I was proud to be an American last night and honored to say a few words about Ambassador Thomas Pickering on the occasion of his delivering the Third Annual Walter Roberts Lecture at GW’s School of Media and Public Affairs which houses the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication.
It was Ambassador Pickering’s birthday and he was in fine form as he answered tough questions from Frank Sesno director of the School of Media and Public Affairs. With a diplomatic career spanning more than four decades, Tom Pickering is the quintessential American diplomat–the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and former ambassador to Russia, India, Israel, El Salvador, and beyond. In 2000, he retired from the State Department as the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and co-chaired the panel which investigated the 2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi.
Ambassador Pickering minced no words in describing the serious “blow” that Benghazi was and the seriousness with which the Accountability Review Board approached issues of embassy security. He also decried the politicization of the tragedy and the lack of accurate, factual reporting that has accompanied the entire story.
What I found most surprising about the interview with Ambassador Pickering was how positive he is about the prospects for a deal with Iran. Pickering believes that Rouhani, the new president of Iran, is serious about the outreach to Washington and has the green light from the Supreme Leader to make a deal.
Let’s hope he’s right.
Editor’s note: Catch up on the Twitter conversation from the lecture at #PickeringPD!
Tara Sonenshine is a fellow at the School of Media and Public Affairs at The George Washington University. In February, she delivered the second annual Walter Roberts Lecture on cultural diplomacy. Previously, she served as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy following a distinguished career in government, non-profit organizations, and the media.
Kamran (actor Najebullah Sadiq) is the hardened but principled veteran police officer on Eagle Four, an Afghan TV show that its creators hope will have a positive effect on Afghans’ attitudes toward the real police. Credit: Tolo TV/ Wakil Kohsar
Advocates of official U.S. public diplomacy have long defended the value of its programs and argued for resources to do even more. But what exactly could be accomplished with such resources if they were, indeed, available?
In fact, we may already have an answer to that question, albeit in the context of a single country at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy—Afghanistan. Even as the United States has invested considerable resources in its military presence and development programs, so, too, has it devoted additional resources to a public diplomacy “surge” in support of overall U.S. goals in that country.
Public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan deploy the tried-and-true models that we employ all around the world, including: educational, youth, and professional exchange programs; English language programs; establishment of American Spaces; and, cultural exchange and preservation. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul also deploys additional public diplomacy resources to support non-traditional programs leveraging public diplomacy expertise, technological innovation, and local partners to further advance key U.S. interests in that critical country.
Noah Berlatsky’s thoughtful recent piece in the Atlantic reviews a new documentary film about Afghan Tolo TV and touches on a few of those public diplomacy efforts. As one of the major Afghan media groups, Tolo TV is also a major partner for U.S. public diplomacy efforts and programs seeking to engage, inform, and influence Afghan public opinion. Berlatsky notes U.S. Embassy support for Eagle Four, for example, “a high-quality-production action drama” about the Afghan national police force. He also highlights the U.S. objective in supporting the production “to demonstrate that those police forces are courageous, honest, and trustworthy.”
The establishment of security and stability in Afghanistan—one of the most important U.S. foreign policy goals worldwide today—will obviously depend on the capacity of Afghan security forces and, more importantly, the trust the people place in those forces. Eagle Four, by reaching a mass Afghan audience and profiling real Afghan police officers helping Afghans, is a perfect example of how innovative public diplomacy practitioners, provided with sufficient resources, advances key foreign policy goals.
Berlatsky raises valid points, of course, about whether such a dramatic depiction of the police force might unduly raise public expectations, but we could also be arguing about the value of producing a stale, realistic documentary that reaches and engages only a tiny fraction of Eagle Four‘s considerable viewership. I would argue that programs like Eagle Four take a risk, but that such risks are appropriate especially in places of conflict where the pay-offs can be so essential to advancing U.S. national security objectives.
Another key objective of Eagle Four and similar programs in Afghanistan is to promote the development and capacity of the Afghan media sector itself. The success of Tolo TV, as noted in the Atlantic article, as well as the availability of a multiplicity of television and radio stations, newspapers and magazines—in a country which not too long ago had only one state broadcaster—is a testament to the success of those efforts. Just as we hope that the Afghan security services will ensure long-term stability, so, too, do we believe that Afghan independent media will promote long-term democracy and government accountability in Afghanistan.
