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Inaugural Public Diplomacy

January 22, 2013public diplomacy1 Comment

President Barack Obama, in his first inaugural address in 2009, said “the world has changed, and we must change with it.” The extent of a transformed domestic and international landscape was clear in his second inaugural address this week. Inaugurals are important opportunities for public diplomacy and his message will appeal to international audiences, but it was clearly tempered by four years of real-world experience. Obama talked at length about ongoing need to achieve equality and opportunity here at home, but gone was much of the soaring rhetoric targeted abroad that captivated international audiences four years ago.

Unlike previous second-terms where Presidents have been challenged politically at home and tried to pad their legacies abroad, Obama’s domestic is clearly going to animate his final four years in office. He outlined an ambitious agenda – a grand bargain on the budget that preserves social equality and promotes economic opportunity, enhanced gun regulation and immigration reform. These issues, along with energy and the environment, have important international dimensions as well.

If engagement was the international watchword four years ago, this time it was collaboration and the need to continue to strengthen the capacity of the international community to tackle major global challenges. He reemphasized a commitment to end a decade of war, rejecting the notion that U.S. security requires “perpetual war.” He renewed America’s support for democracy in a dramatically transformed international landscape.

Those pledges will be tested over the next four years in places like Syria, Mali, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt.

Saying “no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation,” President Obama committed to continued emphasis on collective action through formal alliances, major international organizations, regional structures and informal groups of like-minded nations. The past four years revealed the strengths and limitations of such an approach, with decisive international action in Libya but severe constraints in Syria. Patient and determined action with regional partners appears to be paying off in Somalia. That is a potential model for action in and around Mali, but more resources will need to be committed, and quickly.

Obama said four years ago that his national security strategy involved the “prudent use” of American power. The weight of effort against extremist groups shifted from large-scale deployments of U.S. ground forces to the aggressive use of technology, from unmanned drones to a computer worm. This strategy netted important accomplishments, such as the elimination of Osama bin Laden, but has generated international concerns regarding overly secretive actions that may be rewriting the laws of war and setting potentially far-reaching precedents. The administration is said to be codifying its approach within an American “playbook,” but it remains unclear to what degree this involves genuine partnerships with admittedly weak allies like Pakistan or Yemen.

Obama in his inaugural address encouraged resolving “differences with other nations peacefully, not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.” This approach will surely be tested in the coming months regarding the U.S. approach to Iran and whether sufficient time will be devoted to what will undoubtedly be a lengthy and difficult negotiation.

The United States will continue to support democracy “because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom.” But emerging democracies like Egypt will have a much different look and feel. The United States should help guide Egypt regarding vital elements of an enduring democracy – building effective institutions, protecting minorities, including all segments of society including women, tolerating and encouraging political dissent and peacefully transferring power following free and fair elections. But the United States will have to be patient, recognizing that the path forward will not be a straight line. The final construction should be consistent with long-term U.S. objectives, but will not have a stamp that says “made in America.”

A Wry Look at Why Foreign Policy Can’t Compete with the Golden Globes

January 14, 2013public diplomacyLeave a Comment

Tucker Carlson explains why it’s hard to put catchy titles on foreign affairs events:

“There are legitimate, even powerful arguments, to be made against … [an] administration’s foreign policy. But those arguments are complicated, hard to explain, and, in the end, not all that sensational.”

– Tucker Carlson

Or maybe the problem goes even deeper:

“Bringing democratic control to the conduct of foreign policy requires a struggle merely to force the issue onto the public agenda.”

– Eric Alterman

What too many people think:

“Whatever it is that the government does, sensible Americans would prefer that the government does it to somebody else. This is the idea behind foreign policy.”

– P. J. O’Rourke

What Public Diplomacy folks like to think:

“The moment we begin to fear the opinions of others and hesitate to tell the truth that is in us, and from motives of policy are silent when we should speak, the divine floods of light and life no longer flow into our souls.”

– Elizabeth Cady Stanton

The neoconservative view (and Kennedy definitely was one):

“Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.”

– John F. Kennedy

And, would that Henry Kissinger had paid more attention to his own words:

“No foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none.”

– Henry A. Kissinger

Catalan Independence and Sub-State Public Diplomacy

January 8, 2013public diplomacy11 Comments

Although it hasn’t garnered much attention in the U.S., tensions are high and escalating between the Catalan region of Spain and the national government in Madrid. The latest incident came Sunday when Spanish Defense Minister Pedro Morenes said that the military was “prepared” in the face of “absurd provocations,” presumably referring to recent calls for Catalonia’s secession from Spain.

The friction provides a window into the intriguing but under-studied topic of what is sometimes called sub-state public diplomacy. Like many sub-states – e.g., Quebec and Scotland – the Catalan government has recently embraced public diplomacy as a means toward promoting their region and pursuing their own economic and foreign affairs goals.

Yet if those goals shift to include independence, this could have profound and challenging implications for how Catalonia conducts its public diplomacy.

First, some quick background for those not familiar with the Spanish case. Following the death of the Fascist dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain was divided into 17 autonomous regions, with each controlling education, health, and cultural policies within their borders, while other policy areas remained under the purview of the government in Madrid.

Yet Catalonia has a strong independent streak rooted in the fact that it had been autonomous for centuries before being conquered by Spain in 1714. Catalans are a notoriously proud people, with their own language and a strong cultural history that includes Miro, Picasso, and Gaudi, to name just a few luminaries.

Catalonia and its capital, Barcelona, also represent a driving force in the Spanish economy. This means that Spain needs Catalonia at least as much as the other way around. This is as true during the terrible economic crisis both are currently enduring as it is in good times.

A campaign poster for a hard-line pro-independence party, Solidaritat, still hangs in Barcelona after elections last November. The poster depicts Spanish Prime Minister Mariona Rajoy -- who opposes Catalan independence and is unpopular in Catalonia -- saying, ‘Don’t Vote for Solidaritat, because they will declare independence!’ — A campaign poster for a hard-line pro-independence party, Solidaritat, still hangs in Barcelona after elections last November. The poster depicts Spanish Prime Minister Mariona Rajoy — who opposes Catalan independence and is unpopular in Catalonia — saying, ‘Don’t Vote for Solidaritat, because they will declare independence!’

In fact, it is the economic crisis that some say has fueled the rising secessionist talk from Catalans in the past year. A lack of jobs and revenue has rekindled questions amongst Catalans about why their tax dollars should go to aid poorer regions of Spain, while simultaneously making the rest of the country all the more dependent on the region’s contributions.

In November, Catalonia held elections that were seen in part as a de facto referendum on secession, especially after a huge pro-independence rally in September. The outcome of the vote led to the forming of a coalition between Catalan President Artur Mas’s center-right CiU party and the more leftist and pro-independence ERC party.

