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Category: Protection and Reintegration

Published on Leave a comment on On Colombian IDPs

by Jesse Nimmons

The Colombian people are some of the strongest in the world. Their lives have been plagued with violence, corruption, and economic uncertainty for the last five decades. While the focus is pointed solely towards the conflict between the government and various militias, many groups have been pushed to the sidelines. The largest of which is the massive internally displaced people population. An internally displaced person, or IDP, is a person who has to flee their home but does not cross any borders; they are a refuge in their own country. There are twice as many IDPs as there are refugees worldwide. Because they remain in their home country, they are often out of the jurisdiction of humanitarian aid helpers and not protected by the same human rights safeguards that refugees are.[1]Colombia has the second largest population of IDPs in the world, just behind Syria. It is estimated that six million people in Colombia, 15% of the entire population, are categorized as an internally displaced person. Unfortunately, Colombian IDPs do not have the privilege of staying in massive refugee camps, as seen in many other countries. Instead, they have to integrate into shanty towns with little or no help, invisible to the outside world. They lack the voice that refugees have and are almost unrecorded by the media.

The leading cause of displacement in Colombia is from armed groups. This may be purposely to erase the support system under their political opponents, grow illegal crops on their land, or it can be a byproduct of two groups fighting. All make the area unsafe to live in. Sometimes, displacement is caused by the Colombian military trying to win back areas but make them unsafe in the process. In the wake of these conflicts, towns are destroyed and harm is threatened to the residents if they ever come back. Armed groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), operate where the government presence is scarce; thus, most IDPs come from rural areas. While FARC signed a peace treaty with the government in 2016, other armed groups have started to seize the places they used to control, along with previously "safe" areas, beginning the cycle again. This is a serious issue that has a part in many of Colombia's most significant problems and is a massive humanitarian crisis. I believe that the Colombian government should increase its focus on the IDP population as it is the best issue for them to take on at this time.

The IDP population is plagued with a much higher rate of distrust, mental illness, and substance abuse issues than the general population. One of the reasons this humanitarian crisis is not mainstream in the media is the extreme distrust instilled in the IDP population. One researcher, Mateja Celestina, spent ten months studying the effects of forced displacement on the Colombian people and realized she was getting "half-truths'' and many inconsistencies between people's stories. She had to ask herself, "is it feasible to establish 'complete' trust in conflict and post-conflict environments''[2]. When it comes to getting accurate findings, trust is an indispensable part of research, and research that is not accurate cannot be used. Why is the IDP population so distrustful, even to those genuinely trying to help them? The answer lies in the fact that these people are always "on guard.” Their past experiences with extortion, conflict, violence, and ongoing threats have made them acutely aware of their vulnerabilities. There is too much at stake for them if they misplace their trust. "Their vulnerabilities extended from the risk of loss of life, getting emotionally upset, exacerbation of community relations, to the potential influence on assistance flows.''[3] IDPs have been living in conflict for generations, creating a culture of silence and distrust in turn. While we can tell that this is hurting their population in the long run, IDPs see it as a way of protecting themselves.

Another reason why it is difficult for researchers to get information about the displacement process is it often brings up agonizing memories that last far longer than the time the researcher is there[4]. Displacement is not a singular event. Most IDPs have experienced repeated threats and events that are traumatic and life-threatening enough to force their displacement. Once displaced, they have to focus on survival, both physical and economic, in an unfamiliar and hostile environment. These stressors increase the risk for various mental disorders, including PTSD, depression, anxiety, and substance abuse. The World Health Organization projects that half of the IDP population has some mental health problem[5]. Generally, IDPs are 2.6 times more likely to struggle with alcoholism. In some regions of the country, that figure can be raised to 36 times more likely[6]. While both of these findings should promote the creation of mental health interventions and policies to aid with the physiological repercussions of forced displacement from conflict, the truth is that most IDPs will never receive the aid that they need, nor will there be an international push on the Cololmbian government to cause them to focus on this issue.

The IDP population is the most vulnerable and poor community in all of Colombia. They need better mental health services and overall free access to healthcare, food, housing, extra protection, and assistance to apply for government aid and get an IDP status. There have been countless attempts at creating policies that would help the IDPs. Yet, most of the population remains unemployed, unable to afford housing, and lives under the poverty line[7]. This is because the government is not putting enough of their focus on helping them. For example, in 2011, a law named "Victims Law" was proposed to support the IDPs in gaining land ownership. The government did not put it in place because there was a chance that ex-combatants could have also benefited. A law that would have helped millions of IDPs was denied because it could have helped some ex-combatants[8].

 Another reason there is little legislation to help these people is that armed groups exploit the government's weakness and specifically target programs that help IDPs. While one strategy is exploiting the government’s corruption to shut them down before they start, it also can result in the kidnapping of doctors or massacre of human rights defenders[9]. It is in these groups best interest to keep IDPs unstable. They get to keep their land and can use it as an opportunity to recruit the displaced in the future. This is made easier when it appears to IDPs that the government is disregarding them.

 Colombia functions on a two-level healthcare system: the wealthy pay for better healthcare, and the poor have free access to public healthcare. The government boasts its universal health care policy, but the truth is basically only the upper level that exists. There is an extreme shortage of public healthcare available for those who need it, and the quality is subpar. It has been cited that IDPs face discrimination when they seek healthcare services because they are branded as economic migrants and put at the back of the line. They are at the bottom of the ladder, even being treated worse than the homeless. This has forced them to discover ways to get around this red tape. For example, young females purposely get pregnant to secure care under the Families in Action program for mothers and children. Unfortunately, these loopholes have created a whole new wave of problems in the IDP population.

In an updated and less effective "Victims Law," anyone who could show they were affected by the conflict could get "immediate humanitarian assistance and has provisions for accommodation, food, and medical and psychological services. It also includes provisions for identification documents, health, education, family reunification, funeral assistance, occupational orientation, and income generation". There were 106,833 applicants in 2011. By 2018, only 12% of those applicants had received any assistance[10]. In an effort to help (about) 6 million people, they maxed out at 12,820 people. With the extreme legal documentation requirements to apply for any type of government aid, countless IDPs don't even bother applying for help or even registering themselves as an IDP and realize that they are on their own. This is made worse because the government does not provide IDPs with any type of protection. IDPs are often monitored by the groups that displaced them to ensure that they do not speak about the events that occurred. Those who dare to speak about it are threatened or killed, even if they do not discuss the events that led to their displacement. There is fear that even if one were to get "in the system," they will cause danger to their family and community[11]and this fear is magnified for the single women households who cannot protect themselves as well. With a lack of real government support, the problems detailed below will continue to surge.

Colombia has slowly been moving out of its traditionalist views on gender.  “Women’s rights in Colombia continue to progress every year as women occupy more positions of authority and increase their influence over legislation and societal expectations”[12] and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) found that the rate of domestic violence has fallen in the country[13].  It is gradually becoming a safer nation for women, but internally displaced women are left out of these advancements. Females account for 48% of the IDPs in Botega, and 41% of those [14] women are single mothers, which already sets them back from an economic standpoint. As mentioned before, women are often discriminated against when applying for healthcare and financial aid, causing many to get pregnant for the sole purpose of getting assistance. When the only decision is between not having access to medicine and living in poverty or bearing a child they do not want and cannot care for, obviously something needs to change.

Partner Violence has also plagued the IDP population. "Previous research found that Colombian women perceived IPV (intimate partner violence) to increase after displacement."[15] Economic instability, lack of formal protective systems, and dismantling of social support systems further contribute to the violence committed against women. The dismantling of social support systems makes it incredibly difficult to leave the relationship, as they have nowhere to go. One study found that 50% of Colombian women IDPs have endured violence from their partner, compared to 20% in the general population[16]. With the lack of government intervention to aid women in these situations, the message to women is that they are not a priority, and to men, their actions are okay. Additionally, due to young children being taught that partner violence is expected, it will increase the likelihood of it continuing in the future. It will stay prevalent in generations to come and will spill out of the IDP population into the communities they inhabit.

