Benghazi, Libya mean for an understanding of expeditionary diplomacy, diplomacy’s security / public access dilemma, and evolving concepts of diplomatic agency. (3) Are whole of government diplomacy, a blurred distinction between foreign and domestic, and concepts of ‘global public engagement’ changing traditional approaches to diplomacy? Although changes in diplomacy were only marginally on display in the campaigns, they are evident in the activities of practitioners and the contrasting “new public diplomacy” and “integrative diplomacy” models of scholars.

Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, and Paul Sharp, Whither Foreign Ministries in a Post-Western World, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Policy Brief, No. 20, April 2013. Clingendael’s diplomacy scholars summarize central ideas in their influential Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century report (October 2012) and a follow-up conference at the Clingendael Institute (March 2013). Rather than lament the loss of traditional roles or cling to roles more appropriate to other actors, the authors call on foreign ministries and their diplomats to manage a “highly heterogeneous international system” and “shape the parameters of foreign policy” through networked tools and activities in which they have a comparative advantage. Foreign ministries, they recommend, should: (1) Drive innovation in delivery and knowledge networks at home and abroad, within and without government. (2) Influence policy by ensuring these networks map the objectives of international strategy. (3) Serve as the GPS for government and society in “a post-Western world of fragmenting rule sets and contested values.” (4) Provide a 4-dimensional vision that ensures coherence over time and across geography.

Harold Koh, “How to End the Forever War?” Speech at the Oxford Union, Oxford, UK, May 7, 2013. In rejecting a perpetual “‘global war on terror,’ without geographic or temporal limits,” the Obama administration’s former Department of State Legal Advisor offers a three-part strategy: disengage from Afghanistan, close Guantanamo, and discipline drones. Instead of treating the current conflict as a legal black hole where anything goes, the task is to “translate” existing laws of war to cover a new type of international armed conflict involving continuing and imminent terrorist threats. He calls for a clearer distinction between imminent threats and counterterrorism situations in which law enforcement and intelligence resources are more appropriate. Koh’s finely argued proposals for dealing with legal and policy issues relating to Guantanamo and armed drones make this a useful reading for those developing public diplomacy case studies on these issues.

Marc Lynch, “The Persistence of Arab Anti-Americanism: In the Middle East, Haters Gonna Hate,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2013, 146-152. In this review essay on Amaney Jamal’s Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All(Princeton University Press, 2012), Lynch (George Washington University) offers a perceptive critique of Jamal’s thesis that US policies, primarily support for authoritarian rule, are at the heart of an Arab anti-Americanism driven by Islamist parties in the region. Lynch offers contrasting views on how the Arab revolutions are reshaping attitudes toward the United States: (1) There are important opposition movements other than Islamists. (2) Despite their antipathy toward the US, Islamists are becoming regime incumbents who benefit from US support. (3) Ironically, leftist opposition movements, now marginalized in a new US supported status quo, are in the vanguard of anti-Americanism. (4) Autocrats of any stripe and their backers “can no longer assume either perpetual rule or unconditional U.S. support.”

Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,”Washington, DC, May 23, 2013. President Obama’s broad framework for a US counterterrorism strategy addresses changes in the threat of terrorism, standards for using drones for targeted lethal strikes, study of proposals for a special court or an independent board for deployment of lethal actions, diplomatic engagement and assistance, domestic radicalization, striking a balance between security and civil liberties, and closing Guantanamo. The White House also distributed a Fact Sheet . For an assessment of the speech — drafted by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and Speechwriting Benjamin Rhodes — its origins, and underlying policy debates, see Peter Baker, “In Terror Shift, Obama Took a Long Path,” The New York Times, May 27, 2013.

“The Pacific Century,” Public Diplomacy Magazine, Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars at the University of Southern California, Summer 2013. This issue of PD Magazine includes:

— Jian Wang (University of Southern California), “Shaping China’s Global Imagination.”

— Caitlin Byrne (Bond University), “The Strategic Century: Australia’s Asian Century in the Context of America’s Pacific Century.”

— Naren Chitty and Li Ji (Macquarie University), “Engaging Chinese Media Project.”

— Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), “Issue Brief: ‘Bulging Ideas:’ Making Korean Public Diplomacy Work.”

— Public Diplomacy Magazine Editors, “An Interview with the USC Master of Public Diplomacy Delegation to China.”

— James Thomas Snyder (Formerly NATO International Staff, Public Diplomacy Division), “Fourteen Articles on Public Diplomacy Practice for the Future American Public Diplomat.”