Tensions escalated in mid-December when Spanish Education Minister Jose Ignacio Wert put forth an education reform plan that would restore Castilian Spanish to primacy in all classrooms. Catalans saw this as a naked attempt to eliminate the Catalan language, which is currently taught throughout the region alongside Spanish and is seen as integral to Catalan cultural identity. Franco, for instance, had banned the speaking or teaching of Catalan during his nearly 40-year reign, just as Spain’s Philip V had after the 1714 conquest.

It would be hard to exaggerate the anger that Minister Wert’s proposal engendered amongst Catalans. I happened to be traveling in Barcelona that week, interviewing government officials and others, and the outrage was passionate and palpable. Pro-independence flags flew everywhere and huge rallies were held in protest.

“Even with civil guards in the classroom, school children will not stop studying Catalan,” roared the Congressional spokesman for the ERC. “You are going to come up against a nation ready to defend its children. Don’t you dare touch our children. We’ve had enough; we won’t obey.”

Not to be outdone, the CiU congressional spokesman evoked Spain’s history of trying to silence Catalans: “Phillip V tried to put an end to Catalan and later Franco, but they didn’t succeed.”

Within days, CiU and ERC reached an agreement to hold a referendum within two years on independence. On New Year’s Eve, Mas gave a pro-independence speech in which he said that Catalans “want to build a new country.”

Catalan flags are common in the region, but as momentum for secession has increased in the last few months, so has the presence of Catalan independence flags. — Catalan flags are common in the region, but as momentum for secession has increased in the last few months, so has the presence of
Catalan independence flags.

Although Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy tried to calm things by saying he’s open for dialogue, he made clear that this would be through the prism of the Spanish Constitution, which does not have a provision for secession.

This, though, is where Catalonia’s public diplomacy efforts become an interesting part of the story.

In 2008, the Catalan government began embracing the idea of public diplomacy as part of a larger foreign affairs strategy, and PD represented a core part of the region’s five year (2010-2015) strategic plan.

The PD efforts take several forms, including exchange programs and cultural events such as last year’s Miro exhibit at the National Gallery. But a major component involved creating Catalan delegations in six cities around the world: London, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, New York, and Buenos Aires (which recently closed). Madrid was never thrilled about these delegations – after all, Spain has their own embassies in all of these countries, so why spend the money to have a notoriously troublesome region doing its own PR? But the national government went along on the condition that the delegations simply engage in pro-Catalan work, not engage in any anti-Spanish rhetoric, and not discuss the tensions between Barcelona and Madrid, much less independence.

The recent outbreak of separatist sentiment, however, may change the nature of the delegations’ work, and Catalan public diplomacy generally. Rather than avoiding the topic, or promoting an image of harmony with Madrid, the Catalan government may see a need to start using the delegations to more proactively adopt an independence frame in their rhetoric and outreach.

This makes sense if you start from a premise of future independence. If that is what lies ahead, then Catalan public diplomacy needs to start laying the groundwork for having the rest of the world think of Catalonia as independent and unique. This would go hand in hand with a larger policy of gaining EU and other international support for not only secession, but future membership in the EU. It is worth noting that according to one government official I spoke to, President Mas has made more trips in the last year to Brussels, the EU headquarters, than he has to Madrid.

At the same time, this is a risky strategy, because ultimately Madrid exercises some control over Catalan purse strings (there is currently a dispute over payment transfers, for example). It could move to punish the region – and perhaps apply pressure to close the delegations – should they be seen as promoting independence. And if the Catalans aren’t able to secure independence, then they will have done much to poison relations with Madrid.

Pro-independence graffiti in Barcelona's famous Gaudi-designed Parc Guell — Pro-independence graffiti in Barcelona’s famous Gaudi-designed Parc Guell

In the meantime, the Catalans are also embracing strategies aimed at gaining more favorable coverage in the international media. Like all sub-states, a major problem Catalonia faces is that virtually all of the international reporters covering Spain are based in the capital of Madrid, and hence are inundated with the national government’s frame of Catalonia. To remedy this, the Catalan government has been creating more opportunities for those journalists to visit the region (conferences, for example). Some officials told me that they have noticed more balanced coverage (from their viewpoint) as a result.

Similarly, the Catalan delegations around the world will need to develop a proactive media strategy – including social media – if they want to more effectively alter perceptions of the region in the international community. A challenge will be how they deal with increasing questions about Catalan aspirations for independence.

This highlights an interesting and unique aspect to sub-state public diplomacy and soft power, which is the attempt to achieve foreign policy goals through what Joseph Nye calls “attraction and persuasion.” Unlike traditional state PD, which is by definition focused on citizens in other sovereign nations, sub-states often have a need to also “attract and persuade” fellow countrymen outside their regional borders. This is especially true for autonomous regions, and of course even more so if they have designs on independence.

The Fossar de las Moreres, a memorial plaza in Barcelona, commemorates those who died defending the city from Spanish conquest in 1714, and has been the site of major pro-independence protests in recent months.

Yet many of the people I spoke to in Barcelona felt that outreach to the rest of Spain was, as one said to me, “a lost battle.”

This may be short-sighted, though. Tensions are high, but perhaps artificially so because of the economic crisis. Whatever solution Madrid and Barcelona come up with in the next few years will, presumably, require broad Spanish support. Catalonia, it is important to note, is according to some surveys the least popular region in Spain amongst other Spaniards. That will need to change in order to gain independence, or in the absence of secession, to create a climate favorable to their domestic and foreign affairs goals.

So while it is true that like other sub-states Catalan PD needs to focus on the broader international community, it is also undoubtedly the case that its fortunes lie to some degree in their ability to improve their image within Spain.

The coming months will be interesting. With the independence referendum still potentially two years away, there is perhaps time to negotiate a settlement short of secession, especially if the economy improves. At the same time, the rhetoric from both Barcelona and Madrid – in government and in the streets – could end up pushing both sides further apart. Of course one could argue, as many throughout Catalonia are these days, that the time for compromise has past.

Regardless of what happens, Catalan public diplomacy will play an important and intriguing role that will be fascinating for public diplomacy scholars to watch.

Bruce Gregory’s Public Diplomacy Resources – #63

January 4, 2013public diplomacyLeave a Comment

GW School of Media and Public Affairs Adjunct Assistant Professor Bruce Gregory compiles an annotated bibliography of Public Diplomacy-related readings and other resources. Intended for teachers of public diplomacy and related courses, here is an update on resources that may be of general interest. Suggestions for future updates are welcome and should be directed to Bruce Gregory at BGregory@gwu.edu.

Read the full archive for Bruce Gregory’s Public Diplomacy Resources.

