Author: John Salchak
Date Published: 15 October 2021
Abstract
Established in 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a private multistakeholder technical organization that oversees critical internet infrastructure. This project has theoretical and empirical goals regarding ICANN. Theoretically, this paper will present a framework through which domain name allocation and assignment, a task conducted by ICANN, becomes a public policy problem. Empirically, this paper will use two historical case studies to investigate how the multistakeholder model of governance functions at ICANN regarding political issues of domain name allocation. Through both case studies, this paper finds that states tend to have an outsized role in the ICANN multistakeholder model. ICANN tends to defer to the wishes of states, even if doing so constitutes a violation of its own rules and procedures. Despite this, accountability mechanisms can be used to prompt ICANN to overturn its initial decisions and adhere to its established rules and procedures, thereby reducing the influence of states in the multistakeholder process.
