Here’s a PDx interview with GW graduate student Mohammad Fayaz Yourish. He is in his final year of the MA program in Global Communication, graduating this December. As an international student who has studied in India and Italy, he shares his experiences of coming to the U.S. for graduate school. In the podcast, Fayaz reflects on his time at the George Washington University and living in the nation’s capital.
“Diversity of the GW campus is very important and I think every student must make the best of that while being at GW.”
Mohammad Fayaz Yourish, MA Global Communication, Dec 2024
From his very first semester, Fayaz has given a lot of support to IPDGC events and GW student-focused activities such as the Walter Roberts Annual Lectures which feature leading voices in global communication or public diplomacy; hosting the State Department’s International Women of Courage panel at GW, and career talks with alums of the Global Communication MA program.
Fayaz has also been working on student engagement which means attending conferences like the Global Ties US National Meeting where public diplomacy practitioners, community organizations and government agencies gather – taking the opportunity to talk to attendees about the Global Communication program at the Elliott School.
1. Can you tell us a bit about your background (where you’re from and/or grew up) and what brought you to GW?
I’m from Dallas, Texas born and raised. I lived there all my life and then went to my undergraduate institution, the University of North Texas, where I got my degree in peace studies and conflict resolution. It was a very different field compared to Global Communication which I’m currently doing at GW as a master’s student. What got me interested in Global Communications was learning about the impact that media and media’s effect had on peace negotiations and peace processes either as spoilers, inhibitors, or something that helped further negotiations. It also really brought on my interest in a two-party system, learning about how important it is for an individual and for citizen diplomacy. After I knew that I was really interested, GW had one of the best programs for Global Communications and it was one of the only schools where I could focus on and do something in public diplomacy.
2. What drew you to pursue a graduate degree in Global Communication?
I was drawn to doing a graduate degree in Global Communication because it’s so versatile. Working with media and news outlets, and even how you produce images and content is how building a positive perception in international affairs is run. Global Communication is a way that you get to influence and create those perceptions and that’s something that I feel is widely ignored and not acknowledged in international affairs. I think Global Communication is such a great program where I can touch on so many things but still have my own perspective on a variety of topics.
3. How has your experience at GW prepared you for a career in international affairs and public diplomacy?
My master’s program is enhancing and building on skills that I’ve already learned in past internships or fellowships. I’ve gotten to build upon what I learned in my undergraduate degree which was stuck inside of theory and now at GW, I’m getting to be in classes where I’m learning practical skills. I get to be in classes that simulate working in an embassy, writing press memos, doing speech correspondence, and pretending to prepare ambassadors on press releases. These are all opportunities that I was not able to do before coming to GW, and these are skills you can put on a resume that any employer is looking for.
4. What specific courses or projects have you found most impactful during your Global Communication program?
I think the most impactful project I’ve done so far is my Embassy project that I’ve been doing in my Public Diplomacy seminar. I am doing mine on the U.S. Embassy and Turkey and it is a semester-long project where I’m getting to simulate and work like I’m in an embassy in the public diplomacy sector. In this project, I’m getting to write press memos, prepare a media strategy, and create a perception of what we want to do at the Embassy. I am able to propose my ideas and engage with the rest of my class and it’s been great getting all the feedback from my fellow students. Also, it’s great having a professor who has done this for a career in the Middle East and Africa.
5. What advice do you have for future students who are interested in pursuing a Global Communication graduate degree?
I think what is important for someone wanting to pursue a graduate degree in Global Communication is to try out a lot of different areas of communications. I think that either working in media, international exchange, or working in programming and public engagement on an international scale is helpful. I’ve done things ranging from political advocacy to congressional relations while also doing programming and public engagement on the nonprofit level. These experiences give you an understanding of all aspects of the field and it broadens your knowledge when entering a master’s degree so that you’re able to contribute to your class, and your education by having all of these different experiences.
Gabrielle was interviewed by GW undergraduate Alexis Posel. Alexis is a political science major working with IPDGC as a Communications Assistant.
It was a warm welcome for the incoming graduate students to the Elliott School late last month. The students heard from Dean Alyssa Ayres, met with their Program Directors, and attended sessions with academic advisors, career coaches and student panels. The day ended with a Welcome Reception where the new students met and mingled with faculty, administrators and fellow graduate students.
The Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Studies set up a table at the Engagement Expo. With the help of student Pablo Molina Asensi, 2nd year student in the Global Comms MA program, spoke to many students about the public diplomacy and global communications activities we organize throughout the academic year.
This year (2023-2024), IPDGC will be organizing a cultural diplomacy program primarily for students at the Elliott School and the Corcoran School for Arts and Design to teach the process and practical aspects of developing cultural diplomacy and engagement programming. There will be student career talks, film and book events, and presentations by our Visiting scholars.
Our partnership with the Public Diplomacy Council allows us to host First Monday Forums with leaders and practitioners in US public diplomacy and international engagement. As always, the Walter Roberts Endowment will support the Annual Lecture and the Award for Congressional Leadership in Public Diplomacy for 2023-2024.