“Amb. Ryan Crocker in Conversation with NPR’s Steve Inskeep,” 2012 Annual Banquet Keynote Address, Middle East Institute, November 13, 2012. Inskeep, the host of National Public Radio’s Morning Edition, interviews retired US Ambassador Ryan Crocker. In discussing a range of issues relating to Afghanistan and the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, Crocker offers considered views on lessons from the death of US Ambassador Chris Stevens. “One of the lessons I hope we don’t think we learned is let’s retrench, let’s have fewer engagements, let’s go out less, let’s do less, let’s know less. . . we have to be prepared to go to dangerous places, do difficult things. That’s what Chris Stevens was doing to understand and influence the new ascendancy in Libya. If you don’t deal with them, you’re not going to affect their behavior or even know what their agenda is.” Visit link for a six minute NPR audio feed on diplomacy risk issues.

American Academy of Diplomacy and The Stimson Center, Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity,October 2012. This report, written from a Foreign Service perspective, evaluates “important, if uneven, progress” in staffing the US State Department (up 17 percent) and USAID (up 30 percent) since 2008. It makes resource and personnel recommendations for the 2014-2018 State and USAID budgets based on four assumptions: a “transition trap” driven by increased requirements and reduced resources, a US that should remain “fully engaged” worldwide, equal support for key elements of military and civilian power, and cuts in programs, not people, if choices are necessary. In a brief section that ambiguously treats public diplomacy separately from “core diplomacy,” but as “a core mission of the State Department,” public diplomacy is seen to have fallen short of its goals in personnel, academic exchanges, and creation of American cultural centers.

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), “BBG Global Audience Estimate from the FY 2012 Performance and Results Report,”November 14, 2012. Weekly unduplicated worldwide audiences for US government-funded broadcasting services totaled 175 million in 2012 — down from 187 million in 2011 — according to the government agency responsible for both managing and evaluating US international broadcasting. Audiences increased substantially in Iran and declined in Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Burma as their broadcasting markets became more open.

Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age, Polity, 2012. Networked society scholar Castells (University of Southern California) uses theories of power relationships developed in his book Communication Power (2009) to analyze new social movements characterized by their self-organization, distrust of political parties and traditional mass media, and reliance on the Internet and local assemblies. His research focuses on the Arab revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the Indignadasmovement in Spain, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States.

Nicholas J. Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1999-2001, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. In his comprehensive and deeply researched earlier book, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, (2008), Cull (University of Southern California) took the story of USIA from its origins to the end of the Cold War. His new book, a much slimmer volume, continues the narrative characterized as a downhill trajectory to USIA’s consolidation in the Department of State in 1999 and a crisis in public diplomacy in the months leading up to 9/11. He divides his account into three chronological chapters linked to the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Throughout, he examines four broad themes: (1) political and structural issues in the road to consolidation, (2) the extent to which USIA continued its core work, (3) the extent to which USIA adapted to new technologies and approaches to public diplomacy, and (4) indications of the neglect of public opinion prior to 9/11.

Fergus Hanson, “Baked In and Wired: eDiplomacy@State,” Policy Paper Number 30, Brookings, October 2012. Hanson (Brookings nonresident Fellow, formerly Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia) builds on his earlier paper Revolution@State (March 2012). Using new anecdotes and recent data, Hanson focuses on three of eight categories in the US State Department’s uses of social media: public diplomacy, Internet freedom, and knowledge management. Although brimming with enthusiasm for State’s vanguard role, his paper includes views of critics and assessments of areas for improvement in what is now “a core tool of diplomacy.”

Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, and Paul Sharp, “Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy for the 21st Century,”Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Report No. 1, October 2012. Four leading diplomacy scholars associated with Clingendael and The Hague Journal of Diplomacy take a fresh and comprehensive look at “the puzzles surrounding, and challenges confronting, contemporary diplomacy.” Their goal is to go beyond familiar arguments regarding the state of diplomacy — e.g., multiple stakeholders, managing networks, and the centrality of public diplomacy — “to consider what kind of overall image of diplomacy in the early 21st century they present and their implications for its future development.” The paper offers a framework of “integrative diplomacy” in which foreign ministries act in national diplomatic systems and diplomats “increasingly function as facilitators and social entrepreneurs.” Scholars and practitioners will find this a useful and provocative conceptual framework for ongoing conversations.

Ellen Huijgh, ed., “The Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2012. The authors in this special edition of HJD provide significant reinforcement to the view that a blended domestic and international approach to diplomacy’s public dimension is an essential element in study and practice. Their articles, grounded in analysis of evolving concepts and case studies, look at domestic publics as targets of governments, partners with governments, and independent public diplomacy actors. They usefully frame current debates and provide a platform for further research. Includes:

— Ellen Huijgh (University of Antwerp, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael), “Public Diplomacy in Flux: Introducing the Domestic Dimension”

— Steven Curtis (London Metropolitan University) and Caroline Jaine (The CAST Institute, Cambridge), “Public Diplomacy at Home in the UK: Engaging Diasporas and Preventing Terrorism”

— Ellen Huijgh and Caitlin Byrne (Bond University), “Opening the Windows on Diplomacy: A Comparison of the Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy in Canada and Australia”

— Kathy R. Fitzpatrick (Quinnipiac University), “Defining Strategic Publics in a Networked World: Public Diplomacy’s Challenge at Home and Abroad”

— Teresa La Porte (University of Navarra), “The Impact of ‘Intermestic’ Non-State Actors on the Conceptual Framework of Public Diplomacy”

— Yiwei Wang (Tongji University), “Domestic Constraints on the Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy”

— Shay Attias (Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, Jerusalem), “Israel’s New Peer-to-Peer Diplomacy”

— Mladen Andrlic (Diplomatic Academy, Croatia), Iva Tarle (Embassy of Croatia, Jakarta), and Suzana Simichen Sopta (Embassy of Croatia, Kuala Lumpur), “Public Diplomacy in Croatia: Sharing NATO and EU Values with the Domestic Public”

“Innovations in Public Diplomacy,” PD Magazine, USC Center for Public Diplomacy, Issue 8, Summer 2012. Essays in this collection focus on a range of cutting edge questions and issues. Who is a diplomatic actor? European Union public diplomacy. Sub-state public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy. Sports diplomacy. Digital technologies. And more. Includes:

— Paul Levinson (Fordham University), “Everyone is a Diplomat in the Digital Age.”

— Mia’a K. Davis Cross (University of Southern California), “Europe as a Security Actor.”

— Ellen Huijgh (University of Antwerp and Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael), “The Future of Sub-state Public Diplomacy.”

— Steffan Bay Rasmussen (University of the Basque Country), “Current Challenges to European Union Public Diplomacy.”

— Ali Fisher (InterMedia), “Everybody’s Getting Hooked Up: Building Innovative Strategies in the Age of Big Data.”

— Martha Alhassen (University of Southern California), “Remarkable Current: Music as Public Diplomacy.”