— Alexander Wooley and Tom Perigoe, “Exporting Democracy.”

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Benghazi Investigation Does not Reignite Broad Public Interest: Reactions Split Along Partisan Lines,” May 13, 2013. Pew finds fewer than half of Americans (44%) are following Congressional hearings on the Benghazi attack “very or fairly closely” – virtually unchanged from late January when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified. A deep split over how the Obama Administration and Congressional Republicans are handling Benghazi divides “cleanly along partisan lines.”

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Egyptians Increasingly Glum: Not Optimistic About Economy or Certain They Are Better Off Post-Mabarak,” May 16, 2013. Two years after the revolution of 2011, Pew’s surveys find that “Only 30% or Egyptians think the country is headed in the right direction, down from 53% last year and 65% in 2011 . . . Roughly three-in-four say the economy is in bad shape and optimism about the country’s economic situation has declined sharply.”

Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II, (University of Texas Press, 2012). Sadlier (Indiana University, Bloomington) adds to the growing historical literature on the 20th century origins of US public and cultural diplomacy with this carefully researched study of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA). Her narrative explores conceptual issues in cultural diplomacy, its strengths and limitations, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s motives in creating the CIAA to combat Axis penetration and promote solidarity in the Americas, Nelson Rockefeller’s roles as Assistant Secretary of State and CIAA Coordinator, and chapters on CIAA’s uses of motion pictures, radio, press and publications, museums, and libraries.

Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2013). Part transformational enthusiasm, part Google triumphalism, and part penetrating analysis, Schmidt (Executive Chairman of Google) and Cohen (Director of Google Ideas) offer their vision of “a world where everyone is connected.” Their analysis includes such issues as online identities, implications of WikiLeaks and their interview with Julian Assange, virtual statehood, intellectual property laws, digital provocation and cyber war, armed conflict, and alternative futures of revolution and terrorism, armed conflict, and post-conflict reconstruction.

Jordan Michael Smith, “The U.S. Democracy Project,” The National Interest,May/June, 2013, 26-38. Smith (a contributing writer atSalon and the Christian Science Monitor), surveys the origins and activities of the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, and other democracy promotion organizations funded by US Government grants. He focuses on US democratization activities in Russia, the Middle East, Iran, and Cuba and questions whether it is “smart diplomacy” for the US to fund programs perceived as undermining existing governments, contributing to a double standard in the context of US support for “friendly dictators,” and American meddling in the civil societies of others.

R.S. Zaharna, Amelia Arsenault, and Ali Fisher, eds., Relational, Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift, (New York: Routledge, 2013). Zaharna (American University), Arsenault (Georgia State University), and Fisher (InterMedia) bring together 14 essays by scholars and practitioners that explore conceptual frameworks and case studies in the relational approach to public diplomacy – an approach that privileges “genuine cooperation and collaboration” and relational strategies as a “core imperative” of public diplomacy. Chapters assess political, cultural, and ethical issues; network theory; uses of social media; and collaborative strategies of state and non-state actors. Defenders and critics of the relational model will find this an essential collection of views by its leading proponents.

Recent Blogs of Interest

Robert Albro, “Cultural Diplomacy and Heritage Wars,” May 22, 2013, ARTSblog.

Rosa Brooks, “Authorize This: Can Obama Put the War on Terror on a New Legal Footing?” May 23, 2013; “The War Professor: Can Obama Finally Make the Legal Case for His War on Terror?” May 23, 2013, Foreign Policy National Security Blog.

Robin Brown, “Post ISA Thoughts,” April 12, 2013; “Why I’m a Network Realist,” April 16, 2013; “The Warring Tribes of US Cold War Public Diplomacy,” May 8, 2013; “Can Non State Actors Do Public Diplomacy,” May 10, 2013; “The National Endowment for Democracy and US Public Diplomacy: Part 1,” May 15, 2013; “The National Endowment for Democracy: Part 2,” May 17, 2013, Public Diplomacy Networks and Influence Blog.

Lindsey Horan, “India and Africa Building Ties Through Youth Populations,” May 2, 2013, Take Five Blog, Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, George Washington University.

Tim Lowden, “Ain’t No Sonenshine When She’s Gone. . . .” May 6, 2013, Take Five Blog, Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, George Washington University.

Domani Spero (pseudonym), “37 Former Ambassadors Urge Appointment of a Career Diplomat to State Department’s Public Diplomacy Bureau,” May 24, 2013.