Children are also greatly affected by their IDP status. In rural areas, children are only in school for an average of 5.5 years[17]. When they arrive in host communities, many fail to attend school for a variety of reasons. IDP children cannot afford transportation or uniforms, cannot keep up with the curriculum, or are sometimes refused a spot in school or singled out in the classroom because of the stigma surrounding being an IDP[18]. Without a formal education, it will be incredibly difficult for them to have upward mobility, which may become more difficult in the future due to population growth. Under these conditions, children can't reach their full potential. This increases the rate of poverty, as most IDPs are children, but Colombia is missing out on the advancements these children could have made in the future.

The children also tend to leave school early to work so that their families can survive. Sometimes, this work may be illegal, either legal but “under the table” or involving drug cartels or paramilitary groups. The drug cartels give children drugs to curb their hunger or make them sell drugs to make money. More often than not, they end up hooked for life, especially because they cannot leave due to violent retribution[19]. The paramilitary groups promise regular food on the table, protection for their family, and a sense of fulfillment as they are told they are doing the right thing. With the lack of education that people in poverty, especially IDPs, it is effortless to hook these children for life[20]. With the government keeping them especially vulnerable, the IDP population is increasing the longevity of the drug cartels and paramilitary groups.

  Almost all IDPs go from rural areas to cities, suburbs, and shanty, or illegal towns. This is a problem as they lack the necessary skills to find jobs other than farming. This causes a conflict because they can only accept the lowest level jobs, leading to "increased competition with local workers, suppression of wages, and increased difficulty finding employment.”[21] This creates resentment between IDPs and natives of the host community.

In general, when levels of economic instability and poverty rise, there tends to be an increase in crime. This is shown in Colombia as the impoverished areas typically lack government presence, protection, and aid, which not only forces people into crime but allows them to keep doing it.[22] Because IDPs acquire, or are perceived to acquire, more government assistance than their non-displaced neighbors, they are often the targets of these crimes, creating even more of an "us vs. them" mentality. This is dangerous because it produces an "anti-IDP" sentiment that spreads throughout the country, which will impact policymaking and funding.

With an increase in unemployment, poverty, and crime due to an IDP influx in a host community, there is no change in education and healthcare funding. One would think that with the addition of more people, there would be a proportional increase in funding as they must be able to care for everyone equally at the same level they were before in influx. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It has been found that "a 1 percent increase in IDP inflows would entail a reduction in education investment of 0.021 percent" and "no empirical evidence of an impact of IDP inflows on investment in health is found."[23] The cause of overcrowding in the education system and the healthcare system reduces the grade of service. The people native to the host communities experience a decrease in living standards due to the IDP population. As more and more people become displaced, there will be an increase in host communities that will feel these effects.[24] 

There is no way for IDPs to relocate to wealthy communities. Inhabitants have to leave rapidly when paramilitary groups loot communities. Most IDPs have no wealth by the time they find a place to relocate. There is no affordable housing in upper class communities and they cannot set up their own shelters there, forcing them to only inhabit poorer areas, which creates an even lower socioeconomic standard as detailed in the previous paragraph. This will cause the already massive wealth gap in Colombia to grow. The poor are becoming more accustomed to lower living standards, and the companies are able to lower wages as the job market is so competitive, which increases their bottom line. There is less fertile land to grow crops on, as the paramilitary groups have taken control of these areas, which causes food prices to increase. In conjunction with this, there is a decreasing amount of safe areas to live in, causing overcrowding in and around the cities. Overcrowding causes a myriad of health problems, like respiratory disease and tuberculosis, and not to mention is detrimental during a pandemic.[25] The IDPs and others living in poverty do not have the funds to circumvent these circumstances. While these problems do not affect the wealthy population, they are the difference between life and death for the impoverished people. This type of wealth inequality was one of the main drivers of La Violencia. If this gap continues to grow, the conflict will never be over and may even expand as long as people continue to be displaced.

 With an influx of competition in the job market, there will be a rise in the illicit economy. The illegal economy includes money earned from illegal activities and also unreported income, such as when workers are paid under the table. This is a problem not only because of the billions of dollars in taxes lost, but because unreported transactions skew the country's GDP. Having an accurate GDP is very important because the GDP numbers directly influence monetary policies. If a country has an inaccurate GDP, the policy decisions could actually harm the country.[26] This is very applicable to Colombia as it has one of the highest levels of informal employment in Latin America, with 62.08% of its workforce being informally employed in 2019.[27] IDPs often do not qualify for the lowest level of formal jobs because of their extreme lack of education and limited skill set. The government is pushing them into the illegal market by not focusing it’s attention on helping IDPs get education or training.

The cartels and armed paramilitary groups are seemingly the only ones helping the struggling IDP population survive, so there will always be potential recruits as long as IDPs exist. This means that by the government not doing more to help the IDPs, and letting their people live in poverty, they are hurting their own peace process. This is obviously the most direct way that IDPs' existence hurts the peace process, but the factors mentioned previously also contribute. Economically, populations with mental health issues and various addictions will always be set back. With a lack of institutions to help, these people lack trust in their government and may even feel as though it's "us vs. them." This also applies to the entire IDP population as there has been little government action towards expanding affordable healthcare, housing, food, and protection. One must keep in mind that the IDPs account for 15% of the entire Colombian population. Not only will they not have faith in the government, but they can convince their neighbors not to either. In addition to this, the effects on the host communities' people will also skew their opinion of the government, and they will simply not be as happy. Like mentioned before, there will be more crime, partner violence, unemployment, and wealth inequality. IDPs affect almost all economic and social institutions for the worse, creating more civil and political unrest.

 The pandemic has also exaggerated almost every single one of these problems. IDPs are unable to quarantine as they live off the money that they make each day. A two-week quarantine would be something they could never financially recover from. For the especially poor, it could mean starvation. They also live in very densely populated areas, meaning the virus can spread incredibly quickly, especially with their lack of access to healthcare. Testing is not even an option for them. There is also a lack of clean water and proper sanitation. All of these factors create the perfect breeding ground for Covid-19 and any other sickness. With the lack of testing, it is too early to tell if the IDP population is affected disproportionately, but it is apparent that the IDP population is particularly vulnerable. Many have untreated health conditions and poor diets, which increases the risk of serious complications if they contract the virus. They also do not have the means to go to the hospital to get treatment. With the economic downturn shown across the world, many IDPs faced, or still face, unemployment.[28] While the government did provide monthly stipends to the unemployed, the high transportation fees made them unattainable for IDPs and others in poverty. Any program produced by the government or humanitarian aid agencies was shut down in light of the pandemic, leaving the most vulnerable to fend for themselves.[29] Along with economic downturns, the pandemic increased partner violence in Colombia, which added to an already increased level found in the IDP population.[30] It also left children with no access to education and more vulnerable to paramilitary groups' recruitment techniques. This pandemic will have lasting economic and social consequences on the IDP population.

There are two ways of going about correcting this issue. The first one is to prevent the displacement of people in the first place. The current peace agreement with FARC is a step in the right direction, but this sort of agreement needs to be made with all paramilitary groups for meaningful change. Like mentioned before, the peace agreement with FARC created a power vacuum, allowing other paramilitary groups to acquire the land that FARC previously controlled and more. There needs to be better education and opportunities for people, so they are able to realize paramilitary groups are not fighting in their best interest. Additionally, the government needs to increase its presence across the country. Where most IDPs come from in rural areas, there is little to no government or police presence. If there was increased security in these areas, it would act as a deterrent for armed groups.

