Life in Europe vs. US: Charm a Function of History But Also Public Policy

Naia on pl de la paja

This is the second in a series of posts on life, culture, and politics in the U.S. and E.U. by Robert Entman, who spent 2012 as a Humboldt Research Prize Scholar at Freie Universität in Berlin. Read his previous post here

Madrid is the first city we lived in (seven weeks there, seven months Berlin, three months Paris) and is the cleanest of them. Every day, I believe, Plaza de la Paja, the oldest square in Madrid, on which we lived, was hosed down, and garbage collected. Contrary perhaps to stereotype, Berlin was dirtier than Madrid (and Paris dirtier than both). Berlin’s city government is under-funded and among other things this creates a problem with litter, because trash receptacles are tiny and overflow quickly. Saw much less street cleaning and hosing down in Berlin than in Madrid and Paris.

On the other hand, the subway stations and cars in Berlin were very clean. Subway stations in Paris were quite dirty and also full of homeless people sleeping (and in one case having autoerotic sex inside a sleeping bag) at all hours. Paris, too, featured more poop left unscooped and pee everywhere. Despite the Spanish economic crisis, for reasons I certainly don’t understand, Madrid maintained a policy commitment to keeping the city feel clean and pleasant, and that’s good for the economy and the humans living in it.

Madrid is well known for its wacky late-hour dining. This, too, is a part of its felicitous charm. It must have something to do with the sunny and warm climate facilitating life outdoors. Even in January when it’s relatively cold, everyone eats outdoors (blankets provided). There is a public warmth, a visible enjoyment of life and laughter, a sense of community in the restaurants and the crazy long late lunches and dinners.

Lunch tends to start around 1:30 and go to 3:30, dinner around 9 p.m. and go to 11 p.m. and well beyond. After two or three weeks, we got used to late dining hours. Yet even in Berlin, with its far less salubrious climate, people in public are generally friendly and cheerful, and also enjoy their communal repasts thoroughly. Restaurants in all three cities almost all seem to have one sitting; nobody rushes you out. The point is to stay and enjoy the comradeship.

The comity extends to Americans. Essentially everyone in Berlin speaks English without any hesitation or resentment. And Paris? In my view, the most underrated city in Europe when it comes to friendliness. People are just about always friendly, and most spoke English after hearing my terrible French, some good-naturedly ribbing me about my incroyable pronunciation. In this respect, Paris totally defies stereotype. Of course it’s a big, hurried city—it’s not Mayberry. But like Manhattan, it’s easy to find friendliness right beneath the hubbub.

naia restaurant madridMadrid’s English is weakest of the 3 cities but this didn’t detract from the experience. For me, Madrid was #1 in charm, perhaps because of the Plaza de la Paja neighborhood we lived in, but something about all the other squares tucked in every 2-3 blocks in seemingly every neighborhood, the mountains in the background, the sun, the people, the lovely old buildings made Madrid our favorite.

Berlin: I don’t think you can call Berlin especially charming; fascinating and dynamic for sure. The place was something like 80% destroyed in bombing during WWII. Newer architecture is generally pretty bland. There are nice streets, but nothing like the medieval streets and squares of Madrid or Paris. On the other hand, Berlin’s neighborhoods are very distinctive and that lent some charm and pleasure, very much including Schoneberg where we lived—it was at Rathaus Schoneberg, government offices, that Kennedy gave his “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech.

The conscious zoning policy decisions made in all three cities have enormous impact on the human feel of these cities. Berlin essentially is a planned city from the ground up because of the war history; one can argue with some of the choices but what I loved and admired was the determination to build historical memory into the architecture and layout and thus the lived experience of the city. The other two cities can take advantage of their histories and charming built environment nurtured by public policies that strictly limit building height and cut down on street traffic. Yes, it’s economically inefficient to restrict building height (in DC as well it means higher rents and lower tax revenues), but such efficiency claims rely on implicit assumptions that non-quantifiable utility in the form of air and light and community are less valuable than money. Imagine Paris or Madrid with skyscrapers like Manhattan. I’d argue that a full accounting of economic and other costs and benefits would favor the restrictive zoning.

