December 2024 cases

This block of oral arguments include issues concerning administrative agency authority (in the context of e-cigarettes), sovereign immunity for the confiscation of property during the Holocaust, healthcare for trans minors, the fraudulent inducement theory under federal mail and wire fraud laws, rights of reservists, causation under environmental law, and an equity court’s authority to award disgorgement of profits. [See menus at the top of the page for information about attending arguments in person or listening in online.]

Monday, December 2

First up is a critical case involving the power of administrative agencies, this time in the context of vaping and e-cigarette products. A 2009 law, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, prohibited flavored “cigarettes” and required FDA approval of any new tobacco products, which can come only after the agency has determined that the new product is “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(3)(A). The companies in FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C., sought approval for e-cigarettes (with names including “Rainbow Road,” “Crème Brulee,” and “Jimmy the Juice Man Peachy Strawberry”), asserting that they would allow adult smokers to transition to less harmful products. The FDA rejected the application, and the 5th Circuit held that the FDA action was “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Importantly, this is a line drawn by statute and is different from the Court-defined deference under the recently overruled Chevron framework, although there is good reason to think that some members of the Court will view administrative agency authority with a similar level of skepticism/hostility. A critical issue in this case is whether the FDA rejected the applications because it “secretly” had a requirement that the applicants provide longitudinal studies that affirmatively show the health value of the product or simply because the FDA found that the studies the applicants did provide did not, in fact, support the benefits the companies claimed but instead only demonstrated serious risks to youth. Amy Howe has a useful and more thorough overview, which also notes that the 5th Circuit decision is out of step with other Circuits in multiple respects and was authored by “Judge Andrew Oldham, often mentioned as a possible nominee for the Supreme Court if a vacancy arises during the second Trump administration.”

The second case today is not one for the casual observer – unless you’re particularly interested in how sovereign immunity impacts bankruptcy estates! When a bankrupt entity makes a payment that does not provide it anything of value (and especially when it benefits someone other than the creditor), that is often treated as a “fraudulent conveyance” and the funds must be returned to the bankrupt estate to be fairly apportioned out to all creditors. In U.S. v. Miller, the company paid back taxes to the IRS, which arguably benefited the owners individually, and then filed for bankruptcy. The IRS claims that sovereign immunity prevents application of state law that would recover that payment. Useful explainer here.

Tuesday, December 3

Just one case today, Republic of Hungary v. Simon, arising from “the Hungarian government’s confiscation of property owned by Jews during the Holocaust. Nowhere was the Holocaust executed with such speed and ferocity as it was in Hungary.‘” (D.C. Circuit decision.) The Court will, once again, focus on the scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. FSIA permits suits against sovereign entities for property taken in violation of international law that also “is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” The Supreme Court has held that states taking their own citizens’ property is not a violation of international law that triggers an exception to sovereign immunity. So the DC Circuit here only allowed claims by Czechoslovakian citizens to go forward against Hungary, rejecting claims by (arguably) Hungarian citizens that they were “stateless” by the time Hungary seized their assets.

As to the US commercial-nexus requirement, the Circuit remanded the case for factual findings but noted that “plaintiffs need not produce evidence directly tracing the liquidated proceeds of their stolen property” but rather the defendants would bear the burden to “affirmatively establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their current resources do not trace back to the property originally expropriated.” This allocation of the burden of proof was required because “Congress knew that an expropriating foreign state or instrumentality thereof might ‘exchange[]’ or liquidate the stolen property—i.e. convert it to cash or cash equivalents. It included language in the FSIA to enable plaintiffs to satisfy the expropriation exception’s jurisdictional nexus requirements in those circumstances.” D.C. Circuit, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).

The Supreme Court has accepted cert. on: “(1) Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; (2) whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference; and (3) whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA.”

Wednesday, December 4 – Trans Rights and Tenn. SB 1

One of the more politically contentious cases is scheduled for today: U.S. v. Skrmetti concerns Tennessee’s SB1, which prohibits puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and surgeries for trans minors. These are very familiar issues, so I won’t say much here. KFF offers a thorough overview of this specific case as well as laws concerning healthcare for trans minors nationally. The Court has accepted cert. on a 14th Amendment equal protection question. The federal government argues that the law classifies on the basis of sex:

the law frames its prohibition in explicit sex-based terms: The covered treatments are banned if they are prescribed “for the purpose” of “[e]nabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or “[t]reating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” But the law leaves the same treatments entirely unrestricted if they are prescribed for any other purpose, such as treating delayed or precocious puberty. Thus, for example, a teenager whose sex assigned at birth is male can be prescribed testosterone to conform to a male gender identity, but a teenager assigned female at birth cannot.