The second solution would be to reduce the effect that IDPs have on host communities and the economy as a whole. This means more infrastructure so that there is less overcrowding, formal training so there is less competition for low-level jobs, and better funding for healthcare, education, and food services. There would also need to be education on who the IDPs are, what they have been through, and why they need help in order to reduce the "us vs. them" mentality. This investment would slow the growth of the underground economy, the wealth gap, and the social divide. All of these things contribute to the increasing tension, which damages the peace process and the country's overall stability.

The simple fact that millions of people have fallen victim to their government's weakness should be enough to influence policy and gain international attention and aid. Unfortunately, in today's capitalistic world, people and governments are unwilling to help unless they get something in return. I believe that the Colombian government should focus on this issue not only because these people are in dire need of assistance but because the entire country will be a better place if they do.

[1] James M Shultz et al, “Internal Displacement in Colombia,” Disaster Health 2, no. 1, January 14, 2014, Global internal displacement.

[2] Matej Celestina, “Between Trust and Distrust in Research with Participants in Conflict Context,”international Journal of Social Research Methodology 21, no. 3, May 2018, Trust, conflict and vulnerability.

[3] Celestina, Trust, conflict and vulnerability.

[4] Celestina, Trust, conflict and vulnerability.

[5]  Shultz et al, The rigors of IDP existence are replete with psychological consequences.

[6] Mariana Lagos-Gallego et al., “Alcoholism in internally displaced people of Colombia: An ecological study,” in Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, vol. 31, Elsevier Limited., n.d., December, 15, 2020.

[7] Juliana Andrea Barrera Ramirez and Hernan Dario Franco, “The Effect of Conflict and Displacement on the Health of Internally Displaced People: The Colombian Crisis,” University of Ottawa Journal of Medicine 6, no. 2, published 2016, accessed December 15, 2020, POLICY-MAKING.

[8] Ramirez, Franco, POLICY-MAKING.

[9] Ramirez, Franco, POLICY-MAKING

[10] Lucy Sherriff, “Drugs and Hunger: What Awaits Colombia's Newly Displaced Families,” The New Humanitarian, March 5, 2020.

[11] Shultz et al., Colombian IDPs have no safe place to migrate and no safe alternatives to return.

[12] Natasha Cornelissen, Jennifer Philipp, “4 Facts About Women's Rights in Colombia,” The Borgen Project, October 6, 2020.

[13] Anastasia Moloney, “Domestic Violence Rates Fall in Parts of Latin America: U.N,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, November 29, 2018.

[14] Shultz et al.,Special populations are disproportionately represented among IDPs.

[15] Michelle E Hynes et al, “Exploring gender norms, agency and intimate partner violence among displaced Colombian women: A qualitative assessment,”Global Public Health 11, Acsessed December 15, 2020, abstract.

[16] Shultz et al, Colombian context.

[17] “Exclusion from Education,” Children Change Colombia, accessed December 18, 2020.

[18] Angela Consuelo Carrillo, “Internal displacement in Colombia: humanitarian, economic and social consequences in urban settings and current challenges”,  International Review of the Red Cross 91 (875): 541. September 2009.

[19]Sherriff.

[20]Sherriff.

[21] Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J Santos, “The Impacts of Internal Displacement Inflows on Host Communities in Colombia,” KNOMAD, August 2017.

[22] Eleanor Gordon, “Poverty, Crime & Conflict: Socio-Economic Inequalities & Prospects for Peace in Colombia,” Centre for Security Governance, December 4, 2015.

[23] Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J Santos.

[24] Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J Santos.

[25] Nyasha Weinberg, “How Can Cities Be Preemptive and Effective in Preventing Overcrowding?,” Data Smart City Solutions, Harvard, August 11, 2016.

[26] Andrew Bloomenthal, “How the Underground Economy Affects GDP,” Investopedia, August 28, 2020.

[27] Marina Pasquali, “Informal Employment as Percentage of Total Employment in Colombia from 2010 to 2019,” Statista, July 24, 2020.

[28] “Coronavirus Crisis: Internal Displacement” Internal Displaced Monitoring Center, accessed December 18, 2020.

[29] Jose M Vivanco, “Colombia Should Protect Displaced People During Covid-19,” Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2020.

[30] Sofia Jaramillo and Catalina R Villegas, “Financial Health and Intimate Partner Violence in Colombia During COVID-19,” Innovations for Poverty Action, July 24, 2020.

Bibliography

Bloomenthal, Andrew. “How the Underground Economy Affects GDP.” Investopedia, August 28, 2020. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets-economy/062216/how-underground-economy-affects-gdp.asp.

Carrillo, Angela Consuelo. 2009. “Internal Displacement in Colombia: Humanitarian, Economic and Social Consequences in Urban Settings and Current Challenges.” International Review of the Red Cross 91 (875): 527–46. doi:10.1017/S1816383109990427.

Celestina, Mateja. 2018. “Between Trust and Distrust in Research with Participants in Conflict Context.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 21 (3): 373–83. doi:10.1080/13645579.2018.1427603.

“Coronavirus Crisis: Internal Displacement.” Internal Displaced Monitoring Center. Accessed December 18, 2020. https://www.internal-displacement.org/crises/coronavirus.

Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio, and Rafael J Santos. “The Impacts of Internal Displacement Inflows on Host Communities in Colombia.” KNOMAD, August 2017. https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/KNOMAD%20WP%20The%20impacts%20of%20IDPs%20on%20host%20communities%20Colombia%20FINAL.pdf.

“Exclusion from Education .” Children Change Colombia. Accessed December 18, 2020. https://www.childrenchangecolombia.org/en/what-we-do/exclusion-from-education.

Gordon, Eleanor. “Poverty, Crime & Conflict: Socio-Economic Inequalities & Prospects for Peace in Colombia.” Centre for Security Governance, December 4, 2015. https://secgovcentre.org/2016/10/poverty-crime-and-conflict-socio-economic-inequalities-and-the-prospects-for-peace-in-colombia/.

Hynes, Michelle E., Claire E. Sterk, Monique Hennink, Shilpa Patel, Lara DePadilla, and Kathryn M. Yount. 2016. “Exploring Gender Norms, Agency and Intimate Partner Violence among Displaced Colombian Women: A Qualitative Assessment.” Global Public Health 11 (1/2): 17–33. doi:10.1080/17441692.2015.1068825.

Jaramillo, Sofia, and Catalina R Villegas. “Financial Health and Intimate Partner Violence in Colombia During COVID-19.” Innovations for Poverty Action, July 24, 2020. https://www.poverty-action.org/study/financial-health-and-intimate-partner-violence-colombia-during-covid-19.

Lagos-Gallego, Mariana, Julio C Gutiérrez-Segura, Guillermo J Lagos-Grisales, and Alfonso J Rodríguez-Morales. “Alcoholism in Internally Displaced People of Colombia: An Ecological Study.” Essay. In Travel Medicine and Infectious Diseases 31, Vol. 31. Elsevier Limited., n.d.

Moloney, Anastasia. “Domestic Violence Rates Fall in Parts of Latin America: U.N.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters Foundation, November 29, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-women-domestic-violence/domestic-violence-rates-fall-in-parts-of-latin-america-u-n-idUSKCN1NY2SX.

Pasquali, Marina. “Informal Employment as Percentage of Total Employment in Colombia from 2010 to 2019.” Statista, July 24, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1039930/informal-employment-share-colombia/.

Philipp, Jennifer, and Natasha Cornelissen. “4 Facts About Women's Rights in Colombia.” The Borgen Project, October 6, 2020. https://borgenproject.org/womens-rights-in-colombia/.

Ramirez, Juliana Andrea Barrera, and Hernan Dario Franco. “The Effect of Conflict and Displacement on the Health of Internally Displaced People: The Colombian Crisis.” University of Ottawa Journal of Medicine 6, no. 2 (2016): 26–29. https://doi.org/10.18192/uojm.v6i2.1558.

Sherriff, Lucy. “Drugs and Hunger: What Awaits Colombia's Newly Displaced Families.” The New Humanitarian, March 5, 2020. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/07/24/drugs-hunger-colombia-displaced-families.