— Geoffrey Pigman (University of Pretoria), “‘Crouch, Touch, Pause, Engage,’ Moving Forward in the Scrum of International Sport and Public Diplomacy.”

Institute of International Education, Open Doors Report 2012, November 12, 2012. The lead finding in this year’s Open Doors Report is that international students in the US increased by six percent and US students studying abroad increased by one percent. This comprehensive report is published annually with funding from the US Department of State. In its press release, IIE emphasized that international exchanges contributed $22.7 billion to the US economy and that international education “creates a positive economic and social impact for communities in the United States and around the world.” Open Doors data and “fast facts” are available on IIE’s website.

Iskra Kirova, Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkazia and South Ossetia, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Paper No. 7, Fall 2012. Kirova (CPD Research Fellow) analyzes public diplomacy and soft power strategies used by key actors in Russia’s “near abroad.” Her study provides a descriptive overview of Russia’s hard and soft power influence in the region and offers a prescriptive analysis of the EU’s and Georgia’s public diplomacy strategies for conflict resolution. Kirova focuses on the relevance of social, cultural, linguistic affiliations and draws conclusions from her cases for a broader understanding of public diplomacy.

Frank Lavin, “Enemies at the Gates: Security Lessons from a Foiled Embassy Attack,” Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2012. In the context of the attack on the US mission in Benghazi, Libya, former US Ambassador to Singapore Lavin draws lessons from a foiled terrorist attack on the US embassy in Singapore in 2001.

George E. Little, “Communication Synchronization — A Local Coordination Process,” Memorandum for Commanders of the Combatant Commands from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, November 28, 2012. In this one-page memorandum, the Assistant Secretary explains his decision to replace the term “strategic communication” with “communication synchronization.” For comments on the memo see P.J. Crowley, “The Pentagon Drops Strategic Communication: Behind the Name Change,” Take Five, The IPDGC Blog on Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, December 4, 2012; Rosa Brooks, “Confessions of a Strategic Communicator,”Foreign Policy National Security Blog, December 6, 2012; and Tom Vanden Brook, “Pentagon Drops ‘Strategic Communication,'” USA Today, December 3, 2012.

Michael J. Mazarr, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, Fall 2012, 7-17. Mazarr (US National War College) argues the US strategic posture is becoming unsustainable due to a fundamental disconnect between means and ends – and “because it presumes an American relationship with friends, allies, and rivals that is the hallmark of a bygone era.” Mazarr urges a dramatic strategic shift guided by three principles: (1) strengthened economic, educational, and energy sectors at home, (2) a substantially reduced military establishment with less forward deployment and a combination of cyber and other emerging capabilities, and (3) increased investment in knowledge of complex issues and trends coupled with diplomatic efforts to share leadership burdens with others.

National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December 2012. In its latest quadrennial report, the NIC uses a variety of analytical tools to identify “relative certainties” and “potential game changers” in its long-term projection of global trends. The report includes studies of potential scenarios. Its attractive design and online presentation make it an effective teaching tool. Public diplomacy scholars and practitioners will find useful its discussion of individual empowerment, increased power of non-state actors, new technologies, demographic trends, governance deficits, problems created by rapid urbanization and climate change, and nuanced discussion of the potential for US leadership. In addition to its full report, the NIC provides a useful online summary.

Lynne Olson, Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in its Darkest, Finest Hour,Random House, 2010. In this well-researched book, historian Lynne Olson chronicles the World War II relationship between Britain and the US through the eyes of CBS News London Bureau Chief Edward R. Murrow and two American diplomats, US Ambassador to Britain John Gilbert Winant and Lend Lease Administrator Averell Harriman. Part personal relationships, part public diplomacy, part biography, Olson’s story is about a fractious and ultimately successful alliance with contrasting needs and perceptions on both sides. Particularly useful is her account of Americans assuming a larger role in the world but who, in the words of one British worker, “needed to know more about the world before they could lead it.” (Courtesy of Jim Whittemore)

James Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice, Routledge, 2012. Pamment (Karlstad University / Uppsala University) explores the meaning of “new public diplomacy” viewed as a paradigm shift in which globalization, new media, and multiple new international actors challenge traditional foreign ministry structures and diplomacy strategies. His book combines in-depth conceptual analysis with empirical data from three country case studies (United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden). Pamment draws extensively on interviews with practitioners in each country and a growing research consensus that distinguishes between old and new public diplomacy. His goals: (1) “to explore and challenge some of the accepted boundaries of PD theory as it has developed over the past decade,” and (2) “to introduce both the scholarly debate and foreign ministry practices surrounding the new public diplomacy.”

Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie & Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power,Columbia University Press, 2012. Parmar (University of Manchester) provides a deeply researched account of ways in which philanthropic foundations created cultural and intellectual networks that supported the projection of American power from the 1920s to the 21st century. The principal achievement of American foundations, Parmar argues, has been the construction of global networks linking universities, think tanks, corporate actors and policymakers. His book contains a thorough discussion of its conceptual grounding in a Gramscian analysis of power and a number of detailed case studies. These include the Salzburg Seminar and the Cold War’s American studies network, Nigeria and the African studies network, Indonesia and the Asian studies network, and Chile and the Latin American studies network.

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable: Trends in News Consumption: 1991-2012, September 27, 2012. Pew’s survey finds television may be losing its hold on a successor generation now getting more of its news on social networking sites, cell phones, tablets, and other mobile platforms. The report shows also digital news surpassing radio, newspapers, and magazines. Book readers show no decrease, but a growing number use electronic and audio devices.

“Soft Power, Smart Power and Public Diplomacy in Asia,” Global Asia, A Journal of the East Asia Foundation, Volume 7, Number 3, Fall 2012. Articles in this edition of Global Asia examine ways in which Asian countries and Asia as a region are “deeply engaged in the projection of soft power” — and how they are adopting and adapting soft power and public diplomacy concepts and terms. (Courtesy of Ellen Frost)

Includes:

— Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), “Listening for the Hoof Beats: Implications of the Rise of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy”

— Keith Dinnie (NHTV Breda University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands), “More Than Tourism: The Challenges of Nation Branding in Asia”

— Zhou Qingan and Mo Jinwei (Tsinghua University), “How 21st Century China Sees Public Diplomacy as a Path to Soft Power”

— Kazuo Ogoura, (Head of Tokyo’s Olympic Bid Committee, former President of the Japan Foundation), “From Ikebana to Manga and Beyond: Japan’s Cultural and Public Diplomacy is Evolving”

— Yul Sohn (Yonsei University), “‘Middle Powers’ Like South Korea Can’t Do Without Soft Power and Network Power”

— Wu-suk Cho, “Riding the Korean Wave From ‘Gangnam Style’ to Global Recognition”

— Alison Broinowski (Australian National University), “Soft Power, Smart Power or Public Diplomacy? Australia Fumbles”

Tara Sonenshine, “Measuring the Public Diplomacy of the Future,” Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, December 3, 2012. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs talks about the underlying purposes of public diplomacy and the Department’s policy guidelines on planning, managing, and conducting evaluations.