Philip Seib, “Public Diplomacy’s Impact and Prospects,” May 9, 2013; “Beyond Conflicts, The Arab World’s Other Challenges,” The CPD Blog, Center for Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California.

R.S. Zaharna, “Culture Posts: Who is the Public in Public Diplomacy?” May 22, 2013, The CPD Blog, Center for Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California.

Amy Zalman, “Post-Boston: Keep Calm and Think Clearly (Part I),” April 23, 2013;“Post-Boston: A More Effective Battle of Ideas (Part II),” April 24, 2013, theGlobalist.

Gem from the Past

Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics,(Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932; Westminster John Knox Press, 2013). The coincidental release of this new edition of Niebuhr’s classic book on individual morality and group behavior and today’s popular relational and collaborative approaches to diplomacy is fortuitous. Although Niebuhr was open to the possibilities of social intelligence and moral good will in human history, particularly as they might occasionally mitigate social conflict, he was deeply skeptical of the capacity of groups to overcome “the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all inter-group relations.” Groups, he argued, are constrained by the “limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the constant persistence of irrational egoism.” For these reasons Niebuhr insisted, as Langdon B. Gilkey (University of Chicago) observes in his introduction to the 1960 edition, “no group will ever be dislodged from power by persuasion, by arguments, however academically or legally elegant those arguments might be.” Quoting Niebuhr: “Reason is the servant of impulse before it is its master.” Includes a new foreword by Cornel West (Union Theological Seminary).

Current compilations of Diplomacy’s Public Dimension: Books, Articles, Websites are posted at Arizona State University’s COMOPS Journal, George Washington University’s Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy, and the Public Diplomacy Council. For previous compilations, visit Matt Armstrong’sMountainRunner.uswebsite.

Ain’t No Sonenshine When She’s Gone…

public diplomacy1 Comment on Ain’t No Sonenshine When She’s Gone…

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… only darkness everyday (until someone gets confirmed, at least).

Rumors began to fly online on April 23rd, and today, April 24, The Washington Post politics blog said that Tara Sonenshine, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the State Department, will be leaving her post in July. It has not been made public what her next position will be, although the Post noted she’s  “likely headed to an academic or media gig”.

Let’s recap the Under Secretaries in that position over the last 10 years:

  • Margaret Tutweiler: December 2003 – June 2004 (7 months)
  • (14 month vacancy)
  • Karen Hughes: September 2005 – December 2007 (27 months)
  • (5 month vacancy)
  • James K. Glassman: June 2008 – January 2009 (7 months)
  • (4 month vacancy)
  • Judith McHale: May 2009 – July 2011 (26 months)
  • (6 month vacancy)
  • Kathleen Stephens (Acting): February 2012 – April 2012 (2 months)
  • Tara Sonenshine: April 2012 – July 2013 (15 months)

In the last ten years, the United States has had only two presidents, but has had six Under Secretaries at the helm of what is increasingly regarded as a very important piece of U.S. foreign policy (public diplomacy). The shelf life of these people (not including Stephens) averages to less than a year and a half.  In addition, approximately 29 months of the last decade, the seat has been empty, which is maybe the saddest fact of the entire situation. And likely, it will see many more months of vacancy after July, due to the incredible hassle of confirmation in today’s Congress.

So, my question is, “What exactly is driving these people away?”.

I understand that it has historically been an appointed position (which many say is a flaw in itself), but what is it about U.S. public diplomacy that makes it so we can’t even keep someone for a single Presidential term?

Is the job too difficult because one simply can’t easily defend U.S. foreign policy over the last decade? Are the appointees, many from the more efficient private sector (including Sonenshine) too bogged down by bureaucracy? Is promoting the image of the U.S. to foreign countries a lost cause?

I don’t know the answers to those questions, nor will I opine thoughts about them. But the current level of rotation of the top public diplomacy position in the U.S. surely is not helping our cause, for obvious reasons. Internationally, it reflects poorly that people keep quitting a job that our long-held American exceptionalist ideals would lead people to believe is virtuous and done with ease. Internally, State Department officials have to deal with every newly confirmed Under Secretary coming in and mixing things around–“making their mark” in structure and programming. And for the American people, it creates breaks in the links of the PD machine, which serve to promote understanding and create security for us at home.

It would be wise of President Obama to swiftly nominate someone who he thinks will stick around, at least until the end of his term. For everyone’s sake.