Eagle Four is, of course, just one of many such public diplomacy programs that partner with Afghan media, universities, civil society, women’s groups, and many others. Keen observers and veteran public diplomacy experts will note that some of these programs go well beyond the role of traditional public diplomacy in simply “telling America’s story” but are the proof of what can be accomplished with additional public diplomacy resources. The innovative U.S. public diplomacy programs in Afghanistan seek to positively engage, inform, and influence the Afghan public and in so doing to help maintain stability, promote democracy, and advance key U.S. foreign policy goals.
Note: Previous articles about Eagle Four were published in the New York Times and on NPR.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.
Pakistani protesters burn a representation of a U.S. flag to condemn a drone attack in the Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan which killed Taliban leader Waliur Rehman, Thursday, May 30, 2013 in Multan, Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban’s deputy leader was buried hours after he was killed in a U.S. drone strike, Pakistani intelligence officials and militants said Thursday. (AP Photo/M. Abbass)
I join my GWU and IPDGC colleague Tara Sonenshine in saluting Donald M. Bishop for a thoughtful speech on the state of U.S. public diplomacy and the challenges it faces. Let me add my two cents to the discussion.
I agree with the bottom line: public diplomacy is not a sufficiently vital dimension of diplomacy, foreign policy and national security. In an increasingly interconnected world of the Internet, global media, personal media and billions of smartphones, it should be, but isn’t. To be truly influential and effective, public diplomacy must be relevant as policy decisions are being made rather than after the fact.
Structure, story and strategy are contributing factors to the U.S. public diplomacy deficit, but what impacts international perceptions of the United States is less who says what, where and how than what we do. This has always been true, but what has changed from the height of the Cold War is the lens through which our actions are judged and the amount of information available to the average global citizen to continually evaluate American leadership.
The United States took on a truly heroic leadership role through what Donald Bishop terms the “long twilight struggle.” Without the United States, the world would have a different character and vastly different expectations about the future.
That said, the United States took a number of actions during the Cold War that were in retrospect unwise, unproductive and perhaps even unlawful. When this occurred, there was controversy, but most of the world granted America the benefit of the doubt because they could see an alternative that they consistently judged to be worse. The Berlin Wall was the universal symbol of this dynamic.
During the Cold War, while there was a compelling story to tell about American freedom, progress and prosperity (although given race riots, assassinations, Vietnam and Watergate, there was a gap between perception and reality back then), it was really about them, about the Soviet Union and its violations of emerging international norms.
But since the fall of the wall, the world has changed and this has affected how the United States is viewed now. Actions are no longer about them, but primarily about us. There are competing strategic narratives, but America’s dominates. From our perspective, the narrative may still be the same – we’re the guys in white hats riding to everyone’s rescue – but our analog world is now high definition. The picture is a lot more detailed and nuanced than it once was. Still attractive, but blemishes are more visible.
The United States is seen as falling short of expectations, simultaneously accused as President Obama said at the United Nations as doing too much and too little at the same time. Actions are judged according to the international norms that we promulgated, most of the world has embraced and we are viewed fairly or unfairly as ignoring.
This challenge is far less about public diplomacy than policy.
We preach that other countries have to solve their domestic problems, but recently took the world on a political thrill ride with the global economy stuck in the back seat. This political rancor routinely during the Cold War as well – think Joe McCarthy – but what has changed is the rest of the world now has a front row seat and watched it unfold in real time.
In this environment, there is no way to say, pay no attention to the 536 people wrestling behind the green curtain! No heart, courage or especially brains were apparent. No public diplomacy wizard could put a smiley face on the events of the past 30 days.
The say-do gap exists in the foreign policy realm as well.
