A relook: The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy

By Grace Christensen, BA Political Communication

Beijing’s National Stadium (Bird’s Nest) lighted up by fireworks and the Olympic flame during the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games Beijing 2008|
International Olympic Committee (IOC) / Richard Juilliart

Despite claims by the Olympic Charter that “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in the Olympic areas,” the Olympic Games have almost never remained apolitical. In fact, for most countries, the Games provide the perfect opportunity to gain influence in the world, amplify their brands on an international stage and make, or remake their reputations. When given the chance to host the Olympic Games, these powers are only magnified. While hosting the Games is a high-risk endeavor, it is one that all major powers will likely tackle at some point in their histories. One country, in particular, has felt this pressure unlike any other in recent history: China. With Beijing set to be the first city to host both the Summer (2008) and Winter Games (2022) and the second capital city to ever host the Winter Games, China is uniquely positioned to promote its power to the rest of the world. While Nicholas Cull provides an in-depth analysis of China’s soft power strategy in his 2008 work “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy,” the world has changed dramatically in the last decade, and the 2022 Beijing Games will bring with them an entirely new host of issues and image challenges for the emerging superpower.

Despite this, Cull’s analysis of China’s soft power strategy on the eve of the 2008 Summer Games and the subsequent recommendations he provides can still largely be applied to China’s upcoming Winter Games. While China’s image problems may have shifted from lingering concern over protests in Tiananmen Square to recent protests in Hong Kong, Cull’s guidance leading up to the Games can still be just as valuable to China as it was the first time around. Specifically, Beijing would be wise to harness the power of the Olympic Games to form the “ultimate distraction story” to divert attention from the world’s negative media coverage of the country. Most importantly, however, Cull recommends honesty. Whether they accept it or not, China will be known as it is, not as it wishes to be. Since the world will draw its own conclusions regarding the new China regardless of how the country feels about this matter, Cull suggests that they sit back and enjoy the Games.

Ultimately, however, this plan did not serve China quite as well as Cull had predicted it would. Between boycotts from prominent politicians and celebrities, security concerns following civil unrest in Tibet and alarm over the high levels of air pollution the Games produced, China’s “ultimate distraction story” ended up being much less distracting and a lot more revealing. With over a year of protests in Hong Kong now plaguing front pages across the globe and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic leaving negative stereotypes circulating around the world, China’s 2022 Games could be their last shot to alter their image on such a grand stage for a long time to come. While the country has largely succeeded in the fight against COVID-19, recent boycott threats could ruin any chance China has at improving its public image. Moving forward, the best public diplomacy strategy for China is to be honest about the problems it faces. The power of sports diplomacy should not be understated, and with so much still depending on the unfolding of the competition, China still has a good chance of remaking its reputation this coming winter. While China is facing many new problems this Olympic season, there is also a huge potential for new victories.

Grace Christensen is a student in the SMPA 3350 Public Diplomacy class taught by Public Diplomacy Fellow Emilia A. Puma. She is a senior in the School of Media and Public Affairs majoring in Political Communication.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author. They do not express the views of the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication or the George Washington University.