

## **WHY THE CENTURY DATE CHANGE OCCURRED SO SMOOTHLY**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

Although nearly all programmers knew that using two digits to represent years would cause difficulties in the year 2000, repairs in most cases were postponed until the late 1990s. If equipment had not been repaired, world trade and the global economy would have been seriously disrupted. Many people might have died as a result of chemical or nuclear spills or the failure of urban infrastructure. Once the seriousness of the problem was understood, governments, corporations, and associations around the world acted to repair equipment and to prepare for possible disruptions. Although repairs could have been made in the normal process of upgrades, because repairs were not made until time was extremely short, correcting the year 2000 computer problem became the largest technical project in human history. It was the largest management challenge since World War II and the largest example of peacetime cooperation in history. Because the year 2000 computer problem became a multi-disciplinary threat and required a multi-disciplinary solution, it provides an ideal example for illustrating principles and methods from the systems sciences (Umpleby, 1999).

People who had been following the subject were genuinely surprised that the century date change had occurred so smoothly. This paper will answer several questions: What actually happened on January 1? Was there really a problem? Why was there so little disruption? Why were there no problems in countries that seemed to be less prepared, such as Italy? Why were there concerns about Russia? Why were Americans not evacuated from foreign countries thought to be most at risk? Finally, the paper will consider what has been learned from the Y2K experience and what remains to be learned.

## WHAT HAPPENED ON JANUARY 1?

In late January Y2K program managers from national governments, large corporations, and international organizations came together to discuss what had and had not happened. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, England.

On New Year's Eve a lot of equipment was shut down. One report was that electric power consumption was only one third of normal. There were some failures of electric power equipment. However, since demand was low, power could be obtained via the power network from other plants. So consumers did not experience power outages.

In order to keep the Information Coordination Center from being overwhelmed with reports of minor failures, a criterion was established for "reportable failures." However, because of quick fixes there were very few failures that met the criterion of "reportable failures."

The most affected equipment in descending order of frequency of failure were PCs, servers, mainframes, networks, the internet, security systems, and embedded systems. Among failures, 80% were considered to be insignificant; 16% caused brief service interruptions; and 4% caused significant service interruptions.

## WAS THERE REALLY A PROBLEM?

Given the small number of glitches reported and the virtual absence of significant disruptions anywhere in the world, one could reasonably ask whether there was a Y2K problem. Several replies are usually given to this question. First, a large number of knowledgeable executives spent a lot of money to fix equipment. Estimates are that \$500 billion was spent worldwide, that \$100 billion was spent in the U.S., and that almost \$10 billion was spent by the U.S. government. Second, people point to equipment that did in fact fail and note that if repairs had not been made, there would have been many more failures.

Several statements made at the conference illustrate the concerns that people had. Joe Weiss from the Electric Power Research Institute was asked by a rather annoyed member of the audience, "Why didn't you tell people that the electric power grid would work?" Weiss replied, "We did not know that it would work. We thought it would work. We were fairly confident that it would work. We had done everything we could think of to be sure that it would work. But we were not sure. We might have missed something."

A similar statement was made by John Boggs from the International Air Transport Association. He said, "We were uncertain until the last moment." Finally Ed Hillard from Hewlett-Packard/ Agilent said that HP had purchased 60 iridium telephones to be sure that they could communicate among their various field offices. Apparently the people at HP were uncertain whether the telephone system would work. Finally, command centers were set up by businesses and governments around the world. Although one could say that these command centers were set up to reassure the public or to show "due diligence" in case of law suits, those who staffed them were not certain that nothing would happen. Indeed, there were numerous problems that were, in most cases, dealt with quickly.

## WHY WAS THERE SO LITTLE DISRUPTION?

Those who attended the conference were genuinely surprised by the small number of disruptions. Although some said they had not expected major disruptions, no one said that there had been more disruptions than they had expected. Many explanations were offered for why there had been so few disruptions. In some cases problems were avoided by switching to manual operation. It turned out that fewer embedded systems were vulnerable to Y2K failures than was initially feared. Furthermore, there were only six to eight manufacturers of SCADA systems, which were among the systems of greatest concern. These are load-balancing systems which are used in electric power networks, water distribution networks, gas pipelines, chemical and nuclear plants, and even steel mills.