We support the United Nations when it serves our interests and ignore it when it doesn’t. We promote the transparent rule of law, but then create a parallel and opaque legal universe at Guantanamo, a prison we promised to close but haven’t. We believe in democracy but then condone a military coup that removes a duly elected (if imperfect) president in Egypt. We criticize China for stealing our military secrets, but argue everyone does it when our hand is discovered in the cookie jar. We say we respect the sovereignty of other countries, but do as we please. We say drone strikes don’t harm civilians even though we know better, or choose not to know. But it doesn’t matter, since drone operations are secret.
All of these policy judgments are tough calls. They may serve our interests, even if they do not always reflect our values. We see these issues in terms of security and stability, while much of the world looks for dignity, justice, opportunity and consistency. They can be explained by politicians, diplomats and lawyers, but not easily advanced through public diplomacy. Absent the overarching frame and context that the Cold War provided, this divide is not easily bridged.
Tara Sonenshine speaking at the Hip-hop Diplomacy: Connecting through Culture conference in 2012 at GWU.
By Tara Sonenshine
Recently, I read a fascinating speech by Donald M. Bishop, President of the Public Diplomacy Council. He led U.S. public diplomacy in Bangladesh, Nigeria, China, and Afghanistan. He is a trainer, speaker, and mentor in public diplomacy and communication. He also speaks on history and leadership.
His remarks are bold and insightful. I found myself agreeing with many of his individual points – but I take issue with the overall, rather dire view and negative view, that America’s public diplomacy is weak, lacks direction, and increasingly focuses on feel good issues. Ironically, the speech attempts to suggest a more focused, perhaps narrower set of issues for public diplomacy to concentrate on… but in the course of the critique – a multitude of issues and directions are outlined including social media, innovation, countering violent extremism, religious outreach, etc.— a laundry list as long as those the author laments that public diplomacy already faces. All good issues, by the way.
In short, my reaction to the speech:
1. Yes, public diplomacy should play an important role in diplomacy, foreign policy, and national security. Agreed.
2. Yes, we need a clearer “doctrine” or set of strategic imperatives to help guide the communications of those doctrines by public diplomacy officers. But the world, post-Cold War, post-9/11, and post post many other issues, does not quite lend itself to easy doctrines of “containment” or “anti-terrorism” or other simple slogans. Global engagement these days has increasingly complex dimensions.
3. Yes, we all want more public diplomacy personnel at posts — and we agree that in this world of constrained resources, we won’t get them.
4. But no — we are not doing just feel good programs. Ninety-two percent of those who participate in some of those programs (take the Study of the U.S. as an example) go on to work in civil society organizations, run for office, and give back to their communities. They do way more than feel good — they do good. Many of those who participate in exchange programs become prime ministers, presidents, Nobel Prize winners, and leaders. The programs that ECA does are important and it demeans them to talk about them as feel good. Fulbright is not feel good. Gilman scholars are serious people. UGRAD and all the others I can name are critical.
5. Yes, let’s do a better job of communicating about how to deal with religious divides, how to counter violent extremism, how to utilize social media, how to innovate. And yes, let’s be more than a collection of programs and have a coherent set of strategic imperatives.
But let’s not blame public diplomacy officers for not coming up with the big strategic doctrine. They do, as the author notes, have quite a bit on their plates.
Thank you, Don Bishop, for giving us quite a bit to think about and thank you, truly, for your ongoing service to the country.
Tara Sonenshine is a fellow at the School of Media and Public Affairs at The George Washington University. Previously, she served as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy following a distinguished career in government, non-profit organizations, and the media.
São Paulo is the ninth largest city in the world and the largest in South America. Photo credit: KLM
Last week, Rodrigo Tavares wrote in Foreign Affairs about Brazil’s recent involvement in paradiplomacy, or subnational foreign relations, by establishing formal bilateral relations between São Paulo and the UK. According to the article, the U.S. established a similar agreement with the world’s ninth largest city this past March – the first time that the State Department has forged direct relations with a subnational government in the southern hemisphere.
This comes as no surprise to anyone who has witnessed Brazil’s rise over the past 20 years, both economically and in diplomatic prowess: the country is slated to host two of the world’s longest-running sports events, the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and Summer Olympic Games in 2016. For the UK, US and other nations, establishing a presence in Brazil’s largest cities, especially outside the capital, makes sense from a practical and public diplomacy perspective.