US Department of Education, Succeeding Globally Through International Education and Engagement, US Department of Education International Strategy 2012-16, November 2012. In its “first-ever fully articulated international strategy,” the Department advances two strategic goals: strengthen US education and advance US international priorities. The strategy assumes traditional reading, writing, mathematics and science skills are no longer sufficient. Rather, “an effective domestic education agenda must address global needs and trends and aim to develop a globally competent citizenry.” The strategy discusses integrated and coordinated activities and programs intended to achieve three objectives: (1) increase global competencies, (2) learn from others, and (3) engage in education diplomacy.

Peter van Ham, “Two Cheers for Public Diplomacy and Place Branding,” e-International Relations,September 2, 2012. In this brief online article, posted by the e-International website for students of international politics, Peter van Ham (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael) compares overlapping concepts, methods, and goals of public diplomacy and place branding. They “are putting traditional diplomacy to the test,” he argues. However, “these newer forms of diplomacy should not be considered harbingers of a mediatized global democracy.” Hence, only two cheers.

Stephen Walt, “Music hath charms . . . but we don’t use it (updated),” Foreign Policy Blog, December 6, 2012. FP blogger Walt laments the death of jazz legend Dave Brubeck, reflects on his impact as an American cultural ambassador, and observes the US is not using “A-list musicians” in today’s cultural diplomacy. His blog includes a response from Hishaam Aidi (Columbia University and the Open Society Institute), “Leveraging Hip Hop in US Foreign Policy,” critical of current State Department efforts to progam hip-hop and rap artists.

Matthew C. Weed, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Legislative Proposals to Amend Prohibitions on Disseminating Materials to Domestic Audiences, CRS Report for Congress R42754, Congressional Research Service, September 21, 2012. CRS analyst Weed succinctly and usefully analyzes legislation that prohibits the US government from influencing domestic public opinion through “unauthorized publicity or propaganda” and US public diplomacy. Weed’s report examines long-standing provisions of the “Smith-Mundt Act” and issues relating to pending bills that would remove the prohibition on domestic dissemination of “public diplomacy information” by the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, “while maintaining the prohibition on using public diplomacy funds to influence U.S. public opinion.”

Robert F. Worth, “Can American Diplomacy Ever Come Out of Its Bunker,” New York Times Magazine, November 18, 2012. 32-35, 44. The magazine’s staff writer profiles the career and death in Benghazi, Libya of US diplomat Chris Steven and explores issues relating to fortress embassies and contrasting levels of tolerance for risk between Washington and diplomats. Includes views of former US ambassadors Ryan Crocker, Ronald Neumann, Prudence Bushnell, Richard Murphy, and Barbara Bodine. In Neumann’s view, “There’s less willingness among our political leaders to accept risks, and all that has driven us into the bunker.” For Bushnell, “The model has become, we will go to dangerous places and transform them, and we will do it from secure fortresses. And it doesn’t work.”

Gem from the Past

Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead, and Conrad Smewing, Public Diplomacy, London, The Foreign Policy Center, 2002. It has been a decade since the former director of “Tony Blair’s think tank” and his colleagues published this influential volume on the meaning and practice of public diplomacy. Drawing on research on public diplomacy practices in six countries, Leonard calls for “a new type of multilateral public diplomacy,” retooling embassy and foreign ministry structures, and infrastructures that link government and non-state actors across borders. Includes analysis of public diplomacy’s time dimensions, competitive and cooperative public diplomacy, “NGO diplomacy,” “diaspora diplomacy,” “political party diplomacy,” “brand diplomacy,” and “business diplomacy.”

Recent compilations of Public Diplomacy: Books, Articles, Websites are posted at Arizona State University’s COMOPS Journal, Matt Armstrong’s MountainRunner.us website, and George Washington University’s Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication. For previous compilations of Public Diplomacy: Books, Articles, Websites, visit an archive created by the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy.

21st Century Visual Culture, NGOs, and Public Diplomacy

December 20, 2012Cultural Diplomacy, Global Communication, public diplomacy1 Comment

An early Christmas present arrived in the mail today – a new book called Sensible Politics: The Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism (Meg McLagan and Yates McKee, eds., Zone Books, 2012.)

The “visual culture of nongovernmental activism” seems like an important topic for U.S. public diplomacy practitioners to consider. Even though public diplomacy isn’t exactly nongovernmental, neither does it represent the prevailing governing power of the countries in which public diplomats work. And in “making the case for America” in those foreign lands, we are very much activist, vying for attention along with non-governmental (and other-governmental) efforts of every stripe. We may ally ourselves enthusiastically with some causes, for example women’s empowerment. We may argue against others, for example restrictions on free speech deemed blasphemous. But we are always one voice among many, without the authority (however defined or felt) that a government body carries in its own country.

And of course, one of public diplomacy’s key resources is visual culture. From the first great expansion of U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War period, the U.S. looked for ways to make visual our ideas, our values, our culture. Jazz Ambassadors did not tour just so people could hear their music; these mega-stars were sent abroad so that their photos would be on the front page of every newspaper, perhaps shaking the hand of a prime minister or jamming with local musicians. Jeeps and trucks carried USIS officers to remote areas with movies and portable generator-run projectors. Every month USIS distributed glossy color-photo magazines in Russian, Arabic, Spanish, French, and other languages. U.S. cultural centers were and are full of posters, photographs – even décor – supporting our particular “cause,” i.e., America itself. With the advent of satellite television in the 1980’s, USIA under Charles Wick eagerly embraced the opportunity to engage via this new medium. Interestingly, the first and most prominent use of USIA’s “Worldnet” television was to bring together multi-country audiences in mutual discussion and debate.

In the past couple of decades, non-governmental and civil society organizations have proliferated across the globe. In wealthier countries, philanthropy and sometimes government grants provided support. In the developing world, international donors channeled development assistance funds to and through such groups. Even before the Internet became widely accessible, NGOs expressed their activism visually, via photography, posters, videos, theater. Some development agencies ventured deep into visual culture territory, funding local NGO partners to produce films and television programs designed to promote positive actions such as conflict resolution or combating HIV/AIDS. Non-governmental organizations around the world became sophisticated in working with visual culture. Under-funded public diplomacy organizations have felt the pressure.

Today, we all continue to be amazed at the impact and promise of digital media. Digital and social media most certainly multiply our ability to communicate, but they expand the opportunity exponentially to those who may not have much in the way of funds, but who do have the passion, energy, and creativity to produce powerful images that draw us to their message. In this significantly more crowded visual-culture landscape, the U.S. will likely continue to focus on innovative ways to maintain our profile and to partner with other visual-culture organizations to tell America’s story. But this new book is a reminder that in the 21st century, communicating “who we are” is losing ground to communicating “what must change” — with real implications for public diplomacy.