Accordingly, expect a lot of argument concerning Justice Gorsuch’s decision in Bostock, which held that Title VII’s prohibition on “sex” discrimination encompassed discrimination on the basis of gender identity (or sexual orientation). This would allow supporters of trans rights to subject the law to heightened scrutiny under the 14th Amendment as a form of sex discrimination, without having to argue for the level of scrutiny that should apply to discrimination on the basis of gender identity.

Monday, December 9

The first case today concerns the fraudulent inducement theory under federal mail and wire fraud laws, in the context of a scheme to disguise business arrangements in order to satisfy the “disadvantaged business enterprises (DBE)” contracting rules. Federal Dept. of Transportation funds are awarded subject to requirements that recipients set participation goals for DBEs. In Kousisis v. U.S., the contractor committed to working with a DBE but that was just a pass-through entity, which got a 2.25% fee on supplies purchased from other entities. The Court appears to have taken the case to resolve a “Circuit split,” concerning “whether deception to induce a fair commercial exchange is property fraud,” according to the Petition. The case has not received a great deal of attention, but there are useful summaries here and here.

The second case today, Feliciano v. Dept of Transportation, is important for people serving the reserves: “Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.” The Federal Circuit Blog offers a thorough argument preview.

Tuesday, December 10

An environmental law case today concerning causation could have major implications for the government’s response to climate change: “Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.” The most familiar component of NEPA is probably the requirement for an environmental impact statement (EIS) for major federal projects. In Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, the Surface Transportation Board approved a railway after its EIS declined to consider how the new line would impact existing lines or the impacts of increased crude oil drilling, refining, and transportation (including potential spills). Berkeley Law offers a very thorough discussion of causation and environmental law as part of its assessment of this case.

Wednesday, December 11

The final December argument comes in the context of a trademark infringement award that required disgorgement of profits (coming to some $43 million), but could have broader implications for how courts calculate awards, as this post notes. The question presented sheds a little light on the rather absurd caption: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers, Inc., Whether an award of the “defendant’s profits” under the Lanham Act can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

The Court will then be on recess for the holidays, until January 13.

January 2024 Cases

The big Chevron deference cases are at the end of this block of arguments, but the Court will first hear cases on immigration procedure, mootness in the context of civil rights and the No-Fly list, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the confrontation clause for expert testimony, and the takings clause.

Monday, January 8

First up is an immigration procedure question with another grammar kicker! When initiating deportation proceedings, the Immigration and Nationality Act requires the government to serve a “notice to appear” that includes the time and place of the hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229. According to the petition, “[f]or years,” the government has instead served an initial notice that does not include the time and place but rather “supplies that information in a standalone ‘notice of hearing’ that it serves later — at times, years later.”

If correct procedures are followed, then the individual’s failure to appear results in a default judgment and order of removal. Paragraph (1) of the relevant section requires the “notice to appear” to include the time and place; paragraph (2) requires a separate document “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place”; and a separate section provides that the order of removal can be rescinded if “the alien did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).”

A group of linguists filed an amici brief arguing that “[f]rom a linguistic standpoint, the negative
disjunction ‘not A or B’ is ambiguous between two literal semantic interpretations. First, it can be
interpreted as [neither A nor B]. We will call this the neither-nor interpretation. . . . Second, the negative disjunction ‘not A or B’ can be interpreted as [either not A or not B]. Here we refer to this interpretation as the either-or interpretation.” They ultimately argue that “regardless of how the rescission condition is disambiguated, the plain text of the condition provides insufficient support for the Government’s understanding of the condition.”

Today’s argument covers two cases, Campos-Chaves v. Garland and Garland v. Singh, the later of which involves two parties. But the Court has consolidated the cases for one hour of argument total and denied the request for divided argument that would have allowed counsel for all 3 noncitizens to present separate arguments. So I would expect the “one hour” argument to run the now-usual two hours (or so), but not longer.