If you are in the Global Communications MA program or any of the Elliott School programs and would like to participate or volunteer for these events, get in touch: ipdgc@gwu.edu
By Dominique A. Piñeiro, MA Media and Strategic Communication ’23
An A.I.- generated photograph capturing the surreal and symbolic concept of the “TriNet,” representing a narrative contest among the U.S., the European Union (E.U.), and China. Each international player seeks to promote its approach to Internet governance and digital policies on the world stage. The image portrays three distinct data streams flowing through an ethereal cyberspace landscape filled with vibrant neon colors and intricate geometric patterns. (Dominique A. Piñeiro via MidJourney)
The Internet is evolving into a “TriNet” model, with three distinct approaches: China’s strict government control, the E.U.’s focus on data protection and privacy, and the U.S.’s market-driven approach emphasizing profit and competition. This shift alters the Internet’s original principles of openness and accessibility, raising concerns for human rights, democracy, and the free flow of information.
The “TriNet” model represents a narrative contest among the U.S., the European Union (E.U.), and China. Each player seeks to promote its approach to Internet governance and digital policies on the world stage. This narrative contest involves asserting the superiority of their respective models, with the opportunity to shape international norms and influence other countries’ adoption of similar frameworks.
The U.S. promotes a free and open web, believing global Internet access would spread rights, freedom, and democracy. However, the U.S. model is primarily driven by private businesses, leading to the rise of tech giants like Amazon, Apple, Alphabet, Meta, and Microsoft. These companies accumulate profits and power without sufficient regulations to protect users, potentially undermining American democracy and other countries.
A striking example is Meta’s (formerly Facebook) role in the 2017 Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, where its platform was used to incite violence and discrimination. Although not intentionally designed for this purpose, Meta’s focus on engagement and data collection contributed to spreading harmful content. In the Myanmar example, the U.S. effectiveness in influencing global Internet policies might be hindered by the issues arising from the largely unregulated tech industry and increasing calls for data privacy and antitrust regulations, which the E.U. is happy to lead.
The E.U.’s alternative also seeks to spread rights, freedom, and democracy. Still, it emphasizes data privacy, with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) harmonizing data privacy laws across member states and offering individuals greater control over personal data. While not explicitly addressing human rights, GDPR provisions can prevent the misuse of data that leads to situations like Myanmar’s crisis. The GDPR sets a worldwide data privacy standard, contrasting with the U.S.’s fragmented approach, which includes sector-specific regulations like HIPAA and COPPA.
While the E.U. model and GDPR significantly improve data protection and privacy, there are also potential disadvantages. A specific example would be how GDPR imposes compliance requirements on businesses, which can be interpreted differently by E.U. member states, and is an expensive process, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises.
China’s approach contrasts sharply with the U.S. and E.U. In a 2000 speech, President Bill Clinton questioned China’s ability to control the Internet effectively:
“Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet – good luck. That’s sort of like trying to nail jello to the wall. But I would argue that their effort to do that proves how real these advances are and how much they threaten the established order of things, especially the government’s tight information control.”
His remarks were meant to convey that the Internet’s decentralized nature makes it difficult for governments to control or censor information effectively. Ironically, his statement foreshadowed what was possible. The Great Firewall of China, or Golden Shield Project, demonstrates a sophisticated censorship and control system. China emphasizes sovereignty and states’ rights in information and communication, enacting policies to realize its vision.
China exports its internet censorship and surveillance technology to other countries, promoting its regulated Internet model worldwide. Since the 2021 coup d’état, Myanmar has been increasingly cutting off its population from the Internet, causing concern that the regime could become a model for other authoritarian governments if not economically crippled.
China’s strict government-controlled Internet model could be framed as a solution to promoting a harmonious society. The government would control information dissemination significantly, limiting public knowledge of ongoing events and potentially suppressing information. This type of control could appeal to illiberal democracies and autocrats alike. It’s also important to note that a highly controlled internet can monitor and target specific ethnic or religious groups by a government to identify, suppress, or persecute vulnerable populations, potentially leading to or worsening a genocide.
The U.S. and E.U. value free speech and human rights and view China’s controlled and regulated Internet model negatively. However, China’s economic and technological prowess could attract some nations seeking to emulate its success or strengthen political control over their populations. China’s influence may grow in authoritarian countries or those seeking alternative models to Western Internet governance.
The evolving “TriNet” model’s distinct approaches—China’s stringent control, the E.U.’s emphasis on data protection and privacy, and the U.S.’s profit-driven strategy—raise concerns over human rights, democracy, and information flow. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar exemplifies how American tech giants’ practices and China’s internet control technology can have devastating consequences for vulnerable populations. While the U.S. approach to the Internet has flaws, it’s vital to contemplate the ramifications of a world where China sets the standards for digital governance. A free and open internet enables individuals to express their opinions, share ideas, and access diverse perspectives without fear of censorship or persecution.
The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.
In addition, the opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.
By Antoine Morin, GW Exchange Student, Spring 2023
This past month, the normally welcoming and multicultural Canada took the difficult decision to close Roxham Road – a road that generated extensive media coverage because it was a site of irregular migration to Canada from the United States. Joe Biden’s visit to Canada prompted a new agreement stating that illegal migrants caught within fourteen days of crossing the Canada- US border would be sent back to the other country.