Another area of policy regulates retail commerce. In all three countries, most stores are closed Sundays—almost no shopping is done. You’re out of luck if you need milk or toilet paper (with some exceptions, e.g. in Berlin, a few larger supermarkets have Sunday afternoon hours). Small shopkeepers in Madrid, and in Berlin and Paris, often keep irregular hours, probably making low incomes but feeling secure because of the (relatively generous) welfare state. In other words, there’s more freedom to be a small businessperson because of the humane safety net (aka big government), which perhaps yields more competition to bigger corporations in the marketplace while allowing worker/owners to set their own hours.

Europe is friendlier to small business entrepreneurship would be my hypothesis. The whole shopping culture is very different in Paris, Madrid and Berlin from the 24/7 US marketplace. Seems healthy to me to curb acquisitiveness or better balance it against the profit/material acquisition motive with other values. Meanwhile, notice that despite the US’s self-image as worshipping small business, these three European countries have way more of it on any given street, in any given village, and do more to encourage it, at least as far as evidence on the ground suggests.

One outgrowth of the public dining and small business cultures: we got to know restaurateurs personally right away. Whereas my family has been eating at 411 West in Chapel Hill or Bullock’s in Durham for decades, nobody has ever greeted us personally. Ever. By the time we’d eaten twice at Naia on the Plaza de la Paja, the staff always waved when we walked by and spoke to us like old friends when we came in. By the way, the lunch special for 11.50 Euros (about $16) included appetizer, main course, dessert, bread, glass of wine, coffee and a digestif. Quality of food was very high, inventive, and fresh. The place consistently ranked in the top 20 of Madrid on Tripadvisor. Similar experience with the wonderful family that ran Gustibus on Rue St. Sebastien in Paris: fantastic food, warm personal service, at prices below the equivalent quality in any US city I’ve been in.

Whereas, of course, the US nurtures chain stores for every food and product. Are the prices truly lower in the US? Do we get to eat more chain store cheeseburgers, more chain store T-shirts and jeans, for less money? More to the point, do we get the goods for fewer hours of labor expended and lesser amount of employment and unemployment-related stress? I don’t really think so, but I’m not pretending to research this.

Furthermore, it’s not at all clear that everything really is cheaper in equivalent US cities. Madrid featured extremely inexpensive produce like red peppers at 5 or 6 for 1 euro on sale (recently in the US, I bought one red pepper on sale at Harris Teeter for $2.50). Or 20 kiwis for 1 euro, i.e. about 6.5 cents each—never less than 25 cents each in US. And the produce is good! The oranges, strawberries, blueberries taste better; even the lettuce. In Madrid at least, much of it seems actually to come from Spain itself or north Africa. In Berlin too, groceries generally seemed less expensive and produce tastier equivalents than the US. This holds even in the chain markets, not just the mom-and-pop stores or outdoor markets. Let’s not even talk about the cheese or bread.

But I was distressed to see that the uniformity of size of bananas and apples etc., bred by agribusiness to maximize revenue per unit, seemed to characterize Paris grocery chains (like Monoprix, which was two doors down from us on Rue St. Sebastien) as in the US. So far, less so in Germany and Madrid, but the forces of globalization and economic efficiency measured strictly in monetary terms do seem to march on.

Catalan Independence and Sub-State Public Diplomacy

Catalonia Independence

Although it hasn’t garnered much attention in the U.S., tensions are high and escalating between the Catalan region of Spain and the national government in Madrid. The latest incident came Sunday when Spanish Defense Minister Pedro Morenes said that the military was “prepared” in the face of “absurd provocations,” presumably referring to recent calls for Catalonia’s secession from Spain.

