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Making Sense of US Commitment to Afghanistan through Public Diplomacy

November 26, 2013Middle East, public diplomacy, WomenLeave a Comment

The recent decision by Afghan President Karzai to postpone signing a security arrangement on the continued presence of U.S. troops is apt to confuse an already confused Afghan and American public about the future bilateral relationship that will define post-2014. It is hard for any casual observer or media consumer to make sense out of the daily conflicting stories on whether or not American engagement in Afghanistan will be sustained next year. One of the key challenges of public diplomacy is to match rhetoric with actions on the ground and make a convincing argument to citizens.

An issue where the U.S. has stepped up its promises and rhetoric as well as its policy is around standing by Afghan women and girls—a promise we should keep. It is in America’s interest to see women-–a large segment of Afghan society–educated, trained, active and engaged in securing peace in a country in which we have invested a dozen years of money and lives. The women of Afghanistan are the loudest champions of peace and reconciliation in that troubled land.

Good public diplomacy and good policy are reflected in the announcement just a few months ago from the U.S. Agency for International Development a new, five-year $200 million assistance program for Afghan women called “Promote,” a sign of U.S. seriousness of purpose. The announcement, made in a speech by USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah at the U.S. Institute of Peace in July underscored the continued American commitment to success in Afghanistan—success that Shah argued is “fundamentally grounded in a society that creates opportunity for women and girls.” The new USAID program will propel the education, training and promotion of young women in Afghan government, business and civil society, building on successes as measured in the rise of girls enrolled in Afghan schools.

Screen capture from a video featuring an expert panel on women's empowerment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace, July 18, 2013. Source: YouTube — Screen capture from a video featuring an expert panel on women’s empowerment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute for Peace, July 18, 2013. Source: YouTube

That announcement was echoed recently at Georgetown University by Secretary of State Kerry, standing with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former First Lady Laura Bush—another good example of bipartisan public diplomacy.

In the first few months of 2014, President Obama will have opportunities to clear up any fog about American ambitions for Afghanistan, including with the State of the Union in February—the ultimate public diplomacy opportunity. (Twelve years ago in 2002, George W. Bush used his State of the Union speech to signal America’s commitment to Afghan women and to underscore signs of progress: “The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today, women are free and are part of Afghanistan’s new government.”)

Another place to make the case for US-Afghan relations is on social media–a growing platform for public diplomacy around the world. Today, Afghan women and girls are using social media to make their anxiety about the future known. Zahra is a 23-year old Afghan woman, and currently an undergraduate student at the American University of Afghanistan studying business administration. She shared her anxiety on the website WhyDev, which is dedicated to the Voice of Afghanistan’s youth:

“I live in fear more and more as each day passes and it gets closer to 2014.

Everybody is talking about civil war again. Everybody has a plan to leave Afghanistan; they want to have a better life. .. Today, in our office, my colleague said she put her house on the market and wants to go to Australia. “But how?”, I asked. She said –like everybody else that goes… “With an invitation? Do you know somebody there? Will they send you invitation letter?

We are getting crazy thinking about 2014 and civil war. We can’t enjoy our time right now as it passes. We are losing our time as these fears enter our mind…

I fear what will happen. The only image that I have of the Taliban is of men with a huge turbans, big weapons, Afghan clothes and lots of beards and mustaches. They do not like educated women like me. They want to kill those girls who go to universities or schools…. I am confused. What will be Afghanistan’s future?”

Zahra, like many Afghan girls, wants to know that America’s investment in Afghanistan doesn’t end as the troops leave. Education for Afghan girls has improved in Afghanistan from the 1990s when the Taliban pretty much prohibited it. Today, according to the World Bank and USAID, close to a third of Afghan girls attend primary school. Around 120,000 young women have completed secondary school. In total, at least 200,000 Afghan women now have at least a diplomacy from secondary school, some form of a university degree or some equivalent study. But leaves two-thirds of Afghan girls, waiting for a chance.

In the end, time will tell what the Afghan government will do for its own society, what international foundations and funders will provide, and how committed the United States and the international community can afford to remain in the lives of the Afghan people, in particular its women and girls. For now, the challenge is to keep hope alive and prevent backsliding. Promises are important to keep.