The crux of the Roxham Road diplomatic crisis was between Quebec and Canada. Given the country and the province’s conflicting narratives, it took the Trudeau government years to fulfill the wish of its province to close Roxham Road, and it is likely that many other immigration and identity disputes will arise.
Canada’s Narrative
Canada is known for its values of multiculturalism, inclusion, and diversity. Being an alliance of two nations and two official languages, Canada is proud of its liberalism, individual rights record, and its efforts to become a fully bilingual country.
Quebec’s Narrative
The French Model
Canada’s nationalist province wants to protect its language and culture at all costs. As the French language is declining in Quebec and Canada, Quebec turns to France to find solutions to counter trends that could threaten the survival of the nation. Its recent secularism law stating that government employees cannot wear religious symbols was directly inspired by France. Bill 21 is now being contested at the Supreme Court of Canada, which has to determine the validity of such a law. The rest of Canada almost universally condemned Bill 21 as it does not fit Canada’s multiculturalism narrative.
Interculturalism
While Canada is supremely unconcerned about the integration of immigrants, Quebec is keen on ensuring that all newcomers learn the language and culture of the province. North America’s France equivalent believes in interculturalism – a doctrine promoting cross-cultural exchanges instead of self-segregation within cultures. To achieve interculturalism, a nation must reduce immigration and better integrate its immigrants. In Quebec, this means ensuring that all newcomers learn the common language of the nation – French.
The Superpower Nation
With the decline of the French language and globalization, Quebec must act if it wants to remain a distinct and unique nation within Canada. Although Quebec successfully forced Ottawa’s hand on the Roxham Road case, immigration will remain a crucial point of contention between the two governments for the near future. Canada’s second most populous province remains a superpower on the national scene because of its political power and natural resources. The threat of another referendum on Quebec independence must also still be on the back of Canadian politicians. This battleground province has voted for all four major federal parties in the last decade.
Quebec
Master & Identity Narratives – How Quebec views itself
System Narratives – How Quebec views the world
Issue Narratives – How Quebec views the issue
Importance of France to identity
Superpower on the national scene
“Welcoming fewer immigrants but taking care of them.”
Affirmation of Quebec as a nation within Canada.
Interculturalism
Nationalism
Separation between the state and religion
Belief in the importance of nations to preserve their culture, language, and heritage.
Nations should protect their own interests first.
Quebec does not have the capacity to welcome all these migrants.
Closing Roxham Road set a good precedent.
The nation will fight back against Trudeau’s loose immigration policies.
Immigration has contributed to the decline of French in Quebec
The Roxham Road closure is a short-term victory for Quebec. However, the wider narratives that caused the dispute will not change in the coming years and could become even more relevant. According to Statistics Canada, Canada is the fastest-growing G7 country in terms of population. Immigration was responsible for 95.9 % of last year’s 2.7 % population increase. Migration should thus remain a central issue in a country on track to double its population before 2050.
Canada has announced ever-increasing immigration levels for the coming years, an approach consistent with its welcoming, diverse, and multicultural image. Roxham Road or not, I suspect Quebec will still be reluctant to welcome a large number of migrants (illegal or not). Capacity issues, the decline of French in the province, and Quebec’s insistence to stick to an integration model (interculturalism) and not a multicultural approach are the main reasons.
While all these recent debates, laws, and policies around immigration, language, and religion have taken place under a Liberal government, it is difficult to see how a potential Conservative government would help solve identity issues between Quebec and Canada. The Conservative Party of Canada is as pro-immigration as the liberals, and the party’s right-wing agenda would not resonate well with Canada’s most progressive province. Unfortunately, the most likely outcome is that as many identity disputes between Quebec and Canada will continue to take place in the coming years, and La Belle Province may be headed toward another independence referendum.
The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez meets with Moroccan King Mohammed VI, Moncloa (REUTERS)
Spain and Morocco’s Shifting Relationship
Until recently, tensions between Spain and Morocco had been building for decades, particularly over Spain’s lack of recognition for Morocco’s autonomy in the Western Sahara. Spain and Morocco, along with Mauritania, signed a tripartite agreement in 1975 that aimed at stabilizing relations in the Western Sahara region. However, Spain had not formalized or honored its political and diplomatic ties to Morocco. In 2021 Spain welcomed nationalist movement leader seeking independence from Morocco, Brahim Ghali, into its country despite him also being wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity. In retaliation, Morocco then opened its border in May 2021 to Ceuta, a Spanish autonomous city in Morocco, leading to many trying to illegally enter the city and chaos erupting.
Despite the historical tension and recent challenges between the two countries, as of this month, Spain has decided to realign its relationship with Morocco. On March 18 of this year, Spain announced through its foreign minister, José Manuel Albares, that it considers Morocco’s proposal regarding the Western Sahara to be “the most serious, realistic, and credible” plan to de-escalating tensions in the region. The plan involves giving Morocco limited autonomy in the Western Sahara, a region it annexed in 1975, which is inhabited largely by the Polisario Front independence movement. Spain’s backing of the proposal symbolizes a turning point in its foreign affairs with Morocco.