As a Korean American born and raised in Atlanta, I rarely noticed the South Korean government’s presence until the Korean population boomed after the 1996 Summer Olympics. Since then, the Korean consulate has become increasingly active in establishing Korean business and cultural centers out in the suburbs of the metro area where not only the highest concentration of Korean businesses are situated, but gaining influence in municipal trade associations and organizations.
Although building foreign communities abroad isn’t the goal of consulates and bilateral agreements, it certainly doesn’t hurt public diplomacy efforts. According to Tavares, Singapore recently opened an embassy in Brasília, the capital, but noted that the “diplomatic hub in the country is really in São Paulo.” By concentrating trade and other activities in the places where the people live – not just where they conduct official business – countries are maximizing their influence potential at the most accessible level.
Does this dilute the importance of consulates, which were conceivably formed to address paradiplomacy issues within a country? Probably not. But per Tavares, “With the strengthening of local power, the world’s major cities, states, and provinces have adopted international policies previously reserved for national governments and mustered resources to ensure the protection of their interests abroad.”
NBC news carried an interesting story last week highlighting a decision by the U.S. Department of State to return a million-dollar cultural artifact to Iran that had been seized by U.S. Customs a decade ago. The return of the Persian Griffin, long sought by Iranian officials, may not seem like a big deal against the backdrop of the recent exchange of letters and phone conversation between President Obama and Iranian President Rouhani. I have no idea whether this particular gesture will resonate in Iran, but we should not underestimate the significance of such cultural heritage for people around the world.
Some of the most undervalued tools in the public diplomacy toolkit explicitly recognize the fact that more often than not, a nation’s sense of self is closely connected to its cultural heritage. The value of a particular cultural monument, an example of historic architecture, or a specific artifact in a museum goes well beyond its retail or tourism value, but instead is truly priceless in the eyes of those who consider it a part of their national identity. There are well-known examples of how disputes over ownership of such culture, including the Elgin Marbles or the Preah Vihear Temple, have led to tense international relations and even armed conflict. Few are aware, however, of how we routinely use cultural heritage to our advantage in public diplomacy.
One of the best such tools is the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation administered by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau for Education and Cultural Affairs. Under this program, public diplomacy officers at U.S. embassies and consulates all over the world work with local partners to identify worthy cultural heritage preservation projects and submit proposals for review and approval in Washington. Each year a few dozen of the best proposals are funded at a total cost of about $7 or 8 million. In terms of bang-for-your-buck, it is hard to find a better investment of public diplomacy resources. Perhaps every day somewhere in the world, a U.S. Ambassador is visiting an archaeological site, a museum, or some other cultural venue to cut a ribbon or otherwise celebrate a project that tangibly demonstrates U.S. respect for local culture and traditions. In my experience, these events are widely covered by the local media and generally resonate with the local population in a way that signing ceremonies or diplomatic speeches can never hope to match.
I will cite just one example from my own personal experience. In East Timor, a newly-independent country in Southeast Asia, traditional “sacred” houses all across the country were destroyed during the Indonesian occupation of that territory up until the late 1990s. Several years ago, the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation approved a U.S. Embassy project to work with the new Timorese Ministry of Culture and local villages to rebuild several of these houses. Over the course of a few years at numerous nationally-televised groundbreaking and ribbon-cutting events, the U.S. Ambassador and the Timorese Secretary of State for Culture celebrated the “rebuilding” not only of these cultural landmarks, but also the Timorese nation itself. At the cost of a tiny fraction of other more expensive development initiatives, this simple project showed all of the Timorese people that we respected them and their culture and were working to help them rebuild their country.
As the U.S. Department of State fact sheet last week on the decision to return the Persian Griffin stated — “The return of the artifact reflects the strong respect the United States has for cultural heritage property — in this case cultural heritage property that was likely looted from Iran and is important to the patrimony of the Iranian people. It also reflects the strong respect the United States has for the Iranian people.” The return of that artifact, of course, does not appear to have been the result of a particular preservation program or even particularly costly, but it makes good public diplomacy and policy sense. As for our other public diplomacy programs, like the Ambassador’s Fund, even in an era of limited resources, let’s not be penny wise and pound foolish! We would do well to continue to invest in such programs that help us build the mutual understanding and respect that we depend on to advance our policy goals around the world.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. Government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.
