By: Alex Dawson
Beginning with the European migrant crisis and culminating in the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, European Union migration policy since 2015 has steadily become more restrictive. Before the migration crisis, the Dublin System on Migration guided European policy. However, its failures became evident as Europe could not keep up with the flow of people in need, burdening border countries with refugees they could not and did not wish to support. The EU, plagued with disunity over migration policy, was slow to address the situation. A right-wing, anti-migration backlash ensued, most notably resulting in Brexit. Its success permeated European politics, pushing common migration policy toward the right, i.e., restrictive migration policy. To address policy failures, the EU moved to redo the Dublin migration system, with a burgeoning restrictive angle towards migration. The stress of the new policy was tested by the influx of Ukrainian refugees in 2022, which succeeded in preventing the same level of backlash as the previous migrant crisis. By 2023, the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was widely agreed upon and passed, implemented a year later, including many of the same restrictive policies imposed post-2015.
- The Dublin System pre-2015
Initially agreed upon in the 1951 Refugee Convention and clarified in the 1967 Protocol, there was an internationally agreed-upon standard for the treatment of refugees. The basis was responsibility sharing, so that no one state would be burdened with all the support for a refugee population. This was especially important in such geographically important issues like refugee flows, and by extension, migration, which usually involves people moving to the safest, closest country. In the EU’s Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it is stated that member states will enjoy a “fair sharing of responsibility” for refugees, abiding by UN principles (Binetti Armstrong).
However, the Dublin system, agreed upon in 1990 and reviewed in subsequent years, did not abide by the principle of responsibility sharing. It states that the country in which a migrant arrives is responsible for fingerprinting them and caring for their well-being in accordance with certain human rights conditions. The country may send people from secondary countries (i.e., countries of origin) elsewhere if certain conditions are met (such as the refugee having family in a different country, or if their needs would be met better elsewhere), but otherwise that country would have to care for them. The result was that bordering EU countries, such as Greece and Italy, would bear the brunt of supporting refugees and migrants. This system did not break, as there was a manageable flow of people to care for; however, when this flow dramatically increased in 2015, the system broke down.
The 2015 migration crisis in Europe featured a much higher degree of migration than in previous years, but it was the Dublin system that exacerbated the situation.
- The 2015 Migration Crisis
In 2015, over a million Migrants arrived in Europe, over a fourfold increase from the previous year. Furthermore, the vast majority of the increase came from the “Eastern Route,” which goes from the Middle East into Greece and through the Balkans (European Union, (n.d.). Migration flows). Therefore, under the Dublin System, countries in this route were burdened with the greatest share of aiding, and soon stopping, migrants from coming into Europe. The largest portion of these migrants came from Syria, whose refugees were fleeing the Syrian Civil War. Others came from Sudan, Eritrea, and as far as Southeast Asia. Therefore, the majority of migrants were refugees in need of humanitarian support.
Because much of the burden was laid upon a few countries, which were far from the richest in the EU, they did not have the resources to adequately care for all the migrants arriving. In accordance with EU law, states of first arrival required fingerprinting and documenting, as well as providing basic needs. However, even with deep support from humanitarian organizations, it was nearly impossible to fulfill all the requirements for everyone.
Greece, for example, did not have the resources and allowed refugees to move further into Europe without going through the legally required process. For example, the Greek government forgoed the entire screening process, meaning they did not fingerprint everyone entering because they both did not have the means to. Moreover, if there was no fingerprint record, other countries could not ensure they initially entered through Greece, thereby foregoing responsibility once the refugee left the country (Binetti Armstrong, 2019). In addition, migrants could not always be forcibly relocated due to being refugees or other member states being unwilling to take them. Malta, a small island nation in the Mediterranean, was overwhelmed and received little help from the EU (Grech, 2015). These countries were also still recovering from the 2008 Eurozone crisis, and so had imposed austerity measures on government expenditure. Putting already limited resources towards refugees proved unpopular.
After over a hundred thousand refugees moved through Hungary on the way to other countries, most notably Germany, Hungary first erected fences along their border with Austria to prevent migrants’ movements. After this action trapped them in Hungary, the government built fences around the entire country to prevent refugees from passing through (Binetti Armstrong, 2019). The result was a humanitarian disaster for refugees, as they had little access to basic necessities in the territory of a government trying to get rid of them.
In 2015, the EU mandated the relocation of over 34,000 refugees from Greece and Italy, which faced visceral pushback from the Viségrad 4 group (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). The EU did little internal relocation of refugees afterwards (de Bruycker, 2024). Some countries introduced hard borders inside the supposedly free-movement Schengen Zone to prevent migrants from coming into their countries. Hungary did this and refused to take any migrants for a period of time. Disunity within the bloc demonstrated a clear lack of solidarity, fueled the refugee crisis, and made conditions for migrants worse.