Spain’s Evolving Identity
Spain’s strategic messaging of its newly defined stance with Morocco highlights how Spain is attempting to develop the narrative that it is a cooperative democracy and international partner. Since the end of General Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, the country has worked diligently to democratize and become part of the international system. This however conflicts with Spain’s imperialistic history with Morocco, and until recently, apathetic nature towards mending lingering tensions. In order for Spain to shed its dictatorial and imperialistic ways and prove its relevance as a democratic actor, it needed to readjust its relationship with Morocco. For example, when Spain invited Brahim Ghali into its country, Morocco began portraying Spain as indifferent to crimes against humanity. Spain could not let Morocco continue to capitalize on the meeting with Ghali to maintain its reputation as a democratized state. Moreover, for Spain to appear as a collaborative foreign power, it could not continue to ignore its diplomatic agreements with Morocco in the Western Saharan. Amends needed to be made with Morocco to prevent anything from undermining Spain’s legitimacy and relationships in the international system
Spain made the announcement of the backing of Morocco’s proposal through its highest foreign affairs official to validate its stance further. Albares emphasized the commitment even further by stating that Spain is looking to strengthen cooperation particularly regarding migration in the Western Sahara. Spain’s alignment with Morocco though symbolizes much more than this. In the spring of 2021, Morocco organized mass migration through Ceuta, a Spanish city on the border of the two countries. The weaponsing of migration outraged Spain, but also the EU, which has established that it desires maintaining a strong relationship with Morocco. For Spain, it is important to appear as a cooperative and loyal state, something it was not under General Franco. Therefore, to project this narrative, Spain needed to begin appearing active in working towards resolution in the Western Sahara.
Implications for Spain’s Repositioning
Spain’s new positioning will have, and has had, many potential implications for the state. Thus far, Spain’s new positioning has led Morocco to reinstate its ambassador to Spain, which it had previously recalled. This, in addition to other comments made by Morocco, portrays that Morocco is pleased with Spain’s new alignment and is open to working with the state. The EU has also established that it welcomes Spain’s change in stance with Morocco. While Spain has strengthened some of its relationships through this decision, it has also had some negative implications as well. For example, since the Polisario Front is backed by Algeria, Algeria removed its ambassador to Spain because of its decision. Besides this damaging foreign relations between Spain and Algeria, it could also have economic consequences for Spain. Algeria supplies gas to Spain, and given the crisis in Ukraine, Algeria’s supply has become ever more important. Spain could risk increasing gas prices even further if relations are damaged even more with Algeria.
Polisario demonstrators protest against Spain’s support for Morocco’s autonomy plan in Madrid, (AFP).
Going forward, Spain’s relations with other states will shift as well. Some states support Morocco’s proposal and will embrace Spain’s new positioning, such as the US. However, there are other states and international organizations that believe a referendum should occur in the region to decide who is in control. To illustrate its identity as a collaborative and credible democracy, Spain should continue its use of elite officials as spokespeople, remain loyal to and supportive of allies and be proactive in discourse around international issues.
For more on the topic by the author, please click here.
The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.
The AUKUS incident between France, the United States, and Australia occurred due to a contract breach between Australia and France. Australian authorities had contracted France to develop shortfin barracuda submarines to meet its maritime defense needs in 2016 for $38.6 billion. As the deal was delayed and costs increased, the Australian government decided to opt for American-built submarines because they have nuclear capabilities. The abandonment of the deal provoked the removal of the French ambassador to the United States, a first in the history of the Franco-American relationship. Ambassador Etienne returned to Paris for a brief period before returning to his post. The event prompted conversations about alliances and France’s role in the world.
France in the U.S.’ world?
The projection of power was key to the formation of modern France. As an empire, France saw its power expand throughout the world and the country was synonymous with influence.
Until WWII, France saw itself as a world power, influential militarily and culturally. However, its leadership in the world waned as the United States became the world superpower following WWII when the US helped the French fight the Germans, hurting Paris’ pride. Furthermore, the U.S. had obtained nuclear weapons and spread its culture globally, ousting France from the top position. To reclaim its identity as a top contender in a U.S.-dominated world, France developed its own nuclear arms program. In other words, Charles de Gaulle saw it necessary for France to arm itself with nuclear weapons to reassert its dominance in the new world order.
Similarlyfor President Macron, nuclear power is equal to French world leadership. Macron announced a nuclear buildup of 14 generators to reduce carbon emissions and reliance on foreign energy, namely from Russia. Now France also hopes to best the United States and China in the nuclear power race. If France can become Europe’s top nuclear power producer, it can position itself as a worthy adversary of the United States.
Paris still holds onto its former colonies as trade partners, but increased Chinese involvement in the region may drive away French business. The AUKUS deal represented another defeat to French power, prompting it to react strongly. Paris needed to show resolve in the face of its people, Europe, and the world.
A stab in the back?