Secretary of State John Kerry swears in new Peace Corps Volunteers in Antigua, Guatemala, on June 6, 2013. (Credit: State Department, Public Domain)
A recent opinion piece in the Huffington Post raises some interesting issues about the Peace Corps and its relationship to official U.S. public diplomacy efforts overseas. I’d like to begin by professing my appreciation and admiration for the Peace Corps and the many thousands of volunteers who are serving or have served around the world. Although I am no development expert and cannot speak to their accomplishments in that regard, I have long appreciated the valuable contributions that Peace Corps volunteers make towards advancing our public diplomacy efforts.
For millions of foreigners around the world, a Peace Corps volunteer is, or was literally, the “face” of the United States, the only direct interaction they may have had with a U.S. citizen in their entire lives. Judging by my personal interaction over a career that has brought me into contact with hundreds of bright, enthusiastic, and dedicated volunteers, I am confident that those interactions are overwhelmingly positive and reflect favorably on the United States.
In addition to highlighting the Peace Corps’ public diplomacy mission in the article, Mr. Machado points out the considerable efforts expended to ensure that the Peace Corps remains an independent entity from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. military. While I can certainly appreciate the bureaucratic need to maintain such independence, I am also concerned that it comes at the cost of less-than-ideal cooperation and coordination of our shared public diplomacy objectives. Mr. Machado correctly points out that foreigners rarely draw a distinction between Peace Corps volunteers and other official U.S. representatives. Perhaps we should acknowledge that simple fact and develop better procedures to synchronize our efforts.
In many countries around the world, this is already happening. The Peace Corps, where it has an on-the-ground presence, is, of course, part of the Country Team led by the U.S. Ambassador. Working together on those teams, Peace Corps Country Directors and Public Affairs Officers have seen the compelling logic of close coordination.
When I was the Public Affairs Officer at one of my overseas postings, for example, I worked closely with the Country Director to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Peace Corps by profiling a few talented volunteers and on nationally televised news programs. The programs were viewed by hundreds of thousands of locals who marveled not only at the volunteers’ command of their language, but also of the dialects of the local communities where they worked. In a separate collaboration we partnered volunteers with local American Corners, invigorating those key public diplomacy platforms with English language clubs and other activities. I know that similar collaboration takes place in many other countries as well.
At the same time, I worry that the perceived need to maintain “distance” between the Peace Corps and the U.S. Department of State may lead us to miss such opportunities to leverage our respective investments in public diplomacy for maximum impact. The simple reality is that foreign perceptions and opinions of the United States cannot be compartmentalized, but will instead be shaped by a combination of factors, including opinions of U.S. policy and military interventions, American pop culture and American tourists abroad, consumption of U.S. products and services, as well as direct interaction with Peace Corps volunteers and official U.S. public diplomacy programs.
Let’s recognize this and get on with maximizing opportunities to cooperate and collaborate not only between Peace Corps and the U.S. Department of State, but between all U.S. government agencies. In fact, to the extent that we share objectives – and I know that we often do – we should do the same with the private and non-governmental sectors as well.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. Government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.
This is the first in a series of posts on life, culture, and politics in the U.S. and E.U. by Robert Entman, who spent 2012 as a Humboldt Research Prize Scholar at Freie Universität in Berlin. He has also spent extended periods in Madrid and Paris.
This is an account not only of things done but of thoughts thought, especially those pertinent to my various pet peeves about US politics and life.
Bottom line: I did return with some small added appreciation of the US in some ways, after seeing the US more through European eyes. In particular, the notion they have that the US is freer and more flexible, more open to innovative, creative ideas, seems to have some validity. That’s the flip side of Europe’s possession of a long history—and Europeans’ deep appreciation of it.