The friction provides a window into the intriguing but under-studied topic of what is sometimes called sub-state public diplomacy. Like many sub-states – e.g., Quebec and Scotland – the Catalan government has recently embraced public diplomacy as a means toward promoting their region and pursuing their own economic and foreign affairs goals.

Yet if those goals shift to include independence, this could have profound and challenging implications for how Catalonia conducts its public diplomacy.

First, some quick background for those not familiar with the Spanish case. Following the death of the Fascist dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain was divided into 17 autonomous regions, with each controlling education, health, and cultural policies within their borders, while other policy areas remained under the purview of the government in Madrid.

Yet Catalonia has a strong independent streak rooted in the fact that it had been autonomous for centuries before being conquered by Spain in 1714. Catalans are a notoriously proud people, with their own language and a strong cultural history that includes Miro, Picasso, and Gaudi, to name just a few luminaries.

Catalonia and its capital, Barcelona, also represent a driving force in the Spanish economy. This means that Spain needs Catalonia at least as much as the other way around. This is as true during the terrible economic crisis both are currently enduring as it is in good times.

A campaign poster for a hard-line pro-independence party, Solidaritat, still hangs in Barcelona after elections last November. The poster depicts Spanish Prime Minister Mariona Rajoy -- who opposes Catalan independence and is unpopular in Catalonia -- saying, ‘Don’t Vote for Solidaritat, because they will declare independence!’
A campaign poster for a hard-line pro-independence party, Solidaritat, still hangs in Barcelona after elections last November. The poster depicts Spanish Prime Minister Mariona Rajoy — who opposes Catalan independence and is unpopular in Catalonia — saying, ‘Don’t Vote for Solidaritat, because they will declare independence!’

In fact, it is the economic crisis that some say has fueled the rising secessionist talk from Catalans in the past year. A lack of jobs and revenue has rekindled questions amongst Catalans about why their tax dollars should go to aid poorer regions of Spain, while simultaneously making the rest of the country all the more dependent on the region’s contributions.

In November, Catalonia held elections that were seen in part as a de facto referendum on secession, especially after a huge pro-independence rally in September. The outcome of the vote led to the forming of a coalition between Catalan President Artur Mas’s center-right CiU party and the more leftist and pro-independence ERC party.

Tensions escalated in mid-December when Spanish Education Minister Jose Ignacio Wert put forth an education reform plan that would restore Castilian Spanish to primacy in all classrooms. Catalans saw this as a naked attempt to eliminate the Catalan language, which is currently taught throughout the region alongside Spanish and is seen as integral to Catalan cultural identity. Franco, for instance, had banned the speaking or teaching of Catalan during his nearly 40-year reign, just as Spain’s Philip V had after the 1714 conquest.

It would be hard to exaggerate the anger that Minister Wert’s proposal engendered amongst Catalans. I happened to be traveling in Barcelona that week, interviewing government officials and others, and the outrage was passionate and palpable. Pro-independence flags flew everywhere and huge rallies were held in protest.

“Even with civil guards in the classroom, school children will not stop studying Catalan,” roared the Congressional spokesman for the ERC. “You are going to come up against a nation ready to defend its children. Don’t you dare touch our children. We’ve had enough; we won’t obey.”

Not to be outdone, the CiU congressional spokesman evoked Spain’s history of trying to silence Catalans: “Phillip V tried to put an end to Catalan and later Franco, but they didn’t succeed.”

Within days, CiU and ERC reached an agreement to hold a referendum within two years on independence. On New Year’s Eve, Mas gave a pro-independence speech in which he said that Catalans “want to build a new country.”

Catalan flags are common in the region, but as momentum for secession has increased in the last few months, so has the presence of Catalan independence flags.
Catalan flags are common in the region, but as momentum for secession has increased in the last few months, so has the presence of
Catalan independence flags.

Although Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy tried to calm things by saying he’s open for dialogue, he made clear that this would be through the prism of the Spanish Constitution, which does not have a provision for secession.