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Yves Le Drian (Community Commons)
The immediate ending of the $38.6 billion deal shocked the world, not least of all the French. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Yves Le Drian called the dropping of France in the deal “a stab in the back.” Following a conversation with the Australian Prime Minister, President Macron alleged that he was lied to about the failed submarine deal. The U.S. actions attacked France’s falling self-image. The deal demonstrated to France that it would be a second-choice partner, behind the United States. As it struggled to reclaim its lost glory, France found its plans thwarted by U.S. enterprise. Furthermore, the failure of the deal demonstrates the American hegemony against which France has fought for several decades. In France’s view, the United States violated norms in pursuit of its interests, slighting its European allies in favor of its Anglophone partnerships. The submarines France intended to sell to Australia were non-nuclear, per agreements to half nuclear proliferation. From this perspective, France sees the United States as violating agreements established by democracies with shared values. Thus the AUKUS deal struck to the heart of France’s identity of a nuclear power with global trade ambitions.
A Simple Mistake?
The AUKUS deal represented a breach of trust for the French and larger European community, an opportunity to better arm itself for Australia, and another means to secure the indo-pacific for the United States. To resolve the issue, President Joe Biden met with President Emmanuel Macron. The two heads of state addressed the deal, with the American leader referring to the turn of events as “clumsy.” President Biden claimed that he was under the impression that France was aware of the switching of clients. The difference in perspective reveals differences in the larger identity narratives of the two countries. France’s concern was its image as a world power, which has dwindled in recent history. The deal, for France, would have returned lost prestige to the country. France falls behind the United States and Russia as the third-largest weapons exporter globally. The United States, possessing the title of the world’s greatest superpower, merely acted in line with its own identity; it sought to ensure security. The fact that France was caught in crossfires was a blunder, as President Biden explained.
US President Biden and French President Macron (AP Photo)
Reinforced Cooperation?
Though the AUKUS affair ended with the return of French Ambassador Etienne and the two sides found an agreement, what would this mean for France? France successfully defended itself against the United States and was successful in obtaining an admission of guilt from the American president.
For more on the topic by the author, please click here.
The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.
By Alexia Ross, MA Media and Strategic Communication ’22
New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, is preparing for upcoming economic talks with the Biden White House.
New Zealand is a country that the global community does not often associate with international conflict. While not a regular participant in clashes between the world’s dominant forces, New Zealand faces increasing concerns about the impacts of transnational conflicts on its economy. New Zealand is highly import-dependent, with international trade making up over 60% of the country’s economic activities. With rising global tensions that threaten to impact trade routes, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, New Zealand officials are beginning to raise alarms about potential economic and supply implications.
New Zealand’s prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, is putting the protection of free trade at the top of the country’s foreign affairs agenda. She plans to meet with leaders from several key economic powers in the coming months. In early 2022, New Zealand cemented a free trade agreement with the United Kingdom that will bolster bilateral trade and reinforce strong relations between the countries that should, in theory, support continued economic collaboration even in times of international crisis.
Ardern is expected to meet with US officials in May to lock down another vital ally in free trade potentially. The US is New Zealand’s third-biggest trade partner, providing goods like cars and medical equipment. In preparation for this meeting, Ardern’s communication’s team should strategically leverage compelling narratives in her statement to the general US audience, thereby gaining public support for a bilateral trade deal between the two democratic nations.
An Opportunity Connection with US Public
Strategic narratives are an essential tool for appealing to potential allies, allowing governments to find common ground and values to nurture the relationship with the public of target nations. Ardern and her team could pursue a strong trade agreement to safeguard New Zealand’s trade-based economy by leveraging a number of narrative genres that both invoke a sense of shared identity between the nations and touch on some more US-centric narratives.
There are three main narrative structures that Ardern must consider in her speech:
Master and identity narratives that draw on a nation’s history and self-identifying characteristics;
System narratives that characterize a nation’s relationship with the rest of the world;
And issue narratives that address current events in the nations
The following chart showcases trade narratives that the US and New Zealand share, making them prime examples of values that Ardern should draw on when speaking to the US public.
Shared US & New Zealand Trade Narratives
Identity/Master Narrative
System Narrative
Issue Narrative
Leaders in production industry
Participant in Global Markets
Global economic hierarchy
Maintaining trans-national trade patterns
Free Trade
Capitalism
Alliance of Democratic Nations
Rising China
Growing concerns over China and its tensions with global powers
Russia/Ukraine conflict impacting international trade, connotations for future
Global supply chain challenges
A Path Forward
New Zealand is approaching this meeting with a backdrop of positive history with the US. A readout of a 2021 call between Biden and Ardern noted, “They discussed our interest in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and President Biden underscored the enduring U.S. commitment to the region.”
When speaking to the US public in favor of a new trade deal, Prime Minister Ardern will want to draw out commonalities in free-market values. Ardern and her team should utilize a narrative of the importance of a “free, democratic, secure and prosperous world” in light of any range of global complications, and highlight how this partnership plays into the US’s existing frames of economic collaboration with a diverse grouping of nations
New Zealand can leverage current events as a tool for persuasion – arguing that firm partnerships can ensure that global trade is grounded and can remain stable in tumultuous circumstances. Tensions in the Indo-Pacific trade system due to conflict between China and other global superpowers, like the US, are of regional and global concern to Kiwis and Americans alike. By noting the risks for both the US and New Zealand’s economic freedoms if China was to disrupt trade in the region, Ardern could stoke strong emotional support for a trade agreement.
