Written By: Yelena Osipova-Stocker
Public diplomacy – the process by which international actors communicate their culture, values, and policies to engage foreign publics and accomplish foreign policy goals – has always rested on one essential ingredient: trust. Without trust, no nation can sustain influence, credibility, or meaningful dialogue abroad. Russia’s contemporary approach to global engagement, however, complicates this assumption. While the Kremlin has mastered manipulation and disinformation, it continues to devote major resources to more traditional forms of public diplomacy. Understanding this dual strategy is key to grasping Russia’s global ambitions – a first step before democracies can chart an effective response.
From Cultural Projection to a Dual Strategy
Russia’s modern public diplomacy began in the mid-2000s as an effort to reassert its cultural presence and attract investment after the upheavals of the 1990s. Over time, though, as relations with the West soured and Moscow’s aspirations for global recognition grew, it added a second track: sharp power – the use of manipulation, coercion, and subversion, particularly targeting democratic societies – harkening back to Soviet active measures.
Russia did not abandon its traditional public diplomacy tools. It fused both strategies – combining cultural diplomacy, education, and exchange programs with disinformation and coordinated influence campaigns. This duality reflects a core tension in Russian statecraft: an enduring desire for legitimacy alongside deep mistrust of trust-based international engagement. Under Putin, the Kremlin seeks status and recognition – a seat at the table rather than affection.
The Kremlin’s approach blends short-term and long-term thinking. Sharp power tools – disinformation, deception, and political interference – deliver immediate disruption. Traditional public diplomacy builds the appearance of normalcy and the infrastructure of legitimacy. Together, they reinforce Russia’s image as a major power that cannot be ignored, even as trust erodes.
Beyond the West: Expanding Influence in the Global South
Since at least Peter the Great, Russia has often sought approval and acceptance from the West – a task that has proven elusive. In 2025, Pew Research Center data show that only 13% of Americans view Russia favorably (with 85% viewing it unfavorably), and similar figures hold across Europe, with notable exceptions in Greece (38% favorable), Hungary (32% favorable), and Italy (27% favorable). Yet in countries like Indonesia (64%), India (49%), Nigeria (44%), and Mexico (42%), perceptions are significantly more positive. This divergence underscores Moscow’s success in shifting its focus away from Western approval toward the Global South.
Russia’s narrative of sovereignty, anti-colonialism, and resistance to Western hypocrisy resonates with audiences facing insecurity and economic instability and disillusioned by the unfulfilled promise of democracy. While the United States and Europe have dramatically scaled back public diplomacy investments, Russia – along with other strategic competitors – has filled the growing vacuum with its own programming. The Kremlin’s ultimate objective is not to be liked but to appear as a reliable, even if authoritarian, alternative to Western partners.
Moving to Control the Information Supply Chain
Despite sanctions and economic constraints, Russia continues to fund expansive media and cultural initiatives. In the proposed 2026 budget, $400 million is allocated to international broadcasting operations such as RT and Sputnik. Though banned or restricted in much of the West, these outlets have expanded rapidly across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Where traditional news content might be less effective, RT has pivoted to other ventures like engaging local opinion leaders and bankrolling influencers. In another move, in early 2024, RT launched RT Academy to offer free English-language journalism training and cultivate networks of sympathetic professionals embedded within global media ecosystems.
More significant still is Moscow’s effort to shape the very process of global content production. Russian state-backed outlets have moved beyond distributing news to providing raw material for newsmaking – photos, videos, and information that other media organizations use as inputs. This strategy broadens reach while concealing authorship. A prime example is Ruptly, the RT-owned video agency that, following EU sanctions, moved its operations from Berlin to Abu Dhabi in 2023 and rebranded as Viory. Similarly, Sputnik News, RT’s sister organization, acts as both news outlet and news agency, producing content in 16 languages and newswires in six. By offering this content – often free or at minimal cost – to smaller media organizations, Russia ensures wide republication and citation without overt attribution or Russian branding.
Compounding this issue are content-sharing agreements between Russian state media and foreign outlets – particularly Chinese – which have continued to grow in recent years. Through mutual syndication and co-productions, Russian narratives circulate across a secondary network of media organizations, reappearing under the labels of Latin American, African, or Asian news outlets and local content creators. This cooperation multiplies Russia’s distribution capacity and obscures the provenance of Kremlin-aligned material, allowing it to blend seamlessly into international reporting flows and launder Moscow’s narratives.
Needless to say, the disappearance of U.S. media like Voice of America and Radio Free Asia has created further opportunities for Russia and China to expand the influence of their narratives and grow partnerships with resource-strapped media outlets around the world. The effect is subtle but far-reaching: Russia is no longer merely broadcasting propaganda but embedding itself in the infrastructure of global information production, potentially shaping the very environment in which “truth” is constructed.
Disinformation and the Technological Frontier
Russia’s pursuit of informational influence does not stop with traditional and social media – it has now expanded into the realm of artificial intelligence as well. Research by NewsGuard shows that leading large language models fail far more often when producing content in Russian (55%) and Chinese (51%) than in English or French, largely because their training data in those languages relies heavily on state-controlled or propaganda-driven sources. As a result, users of these languages are disproportionately exposed to distorted or manipulated information.
Even more striking is Russia’s expanding influence in English-language AI outputs. Studies suggest that a vast network of fabricated “news” sites floods the open web with Kremlin-aligned stories, ensuring that these narratives are incorporated into the massive datasets used to train AI systems. As people around the world increasingly turn to LLMs as primary sources of information and interpretation, Russia’s manipulation of that data pipeline gives it growing leverage over how knowledge – whether in Russian or other languages – is framed, repeated, and believed.
Whether the result of deliberate “data poisoning” or simply the exploitation of vast informational gaps, the effect is the same: Russia is embedding its narratives in the very technologies people increasingly trust to explain the world.
The Revival of Traditional Public Diplomacy
Yet, even as Russia manipulates information ecosystems, it continues to invest in more conventional public diplomacy. The “Russia in the World” initiative, launched in 2024, exemplifies this commitment. Designed to promote “spiritual-moral values abroad,” it supports exchanges, research collaborations, and an annual World Youth Festival, which aims to bring tens of thousands of participants to Russia.
In 2026, the Kremlin plans to allocate $147 million to this program – a 120% increase from 2025 – even as other domestic budgets face cuts. This demonstrates that, despite the dominance of sharp power in analytical debates, Moscow still recognizes the enduring importance of traditional public diplomacy as a means of engagement and legitimacy-building. What remains unclear, however, is whether Russia sees trust as a goal or as a vulnerability to be exploited.
For democracies, the task ahead is clear: to rebuild credibility and reassert that genuine engagement – grounded in openness and trust – remains the most powerful form of public diplomacy in a world saturated with manipulation, and to prove that trust and legitimacy can still serve as a source of strategic strength.