This, though, is where Catalonia’s public diplomacy efforts become an interesting part of the story.

In 2008, the Catalan government began embracing the idea of public diplomacy as part of a larger foreign affairs strategy, and PD represented a core part of the region’s five year (2010-2015) strategic plan.

The PD efforts take several forms, including exchange programs and cultural events such as last year’s Miro exhibit at the National Gallery. But a major component involved creating Catalan delegations in six cities around the world: London, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, New York, and Buenos Aires (which recently closed). Madrid was never thrilled about these delegations – after all, Spain has their own embassies in all of these countries, so why spend the money to have a notoriously troublesome region doing its own PR? But the national government went along on the condition that the delegations simply engage in pro-Catalan work, not engage in any anti-Spanish rhetoric, and not discuss the tensions between Barcelona and Madrid, much less independence.

The recent outbreak of separatist sentiment, however, may change the nature of the delegations’ work, and Catalan public diplomacy generally. Rather than avoiding the topic, or promoting an image of harmony with Madrid, the Catalan government may see a need to start using the delegations to more proactively adopt an independence frame in their rhetoric and outreach.

This makes sense if you start from a premise of future independence. If that is what lies ahead, then Catalan public diplomacy needs to start laying the groundwork for having the rest of the world think of Catalonia as independent and unique. This would go hand in hand with a larger policy of gaining EU and other international support for not only secession, but future membership in the EU. It is worth noting that according to one government official I spoke to, President Mas has made more trips in the last year to Brussels, the EU headquarters, than he has to Madrid.

At the same time, this is a risky strategy, because ultimately Madrid exercises some control over Catalan purse strings (there is currently a dispute over payment transfers, for example). It could move to punish the region – and perhaps apply pressure to close the delegations – should they be seen as promoting independence. And if the Catalans aren’t able to secure independence, then they will have done much to poison relations with Madrid.

Pro-independence graffiti in Barcelona's famous Gaudi-designed Parc Guell
Pro-independence graffiti in Barcelona’s famous Gaudi-designed Parc Guell

In the meantime, the Catalans are also embracing strategies aimed at gaining more favorable coverage in the international media. Like all sub-states, a major problem Catalonia faces is that virtually all of the international reporters covering Spain are based in the capital of Madrid, and hence are inundated with the national government’s frame of Catalonia. To remedy this, the Catalan government has been creating more opportunities for those journalists to visit the region (conferences, for example). Some officials told me that they have noticed more balanced coverage (from their viewpoint) as a result.

Similarly, the Catalan delegations around the world will need to develop a proactive media strategy – including social media – if they want to more effectively alter perceptions of the region in the international community. A challenge will be how they deal with increasing questions about Catalan aspirations for independence.

This highlights an interesting and unique aspect to sub-state public diplomacy and soft power, which is the attempt to achieve foreign policy goals through what Joseph Nye calls “attraction and persuasion.” Unlike traditional state PD, which is by definition focused on citizens in other sovereign nations, sub-states often have a need to also “attract and persuade” fellow countrymen outside their regional borders. This is especially true for autonomous regions, and of course even more so if they have designs on independence.

The Fossar de las Moreres, a memorial plaza in Barcelona, commemorates those who died defending the city from Spanish conquest in 1714, and has been the site of major pro-independence protests in recent months.
The Fossar de las Moreres, a memorial plaza in Barcelona, commemorates those who died defending the city from Spanish conquest in 1714, and has been the site of major pro-independence protests in recent months.

Yet many of the people I spoke to in Barcelona felt that outreach to the rest of Spain was, as one said to me,  “a lost battle.”

This may be short-sighted, though. Tensions are high, but perhaps artificially so because of the economic crisis. Whatever solution Madrid and Barcelona come up with in the next few years will, presumably, require broad Spanish support. Catalonia, it is important to note, is according to some surveys the least popular region in Spain amongst other Spaniards. That will need to change in order to gain independence, or in the absence of secession, to create a climate favorable to their domestic and foreign affairs goals.