Shultz, James M, Ángela Milena Gómez Ceballos, Zelde Espinel, Sofia Rios Oliveros, Maria Fernanda Fonseca, and Luis Jorge Hernandez Florez. “Internal Displacement in Colombia.” Disaster Health 2, no. 1 (January 14, 2014): 13–24. https://doi.org/10.4161/dish.27885.

Vivanco, Jose M. “Colombia Should Protect Displaced People During Covid-19.” Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/11/colombia-should-protect-displaced-people-during-covid-19.

Weinberg, Nyasha. “How Can Cities Be Preemptive and Effective in Preventing Overcrowding?” Data Smart City Solutions. Harvard, August 11, 2016. https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/how-can-cities-be-preemptive-and-effective-in-preventing-overcrowding-888.  “Internal Displacement in Colombia: Fifteen Distinguishing Features.” Disaster health. Taylor & Francis, January 16, 2014. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5314912/.

Published on Leave a comment on The Security Problem of Ex-FARC Combatants and Social Leaders in Colombia

by Arianna Davila

Colombia has a very extensive and complicated history of intra-state conflict and violence that can be traced all the way back to its founding as an independent nation in the 1800’s. Great progress has been achieved thanks to the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)[1]​ ​, but violence continues to take place all over the country. There are numerous factors that complicate advancing the broader agenda for peace in Colombia such as challenges to the ongoing peace process, criminal drug related activity, the influx of refugees, and most recently the consequences of a global pandemic. I believe, however, that the most urgent issue at the moment is how the Colombian government is failing to protect ex-FARC combatants and social leaders from the violent armed conflict in the country. The violence ex-FARC combatants and social leaders face is large scale, systemic and organized. This situation puts into question the government’s commitment to the peace process, and it demonstrates how the guarantees included in the 2016 peace agreement for the protection of ex-combatants and social leaders are not being met. 

It is important to analyze which are the problems being faced by ex-combatants and social leaders, when did they become an issue, where are they taking place, why are these two groups of Colombian society especially vulnerable to violence, who is at fault, and how has the Colombian government responded. 

What exactly is the “security problem”?

The security problems faced by ex-combatants and social leaders demonstrates that the 2016 peace agreement has changed the nature of the armed conflict in Colombia, but it has not completely halted the violence that continues to disproportionately affect vulnerable sectors of Colombian society. As part of the implementation and verification component of the 2016 peace agreement, a UN verification mission was created for Colombia. This mission was charged with verifying the reintegration of former combatants and the security guarantees included in the peace agreement for both ex-combatants and social leaders.[2]​ The UN mission as the entity tasked with verifying aspects of security during the ongoing peace process has issued several warnings about the violence against former combatants, social leaders and human right defenders. Carlos Ruiz Massieu, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, expressed to the Security Council that he considered the “attacks against community leaders, human rights defenders, former combatants and women — along with the COVID-19 pandemic that is exacerbating them — the gravest threats now facing Colombia’s five-year-old peace process”.[3] ​ The security of ex-combatants and social leaders is crucial to protect what has been accomplished so far by the peace agreement, to move forward and create a positive long-lasting peace in Colombia.

When did this situation become an issue?

The data on the number of ex-FARC combatants and social leaders that have been attacked differs from source to source. The figures observed display the overall insecurity trends of ex-combatants and social leaders, but they don’t tell the whole story. Attacks on social leaders and ex-combatants are often under reported and under investigated, this complicates the collection of accurate information. A report by the Colombian Observatory for Organized Crime and the University of Rosario, indicates that 238 ex-FARC combatants have been murdered since the peace agreement was finalized in 2016. The highest figures were reported during 2019, when 79 ex-combatants were murdered. Up until October 31st​ 2020, 56 former combatants have been killed which indicates a change in the overall trend.[4]​ The change in the overall trend could be a consequence of changing dynamics caused by the global pandemic. 

In the case of ex-combatants, the number of killings decreased during 2020; for social leaders and human rights defenders the number of killings has continued to increase. The Institute for Development and Peace Studies (INDEPAZ), along with several other human rights organizations has compiled various reports on the aggressions against social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia. Since 2016, INDEPAZ reports that over 1,057 social leaders and human rights defenders have been killed in Colombia. These numbers have been increasing annually from 2016-2018. In 2019 there was a decrease in the trend. In 2019, 253 killings were recorded.[5]​ Up until December 2020, 293 killings have been recorded which shows an increase from 2019.[6] For social leaders the global pandemic and the safety measures that were put in place to combat the virus have had devastating consequences. The stay-at-home orders that were implemented, confined leaders to their homes making them sitting targets for violence. Leaders who publicly advocate for the peace process and other causes, were especially vulnerable to attacks. 

To combat the global pandemic, Colombia declared a nationwide lockdown in March. This lockdown would turn out to be one of the longest lockdowns in the world, lasting around 5 months. Danelly Estupiñán, a social leader and advocate for Afro-descendant communities in Colombia, has been calling attention to the threats social leaders are facing amidst the global pandemic. She stated how “enemies are still killing us and it’s not difficult for them during the pandemic because we are all at home, complying with the mandatory quarantine.” Armed groups and criminal organizations have taken measures into their own hands, enforcing lockdowns and killing those who they believe to be violating their rules. Estupiñán also stated how she believes that “they’re accusing social leaders of not complying with the quarantine in order to divert attention from the real political motive for the killings”.[7]​ The “real political motives” behind these attacks are often disagreements with the peace process and those who support it, or opposition to the change that social leaders advocate for in Colombia. The global pandemic has only further complicated the issue of insecurity in Colombia. Social leaders and human rights defenders are being persecuted, vulnerable to violence from armed groups and criminal organizations. 

Where is this taking place?

Analyzing where the attacks against ex-combatants and social leaders are taking place is extremely important to combat the violence faced by these groups and concentrate efforts where they are most needed. A report by the Colombian Observatory of Organized Crime and the University of Rosario has attempted to map the murders of 238 ex-FARC combatants. When analyzing the murders, they found that these were concentrated mostly in the same departments in Colombia. Among the 32 departments in Colombia the one’s with the highest murder rates were Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, Caquetá, and Meta.[8] When analyzing where these departments are located it can be observed that the violence against ex-combatants appears to be concentrated in the western regions of Colombia. 

In the case of social leaders and human rights defenders’ similar trends can be observed. A report by INDEPAZ indicates that from 2016-2020 some of the highest murder rates have been observed in Cauca, Antioquia, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, and Putumayo.[9] Attacks against social leaders and ex-FARC combatants are concentrated in the same general regions. Many of these territories that were previously under FARC control, were up for grabs after the guerilla group began their demobilization process. The people in these areas became vulnerable to attacks from the armed groups and criminal organizations fighting for territorial control. The lack of a strong state presence in these areas essentially created a power vacuum in rural Colombia. This situation can be considered one of the key causes of the security issues in the country.

The attacks against social leaders and ex-combatants in certain Colombian departments has become so violent that international organizations like the UN have called attention to the issue. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has called attention to the situation in the Cauca department of Colombia. He expressed that the situation was deeply worrying, stating that “the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions imposed by the Government and by communities themselves to avoid the spread of the virus seem to have aggravated an already violent and volatile situation”.[10]​ Monitoring the situation and providing resources to combat the problem is necessary in these departments where the violence appears to be concentrated. Advancing the broader agenda for peace in Colombia is not possible when certain regions in the country continue to be disproportionately affected by armed conflict. 

Why is it affecting ex-combatants and social leaders? 