The second case involves the No-Fly list and a rather horrifying set of background facts, but the legal issue concerns the more procedural standard for mootness. In FBI v. Fikre, a US citizen was stranded in Sudan when placed on the No-Fly list after he refused to become an FBI informant, after which he was imprisoned and tortured in the UAE. He eventually managed to return to the US and brought suit against the FBI. (All these facts are compellingly summarized on this scotusblog article.)

But the Court has accepted cert. only on “Whether respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he ‘will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information.'” The 9th Circuit held that this assurance is not enough to moot the case, because the government instead would have to make it “absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”

Tuesday, January 9

The Court considers the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California. That doctrine prohibits the government from denying a benefit in a way that infringes a constitutional right and is usually thought of in the First Amendment context. However, as Oyez explains, “The U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan (1987) and Dolan (1994) recognized that land-use permit applicants ‘are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits.’ Under those cases, the government may condition approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s dedication of property to public use if the government can prove that an ‘essential nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ exist between the demanded property and the impacts of the owner’s project.” This case challenges the county’s “Traffic Impact Mitigation (TIM) Fee Program” imposed on certain building permits.

The second case today involves retrospective refunds of Bankruptcy fees, and is not one I’d recommend to the casual observer.

Wednesday, January 10

The only case today involves the confrontation clause in the context of expert witnesses. In Smith v. Arizona, Smith was convicted of possession of marijuana but the substance was established to be marijuana on the basis of testimony from an expert who did not perform any tests on the substance but only relied on the reports of another expert who did not testify. The Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, noting that the defendant could have called the expert who performed the tests himself. The Innocence Network and others offer an interesting amici brief noting that “[t]he misapplication of forensic science is one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, present in 24% of proven exonerations,” and arguing that “[f]oregoing a cross-examination requirement of the original analyst prevents the criminally accused from being able to reveal the fraud, bias, or error that may have tainted the evidence against them.”

[The Court is closed on Monday, January 15 in observance of Martin Luther King, Jr. Day]

Tuesday, January 16

The first case today is a technical issue involving pleading standards for lawsuits based on violations of SEC regulations, and is not one recommended for the casual observer.

Next up is a takings clause case — challenging a 5th Circuit decision that many observers found rather bizarre (e.g. this ABA Journal piece). Many constitutional rights are vindicated by filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes a lawsuit for deprivations of rights under color of law. However, states themselves are not subject to suit under § 1983. And in this case, Texas argued that landowners cannot bring suit directly under the Fifth Amendment — and the Fifth Circuit agreed, rather summarily reversing a magistrate’s ruling that noted that Texas’s position would “eviscerate[] hundreds of years of Constitutional law in one fell swoop.” The Court has accepted cert. on “Whether a person whose property is taken without compensation may seek redress under the self-executing takings clause of the Fifth Amendment even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action.”

Wednesday, January 17 — Chevron Deference

These are the heavily anticipated cases (Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo) with huge potential to disrupt the power of executive agencies and the role of the administrative state, by reconsideration of Chevron deference.

A very brief primer: Congress often passes laws with broad policy positions and some directly enforceable language, but then empowers administrative agencies to adopt specific regulations to implement those laws. For example, Congress can’t approve every new pharmaceutical or respond to every newly identified environmental or health hazard, so it sets broad standards and empowers the FDA, EPA, CPSC, OSHA, and other agencies to do so. But when are those statutory standards violated, and how much leeway does the agency have to make that call and set regulations to implement them? Does the release of 3 ppm of chemical compound X violate the Clean Water Act, or should it be okay to discharge 5 ppm? Under “Chevron deference,” when the Congressional language is “ambiguous,” courts defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is “reasonable.”

In recent years, more and more members of the Court have questioned the role and power of administrative agencies. In two cases set for argument today, the Court has signaled an interest in taking on the fundamental question: “Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.”

These are incredibly important cases but it won’t be easy to follow the arguments; the issue is easy to understand in principle, but much more difficult when you try to actually draw lines and deal with implications. The organization that was part of the original Chevron case has an interesting and readable article. Also, an amici brief from administrative law professors might provide helpful background to understanding the arguments. And finally, I strongly recommend you consider this perspective on the implications for civil rights laws.

There are two cases with the same “question presented” but they have not been consolidated for oral arguments. Expect this one to run very long (I’m guessing at least 3 and probably more like 4 hours).