It is their historical memory, the constant awareness of cultural heritage and connections that make Europe and Europeans so charming and fascinating to me. (Of course I’m generalizing in calling it “Europe” rather than individual countries but I think this is generally true throughout.). It is Americans’ maddening obliviousness to history of 10 or 20 years ago let alone 300 that drives me nuts, but the downside to Europeans’ quite opposite hyperawareness of history’s presence every day that also apparently makes them somewhat more rigid when asked to change a practice or think up a new solution.
I wouldn’t exaggerate this tendency toward caution about change, not at all, because there’s so much evidence that Europeans can and do accommodate change. Just think about the movement from crazy nationalism to the EU, from fear and distrust of the Iron Curtain to integration (albeit imperfect) of so many Eastern European countries into the West, or the adaptation of wind power and solar power.
Obviously the US has its own enormous prejudices and rigidities and especially ignorance (though I understand a bit better why Americans tend to be ignorant and indifferent to the perspectives of foreigners, at least compared to the average European). (More on that later.) But it did occur to me this year while seeing all the traces of the US everywhere in Europe, from IPhones (indeed all telephones) to Hollywood movies to laptops, and while hearing so many Europeans talk in glowing terms about their trips to New York or Washington or California, and while noting the Starbucks and the McDonald’s which market themselves as a kind of exotic luxury because they’re so American, all this tells me the US does have a degree of openness to innovation, especially commercial/business innovation, i.e. creativity that can earn money, that is unusual in the world. (Two different people in Paris—Paris!—told me DC is their very favorite city, as did somebody else in the enchanting city of Copenhagen, and several in Berlin told me how much more they like NYC.)
Allied to this are such obvious characteristics as the huge size, which makes Europeans marvel at how far you can go and still be in the same country speaking the same language: the big cars, the big houses, the skyscrapers. So that, whereas I come to Europe and love the narrow streets and center cities with their height restricted-buildings, and especially the way everything is smaller from the apartments to the washing machines, waste baskets and cars, Europeans look at the wide open US and its room for everything big and see a kind of dynamic, youthful optimism and openness to just about anything.
It’s not really a contradiction to note at the same time that the Europeans adore America’s open culture and landscapes, they tend to puzzle at the Americans’ political choices. The more politically interested people do have a lot of hostility to the US. At my Buddhist retreat—where everyone is above average in leftist sympathies—outside Lockerbie, Scotland, several people told me they were surprised I am an American because I’m nice and fairly unassuming, rather than arrogant and loud.
But I’d say more dominant is bewilderment at how inanities like denial of climate change and evolution, or scandals over political leaders’ private sex lives, or refusal of gun control, or election/selection for high office of the obviously mediocre like George W. Bush or Sarah Palin, can happen in a place otherwise so seemingly overflowing with intelligence and talent. I guess the hostility comes more from US foreign policy than anything else, whereas the puzzlement comes over the strength, extremity and dogmatism of America’s right wing and its religious conservatives. More on that in a later entry.
On Saturday, Olympic Committee delegates chose Tokyo (over Istanbul and Madrid) to host the 2020 Summer Olympic games. Meanwhile, a Washington, D.C. nonprofit recently announced that they will spearhead an effort to support Washington as the host of the 2024 games (Washington Post article here).
Competitions to host the Olympic games inevitably generate considerable controversy and criticism about the merits (or lack thereof) of hosting the games. Most of the debate focuses on the economic costs and benefits involved.
Little attention is paid, however, to listing the intangible benefits of hosting such a major event. Public diplomacy should be high on any such list. Hosting the Olympics is a unique opportunity to attract international attention – not only hundreds of thousands of tourists, but also many millions of television viewers – and to shape a powerful and positive narrative of the host country, city, and its people. Recent hosts, most notably China, worked hard to capitalize on this very opportunity.
There are obvious risks for the host, of course, including the possibility of a man-made or natural disaster, as well as the potential for groups to use the event to highlight particular political agendas. Russia, for example, currently faces precisely such a challenge with regard to its record on LGBT issues and the upcoming Winter Games in Sochi. That said, perhaps no other event has quite the same potential for national rebranding and polishing of a country’s image than the feel-good vibes of the peaceful competition, international camaraderie, and mutual understanding epitomized by the Olympic Games.