It is also important to analyze why ex-combatants and social leaders are being disproportionately affected by this situation. One of the main reasons why these groups are being targeted could be territorial control. The Institute for Development and Peace Studies (INDEPAZ) reports that as much as 70.74% of the deaths of social leaders since 2016 were related to conflicts over land, territory, or natural resources.[11]​ Territorial control is a key issue that continues to affect rural communities in Colombia. Ex-combatants and social leaders could also be targeted because of their public support and commitment to the peace process in Colombia. While social leaders and ex-FARC combatants have demonstrated their commitment to the peace process, other non-state actors continue to benefit from the armed conflict. The illegal economies that often support these other group’s activities are threatened by the peace process. One of the initiatives of the 2016 peace agreement was to encourage farmers in rural communities to move away from coca production. InSight crime reports how in the regions where crop substitution programs are trying to be implemented the deaths of social leaders who support and advocate for these programs were particularly high.[12]​ Since these programs disrupt the production of cocaine, the people who support these initiatives often become targets for groups that benefit from the drug trade. 

The final reason why ex-combatants and social leaders are being targeted could be the nature of the 2016 peace agreement itself. The security and protection mechanisms for ex-combatants and social leaders fall under point three of the agreement, “End of conflict”.[13] The peace agreement attempts to put an end to an armed conflict between multiple state and nonstate actors through an agreement where only two parties are represented. FARC dissident groups, paramilitary groups, other guerillas, and criminal organizations are not currently part of the peace process in Colombia. While the 2016 agreement has definitely improved the situation, there is still an incomplete peace in the country. Those who actually support the agreement are now vulnerable to attacks from the other actors that have not been integrated into the peace process. 

Who is at fault?

Determining who are the perpetrators of the attacks against ex-combatants and social leaders is difficult because these attacks are often under reported and under investigated. The most common suspects are guerilla groups, FARC dissidents, paramilitary groups, and criminal organizations. A report produced by the Colombian Observatory of Organized Crime and the University of Rosario, claims that the Attorney General’s office has identified FARC dissident groups, the Gulf Clan, the National Liberation Army, the Popular Liberation Army, and the paramilitary group the “Caparrapos” as some of the greatest security threats to ex-combatants.[14]​ While there is no data this specific on the attacks against social leaders and human rights defenders, INDEPAZ reports that the alleged perpetrators of most attacks from 2016-2020 were dissidents from guerillas groups or paramilitary organizations, the National Liberation Army, the Popular Liberation Army, and state forces.[15] There is a need for further investigations into the violence against ex-combatants and social leaders. The perpetrators of these crimes need to be held accountable, if not these sorts of attacks will continue. 

How has the Colombian government responded?

The response from the Colombian government has received criticism from former combatants, human rights advocates, and international organizations. The Head of UN Verification Mission in Colombia has expressed his concern over the situation, calling for “improved protection mechanisms and for increased efforts to fight the impunity for the murders of ex-combatants.”[16]​ Former combatants and social leaders have been very vocal with their concerns over what they consider to be an inadequate response from the Colombian government. 

Former FARC combatants have recently taken to the streets to make their security concerns heard by the government and the people of Colombia. On November 6 former combatants culminated their “pilgrimage for life and peace” in the capital city of Bogota, where they met with President Ivan Duque. The main takeaways from the meeting were the need for a security analysis of the situation and a continued commitment to the implementation of the security and protection guarantees included in the peace agreement. The spokesperson for ex-FARC combatants, Diana Viloria, stated that the meeting was an “important first step for the strengthening of measures.”[17]​ Both the UN and former combatants have now called for the Colombian government to improve their measures to combat this security problem. The peaceful demonstration led by the former combatants and the meeting with the Colombian government appears to be a step in the right direction. 

Social leaders in Colombia have also taken to the streets to make their concerns heard by the Colombian government, but they have not received the same response as ex-combatants. More than 7,000 advocates for indigenous communities, Afro-descendant people, peasants, students and women traveled to Bogota asking to meet with President Duque. The various organizations that participated in the peaceful manifestation denounced the violence against social leaders, demanding a response from the government on the situation. President Duque, however, has not agreed to meet with them.[18] The concerns of social leaders need to be heard; dialogue is a key component for the resolution of this issue. The Colombian government has a responsibility to protect all of its citizens, regardless of whether they support the current administration or not. At the moment the Colombian government is failing to protect social leaders, denying them a meeting does not demonstrate the “commitment” that the government often expresses towards the pursuit of peace in Colombia. 

Suggestions to Address the Issue Going Forward 

To address the issue, I believe that all parties involved should first come to an agreement on what exactly is the nature of the situation. The Colombian government has been treating the insecurity problem as isolated events caused by the presence of other non-state actors. While ex-FARC combatants and social leaders believe they are being directly targeted, they consider the violence they face an organized, large scale, systemic issue. It is important to acknowledge the concerns that ex-combatants and social leaders continue to express. An open channel of communication between the Colombian government and these groups is necessary to move forward and tackle the problem. 

Ex-combatants and social leaders have called on the Colombian government to demonstrate a commitment to the full implementation of the peace agreement. Many of the protection and security guarantees are part of this agreement. Additionally, the agreement also addresses important structural issues in Colombian society that further complicate the security problem. The implementation of the agreement has never been an easy task, with the current administration opposing it, but the global pandemic and the economic recession that Colombia currently faces has also halted the implementation of many programs. And while it is extremely important to implement what’s already included in the agreement for protection and security, maybe other measures should be considered as well. The full implementation of the peace agreement will be a long difficult process, and the protection of these vulnerable groups cannot rely on the political agendas around the agreement. The insecurity situation demands urgent attention and new solutions. 

Ex-combatants and social leaders have also called to attention the lack of a strong state presence in the areas where most of the violence is taking place. I believe that the lack of a strong state presence has essentially created a power vacuum in rural Colombia. This situation is one of the key causes of the insecurity issues in the country. To address the issue, it will be necessary to not only implement short-term solutions, but to establish long-term structural reforms in the country. Measures such as the increased policing of rural communities often have adverse effects, the focus should be placed on changes that promote long-term positive peace. 

This type of change does not happen overnight, the cooperation and commitment of many parties is needed for such large-scale change. A step that may be needed is the incorporation of other non-state actors into the Colombian peace process. Currently the peace agreement is between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), but there are many other non-state actors involved in the conflict. Opening channels of communication with the National Liberation Army, the Popular Liberation Army, and paramilitary groups will be necessary as long as the Colombian government does not have a monopoly on violence in the country. The issue of state weakness, as displayed by the lack of a strong state presence and a monopoly of violence, should be further looked into to analyze the relationship between state weakness and security issues in Colombia. 

[1] FARC is an acronym in Spanish for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (English: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). 

[2] United Nations, “About,” UN Verification Mission in Colombia, September 26, 2017. 

https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/about

[3] United Nations, Security Council, ​Increased Attacks against Community Leaders, Human Rights Defenders Pose Gravest Threat to Colombia Peace Process, Special Representative Warns Security Council.​ (SC/14252, July 14,

[4] Charles, Baysal, Forero, ​A Criminal Peace: Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants.​ (Documento OCCO. The Colombian Observatory of Organized Crime Working Paper Series Number 2, Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2020), 13. 

[5] INDEPAZ, Cumbre Agraria and Marcha Patriótica, Informe Especial Sobre Agresiones a Personas Defensoras de los Derechos Humanos y de los Acuerdos De Paz.6                     ​ (Bogotá: Colombia, 2020), 8-17. 

[6] INDEPAZ, “Líderes Sociales Y Defensores De Derechos Humanos Asesinados En 2020”, Accessed December 19, 2020 from ​http://www.indepaz.org.co/lideres/​. 

[7] Estupiñán, Danelly, “Colombia's Social Leaders Are Still Being Killed during the Quarantine.” Amnesty International, June 22, 2020.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/lideres-sociales-nos-siguen-matando-durante-cuarentena/​.

[8] Charles, Baysal and Forero, ​A Criminal Peace​, 13. INDEPAZ, Cumbre Agraria and Marcha Patriótica, ​Informe Especial​, 11. 