Public Diplomacy on the Front Lines of U.S. Foreign Policy

October 27, 2013Cultural Diplomacy, Middle East, public diplomacyLeave a Comment

Kamran (actor Najebullah Sadiq) is the hardened but principled veteran police officer on Eagle Four, an Afghan TV show that its creators hope will have a positive effect on Afghans' attitudes toward the real police. Credit: Tolo TV/ Wakil Kohsar — Kamran (actor Najebullah Sadiq) is the hardened but principled veteran police officer on Eagle Four, an Afghan TV show that its creators hope will have a positive effect on Afghans’ attitudes toward the real police. Credit: Tolo TV/ Wakil Kohsar

Advocates of official U.S. public diplomacy have long defended the value of its programs and argued for resources to do even more. But what exactly could be accomplished with such resources if they were, indeed, available?

In fact, we may already have an answer to that question, albeit in the context of a single country at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy—Afghanistan. Even as the United States has invested considerable resources in its military presence and development programs, so, too, has it devoted additional resources to a public diplomacy “surge” in support of overall U.S. goals in that country.

Public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan deploy the tried-and-true models that we employ all around the world, including: educational, youth, and professional exchange programs; English language programs; establishment of American Spaces; and, cultural exchange and preservation. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul also deploys additional public diplomacy resources to support non-traditional programs leveraging public diplomacy expertise, technological innovation, and local partners to further advance key U.S. interests in that critical country.

Noah Berlatsky’s thoughtful recent piece in the Atlantic reviews a new documentary film about Afghan Tolo TV and touches on a few of those public diplomacy efforts. As one of the major Afghan media groups, Tolo TV is also a major partner for U.S. public diplomacy efforts and programs seeking to engage, inform, and influence Afghan public opinion. Berlatsky notes U.S. Embassy support for Eagle Four, for example, “a high-quality-production action drama” about the Afghan national police force. He also highlights the U.S. objective in supporting the production “to demonstrate that those police forces are courageous, honest, and trustworthy.”

The establishment of security and stability in Afghanistan—one of the most important U.S. foreign policy goals worldwide today—will obviously depend on the capacity of Afghan security forces and, more importantly, the trust the people place in those forces. Eagle Four, by reaching a mass Afghan audience and profiling real Afghan police officers helping Afghans, is a perfect example of how innovative public diplomacy practitioners, provided with sufficient resources, advances key foreign policy goals.

Berlatsky raises valid points, of course, about whether such a dramatic depiction of the police force might unduly raise public expectations, but we could also be arguing about the value of producing a stale, realistic documentary that reaches and engages only a tiny fraction of Eagle Four‘s considerable viewership. I would argue that programs like Eagle Four take a risk, but that such risks are appropriate especially in places of conflict where the pay-offs can be so essential to advancing U.S. national security objectives.

Another key objective of Eagle Four and similar programs in Afghanistan is to promote the development and capacity of the Afghan media sector itself. The success of Tolo TV, as noted in the Atlantic article, as well as the availability of a multiplicity of television and radio stations, newspapers and magazines—in a country which not too long ago had only one state broadcaster—is a testament to the success of those efforts. Just as we hope that the Afghan security services will ensure long-term stability, so, too, do we believe that Afghan independent media will promote long-term democracy and government accountability in Afghanistan.

Eagle Four is, of course, just one of many such public diplomacy programs that partner with Afghan media, universities, civil society, women’s groups, and many others. Keen observers and veteran public diplomacy experts will note that some of these programs go well beyond the role of traditional public diplomacy in simply “telling America’s story” but are the proof of what can be accomplished with additional public diplomacy resources. The innovative U.S. public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan seek to positively engage, inform, and influence the Afghan public and in so doing to help maintain stability, promote democracy, and advance key U.S. foreign policy goals.

Note: Previous articles about Eagle Four were published in the New York Times and on NPR.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.

Beauty Pageants as an Environmental Public Diplomacy Platform

April 3, 2013Cultural DiplomacyLeave a Comment

by Katherine Cincotta

The Miss Earth Pageant: A prime example of cultural diplomacy used to increase awareness of environmental issues, or a standard beauty pageant that only pays lip service to environmental issues?

The pageant, held annually in the Philippines, has two primary goals. The first is to “…have its candidates and winners actively promote and get involved in the preservation of the environment and the protection of Mother Earth.” The pageant winner, chosen from a group representing nearly 100 nations, agrees to commit a year of service promoting environmental projects around the world, such as cleaning up beaches or planting trees with a community.

Environmental diplomacy is what first comes to mind when I hear “Miss Earth;” a pageant that showcases the environmental concerns and projects from diverse countries.