In any case, it’s exciting when a book provokes so much thought via the title alone. And now I see that already on p. 14 there’s a discussion of Walter Benjamin on the “’aestheticizing of politics’ by fascism” in the 1930’s, which somehow got me thinking about the global reach of U.S. consumer culture and how this also shapes the landscape in which we public diplomacy practitioners work. Sounds like a topic for a future blog post!

Tweeting in State

December 11, 2012Global Communication, public diplomacy, Social Media1 Comment

daniel_hertzberg_twitter_use_in_government — Source: danielhertzberg.com

When the recent Diplopundit post and related news items came out about State Department revising its external communication clearance rules, a lot of people reacted with concern that State was either deliberately or merely blind-bureaucratically limiting its ability to communicate by imposing a new delay on digital communication, even on tweets. Colleagues here at GWU quizzed me with “State Department rules might impose a 48-hour review period on employees tweets. Because that’s the best way to communicate in the era of instant communication?”

But my experience with the State Department tells me this is not what the new draft clearance rules are about — and here is why:

Right now, if you are an Ambassador or PAO (public affairs officer) overseas you are cleared to tweet or post to social media (as well as talk to local journalists, do interviews with local media, etc.) as you see fit — and it doesn’t look like these new rules would change that. And if you are in Washington in an office that needs to communicate publicly about something, you can work with the PA staff in your own bureau to get near-instant clearance.

(Plus, employees can always use language that’s already been cleared, e.g. text from previous official speeches and statements — and frankly, a lot of language gets recycled this way because it’s efficient and ensures consistency, which is necessarily valued in this business).

So I don’t see the new rules having any restrictive effect on on-the-job communication via digital media, either overseas or at reasonably senior levels in Washington.

To me (and again, this is just from looking at Diplopundit and the spinoff media articles from it), the new draft rules appear to do two things:

Actually shorten the maximum time State PA is allowed to take to clear independent thoughts on foreign affairs which State employees might want to express in a non-official or quasi-official role. In other words, in situations where the reason people might read your blog article or listen to your speech is that you work for State, but you want to use your own words and speak your own thoughts. And of course there’s a broad spectrum of such situations, ranging from invitational speaking that all State officers ought to do as part of their work (on one end) to whistle-blowing (at the other); and,
Close a loophole that indicated if State PA doesn’t respond to a request for clearance within a certain deadline, one is free to publish.

Up until now, there’s been a blanket maximum time of 30 days for clearance of such quasi-official communication, via any media. But according to the new draft rules, the very small subset of employees’ social media content that might be subject to review through this formal Department process would be guaranteed a much shorter maximum (not target) deadline for clearance.

But it’s good that journalists and the general public are interested in this. (Government always works better when the citizens are paying attention and can give sensible advice if insider-thinking shows signs of going off the rails!)

Take Five remembers Dave Brubeck’s Legacy

December 6, 2012public diplomacy1 Comment

The contributors to the Take Five blog were all saddened to learn about the passing of legendary jazz pianist – and public diplomat – Dave Brubeck on Wednesday. Brubeck’s status as a giant and a pioneer in jazz is well known, and a large part of why he received the Kennedy Center Honor in 2009. (He also received an Honorary Degree from George Washington University – the home of this blog and the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication – in 2010.) His seminal album “Time Out,” which includes the classic hit for which this blog is named, broke new ground in jazz composition while achieving the kind of popular success rarely seen by even the genre’s giants. It’s a beautiful, timeless album.

Less well known, however, is his major contributions to American public diplomacy. In the late 1950s the State Department sent his quartet on a world tour as part of their efforts to reach foreign publics through the power of jazz, which many consider to be not only the greatest American music genre, but perhaps the country’s only truly indigenous one. He continued to lead tours of “jazz ambassadors” throughout his life, and was awarded the prestigious Benjamin Franklin Award for Public Diplomacy in 2008 for his efforts.

Those tours played an important role in Brubeck’s life, and his contributions went beyond his music. The music he heard in the countries he visited inspired many of his greatest hits, including those on “Time Out” such as “Blue Rondo a la Turk” and “Take Five.” At the same time, Brubeck’s strong civil rights stance empowered him to refuse to play in South Africa due to its brutal system of racial Apartheid when the contract required him to play with an all-white band.

Both, it seems to me, are examples of the nature and power of public diplomacy, which is predicated on two-way, interactive communication and exchange of ideas. The State Department sent Brubeck around the world to spread the gospel of Jazz, and with it a more subtle message of America’s cultural greatness and freedom during the Cold War. But Brubeck didn’t just play for his audiences, he listened to them, too. The world benefited from these exchanges in the form of even greater music from those he inspired, but also from him.

At the same time, the racial diversity of Brubeck’s traveling combos – and of other “Jazz Ambassadors” sent by the State Department during this period – made a statement in and of itself, even if at the time the United States wasn’t even coming close to living up to that standard. But Brubeck’s unwavering commitment to racial equality, and his willingness to stand up to the Apartheid regime, also showed the power of public diplomacy to convey our cultural values.

Brubeck’s loss is a giant one to jazz, and to diplomacy. We at Take Five are proud to honor his legacy with this blog.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=faJE92phKzI]

The Pentagon Drops Strategic Communication: Behind the Name Change

December 4, 2012public diplomacy6 Comments

There are a number of competing and overlapping terms to describe how governments communicate with or relate to their own citizens and those of other countries, including strategic communication, public diplomacy, public affairs, information operations and global engagement. Depending on who is saying what to whom and where, different authorities, funds, channels or even laws can apply.

For example, by law, the United States government cannot “propagandize” its own people, but is permitted to try to “persuade” others around the world to support U.S. interests and actions. It can “inform” anyone about U.S. policies, actions, history, culture and opportunities.

When the State or Defense Departments communicate with the American people, usually through the media, it is called public affairs. How the State Department interacts with global audience is termed public diplomacy. When the Department of Defense does something similar (but usually with a short-term objective) it has been known as strategic communication — until recently.

But late last month, the Department of Defense issued a memorandum announcing that the term strategic communication is out, and communication synchronization is in. Why the shift and what does it mean?

According to the memo, strategic communication, which has been a joint responsibility of DoD’s Public Affairs and Policy communities with lots of interested players on the margins, created bureaucratic and functional confusion regarding military planning and oversight. As Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs George Little wrote, “most things previously termed ‘SC’ are in fact Public Affairs responsibilities.” This makes sense.

But are strategic communication and communication synchronization the same? Not necessarily.

Communication synchronization can be viewed as constructing a narrative and sustaining it across the bureaucracy. The United States is actually pretty good at this. Take one recent celebrated example. Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, echoed talking points about Benghazi developed by the intelligence community when she appeared on several Sunday shows five days after the attack. The criticism from some Senators has been that she should have been less, well, synchronized.