[9] INDEPAZ, Cumbre Agraria and Marcha Patriótica, Informe Especial , 11.

[10] Rupert Colville, ​Press briefing note on Colombia / right defenders killing​. (Geneva: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020).

[11] INDEPAZ, Cumbre Agraria and Marcha Patriótica, ​Informe Especial​, 13. 

[12] Chaparro, Maria Paula, and Felipe Puerta, “A Death Foretold: Colombia's Crop Substitution Program.” InSight Crime, April 1, 2019. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/a-death-foretold-colombias-crop-substitution-program

[13] Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, ​El Acuerdo Final de Paz: La Oportunidad para Construir Paz (Bogotá: Colombia,  n.d), 16-19. 

[14] Charles, Baysal, Forero, ​A Criminal Peace​, 6. 

[15] INDEPAZ, Cumbre Agraria and Marcha Patriótica, ​Informe Especial​, 17. 

[16] United Nations Security Council, ​Increased Attacks against Community Leaders​, SC/14252. 

[17] Camacho, Carlos, “Seguridad y Tierras, Los Acuerdos Entre Gobierno y Farc.” El Tiempo, November 7, 2020. https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/gobierno-duque-y-exfarc-acuerdan-acelerar-proceso-de-reincorp oracion-547463​. 

[18] BBC, “Indigenous Colombians Rally in Bogotá over Killings.” BBC News Latin America. BBC, October 20, 2020. ​https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-54598875​. 

Bibliography

BBC. “Indigenous Colombians Rally in Bogotá over Killings.” BBC News Latin America. BBC, October 20, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-5459887​          5.​ 

Camacho, Carlos. “Seguridad y Tierras, Los Acuerdos Entre Gobierno y Farc.” El Tiempo. El Tiempo, November 7, 2020. https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/gobierno-duque-y-exfarc-acuerdan-acel erar-proceso-de-reincorporacion-547463.​ 

Chaparro, Maria Paula, and Felipe Puerta. “A Death Foretold: Colombia's Crop Substitution Program.” InSight Crime. Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime, April 1, 2019. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/a-death-foretold-colombias-crop-substitutionprogram/.​ 

Charles, Matthew, Başar Baysal, Juan Diego Forero.  A Criminal Peace: Mapping the        Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants​. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2020. 

Estupiñán, Danelly. “Colombia's Social Leaders Are Still Being Killed during the Quarantine.” Amnesty International. Amnesty International, June 22, 2020.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/lideres-sociales-nos-siguen-matando-dura nte-cuarentena/. 

INDEPAZ. “Líderes Sociales Y Defensores De Derechos Humanos Asesinados En 2020”, Indepaz: Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz. Accessed November 28, 2020.

http://www.indepaz.org.co/lideres/.​

INDEPAZ, Cumbre Agraria and Marcha Patriótica. Informe Especial Sobre Agresiones a​   Personas Defensoras de los Derechos Humanos y de los Acuerdos De Paz. ​Bogotá: Colombia, 2020.

Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. El Acuerdo Final de Paz: La Oportunidad para​          Construir Paz​. Bogotá: Colombia,  n.d. 

Rupert Colville. Press briefing note on Colombia / right defenders killing​   ​. Geneva: Office of the  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020.

United Nations. “About.” UN Verification Mission in Colombia. UN, September 26, 2017.

https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/about.​

United Nations, Security Council. Increased Attacks against Community Leaders, Human Rights​  

Defenders Pose Gravest Threat to Colombia Peace Process, Special Representative Warns Security Council.​ (SC/14252, July 14, 2020), available from https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14252.doc.htm

Published on Leave a comment on Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia

by Jesse Nimons

The Colombian people are some of the strongest in the world. Their lives have been plagued with violence, corruption, and economic uncertainty for the last five decades. While the focus is pointed solely towards the conflict between the government and various militias, many groups have been pushed to the sidelines. The largest of which is the massive internally displaced people population. An internally displaced person, or IDP, is a person who has to flee their home but does not cross any borders; they are a refuge in their own country. There are twice as many IDPs as there are refugees worldwide. Because they remain in their home country, they are often out of the jurisdiction of humanitarian aid helpers and not protected by the same human rights safeguards that refugees are[i]. Colombia has the second largest population of IDPs in the world, just behind Syria. It is estimated that six million people in Colombia, 15% of the entire population, are categorized as an internally displaced person. Unfortunately, Colombian IDPs do not have the privilege of staying in massive refugee camps, as seen in many other countries. Instead, they have to integrate into shanty towns with little or no help, invisible to the outside world. They lack the voice that refugees have and are almost unrecorded by the media.

The leading cause of displacement in Colombia is from armed groups. This may be purposely to erase the support system under their political opponents, grow illegal crops on their land, or it can be a byproduct of two groups fighting. All make the area unsafe to live in. Sometimes, displacement is caused by the Colombian military trying to win back areas but make them unsafe in the process. In the wake of these conflicts, towns are destroyed and harm is threatened to the residents if they ever come back. Armed groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), operate where the government presence is scarce; thus, most IDPs come from rural areas. While FARC signed a peace treaty with the government in 2016, other armed groups have started to seize the places they used to control, along with previously "safe" areas, beginning the cycle again. This is a serious issue that has a part in many of Colombia's most significant problems and is a massive humanitarian crisis. I believe that the Colombian government should increase its focus on the IDP population as it is the best issue for them to take on at this time.

The IDP population is plagued with a much higher rate of distrust, mental illness, and substance abuse issues than the general population. One of the reasons this humanitarian crisis is not mainstream in the media is the extreme distrust instilled in the IDP population. One researcher, Mateja Celestina, spent ten months studying the effects of forced displacement on the Colombian people and realized she was getting "half-truths'' and many inconsistencies between people's stories. She had to ask herself, "is it feasible to establish 'complete' trust in conflict and post-conflict environments''[ii]. When it comes to getting accurate findings, trust is an indispensable part of research, and research that is not accurate cannot be used. Why is the IDP population so distrustful, even to those genuinely trying to help them? The answer lies in the fact that these people are always "on guard.” Their past experiences with extortion, conflict, violence, and ongoing threats have made them acutely aware of their vulnerabilities. There is too much at stake for them if they misplace their trust. "Their vulnerabilities extended from the risk of loss of life, getting emotionally upset, exacerbation of community relations, to the potential influence on assistance flows.''[iii] IDPs have been living in conflict for generations, creating a culture of silence and distrust in turn. While we can tell that this is hurting their population in the long run, IDPs see it as a way of protecting themselves.

Another reason why it is difficult for researchers to get information about the displacement process is it often brings up agonizing memories that last far longer than the time the researcher is there[iv]. Displacement is not a singular event. Most IDPs have experienced repeated threats and events that are traumatic and life-threatening enough to force their displacement. Once displaced, they have to focus on survival, both physical and economic, in an unfamiliar and hostile environment. These stressors increase the risk for various mental disorders, including PTSD, depression, anxiety, and substance abuse. The World Health Organization projects that half of the IDP population has some mental health problem[v]. Generally, IDPs are 2.6 times more likely to struggle with alcoholism. In some regions of the country, that figure can be raised to 36 times more likely[vi]. While both of these findings should promote the creation of mental health interventions and policies to aid with the physiological repercussions of forced displacement from conflict, the truth is that most IDPs will never receive the aid that they need, nor will there be an international push on the Colombian government to cause them to focus on this issue.