In response to the crisis, EU leaders agreed on stricter migration control to stem the flow of migrants into Europe. This included increasing funding for border agents, return and readmission of refugees, and working with countries of origin to address some root causes of migration. “Operation Sophia” was an EU mission with the goal of ending human smuggling rings, which were some of the main ways migrants got into Europe (European Union, 2025). €3 million was to be given to humanitarian relief in Syria to limit the need for individuals to flee the country; however, they could do little to stop the ongoing civil war. The Council made an agreement with Turkey, formalized in 2016, to pay them €3 million in exchange for Turkey stopping migrants from reaching Europe. The money would go towards support for Turkish border agents and humanitarian relief for migrants. In addition, the EU worked with the UNHCR and many non-profits to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants.
- A Permanent Trend of Restrictiveness
Effects of right-wing politics
An early sign that the trend of restrictiveness during the 2015 migration crisis would permanently shift migration policy was the rise of right-wing, anti-migration movements. In countries like Hungary, Poland, and Italy, right-wing governments succeeded in turning anti-migration fervor into political support. However, the movement was perhaps the most successful in the United Kingdom, where migration was one of the largest elements of the Brexit campaign, which succeeded in voting the UK out of the European Union. The success of these movements meant, on the issue of migration, politicians largely pivoted to the right. Politicians were both scared of losing elections to right-wing movements and thus co-opted their policies and gave in to popular positions. Even after the crisis subsided in 2016, these politicians and their migration policies proved popular, so centrist European politicians’ migration policies remained restrictive (Varma, T., & Roehse, S.).
Operation Sophia, having begun in 2015 as an operation to end human smuggling, continued far beyond its initial mandate (European Union, 2025). This was in spite of migration levels in the late 2010s being largely aligned with trends pre-2015; however, the attitude towards migration had permanently shifted. Operation Sophia was extended numerous times, finally ending in 2020 after the beginning of the Coronavirus pandemic. Even though this operation ended, there was a permanent increase in border control and spending on return programs for migrants. In 2018, the European Council largely agreed that the increase in restrictiveness would continue as EU policy going forward, a policy that would become one of the bedrocks for the eventual EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.
There was little support among European leaders for opening borders in the late 2010s and even into the 2020s. The 2015 migration crisis and, perhaps more importantly, the political backlash, meant that pro-migration stances were unpopular positions. Some support for humanitarian programs, such as protecting the rights of children, did exist, but humanitarianism largely took a backseat.
Test of new policies: Ukrainian refugees
As compared to 2015, the EU largely succeeded in managing the flow of refugees from Ukraine into Europe, primarily into Poland and Germany. One primary reason for the success was the proactivity of the EU. Recognizing they were facing many of the same struggles of 2015, humanitarian relief was delivered immediately and coordinated by the EU, with much of the support going directly to Poland, the country supporting the majority of refugees. Compared to €6 million being spent in 2015/16 for assistance to Turkey and Syria, €17 million was spent in 2022 alone to assist Ukrainian refugees (European Union, 2025, Timeline).
However, the notable difference in 2022 as compared to 2015 is the political atmosphere surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Europeans were, on average, sympathetic towards Syrians fleeing war, they were far more supportive of Ukrainian refugees. The reasons range from Russia being an existential threat to Europe and thus Ukraine being on their side, to Ukrainians being perceived as “European” and thus culturally close to the EU, especially in countries like Poland (Rosina, 2023). However, the migrants in 2015-16 were predominantly from the Middle East and Africa, with the largest group being Syrians; right-wing politicians succeeded in using racism, xenophobia, and islamophobia to push their message, a strategy that could not work nearly to the same extent with Ukrainians. That being said, the EU managed a refugee crisis in Europe well, proving to themselves that the new migration policies were the correct solution.
- The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum
With the clear disaster of EU migration laws in 2015, within two years, member states were beginning talks on restructuring the existing Dublin arrangement. Member states that shouldered much of the burden wanted increased sharing of responsibility. EU leaders wanted to show the bloc could cooperate and succeed in the future, while many member states that were either run by or were trying to stave off right-wing politicians wanted increased migration control. However, talks stalled in 2020 as the response to the Coronavirus pandemic took precedence, and migration sharply declined due to it. Following 2015, the EU had implemented many stopgap measures to tackle the issue of migration, and they were put to the test after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The success of limiting the political pressure of refugee flows on voters demonstrated the apparent success of the restrictive policies.
Beyond increases to border funding, the European Council agreed to rework the EU immigration system, i.e. the legal pathway for entering the Union. One of the first systems to be reworked was the visa program, which was made easier for immigrants to access, thus decreasing the number of people whose immigration status was in limbo. The EU “blue card” was introduced in 2021, along with the understanding of a “common approach” towards migration (European Union, 2025, Timeline). These systems followed the new ideals that would be implemented in the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum: making legal immigration easier and illegal immigration more difficult, as well as encouraging all member states to play an equal part in migration policy.