In prior years the pageant did a fair job of incorporating environmentalism into its production. The 2008 pageant, for example, included montages of the contestants’ projects, as well as questions directly related to the environment. In 2012, however, much of the environmental focus in the pageant had been cut down. There were several shorter montages of contestants mentioning their environmental goals briefly. Overall, the pageant generally progresses as any other would, with an assortment of clothing changes, and not much else. The sole question asked of the contestants in the 2012 pageant was: “what would you consider your defining moment as a woman?” Consistent with the rest of the pageant, the word “environment” was barely mentioned in the responses.

The second goal of the pageant is to “…showcase and promote various tourist destinations.” The promotion of diverse destinations would give each location an opportunity to showcase how they are specifically impacted by environmental issues. Thus far attempts to hold the pageant in locations outside of the Philippines have generally fallen through. Going into the thirteenth year of the pageant, Miss Earth has only successfully been held outside of the Philippines once; when it was held in Vietnam in 2010.

As one of the largest pageants in the world, behind Miss World and Miss Universe, Miss Earth has the potential to draw a large audience. In addition to the potential economic benefits, hosting the pageant would allow a country to highlight its culture, as well as its own specific environmental concerns. For example, if the pageant were held in Haiti, the country could convey their struggle with natural disasters and how they have been impacted by climate change.

Climate change is currently one of the most pressing environmental concerns globally. Many of the countries that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as Bangladesh, Malawi and Madagascar, would benefit from hosting Miss Earth to draw attention to the concerns and cultures of their small country. Assuming the pageant airs internationally, it has the potential to reach millions of viewers. This begs the question, which countries actually broadcast it? The Miss World Pageant is viewed by an estimated 2 billion people a year globally, and over 1 billion watch Miss Universe. The numbers on Miss Earth, meanwhile, are much more difficult to track down. Though the pageant claims to be one of the largest in the world, how many people globally are aware that it exists? What can be done to increase its viewership?

One reason that Miss Earth may not yet have reached its full viewership potential is funding. Of the five main sponsors of the pageant, Hewlett Packard is the most notable. As one of the Top 25 “greenest” companies in the world according to Newsweek, HP has the ability to influence and collaborate on pageant events. If other green corporations were similarly willing to sponsor Miss Earth, the necessary funds may allow the pageant to be held in a variety of locations, and to reach its full potential as an environmental public diplomacy platform. Other companies that made Newsweek’s list include Google and McGraw-Hill, two companies that would be able to use their marketing platforms to help promote the pageant.

In addition to funding, another constraint that would prevent some countries from hosting Miss Earth is cultural barriers. In particular, many Muslim countries (such as Bangladesh) have outlawed pageants altogether. Though it may not be possible for every country to host the pageant that does not mean citizens of every country cannot get involved. In 2003 Miss Earth made headlines when Miss Afghanistan, Vida Samadzai, became the first Afghan woman to participate in a beauty pageant in 30 years, particular notice was given to her participation in the bikini portion of the pageant. In moderate countries, could it be possible to adapt the pageant to fit cultural norms? As the main goal of the pageant is spreading environmental awareness, could it still be effective? It may be beneficial if the pageant was first held in more liberal and environmentally conscious societies, such as Brazil so that smaller or somewhat more conservative countries could see the benefits that the pageant can bring with it.

Because pageants are popular globally, and young girls aspire to be like pageant contestants, Miss Earth could create a platform for environmental diplomacy, particularly for the younger generations. Perhaps in part due to funding constraints and cultural barriers, the pageant unfortunately has not yet been able to reach its full potential public diplomacy and awareness-raising potential. In turn, the pageant overall currently seem somewhat superficial.

If changes were made, Miss Earth may have the potential to act as a subset of Cosmopolitan Constructivism, which Cesar Villanueva Rivas describes as “constructing long-lasting friendly relations among states by inviting their societies to learn from each other in the construction of cosmopolitan cultural attitudes.” In other words, with increased funding and more emphasis on environmentalism during the show, the Miss Earth pageant could allow people of different countries and cultures to establish common environmental interests or concerns. Could this realization of shared goals in turn lead to the creation of a platform on which environmental collaboration could take place?

The above post is from Take Five’s new Student Perspective series. Graduate students studying Cultural Diplomacy as Communication at the George Washington University are encouraged to think about themes such as youth, gender, health, climate, free press, and democracy, and write on how these themes relate to cultural diplomacy and to communication. The posts involve thoughtful commentary on the writer’s chosen theme, linking to class readings and discussions.