Utilizing a few more US-centric frames may also be helpful in developing public support for the partnership. For example, the US knows that it is a global superpower and acknowledges its role in global affairs. There is an expectation that US leaders will protect the reputation of the country as economic and humanitarian leaders. By touching on these identity narratives in her statement, Ardern would draw on the public’s desire to see its government showcase American values on the global stage.
Through the strategic use of narratives, Prime Minister Ardern could stoke pressure from a broad US audience, initiating an extra nudge that could push the Biden Administration to formalize a new trade agreement between the nations. For these reasons and more, Ardern’s messaging to the US public must be deliberate, highlighting why this deal is essential to both countries’ economic agendas.
For more on the topic by the author, please click here.
The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria fighters marching Raqqa, Syria. Source
With an estimated 27,000 foreign fighters joining the Islamic State and its cause, one can’t help but wonder: what is the driving force behind the support? This article aims to provide an answer, as well as a solution to the underlying problem.
What is ISIS?
For those who are unfamiliar with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its major debut happened in 2014, when the Islamic State successfully captured key Iraqi cities, defeated Iraqi government forces, and proclaimed itself as a worldwide Caliphate. Ever since then, there has been a massive push by the Islamic State towards its ultimate goal – the apocalypse.
Contrary to popular belief, ISIS follows a strict medieval form of Islam , which is why it practices very extreme war tactics like crucifixions, beheadings, and slavery. In the Islamic State’s interpretation of the Koran, the apocalypse will bring an end of the world. The prophesy also reads that a reestablished God’s Kingdom on Earth, the Caliphate, will fight a decisive battle at Dabiq against the infidels, where Jesus will join the Caliphate and end the war.
While most ISIS recruits come from the immediate territories captured by ISIS, i.e. Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has a very sophisticated recruitment system in place that draws supporters from around the world.
Recruitment Methods
Islamic State uses sophisticated propaganda tactics to persuade potential recruits and promote their cause. ISIS targets specific groups of people and uses tailored media for different parts of the world. Dabiq, now Rumiyah, is a magazine in English, which caters to English speaking audience, while Dar Al-Islam does the same for French speakers, and Istok for Russian speakers. By diversifying its media, ISIS can influence its targets with regionally-relevant propaganda, which has stronger effect then general propaganda does.
From propaganda videos, to infographics, to extensive social media campaigns, and even a news channel – every piece of propaganda ISIS creates is top quality. By creating visually appealing propaganda that reflects popular media – like video games, TV shows, and pop culture – ISIS is reaching a wide audience and successfully communicating its ideas in a very powerful way.
ISIS associates terrorism with positive ideas and thoughts, and in its methods, uses terror to seduce, not terrorize. Since modern age audience is so susceptible to action and violence, it’s also susceptible to Islamic State’s media.
Vulnerability
Now, why does the Islamic State make such a great effort to target Muslims across the globe? Short answer: it is easy to influence people who do not feel accepted in society.
You see, Islamic terrorism is all about polarization.
In its propaganda campaigns, the Islamic State targets minority Muslims, who have been oppressed by society. That is also the reason regionally-catered propaganda is so effective.
The map above shows estimated statistics on foreign recruits who had joined the Islamic State. By using that data, the percentage of recruits who joined ISIS out of total Muslim population can be derived.
As it is evident from the graph, it is striking that it is countries with a minority Muslim population that have the greatest percentage of fighters joining the Islamic State. This is caused by the pressure the society puts on Muslims. By alienating the Muslim population in Muslim minority countries, great tension is created. Muslims do not feel welcome, feel underrepresented, discriminated against, and seek ways to be recognized. ISIS propaganda acts on those vulnerabilities making people believe in an ideal society, where they feel welcome and valued.
On the other hand, there is a much lower percentage of Muslims joining the Islamic State from Muslim majority countries. Again, same principles are applied here: Muslims do not feel alienated, undervalued, or underrepresented. They have a voice in their government, are involved in political, social, or even their own radical groups. There is no reason for them to join ISIS unless they truly believe in the cause.
The Islamic State propaganda targets Muslims who lack a sense of unity, and the statistics prove that ISIS tactics are working.
Residents of Iraq and Syria are a bit of a different story, since they felt oppressed by their governments and ISIS promised to raise their quality of life. Since Iraq and Syria are zones of current conflict, it’s much more difficult to gauge residents’ reasons for joining the Islamic State, but judging by the sheer number of refugees fleeing from those countries, it is easy to say that ISIS is not that popular in Iraq and Syria.
Solution
To undermine ISIS recruitment efforts, Muslims, overall, need to be treated fairly. If Muslim minorities got the treatment they deserve, there would be no need for violence and extremism. By creating anti-Muslim policies and by alienating the religion, radical responses are created.
By incorporating Muslims into society through public office, cultural exchange programs, clubs, and sports teams, the sense of undervalue decreases. People who once were angry with the way Muslims were treated, felt alone, or felt segregated against, will have less of a need to join a radical organization – they will feel like their voice is finally heard.