While the nay-sayers will have their say, I have no doubt that leaders in Japan, Turkey, and Spain all had this in mind as they lobbied for the 2020 games. Congratulations to Japan (and good luck to Turkey and Spain in their future bids) for securing this incredible public diplomacy opportunity!
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. government. The author is a State Department officer specializing in public diplomacy, currently detailed to the IPDGC to teach and work on various Institute projects.
The already fascinating thrust and parry between the United States and Russia over Syria just got even more interesting with the latest Russian proposal calling on Damascus to give up its chemical weapons. This high stakes debate about war and peace unfolding in Washington, Moscow and other capitals around the world has important public diplomacy implications.
President Obama’s decision on August 31 to hit the pause button rather than launch button on military action against Syria reflected American concerns that there was insufficient political legitimacy to offset the lack of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to punish the Assad regime for its alleged use of chemical weapons. There was a UN resolution two years ago when NATO intervened in Libya.
The pursuit of congressional and parliamentary backing was considered partial compensation, but there was an unexpected setback when the British House of Commons defeated a resolution to authorize force in Syria. The Obama administration continues to make its case for action, but getting a resolution authorizing the use of force through a deeply divided Congress is an uphill struggle, particularly in the House of Representatives.
The choice to seek popular and representative approval for military action is a political roll of the dice, but also an interesting civics lesson. The leaders of the world’s most enduring democracies are governing according to the wishes of their people, and subject to meaningful checks and balances by co-equal legislative branches. This assumes that President Obama would follow the lead of Prime Minister David Cameron and abide by the result of the congressional vote (assuming one takes place) that he said he didn’t need, but sought anyway. Meanwhile, a dictator uses all the weapons at his disposal, including chemical weapons, to hold on to power, backed by those who cynically use international law to undermine international norms. The process, slow and messy as it is, puts in sharp relief what is at stake in Syria.
The United States, Britain and France have presented compelling accounts that chemical weapons have been used in the increasingly brutal Syrian civil war. But there is not yet a “smoking gun” that definitively ties the latest chemical attacks that killed more than 1,400 people to the Syrian military or Assad himself. The results of a UN inspection to confirm the crossing of the red line regarding the use of chemical weapons are still pending, although its mandate does not include a judgment regarding who did it.
To many, this smacks of the Iraq debate ten years ago, a public diplomacy nightmare for the United States that will continue to handicap perceptions of American power and influence for years to come.
Mr. Obama has insisted that the unfolding tragedy in Syria represents a challenge for the international community, not just the United States. “I didn’t set a red line,” President Obama said about chemical weapons during remarks in Sweden recently. “The world set a red line.”
But while many countries are critical of the Assad regime, a lot less have openly called for a military strike. And fewer still seem prepared to directly participate. Many Americans are asking themselves, if the United States is considering defending widely accepted norms under the Chemical Weapons Convention (to which Syria is not a signatory), where is the rest of the world? Russia and China have effectively sidelined the United Nations. Many within the Arab League are hedging their bets.
But on the heels of a G-20 summit that featured open competition between Putin and Obama over international expressions of support for their colliding strategies on Syria, Putin has played a hole card that potentially takes the initiative away from Obama and shifts the debate from military back to political action.
While on the surface it appears to wrong-foot the president, it puts the onus on Putin to actually deliver. If Syria balks, it actually strengthens Obama’s argument for military action.
Obama should hit the pause button again, request that Congress suspend its consideration of a war resolution, move the debate back to the UN and see if Russia and China are prepared to give the international community a more meaningful role in the Syrian conflict. A UN resolution should authorize an intrusive international inspection regime to monitor Syria’s chemical weapons, since destroying its existing stockpile will take many years.
War-weary publics have expressed their fears that Syria would become another Iraq, circa 2003. Accepting the Russian offer, and then codifying and verifying it, would place UN inspectors on the ground who would work to at least take chemical weapons out of the deadly equation of the Syrian civil war. This would turn Syria into another Iraq, but circa 1991.
There are public diplomacy risks and costs to this course as well, but far fewer than starting another perceived American war in the Middle East.