The Book on Iraq and Afghanistan: Lessons Learned

March 3, 2013public diplomacyLeave a Comment

In Vietnam, the United States fought a counterinsurgent war on behalf of a government lacking popular legitimacy using primarily conventional tactics in support of a flawed strategic objective that turned out to be inconsequential to the broader Cold War struggle against Communism. The primary lesson learned, particularly within the Army, was “never again.”

However, a decade ago, a cadre of officers well schooled in irregular warfare and intrastate conflicts, eventually marshaled by General David Petraeus, scrambled to rearticulate the lost principles of counterinsurgency deliberately buried after Vietnam, incorporate them into a new Army doctrine and apply them (appropriately) in Iraq and (less so) in Afghanistan.

This experience is compellingly detailed in Fred Kaplan’s book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.

Kaplan cautions whether the military is capturing the right lessons or adequately incorporating them into future planning. Coupled with the Obama administration’s understandable reluctance after unwinding two wars to engage in large-scale interventions any time soon, the risk is that the military will walk away from counterinsurgency doctrine when the war in Afghanistan ends next year, just as it did after Vietnam.

The Insurgents offers several strategic lessons regarding the nature of future conflict; how the United States should wage war; and key factors that will determine success or failure.

The first is the preeminence of political rather than military outcomes. As Kaplan relates, Petraeus adopted the dictum that counterinsurgency is 80 percent political and 20 percent military. That is likely to be true with any future intervention.

The United States entered Afghanistan and Iraq knowing what it wanted to eliminate – Osama bin Laden’s sanctuary and Saddam Hussein’s regime – but with only a vague conception of a desired strategic end state. In Iraq, the lack of a post-conflict strategy was not an oversight, but deliberate. In neither case was there a grasp of the political, social and cultural forces in those countries that would shape the eventual outcomes.

Regime change is not the end of the war, only the end of the first phase. The desired end state, a government with perceived legitimacy that earns the support of a large cross-section of the local population, is very difficult. This is not only clear from the mixed results achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Libya as well.

An effective plan for the conflict and what happens afterwards requires integrated civilian and military action, a second lesson. This rarely happened over the past 12 years. While there was an effective partnership in Iraq between Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the norm involved civilians and the military pulling in different directions. The worst case involved Paul Bremer’s ill-advised orders regarding the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and de-Ba’athification of the government, uncoordinated steps that fueled if not generated the insurgency.

Future interventions will involve a “whole of government” effort, involving not just soldiers and diplomats, but development experts in wide-ranging fields from agriculture, policing and justice to energy, commerce and communication. Unfortunately, the United States government is not structured to plan or naturally operate that way. As it is, Congress fully funds only one element of national power, the military. Given the military cuts associated with sequestration, Congress over time may be tempted to restore some of them with offsets from non-defense discretionary accounts. If so, this will only widen the gap between military and civilian capabilities.

The third lesson regards time. Wars of insurgency are by nature “slow and messy.” Kaplan questions whether the American people are unwilling to support such long, complicated and costly endeavors.

While this remains a richly debated field of study, the American people gave its leaders 12 years to succeed in Afghanistan and eight years in Iraq. While some have already argued the military has been withdrawn too quickly, the fact is the United States squandered too much time developing workable strategies and putting appropriate levels of resource in place.

Going forward, any intervention will be a race against time. Better strategic planning is an imperative. Given the emerging global media environment, the perceived legitimacy of any action is on the clock with no time to waste.

Given how lethal force can be delivered through more technology and fewer troops, future Presidents will be tempted to solve the time problem by engaging in high-tech wars without mobilizing the American people or the government. But given the proliferation of smartphones with cameras linked to the Internet and social media like Facebook and Twitter, future warfare will still be influenced by public opinion. Governments may choose to ignore the impact, as is happening now in Pakistan, but public pressure can be expected to increase, overseas if not at home.

The final lesson is simple, yet compelling. If we are not confident that military action can be decisive, the most prudent decision may be not to intervene militarily in the first place. This is certainly not easy with various constituencies calling on the United States to “do something.” But the reality is that, if future conflict is mostly political, military action may incur profound costs without actually solving the problem.

This appears to be the one lesson that has been put into practice. The result, right or wrong, is evident in Syria.