Speaking of being heard, instead of shunning away refugees, give them a voice and safety they try to obtain. If refugees share their first-hand experiences with the Caliphate and with ISIS, many will realize how different the reality is from an image ISIS is trying to sell.
Caveat: The views expressed in this blog are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.
(Source: Flickr/Photo Phiend – American and Taiwanese flags at the Chinatown gate in Washington, DC)
Since the severing of official diplomatic ties between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1979, U.S. policy towards Taiwan has stayed relatively consistent throughout the past six administrations by adhering to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and President Reagan’s “Six Assurances.” Although the TRA continues commercial, cultural, and public exchanges under a de facto relationship, significant gaps remain. Much more can be done to strengthen the partnership between the U.S. and Taiwan.
The world has increasingly become more interconnected. However, Taiwan continues to be pushed out of the international community. Recently, Taiwan was excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and a U.N.-affiliated meeting in New York on rare diseases. The United States should consider deepening its exchanges with Taiwan. Public diplomacy efforts are inextricably linked with American national security. As such, the U.S. should place greater emphasis on its people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan.
At a time when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) exhibits increasingly assertive behavior in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies should highlight the positive role Taiwan plays in the regional architecture. U.S. strategy toward the region has taken a multifaceted approach that seeks to strengthen cooperation with like-minded nations to address shared challenges. In addition to commercial engagement, expanding people-to-people ties are essential for fostering goodwill and unity with our partners and allies.
In the absence of diplomatic relations, Taiwan has received diminished time and attention in Washington. Over the past ten years, the White House has not viewed it as a priority to support Taiwan and advance the unofficial bilateral relationship. This has affected the way everyday Americans and Taiwanese have come to view each other. According to survey results reported by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2014, only 28 percent of Americans would support sending U.S. troops to Taiwan in the event that the PRC invaded the island.[1] In sharp contrast, a 2016 poll in Taiwan indicated that over 70 percent of Taiwanese people believe that America would come to Taiwan’s rescue in the event of a Chinese invasion. It can be interpreted that—in addition to having a case of ‘war fatigue’ from 13 years of on-going conflict in the Middle East—this perception gap may be the natural result of many Americans having limited understanding of the TRA and the political complexity of cross-Strait relations.
Following the recent Trump-Tsai phone call, the misinformed American media further demonstrated a lack of concern and understanding regarding the nuances surrounding U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. More exchanges, not only on the governmental level but also on the educational level, will allow for more Americans to understand Taiwan and its people better. Currently, the United States is struggling to establish a proactive international education policy and failing to meet its goal of 1 million Americans studying abroad by 2017. New and creative exchanges with Taiwan will boost U.S. foreign policy and security goals, and ultimately garner more public support on both sides of the relationship for stronger U.S.-Taiwan cooperation.
Current Public Exchange Programs
Despite the fact that the U.S. and Taiwan both have visa waiver programs that contribute to tourism on both sides—which may see a record high of over 1 million visitors this year—these types of exchanges are mainly short and business-driven. Long-term exchanges that seek to deepen people-to-people relations must be pursued as well. On the U.S. side, government-sponsored public exchange initiatives that have a Taiwan component include a variety of programs funded by the U.S. Department of State (International Visitor Leadership Program, Fulbright, Critical Language Scholarship, National Security Language Initiative for Youth, Benjamin A. Gilman International Scholarship, etc.) and Boren awards for international study. The U.S. Department of Education also has 118 universities that offer the Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships (FLAS) to study abroad. Language exchange programs funded by nongovernmental organizations include the Blakemore and Freeman Foundations.
On the Taiwan side, the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) provide generous scholarship opportunities for foreign nationals seeking language learning, degree programs, or research (Huayu Enrichment Scholarship, Taiwan Scholarship, and Taiwan Fellowship, respectively.) The Taiwan government also sponsors the Ambassador Summer Scholarship Program for the Taiwan-U.S. Alliance, known as TUSA, which is a non-profit organization that focuses on building international friendships on the student-to-student level. In 2014, MOFA launched an international youth leadership program called Mosaic Taiwan, which is committed to better informing future American leaders through a three-week program filled with workshops and seminars in Taiwan. Finally, a unique initiative is the Taiwan Tech Trek program, which recruits young people of Taiwanese ancestry for an eight-week summer internship or research program, allowing Taiwanese-Americans to learn about Taiwan and its well-known tech industries. These programs ultimately seek to promote and improve U.S.-Taiwan relations and counter China efforts to stop Taiwan from participating in the community of nations.
Challenges With Current Programs
The U.S.-Taiwan pursuit to seek partnerships through educational and cultural exchange programs is laudable. There are, however, significant challenges with U.S. programs, particularly with the International Leadership Visitor Program (IVLP), that inhibit more meaningful exchange. IVLP is a three-week tailored individual or group program sponsored by the State Department that brings mid-career professionals and emerging foreign leaders to the United States. Former presidents Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian are both alumni of this program. These leaders are nominated by U.S. embassies overseas, and in this case the de facto embassy known as the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), for meetings and opportunities to engage with Americans on global thematic issues. It is through collaboration with National Programming Agencies (NPA) that these projects are implemented. Due to fact that visits by Taiwanese officials in the U.S. are seen as highly political by Beijing (former President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell in 1995 sparkedthe Third Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis), it is protocol that Taiwan government representatives are barred from entering the Harry S. Truman Building of State Department, the White House, and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. Another caveat with the IVLP is the small amount of funding available for Taiwan, in comparison to China. According to State Department statistics, the FY2016 budget only allowed for 16 visitors from Taiwan, while China had 112. The small amount of attention given to Taiwan negatively impacts U.S.-Taiwan relations. More can be done to support exchanges on the government and professional levels.