The word strategic communicates importance, something directly related to a vital interest or a core function. The evolution of the concept of strategic communication within the military a decade or so ago reflected the emergence of a 24/7 global media environment, the interconnected world of the Internet, traditional media, satellite television and now social media and citizen journalists. In this world, governments communicate with each other and with broader society. People communicate vertically and horizontally and have access to more and better quality information than ever before.

United States policies, pronouncements and actions receive relentless scrutiny. In order to gain international understanding and support, to the extent possible, what we say and what we do need to complement and not contradict each other. Strategic communication is about keeping our words and deeds in the same zip code, or offering a quick and coherent explanation when one or the other strays beyond the established narrative.

This can be very difficult, particularly when policies and priorities, or interests and values, collide.

More often than we’d like to admit, our actions look one way to us, but are perceived very differently half a world away. Think of the bin Laden raid in Pakistan. From Kalamazoo, taking bin Laden off the battlefield was a no-brainer. From Karachi, it was a violation of sovereignty and a national humiliation.

Recognizing that the raid, necessary as it was, would inflame Pakistani public opinion, the initial description of the operation by President Obama was carefully constructed to try and mitigate these vastly different perceptions between the two countries. That’s strategic communication.

It’s not clear that communication synchronization addresses situations where our actions, no matter how well we attempt to explain them, have potentially far-reaching public policy consequences. Despite assertions to the contrary, the United States had no trouble communicating in Iraq. But what we viewed as liberation, others viewed as occupation. What we described as a war on terror, others perceived as a war against Islam. Our narrative was clear and consistent, but carried high costs we are still paying in a critical part of the world.

Going forward, the United States must recognize how consistent words and actions translate into effective and sustainable policies, regardless of what you call it.

Influencing the World through Soft Power

November 28, 2012public diplomacyLeave a Comment

The international magazine Monocole has released its third annual “Soft Power Survey – 2012,” an analysis in which states are judged by their ability to influence others through “attraction” rather than coercion. This survey both examines and seeks to push the debate on where soft power comes from as well as how to use it. Ranking first in this year’s survey—and taking the lead for the first time—is the United Kingdom.

As Monocle states on its website, “with current shifts in the global power balance, never has [the debate on soft power] been more relevant.” Britain placed first for a number of reasons, but as one commentator summarized:

“The Britain that the country has become was best summed up in the Olympics opening ceremony celebrating the national health service, birth of the World Wide Web, and Harry Potter. It united a nation that has often had trouble summing itself up, and was a brilliant advert to the rest of the world.”

Countries making the soft power countdown include Belgium for its consistency on business, diplomacy and education; Brazil for its “peace-loving citizens;” Finland for its problem-solving professionals; and Denmark for its popular music, art, architecture and design.

Harry Potter author J.K. Rowling takes p — Source: Telegraph.co.uk

Among the top five countries are Sweden (considered one of the world’s friendliest countries), France (the home of exceptional culture and cuisine), and Germany (a European powerhouse with strong business brands and a popular soccer league).

The country the United Kingdom ousted for this year’s top role as a soft power nation was the United States, which was ranked first in 2011 for its unmatched cultural exports. “From Hollywood to country music to hip-hop,” the United States influence through soft power was unparalleled. Within this year’s “Soft Power – 2012” video, which briefly discusses the top 20 soft power nations, Monocole commended the United States for its vast humanitarian spending. As highlighted in the video, in 2012 alone, the United States spent $960 million on global food initiatives, $8 million on world health, and $480 million on preventing climate change. Making evident why the United States failed to place first in the rankings, the section ended by asserting that the “United States should rely more on these kind of investments than drone strikes to assert its authority overseas.”

In an interview with Daily Mail, Monocle‘s editor-in-chief Tyler Brûlé said that “the importance of soft power was more important in global influence than at any previous period of history.” In a time when states might be more prone to flex their military muscle, soft power is a largely undervalued currency. Xenia Dormandy, a senior fellow and U.S. expert at Chatham House, told the Daily Mail she believes the United States “has a tendency to focus on the tangible and the concrete” rather than on using soft power as a bargaining chip.

Although the full list of the 30 countries on the 2012 ‘Soft Power’ list can only be accessed by Monocle subscribers, the top 20 countries are discussed in the previously mentioned video and Daily Mail article.

Expert Views on Public Diplomacy: The Next Four Years

November 26, 2012Global Communication, public diplomacy, Social MediaLeave a Comment

On November 13, IPDGC had the privilege of sponsoring Public Diplomacy: the Next Four Years, a terrific “insiders” discussion featuring two former Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy (James Glassman and Judith McHale), a key Senate senior committee staffer (Paul Foldi), and a former State Department Assistant Secretary / spokesperson (Philip “PJ” Crowley). These are all people who not only have a vision of what America’s public diplomacy can and should do, they also know a lot about what it actually does.

Panel members enthusiastically debated the role and strengths of contemporary U.S. public diplomacy. One area of complete agreement: two-way engagement is a big priority over one-way messaging. Another consensus: information technology is a game-changer in diplomacy and foreign affairs.

Key Takeaway: Signficant discussion revolved around how diplomacy itself – not just public diplomacy – is changing. The implication was clear that diplomacy must change even more in this modern world of globally shared challenges and exponentially more information networks.

Here is one blogger’s observations on key points and highlights from this IPDGC-sponsored panel:

1) Consensus: Engagement and relationships trump one-way messaging:

McHale: The world has changed [and] we will not be able to move our foreign policy goals and objectives forward without having a better relationship, better understanding and engagement with people all over the world. We simply can’t do it.

Crowley: [re: tweeting with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez] By doing that, the folks in [the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau] will go, why are you doing that? I’d say, it is generating a debate within Venezuela. And one of my colleagues said, when you wrestle with a pig you get dirty. I go yes, but this is a debate that we will ultimately win. [We] have to be willing to let our diplomats engage in this debate and quite honestly that’s a phenomenon that will happen.

Foldi: Sometimes I think the department falls into this trap of, “well we put all things out on a web and then we let people comment on them.” Well that’s not what they really want, they want to engage in a conversation

Glassman: You look for those avenues where you can pursue those conversations, where you can build relationships even in very difficult and challenging parts of the world for us.

But at least one voice made the case for “messaging” — when it is done in new, relational contexts:

Glassman: I realized that simply standing up and preaching at people… is not a very effective way to communicate. [Foreign audiences] don’t want to listen to you, to Americans preaching at them. But rather a better way to communicate is to use American authority, such as it is, to convene a large, broad and deep conversation in which American messages are … injected [or] distributed among other messages

So the emphasis is on relationships and engagement. And whether focused on advancing foreign policy goals or debating policies and ideologies at the head of state level, the panelists are not just talking about public diplomacy, they’re talking about all of diplomacy.