            The IDP population is the most vulnerable and poor community in all of Colombia. They need better mental health services and overall free access to healthcare, food, housing, extra protection, and assistance to apply for government aid and get an IDP status. There have been countless attempts at creating policies that would help the IDPs. Yet, most of the population remains unemployed, unable to afford housing, and lives under the poverty line.[vii] This is because the government is not putting enough of their focus on helping them. For example, in 2011, a law named "Victims Law" was proposed to support the IDPs in gaining land ownership. The government did not put it in place because there was a chance that ex-combatants could have also benefited. A law that would have helped millions of IDPs was denied because it could have helped some ex-combatants.[viii]

            Another reason there is little legislation to help these people is that armed groups exploit the government's weakness and specifically target programs that help IDPs. While one strategy is exploiting the government’s corruption to shut them down before they start, it also can result in the kidnapping of doctors or massacre of human rights defenders[ix]. It is in these groups best interest to keep IDPs unstable. They get to keep their land and can use it as an opportunity to recruit the displaced in the future. This is made easier when it appears to IDPs that the government is disregarding them.

            Colombia functions on a two-level healthcare system: the wealthy pay for better healthcare, and the poor have free access to public healthcare. The government boasts its universal health care policy, but the truth is basically only the upper level that exists. There is an extreme shortage of public healthcare available for those who need it, and the quality is subpar. It has been cited that IDPs face discrimination when they seek healthcare services because they are branded as economic migrants and put at the back of the line. They are at the bottom of the ladder, even being treated worse than the homeless. This has forced them to discover ways to get around this red tape. For example, young females purposely get pregnant to secure care under the Families in Action program for mothers and children. Unfortunately, these loopholes have created a whole new wave of problems in the IDP population.

In an updated and less effective "Victims Law," anyone who could show they were affected by the conflict could get "immediate humanitarian assistance and has provisions for accommodation, food, and medical and psychological services. It also includes provisions for identification documents, health, education, family reunification, funeral assistance, occupational orientation, and income generation". There were 106,833 applicants in 2011. By 2018, only 12% of those applicants had received any assistance[x]. In an effort to help (about) 6 million people, they maxed out at 12,820 people. With the extreme legal documentation requirements to apply for any type of government aid, countless IDPs don't even bother applying for help or even registering themselves as an IDP and realize that they are on their own. This is made worse because the government does not provide IDPs with any type of protection. IDPs are often monitored by the groups that displaced them to ensure that they do not speak about the events that occurred. Those who dare to speak about it are threatened or killed, even if they do not discuss the events that led to their displacement. There is fear that even if one were to get "in the system," they will cause danger to their family and community[xi]and this fear is magnified for the single women households who cannot protect themselves as well. With a lack of real government support, the problems detailed below will continue to surge.

            Colombia has slowly been moving out of its traditionalist views on gender.  “Women’s rights in Colombia continue to progress every year as women occupy more positions of authority and increase their influence over legislation and societal expectations”[xii] and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) found that the rate of domestic violence has fallen in the country[xiii].  It is gradually becoming a safer nation for women, but internally displaced women are left out of these advancements. Females account for 48% of the IDPs in Botega, and 41% of those [xiv] women are single mothers, which already sets them back from an economic standpoint. As mentioned before, women are often discriminated against when applying for healthcare and financial aid, causing many to get pregnant for the sole purpose of getting assistance. When the only decision is between not having access to medicine and living in poverty or bearing a child they do not want and cannot care for, obviously something needs to change.

Partner Violence has also plagued the IDP population. "Previous research found that Colombian women perceived IPV (intimate partner violence) to increase after displacement."[xv] Economic instability, lack of formal protective systems, and dismantling of social support systems further contribute to the violence committed against women. The dismantling of social support systems makes it incredibly difficult to leave the relationship, as they have nowhere to go. One study found that 50% of Colombian women IDPs have endured violence from their partner, compared to 20% in the general population[xvi]. With the lack of government intervention to aid women in these situations, the message to women is that they are not a priority, and to men, their actions are okay. Additionally, due to young children being taught that partner violence is expected, it will increase the likelihood of it continuing in the future. It will stay prevalent in generations to come and will spill out of the IDP population into the communities they inhabit.

Children are also greatly affected by their IDP status. In rural areas, children are only in school for an average of 5.5 years[xvii]. When they arrive in host communities, many fail to attend school for a variety of reasons. IDP children cannot afford transportation or uniforms, cannot keep up with the curriculum, or are sometimes refused a spot in school or singled out in the classroom because of the stigma surrounding being an IDP[xviii]. Without a formal education, it will be incredibly difficult for them to have upward mobility, which may become more difficult in the future due to population growth. Under these conditions, children can't reach their full potential. This increases the rate of poverty, as most IDPs are children, but Colombia is missing out on the advancements these children could have made in the future.

The children also tend to leave school early to work so that their families can survive. Sometimes, this work may be illegal, either legal but “under the table” or involving drug cartels or paramilitary groups. The drug cartels give children drugs to curb their hunger or make them sell drugs to make money. More often than not, they end up hooked for life, especially because they cannot leave due to violent retribution[xix]. The paramilitary groups promise regular food on the table, protection for their family, and a sense of fulfillment as they are told they are doing the right thing. With the lack of education that people in poverty, especially IDPs, it is effortless to hook these children for life[xx]. With the government keeping them especially vulnerable, the IDP population is increasing the longevity of the drug cartels and paramilitary groups.

            Almost all IDPs go from rural areas to cities, suburbs, and shanty, or illegal towns. This is a problem as they lack the necessary skills to find jobs other than farming. This causes a conflict because they can only accept the lowest level jobs, leading to "increased competition with local workers, suppression of wages, and increased difficulty finding employment.”[xxi] This creates resentment between IDPs and natives of the host community.

In general, when levels of economic instability and poverty rise, there tends to be an increase in crime. This is shown in Colombia as the impoverished areas typically lack government presence, protection, and aid, which not only forces people into crime but allows them to keep doing it.[xxii] Because IDPs acquire, or are perceived to acquire, more government assistance than their non-displaced neighbors, they are often the targets of these crimes, creating even more of an "us vs. them" mentality. This is dangerous because it produces an "anti-IDP" sentiment that spreads throughout the country, which will impact policymaking and funding.

With an increase in unemployment, poverty, and crime due to an IDP influx in a host community, there is no change in education and healthcare funding. One would think that with the addition of more people, there would be a proportional increase in funding as they must be able to care for everyone equally at the same level they were before in influx. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It has been found that "a 1 percent increase in IDP inflows would entail a reduction in education investment of 0.021 percent" and "no empirical evidence of an impact of IDP inflows on investment in health is found."[xxiii] The cause of overcrowding in the education system and the healthcare system reduces the grade of service. The people native to the host communities experience a decrease in living standards due to the IDP population. As more and more people become displaced, there will be an increase in host communities that will feel these effects.[xxiv] 

            There is no way for IDPs to relocate to wealthy communities. Inhabitants have to leave rapidly when paramilitary groups loot communities. Most IDPs have no wealth by the time they find a place to relocate. There is no affordable housing in upper class communities and they cannot set up their own shelters there, forcing them to only inhabit poorer areas, which creates an even lower socioeconomic standard as detailed in the previous paragraph. This will cause the already massive wealth gap in Colombia to grow. The poor are becoming more accustomed to lower living standards, and the companies are able to lower wages as the job market is so competitive, which increases their bottom line. There is less fertile land to grow crops on, as the paramilitary groups have taken control of these areas, which causes food prices to increase. In conjunction with this, there is a decreasing amount of safe areas to live in, causing overcrowding in and around the cities. Overcrowding causes a myriad of health problems, like respiratory disease and tuberculosis, and not to mention is detrimental during a pandemic.[xxv] The IDPs and others living in poverty do not have the funds to circumvent these circumstances. While these problems do not affect the wealthy population, they are the difference between life and death for the impoverished people. This type of wealth inequality was one of the main drivers of La Violencia. If this gap continues to grow, the conflict will never be over and may even expand as long as people continue to be displaced.