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India and Africa Building Ties through Youth Populations

Africa, Cultural Diplomacy, public diplomacyLeave a Comment on India and Africa Building Ties through Youth Populations

IndiAfrica2

India: the world’s most populous democratic country with one of the largest economies. Africa: a largely developing continent attempting to work itself out of vast poverty and violent conflicts. Both have large youth populations, a desire to play a stronger role in international markets and, importantly, an interest in each other.

In early April, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) sponsored a two-day collaborative workshop in New Delhi known as “INDIAFRICA: A Shared Future.” The purpose of the forum, held on April 4-5, was to bring together the youth (defined as those under 30 years old) of two populations that have a mutually growing interest in each other to fashion solutions to the many shared development challenges faced by India and Africa:

“The initiative [was] born in 2011 out of recognition of shared sensibilities, histories and intertwined cultures between India and the African continent. The connection between India and Africa, home to an over-two-million-strong Indian diaspora, has been ‘a continuous process of socio-cultural and economic exchange.’”

indiafrica

Given these similarities, why the targeted focus on youth? As previously mentioned, both India and Africa have considerable youth populations. According to statistics from the CIA World Factbook, the median age in India is 26.5 years, while the median age for countries in Africa ranges from 15.1 in Uganda and 18.9 in Zimbabwe to 25.3 in South Africa and 28.1 years in Algeria. The young populations, as Manoj Kohli, head of the International Business Group for Bharti Airtel, explains, are very attractive, especially when considering “the western world, Russia, China, Japan are all graying.” Navdeep Suri, joint secretary of public diplomacy in India’s MEA, said, “The driving vision of the program is to unleash the enormous energy of young people, to encourage their powerful creative ideas and to enable them to be facilitators of this process.”

As described on the website, “INDIAFRICA: A Shared Future is a unique people-to-people initiative that aims at engaging multiple stakeholders in India and Africa through contests, fellowships, discussions, events, collaborative projects and cultural exchanges.” During this workshop, a total of 72 Indian and African youth (36 Indian and 36 African individuals), coming from a wide range of disciplines, pitch and debate “their views on challenges and opportunities in areas like energy, environment, healthcare, education, culture, creative exchanges, tourism, governance, food and nutrition in their respective regions…”

Public diplomacy, in the past few decades, “has been widely seen as the transparent means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and advancing its foreign policy goals.” This—what one might call public diplomacy in the modern sense of the word—was put forth by the University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy. The definition is useful in the sense that it is broad and fairly encompassing, but how does INDIAFRICA fit within it?

indiaafrica

At its core, INDIAFRICA is an initiative that might be defined as “little c” cultural diplomacy, a narrower subcategory of public diplomacy. Using Dr. Emil Constantinescu’s definition, cultural diplomacy can be defined as “a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity…” INDIAFRICA fits perfectly within this characterization and has the added element of youth involvement. Rather than convening a forum for business and government officials, INDIAFRICA brings together two youth populations in the name of building positive first impressions and tapping on the energy, creativity and enthusiasm–rather than the demonstrated expertise–these groups have the potential to generate.

INDIAFRICA lumps different categories, such as business and culture, together in the same package. The initiatives taken on by this enterprise include building democratic developmental institutions; establishing governance networks in areas such as agriculture, micro-finance, entrepreneurship development and healthcare; generating employment; creating “profitable partnerships”; funding the future through Indian soft loans to its African partners; and finally “building trust and mutual respect and building relationships.” And participants tackle these strategies in a number of ways—not simply the two-day workshop. INDIAFRICA promotes India-Africa collaboration through a series of contests: 1) Business Venture, 2) Poster Design, 3) Photography, and 4) Essay Writing, each attributing to a cultural diplomacy niche.

Each of the four contests has a theme that aligns with some larger cultural phenomenon. In the 2012-2013 contests for instance, the theme for Business Venture Contest was “Entrepreneurial Solutions to Address Developmental Challenges,” the Poster Design Contest’s was “What does Freedom mean to you?” the Photography Contest’s was “Communities in India and Africa” and the Essay Writing Contest’s was “How can India and Africa collaborate to co-create a brighter future?”  These themes align well with the ‘universal norms’ of democracy and innovation, while suiting INDIAFRICA’s aim to help shape the future of these two geographies through their respective youths. They emphasize the culture of both India and Africa while still moving them toward more global political and developmental environments. Suri surmised this point by noting that the multidisciplinary contest series help “create a platform for talented and young Indians and Africans to exchange ideas about emergent realities, successes and challenges and explore future collaborations in business, design and culture.”