So while it is true that like other sub-states Catalan PD needs to focus on the broader international community, it is also undoubtedly the case that its fortunes lie to some degree in their ability to improve their image within Spain.

The coming months will be interesting. With the independence referendum still potentially two years away, there is perhaps time to negotiate a settlement short of secession, especially if the economy improves. At the same time, the rhetoric from both Barcelona and Madrid – in government and in the streets – could end up pushing both sides further apart. Of course one could argue, as many throughout Catalonia are these days, that the time for compromise has past.

Regardless of what happens, Catalan public diplomacy will play an important and intriguing role that will be fascinating for public diplomacy scholars to watch.

Baby You Can Drive My Car. Please.

Americans tend to think—and politicians tell them at almost every opportunity—that theirs is the greatest, richest, freest country in the world. Leaders seem to consider this description so self-evident that they rarely provide evidence, nor do their audiences demand it. A major reason is the absence of truly “global communication” in most American households. Most Americans seem utterly unfamiliar with the public polices, political practices, daily lives and living standards even of this country’s closest allies. When messages about France, Germany, Norway, Spain and even the UK do reach US media, their main purpose is often to disparage these countries—again without much evidence.

A lot could be said about this but for now consider the car. I just spent 6 weeks in Madrid and had time to ponder why so many European cities seem so much more charming and livable than just about any American city. I think it’s got a lot to do with cars, specifically the paucity thereof.

In Madrid, just like DC, there are plenty of wide boulevards, where car traffic is heavy at rush hour. But there are also many, many pedestrian passages, plazas and narrow medieval streets that cars never or rarely traverse. At least in the center, you can walk for several blocks, or sit out at a café on a plaza like the one I lived on (Plaza de la Paja, the oldest in Madrid—see picture) for an hour and not see or hear a car. You can enjoy being outside, as Madrileños do even when it’s cold, soaking in sun and (fairly) fresh air, communing with other people. No need as in DC to will yourself to block out the noise and aesthetic assaults generated by automobiles and trucks. In this dimension, Madrid offers a great, rich (indeed priceless, unobtainable) experience in daily living, one most Americans are not free to enjoy whatever their income level.

Of course there are a hundred reasons for the greater charms of European capitals (not to mention the smaller towns). Some relate to cars and public policy (high gasoline taxes, heavy investment in mass transit enabled in part by far lower investment in military infrastructure), most to history, climate and many more factors.

My points in bringing up cars and comparative living standards are three: 1) The arguments for Americans reducing reliance on cars are numerous and thoroughly familiar to readers of blogs like this: augmenting national security; reducing the trade deficit; cutting the indirect funding that guzzling gas provides to terrorist organizations and nasty regimes; slowing climate change. What’s significant is how marginalized—to the point of invisibility—such reasoning is in the public discourse of 2012.

2) This in part reflects one area where America may indeed be the leader among affluent countries. I’d hypothesize (I’m not sure) that we enjoy the dubious distinction of the greatest isolation of citizens from globally communicated information and globally shared (at least among the wealthy democracies) cultural assumptions. Among many other areas, this manifests itself in the political impossibility of even mentioning the option of raising gasoline taxes to, say, half of what Europeans pay. Gasoline here in Berlin runs about 1.6 Euros, around $2.12, per liter—about $8 a gallon. The difference between that number and what Americans pay is mostly tax.

3) Americans’ isolation from two-way global communication both reflects and reinforces their impoverished sense of such words as “greatest,” “richest,” and “freest” when applied to the US.

I’m not saying this is anyone’s fault. Politicians and media can’t attack conventional notions of the normal until enough citizens share some assumptions and perceptions to make sense of the attacks. But citizens can’t develop such thinking unless their leaders and media provide the basis. If Americans could somehow plug into global communication more than they do now, perhaps the vicious circle might be interrupted.