After over six years of formal negotiations, the EU Council agreed upon the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum to replace the Dublin System in 2023. It would be implemented the following year, and would take lessons from the 2015 migration crisis and the subsequent political backlash. The agreement was implemented under five new EU laws (European Union, 2025, Timeline):
- Screening irregular migrants when they arrive in the EU
- Taking biometric data
- Common procedures for making and handling asylum applications across the EU
- Clarifying the rules on determining which member state is responsible for handling an asylum application
- Cooperation and solidarity among member states on how to handle crisis migration, including cases of the instrumentalization of migrants (i.e., using migrants as political bargaining chips)
The first two laws make it more difficult for immigrants to enter the EU, facing a higher standard than just crossing a border. This puts increasing restrictiveness into EU asylum law and works in tandem with permanently increased funding for border agents. The third established a common asylum procedure across the EU, replacing the haphazard EU/member state system that existed under Dublin. The blue card is an essential part of that, as is making visa claims easier for those already in the EU.
The Single Solidarity Mechanism is flexible in that not all member states are required to take in migrants, but can substitute physical support for financial or alternative measures (de Bruycker, 2024). This means that, in practice, the border countries may still be the most burdened with refugees if others only help financially or under alternative means. Therefore, although the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum replaced the Dublin system on paper, in practice, some of the core tenets have endured. That being said, flexibility does allow the EU leeway if some countries may be unwilling to take migrants due to political reasons.
- Migration in the EU Going Forward
Following the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU is expected to continue its restrictive stance on migration, especially considering the increasingly unstable nature of world politics. The apparent success of restrictive policies in terms of limiting migration has not eliminated it as an issue for the EU, but they have demonstrated the bloc can do something about a crisis and can reform itself in accord with public opinion. However, that does not mean the program is without issues, such as continued financing and ensuring member states comply with a system based on solidarity (de Bruycker et al., 2024).
However, fewer refugees and migrants allowed in Europe has had a damaging effect on the refugees and migrants who may wish to go to Europe. Numerous boats of migrants sailing across the Mediterranean have been turned back by the European Coast Guard, leaving thousands wanting a better life stuck across the sea (Farge & Le Poidevin, 2025). This is in stark comparison to the vast efforts made to support Ukrainian refugees, many of whom have integrated into Europe, though this process is not without its tensions.
The improved visa system is an improvement on the often unclear process before; however, the visa system – in large part due to the importance of the blue card – favors wealthy, educated migrants. Migrants and refugees without the means or strong local education have a much more difficult path of gaining entry to Europe, disadvantaging the poor and strengthening inequality. Current victims of humanitarian disasters, such as Gaza and Sudan, have had a much more difficult time gaining entry to Europe compared to those fleeing war a decade earlier, as many are turned back in international waters despite both conflicts being labeled as genocides by scholars (Farge & Le Poidevin, 2025). Because of the restrictive nature of European migration policy, fewer refugees may desire to get to Europe and would thus be stuck with fewer options for safety.
The reformation of EU migration policy was largely shaped by intra-European politics, but its effects are most largely felt on refugees and other migrants left with fewer options.
References
Binetti Armstrong, A. (2019). You Shall Not Pass! How the Dublin System Fueled Fortress Europe. Chicago Journal of International Law. https://cjil.uchicago.edu/print-archive/you-shall-not-pass-how-dublin-system-fueled-fortress-europe#heading-10
de Bruycker, P. (2024, September 5). The New European Solidarity Mechanism: Towards a Fair Sharing of Responsibility Between Member States?. European Policy Centre. https://www.epc.eu/publication/THE-NEW-EUROPEAN-SOLIDARITY-MECHANISM-5cf6d4/
de Bruycker, P., De Leo, A., Hahn, H., Milazzo, E., Neihardt, A.-H., Thym, D., & Tsourdi, E. (2024, December 18). From Compromise to Implementation: A New Era for EU Migration Policy?. European Policy Centre. https://www.epc.eu/publication/From-Compromise-to-Implementation-A-New-Era-for-EU-Migration-Polic-604294/
European Union. (2025). Operation Sophia. https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/
European Union. (2025). Timeline – EU Migration and Asylum Policy. European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/migration-timeline/
European Union. (n.d.). Migration flows: Eastern, Central and Western Routes. European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/migration-flows-to-europe/
Farge, E., & Le Poidevin, O. (2025, April 11). More Sudanese refugees fleeing as far as Europe, UN Refugee Agency says | Reuters. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-sudanese-refugees-fleeing-far-europe-un-refugee-agency-says-2025-04-11/
Grech, H. (2015, April 21). Migrant Crisis: Malta Seeks Solutions to Stem the Tide. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32389754
Rosina, M. (2023). Migration and soft power: the EU’s visa and refugee policy response to the war in Ukraine. Policy Studies, 45(3–4), 532–550. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2288237
Varma, T., & Roehse, S. (2024, October 25). Understanding Europe’s turn on migration. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-europes-turn-on-migration/