Tag: 9/11

“In the weeks and months after 9/11, I saw the way that the idea of extremism and terrorism in the western popular mind and within the security community worldview, became invariably linked to ethnic and religious factors.”

9/11 had a profound impact on my work on international security and South Asia. In the weeks and months after 9/11, I saw the way that the idea of extremism and terrorism in the western popular mind and within the security community worldview, became invariably linked to ethnic and religious factors. This was deeply disturbing to me since the dominant history of South Asia is notable for tolerance and coexistence, despite highly plural societies. Besides, much of the post-9/11 analysis was from a U.S. policy perspective with little theoretical or historical content—and for a region with an overabundance of history and political complexity—this was completely misguided. I wanted to challenge what I feared was fast becoming conventional wisdom and ended up writing an entire book to do so! In my book, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge, 2008), I argue that the main drivers of extremism in South Asia are external geopolitical factors that combine with specific interests of state elites to subvert domestic historical identities that tended to be inclusive. Twenty years on, our academic understanding of extremism in South Asia has become better but our policies still leave much to be desired. 

“it took Washington’s strategic focus off of Beijing and it bought nearly eight years of relatively smooth, stable, and constructive U.S.-China relations. The relationship has never been as stable or cooperative since.”

9/11 certainly did impact US-China relations, as the then new Bush 43 administration had strategic competition with China in its sights as the No. 1 foreign and military policy priority—but with 9/11 China all of a sudden became a key “partner” in the “global war on terror” (GWOT). Chinese President Jiang Zemin was reported to have witnessed the planes hitting the twin towers in New York live on CNN, and immediately thereafter the Chinese government tried to put through a (secure) phone call from Jiang to President Bush. Of course, Bush was in no position to receive such a call, but a few weeks later the two leaders spoke and President Jiang offered the United States China’s full cooperation against al-Qaeda and attacking the Taliban (this included briefly permitting overflights of Chinese territory to bomb the Taliban). It was very astute of Jiang and the Chinese government to take advantage of 9/11 in this way, as it took Washington’s strategic focus off of Beijing and it bought nearly eight years of relatively smooth, stable, and constructive US-China relations. The relationship has never been as stable or cooperative since.

“The role of non-state actors in shaping insecurity, threat, and risk was taken much more seriously by the security sector after 2001.”

The 9/11 attacks had a significant impact on security studies as a discipline. Terrorism was studied prior to September 11, 2001. Indeed, some of the most important theoretical insights we have about political violence come from the classic literature on terrorism authored decades before the major attacks by al-Qaeda. But what happened after 9/11 was that the study of terrorism acquired high level prominence within the field of security studies. There was increased public interest in this phenomenon, a plethora of publications were dedicated to analyzing terrorism, scholars debriefed decision-makers, and even journalists cited academic works on terrorism. Terrorism was no longer seen as an intrinsic characteristic of the developing world, an effect of post-colonialism, or constrained to just Europe and the Middle East. The role of non-state actors in shaping insecurity, threat, and risk was taken much more seriously by the security sector after 2001. Yet, despite the large body of contemporary literature produced since 9/11, the main questions remain: Can terrorism be defeated with military force? What type of measures can governments put in place to avoid future terrorist attacks? How much security should citizens tolerate in the name of counterterrorism? Should state authorities engage in negotiations with terrorists to achieve peace? What is the relationship between political regimes and terrorism? My biggest fear about post-9/11 is historical amnesia in academia and policy-making circles. Policymakers tend to focus their attention on the current challenges and have virtually no time to think about the past, let alone reflect on the lessons learned from 9/11. Hence, amnesia is frequently the source of major policy mistakes, that is until the next major terrorist attack occurs. Security studies scholars have thus a commitment to continue studying terrorism rigorously and systematically; after all, terrorism is not a fad or a single incident. We also have an obligation to expose our current students—future policy makers—to the mistakes made by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11: walls were built to protect garrison states; human rights abuses were justified in the name of safety wars by choice were declared; and a culture of “fear of the other” emerged. Understanding the imperfection of our very own acts—and policies—is also part of the learning process.