In the educational realm, there are many U.S. exchange initiatives in place that give exposure to Taiwan. However, the amount of students that go to Taiwan pale in comparison to the number of those who go to the PRC. From statistics provided for the 2013-14 year, the Institute for International Education (which is an NPA) reported that 13,763 American students studied in the PRC, while only a diminutive 801 went to Taiwan. Many American students are naturally drawn to China’s rich cultural heritage, strategic importance, and economic power (something which relates to future career prospects). However, U.S. policies and officially-expressed attitudes toward Taiwan and the PRC influence the choices made by young Americans as well. Many do not see value in learning traditional Chinese characters and view Taiwan as only a subsidiary to the PRC.
China Factor
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has worked hard to win the hearts and minds of the American people through its vigorous overseas propaganda efforts. Its Confucius Institutes are but one example. Confucius Institutes, which are operated under the PRC Ministry of Education, are an extension of the CCP. They have nearly 100 partnerships in the United States, with the stated goal of promoting Chinese language and culture. These institutes provide attractive financial packages to universities seeking Chinese language learning resources.[2] However, their programs engage in censorship and only allow for Party-approved rhetoric and policies to be heard. In 2014, the University of Chicago ended its partnership with the Confucius Institute due to concerns regarding censorship and limitations to academic freedom.
All American students deserve the right to freely discuss issues like the Tiananmen Square Massacre, U.S.-PRC relations, and the futures of Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan. Yet, a Government Accountability Organization (GAO) report found that 12 overseas American universities in the PRC have challenges operating in a restrictive environment. Internet censorship and self-censorship are listed as two main problems. While Confucius Institutes offer generous funding to American educational institutions, the continuation of these engagements perpetuate the CCP’s authoritarian interests and leads to further marginalization of Taiwan’s influence in the world. While education initiatives between the U.S. and the PRC are important to the bilateral relationship, they tend to impact and diminish opportunities for greater American understanding of Taiwan. U.S. relations between the PRC and Taiwan should not be viewed in zero-sum terms, but the reality is that they are.
Recommendations: Innovative Exchanges To Strengthen U.S.-Taiwan People-to-People Relations
More innovative solutions are needed to re-emphasize the importance of people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan. The Taiwan Travel Act, proposed by Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), calls for more exchange between Taiwanese and American leaders at all levels. This could alleviate the protocol challenges for Taiwanese visitors. Additionally, some bottom-up approaches are needed to tackle the challenge of current institutional practices in place that continue to discourage American students from pursuing Taiwan exchanges, including the student-run Taiwan-America Student Conference (TASC). The program, currently making plans for its fourth annual conference, was founded on the premise that American students need to think critically about the strategic and cultural value of Taiwan, and Taiwanese students need to think globally and address where they fit within the international community. Every year, students come together at TASC for dialogue and discussions on ways to confront global issues facing their respective societies. These include issues such as environmental sustainability and modern issues in education, among others. This is an excellent model for more future citizen diplomacy exchanges, given the aforementioned constraints.
(Source: Taiwan-America Student Conference – Taiwanese and American students building mutual trust and understanding through an exchange program)
Another recommendation is the establishment of a foundation that seeks to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan educational and cultural exchanges, much like the U.S.-China Strong Foundation. The U.S.-China Strong Foundation is a nonprofit organization that seeks to strengthen U.S.-China relations by investing in the next generation of leaders. Its principal goals are to increase the number of American students in the PRC and to strengthen Chinese language learning opportunities in the United States. A U.S.-Taiwan Strong Foundation would be at the center of bilateral educational exchanges. It could house programs modeled off of TASC, establishing chapters in universities and high schools, and striving to increase the number of American students in Taiwan and vice versa.
Beijing’s influence operations continue to drown out Taiwan’s voice in the United States. Taiwan’s democratic society is full of Chinese culture and increasingly diverse. The island nation is a paradigm of pro-American progressive values. When it comes to learning Mandarin, the PRC is far from the only option. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated that a more inclusive security architecture is needed. Emphasizing Taiwan’s role in Asia is smart policy. Advancing exchanges with Taiwan requires a willingness to employ all the available tools, especially the establishment of a new foundation dedicated to this mission. Doing so will add tremendous value to U.S. foreign policy and national security outcomes in the years ahead.
This article was first published through the Asia Eye, the official blog of the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington-based think tank focused on security issues and public policy in Asia.
[1] Americans Affirm Ties to Allies in Asia. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Pg. 2. October, 2014. <http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Chicago%20Council%20Survey%20-%20Asia%20Report.pdf>
[2] Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy. Pg. 510. Fall, 2010. <http://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/delisle.chinataiwan_01.pdf>