2) Another area of agreement: Information technology as a game-changer:

McHale: The world has changed so dramatically and so fundamentally with … technology and with information and power now being widely dispersed. We have got to find better ways of influencing foreign populations or we simply can’t go forward. [For example], right now in this room there is nobody here who can raise their hand and say ‘I can identify who was the leader of the Egyptian revolution.’ Because there wasn’t one; it was coalitions, ever changing coalitions of interests.

Glassman: And second, it’s just amazing, we … have lucked into this world — and we haven’t “lucked” into it, but the tools are there, tools that did not exist ten years ago. The tools for communicating in a public diplomacy 2.0 way.

3) Defining the core goal of public diplomacy: is it “Benefit of the Doubt?”

Paul Foldi and PJ Crowley both focus on the perceived gap between words and deeds as a major challenge for public diplomacy. Foldi describes how a country that builds up its soft power can get over specific policy hurdles:

Foldi: It can take years to get what I call ‘benefit of the doubt,’ which I believe is the goal of public diplomacy. So that when your country does something or has a policy that seems counterintuitive to the rest of the world, they’ll go “oh, but they are the United States — so maybe they’re doing this [thing we don’t like], but for the most part we agree with them.” And to me … it’s a question of can we get back into the ‘benefit of the doubt’ category for many of these countries?

(Note: Foldi’s view – creating the benefit of the doubt – strikes me as something a lot of public diplomacy practitioners would agree with. I think many of us would see this is as an achievable goal in many overseas contexts, and we would consider the public diplomacy ‘toolkit’ useful in pursuing this goal.)

By contrast, PJ Crowley focuses not on helping contextualize policies that are unappreciated abroad as being inconsistent with shared values, but rather on trying to eliminate them:

Crowley: Ultimately the best public diplomacy is … policies that reflect your interests and your values and [when] the gap between what we say and what we do is as narrow as it can be. … [One] of the great challenges for public diplomacy is to bridge the gap between words and deeds, to narrow that to the extent possible. … [Polling trends] should inform what our short term and mid term actions are.

Meanwhile, Glassman and McHale reject a polling-driven “popularity contest” approach, maintaining that targeted PD efforts can and should be used to further specific U.S. foreign policy goals.

Glassman: I don’t think that favorability ratings in the Pew survey are evidence of whether we are doing something wrong or right. [I tried] to disabuse people of that notion and rather to focus attention on what public diplomacy can do to achieve specific ends that are part of [our] goals in foreign policy and national security policy; that’s what public diplomacy is supposed to do.

McHale: I’m certainly in agreement with Jim on this issue, it’s not a popularity contest … that is absolutely the wrong focus.

As the panelists fleshed out their ideas, however, I heard each one suggest support for Foldi’s “benefit of the doubt” role for public diplomacy:

Crowley: we will always be challenged …for example Indians have expectations in terms of the US policy towards Pakistan or Pakistan has expectations towards the US policy towards India, and those two… do not easily coexist. And when… you sit in between those two long time antagonists, you are going to end up disappointing both of them to some degree or another.

McHale: There were many areas where … we do find areas of common interest, science, technology, education, all of those areas. … [N]aturally you are going to encounter a lot of resistance and what have you but that’s no reason to give up. And you look for those avenues where you can pursue those conversations, where you can build relationships even in very difficult and challenging parts of the world for us.

Glassman: [A]s Senator Fulbright said, the Fulbright programs teach empathy, standing in somebody else’s shoes. I’m a huge believer in that and I think that is valuable. (But should two thirds of the money be spent on that?)

Glassman (again): [A]s president Obama said right in the beginning … we need to focus on mutual interest and mutual respect and there are many things that we can get done in that fashion.

All of these comments reflect the idea that some U.S. policies will inevitably be viewed by some other countries as inimical, unfair, and/or a betrayal of U.S. stated values — so concentrating on other interests and values that we do share, as well as working to promote mutual empathy and understanding, is essential.

4) This is really about “all of diplomacy”:

It is worth repeating Judith McHale’s observation about the Egyptian revolution: “right now in this room there is nobody here who can raise their hand and say ‘I can identify who was the leader of the Egyptian revolution.’ Because there wasn’t one, it was coalitions, ever changing collations of interests.”

Pair this with Crowley’s discussion of high-level public communications, for example those tweets with Hugo Chavez. He makes clear that informal and globally available public communication by heads of state and top diplomats (not to mention powerful business leaders and highly influential NGO advocates) is here to stay.

These panelists emphasized, in other words, that understanding and responding to events such as the Egyptian revolution or debating Hugo Chavez in his domestic political arena is not only the work of public diplomacy, it’s at the center of diplomacy and foreign policy. And engaging in this public sphere has to be a focus of the whole State Department, not just its public diplomacy bureaus.

Glassman makes the case that, in this new environment, using the tools of public diplomacy is a notably low cost / high impact strategy and should be expanded: “There are ways to move money within the State Department budget that would make the Department as a whole more effective by putting more emphasis on public diplomacy. … One of the reasons that I strongly believe that we need more public diplomacy … is because at a time of tight budgets, it’s the most cost effective way to achieve those national interest goals that I talked about.”

He takes that idea further to suggest that Embassies themselves may be obsolete.

Glassman: And the other thing that I would just throw out to you is whether in an era of social media and very, very fast communications, whether we should be spending as much money as we are in general at the State Department on things called embassies. Okay it made a lot of sense 100 years ago, but does it make sense today to have this edifice and this very complicated kind of arrangement where people go for a few years and live there, as though they couldn’t possibly influence people in those countries if they didn’t live there?

No doubt many would find controversial the idea that one can influence people whom one has never met face to face, much less grown to know better over time. But on closer examination, is Glassman really saying that diplomats don’t need to go abroad and meet people? Is it possible to envision an engaged diplomacy involving both face to face and online interactions that does not involve the traditional Embassy model?

I’m not sure. (What do TakeFive blog readers think?)

Advocates of ‘new approaches to public diplomacy’ often end up by proposing new approaches to diplomacy itself. As these excerpts from last week’s expert panel discussion show, our panelists at the IPDGC event were no exception. (And there was much more rich discussion that can be found on the event video or in the transcript.)

Yes, they were unanimous on the importance of existing public diplomacy efforts, and there was little disagreement on the impact of valued public diplomacy tools (exchanges, social media).

At the same time, these experienced public diplomacy experts expressed a range of ideas – some quite provocative – about how approaches rooted in public diplomacy are particularly appropriate for the 21st century challenges of U.S. diplomacy overall.

It will be great for IPDGC and other groups interested in the theory and practice of public diplomacy to get more such debates launched in the wider arena of foreign affairs / diplomacy.