            With an influx of competition in the job market, there will be a rise in the illicit economy. The illegal economy includes money earned from illegal activities and also unreported income, such as when workers are paid under the table. This is a problem not only because of the billions of dollars in taxes lost, but because unreported transactions skew the country's GDP. Having an accurate GDP is very important because the GDP numbers directly influence monetary policies. If a country has an inaccurate GDP, the policy decisions could actually harm the country.[xxvi] This is very applicable to Colombia as it has one of the highest levels of informal employment in Latin America, with 62.08% of its workforce being informally employed in 2019.[xxvii] IDPs often do not qualify for the lowest level of formal jobs because of their extreme lack of education and limited skill set. The government is pushing them into the illegal market by not focusing it’s attention on helping IDPs get education or training.

            The cartels and armed paramilitary groups are seemingly the only ones helping the struggling IDP population survive, so there will always be potential recruits as long as IDPs exist. This means that by the government not doing more to help the IDPs, and letting their people live in poverty, they are hurting their own peace process. This is obviously the most direct way that IDPs' existence hurts the peace process, but the factors mentioned previously also contribute. Economically, populations with mental health issues and various addictions will always be set back. With a lack of institutions to help, these people lack trust in their government and may even feel as though it's "us vs. them." This also applies to the entire IDP population as there has been little government action towards expanding affordable healthcare, housing, food, and protection. One must keep in mind that the IDPs account for 15% of the entire Colombian population. Not only will they not have faith in the government, but they can convince their neighbors not to either. In addition to this, the effects on the host communities' people will also skew their opinion of the government, and they will simply not be as happy. Like mentioned before, there will be more crime, partner violence, unemployment, and wealth inequality. IDPs affect almost all economic and social institutions for the worse, creating more civil and political unrest.

            The pandemic has also exaggerated almost every single one of these problems. IDPs are unable to quarantine as they live off the money that they make each day. A two-week quarantine would be something they could never financially recover from. For the especially poor, it could mean starvation. They also live in very densely populated areas, meaning the virus can spread incredibly quickly, especially with their lack of access to healthcare. Testing is not even an option for them. There is also a lack of clean water and proper sanitation. All of these factors create the perfect breeding ground for Covid-19 and any other sickness. With the lack of testing, it is too early to tell if the IDP population is affected disproportionately, but it is apparent that the IDP population is particularly vulnerable. Many have untreated health conditions and poor diets, which increases the risk of serious complications if they contract the virus. They also do not have the means to go to the hospital to get treatment. With the economic downturn shown across the world, many IDPs faced, or still face, unemployment.[xxviii] While the government did provide monthly stipends to the unemployed, the high transportation fees made them unattainable for IDPs and others in poverty. Any program produced by the government or humanitarian aid agencies was shut down in light of the pandemic, leaving the most vulnerable to fend for themselves.[xxix] Along with economic downturns, the pandemic increased partner violence in Colombia, which added to an already increased level found in the IDP population.[xxx] It also left children with no access to education and more vulnerable to paramilitary groups' recruitment techniques. This pandemic will have lasting economic and social consequences on the IDP population.

            There are two ways of going about correcting this issue. The first one is to prevent the displacement of people in the first place. The current peace agreement with FARC is a step in the right direction, but this sort of agreement needs to be made with all paramilitary groups for meaningful change. Like mentioned before, the peace agreement with FARC created a power vacuum, allowing other paramilitary groups to acquire the land that FARC previously controlled and more. There needs to be better education and opportunities for people, so they are able to realize paramilitary groups are not fighting in their best interest. Additionally, the government needs to increase its presence across the country. Where most IDPs come from in rural areas, there is little to no government or police presence. If there was increased security in these areas, it would act as a deterrent for armed groups.

            The second solution would be to reduce the effect that IDPs have on host communities and the economy as a whole. This means more infrastructure so that there is less overcrowding, formal training so there is less competition for low-level jobs, and better funding for healthcare, education, and food services. There would also need to be education on who the IDPs are, what they have been through, and why they need help in order to reduce the "us vs. them" mentality. This investment would slow the growth of the underground economy, the wealth gap, and the social divide. All of these things contribute to the increasing tension, which damages the peace process and the country's overall stability.

            The simple fact that millions of people have fallen victim to their government's weakness should be enough to influence policy and gain international attention and aid. Unfortunately, in today's capitalistic world, people and governments are unwilling to help unless they get something in return. I believe that the Colombian government should focus on this issue not only because these people are in dire need of assistance but because the entire country will be a better place if they do.

[i] James M Shultz et al, “Internal Displacement in Colombia,” Disaster Health 2, no. 1, January 14, 2014, Global internal displacement.

[ii] Matej Celestina, “Between Trust and Distrust in Research with Participants in Conflict Context,”international Journal of Social Research Methodology 21, no. 3, May 2018, Trust, conflict and vulnerability.

[iii] Celestina, Trust, conflict and vulnerability.

[iv] Celestina, Trust, conflict and vulnerability.

[v]  Shultz et al, The rigors of IDP existence are replete with psychological consequences.

[vi] Mariana Lagos-Gallego et al., “Alcoholism in internally displaced people of Colombia: An ecological study,” in Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, vol. 31, Elsevier Limited., n.d., December, 15, 2020.

[vii] Juliana Andrea Barrera Ramirez and Hernan Dario Franco, “The Effect of Conflict and Displacement on the Health of Internally Displaced People: The Colombian Crisis,” University of Ottawa Journal of Medicine 6, no. 2, published 2016, accessed December 15, 2020, POLICY-MAKING.

[viii] Ramirez, Franco, POLICY-MAKING.

[ix] Ramirez, Franco, POLICY-MAKING

[x] Lucy Sherriff, “Drugs and Hunger: What Awaits Colombia's Newly Displaced Families,” The New Humanitarian, March 5, 2020.

[xi] Shultz et al., Colombian IDPs have no safe place to migrate and no safe alternatives to return.

[xii] Natasha Cornelissen, Jennifer Philipp, “4 Facts About Women's Rights in Colombia,” The Borgen Project, October 6, 2020.

[xiii] Anastasia Moloney, “Domestic Violence Rates Fall in Parts of Latin America: U.N,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, November 29, 2018.

[xiv] Shultz et al.,Special populations are disproportionately represented among IDPs.

[xv] Michelle E Hynes et al, “Exploring gender norms, agency and intimate partner violence among displaced Colombian women: A qualitative assessment,”Global Public Health 11, Acsessed December 15, 2020, abstract.

[xvi] Shultz et al, Colombian context.

[xvii] “Exclusion from Education,” Children Change Colombia, accessed December 18, 2020.

[xviii] Angela Consuelo Carrillo, “Internal displacement in Colombia: humanitarian, economic and social consequences in urban settings and current challenges”,  International Review of the Red Cross 91 (875): 541. September 2009.

[xix]Sherriff.

[xx]Sherriff.

[xxi] Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J Santos, “The Impacts of Internal Displacement Inflows on Host Communities in Colombia,” KNOMAD, August 2017.

[xxii] Eleanor Gordon, “Poverty, Crime & Conflict: Socio-Economic Inequalities & Prospects for Peace in Colombia,” Centre for Security Governance, December 4, 2015.

[xxiii] Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J Santos.

[xxiv] Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J Santos.

[xxv] Nyasha Weinberg, “How Can Cities Be Preemptive and Effective in Preventing Overcrowding?,” Data Smart City Solutions, Harvard, August 11, 2016.

[xxvi] Andrew Bloomenthal, “How the Underground Economy Affects GDP,” Investopedia, August 28, 2020.

[xxvii] Marina Pasquali, “Informal Employment as Percentage of Total Employment in Colombia from 2010 to 2019,” Statista, July 24, 2020.

[xxviii] “Coronavirus Crisis: Internal Displacement” Internal Displaced Monitoring Center, accessed December 18, 2020.

[xxix] Jose M Vivanco, “Colombia Should Protect Displaced People During Covid-19,” Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2020.

[xxx] Sofia Jaramillo and Catalina R Villegas, “Financial Health and Intimate Partner Violence in Colombia During COVID-19,” Innovations for Poverty Action, July 24, 2020.

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