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The beauty of INDIAFRICA lies within its configuration, which includes strategic as well as shared considerations. The Indian government has increasingly viewed Africa as a realm of opportunity for furthering its commercial interests, and the “leadership of Indian and African nations have set a bilateral trade target of $100 billion by 2015.” Kohli said that his company alone has invested $13 billion in Africa, plans to invest more and has already recruited about 7,000 employees in the continent. Although cultural diplomacy is rarely conducted  in the name of self-interest, it is worth noting that India’s interest in Africa extends beyond purely strategic self-interest and that the country considers this initiative as a means for achieving shared policy goals. Both geographies (both the governments and national companies) “work jointly to help in capacity building, knowledge sharing, job creation and other areas.” The similar and shared foreign policy goals lends INDIAFRICA to being seen as a joint collaboration, benefiting all involved.

“A large workforce with fewer children to support creates a window of opportunity to save money on health care and other social services; improve the quality of education; increase economic output because of more people working; invest more in technology and skills to strengthen the economy; and create the wealth needed to cope with the future aging of the population.”

This window, known as the demographic dividend, can be addressed through initiatives such as INDIAFRICA that bring together the young people in the name of a better future. For young participants, who may or may not be true opinion leaders in their home societies yet, this forum provides the ultimate learning model as well as a safe venue for the sharing of ideas. Further, this particular program not only allows youth to address development challenges and think of solutions early on, but it is also acts as the foundation for the future relationship between the two geographies.

Should We Even Be Studying Public Diplomacy?

Cultural Diplomacy, public diplomacy1 Comment on Should We Even Be Studying Public Diplomacy?

Rodman

by Anna-Lena Tepper

Former NBA player Dennis Rodman’s recent visit to North Korea came to many as a surprise. Along with an entourage of fellow basketball players from the performance group Harlem Globetrotters, Rodman went to visit the most oppressive country in the world, but his intentions weren’t politically motivated. His mission was simply to share the joy of basketball with the North Korean people. In his few days there he did not only initiate several friendly games between American players and North Korean teams, but he also had several friendly encounters with the country’s dictator Kim Jong Un. He left with a great impression of the country and its people and they also seemed to have enjoyed his visit. Upon his return to the States, Rodman’s advice to the President was that he should just call his Communist counterpart to sort things out. This sounds almost too good to be true and very easily done. The question arises, if maybe this approach might yield better results than the ones initiated – or in the case of US-North Korean relationship “non-initiated” – by the international community. After all, Rodman managed to have friendly encounters with one of the US’s biggest enemies.

The field of public or cultural diplomacy has received major academic attention over the last few years. People are not just studying public diplomacy, they also try to analyze, standardize, optimize, generalize, and define it. In an attempt to engage foreign audiences and develop a deeper relationship with them, based on shared interests and common ideas, governments spend millions of dollars each year to implement programs that can facilitate these engagements. However, despite countless highly sophisticated programs – ranging from student and leadership exchanges to a variety of cultural events – that are tailored to different audiences, too often neither scholars, nor policy makers can determine a cause-effect relationship between the programs they implemented and approval rates abroad.

0228-world-orodman_full_600And then there is Dennis Rodman, who travels to North Korea without a plan and manages to leave the country a few days later and everyone, including the country’s communist leader that hasn’t had any friendly encounters with an American in as long as anyone can remember, is all smiley faces. No science behind it, just what seems like intuition, and it worked – apparently. However, some argue that     Rodman’s visit was actually counterproductive, as his approval of Kim Jong Un directly legitimized his questionable leadership.

Still, the question arises if maybe American scholars are sometimes overanalyzing public diplomacy and therefore, often miss their set goals (or can’t detect it). Many argue that Dennis Rodman’s visit was just staged and now that he has gone nothing has changed. Those people have a point. Kim Jong Un has just threatened the United States with a nuclear war again. Politically, Rodman’s visit hasn’t changed anything. However, he still managed to open North Korea to an American visitor for a friendly encounter with the leader for first time in decades, and that is something neither politicians nor scholars have been able to achieve.

Fact is, public diplomacy needs to be very targeted in order to be successful, but at the same time, PD scholars and practitioners should also keep in mind that sometimes intuition is a good indicator of what is a good approach and what is not. Especially in the case of North Korea, maybe a mix of intuitive steps and targeted PD programs is going to lead to a change in the near, or not so near future.

Anna-Lena Tepper is a graduate student at the George Washington University, and is posting as part of Take Five’s ongoing Student Perspective series.

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