Once embedded systems were recognized as a danger in 1997, people had to learn about them, find them, determine which ones were vulnerable, and then repair or replace the affected systems. This task was called “the world’s greatest Easter egg hunt.” Fortunately, those who started this task early made public what they had learned. Hence, those who started late learned from those who started early. They could look for and replace only the vulnerable equipment. This greatly simplified the task.

Although the cost of not fixing the problem was very high – loss of market share or even bankruptcy – the cost of making repairs was small. The money required to make repairs was usually less than one percent of operating revenues, and often less than half of one percent. In contrast, the cost of converting computer systems to handle the Euro is three to six times more expensive. The small sums of money involved meant that managers did not have to wait for budget approval. They could spend the money immediately and adjust budgets later. This sped up repairs. Once top management became aware of the magnitude of the danger and hence the importance of the project, top management became committed and made the necessary resources available.

Email and the Internet were widely used to increase awareness and to share technical information, and all presenters agreed that the Internet was crucial to the successful outcome. International associations were used to increase awareness, to provide technical information, and to gather reports on vulnerability and progress.

There is low information technology penetration in much of the world. So, many countries simply did not have much equipment that needed to be repaired or replaced. Repairs were thus made quickly, even though some countries started late.

For me the greatest surprise at the conference was the news that multi-national corporations had been very active very early in all the countries in which they operated. Large corporations were acting abroad as they were at home. They not only repaired their own equipment, they also worked with their critical suppliers. For example, Shell Oil Company held awareness-building seminars, conducted technical training seminars, and made available information on vulnerable systems.

There was unprecedented cooperation among all affected organizations – businesses, governments, and associations. Y2K was perceived as a common threat. Due to economic interdependencies, people realized that everyone had to be ready in order for anyone to be ready.

Critical sectors, primarily electric power and telecommunications, were addressed first. After these were fixed, attention was given to less critical equipment.

## WHY WERE THERE NO PROBLEMS IN ITALY AND RUSSIA?

Italy is an example of a country where problems were anticipated. It is an industrially advanced country, which means there is vulnerable equipment, and Italy started late in its attempts to repair its systems. The country did not appoint a Y2K coordinator until late 1998. He did not have an office, staff, or budget for several months. The first government-wide meeting on Y2K was held in Italy in either August or September of 1999. Yet when the Y2K coordinator began checking with key utilities, he was told, "It's been fixed." This sequence of events created both concern and then disbelief. People first worried that Italy had learned about Y2K much too late to repair vulnerable equipment. Then they thought that it was not possible for Italy to have repaired its equipment so quickly. The explanation seems to be that the multi-national corporations had been working with the utilities and key businesses in Italy in order to be sure that they would function. However, apparently no one bothered to inform the government, which learned about the Y2K problem through the United Nations conference for country Y2K coordinators in December 1998.

In the spring and summer of 1999, there were great concerns about Russia's readiness. The issues of concern were nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants, electric power production, and natural gas supplies to Europe. Nuclear missiles cannot be launched without human action, either in the U.S. or Russia. There was no possibility that a computer failure would launch a missile. The danger was that a computerized early warning system might fail to function, and a country might launch its missiles, thinking that it was under attack. To be sure that such misunderstandings did not occur, a shared command center in Colorado was established, and the hotlines between the White House and the Kremlin, which had not been Y2K compliant, were made compliant.

Probably the greatest concerns centered around nuclear power plants and electric power generation. In the spring of 1999, it was learned that the nuclear reactor monitoring systems in Russia and Ukraine were not Y2K compliant. If not repaired, this would necessitate shutting down nuclear reactors. However, when a nuclear reactor is shut down, the reactor core continues to be hot for many months. Electricity is required to circulate cooling water. If the cooling water is not circulated, the water boils off, and the reactor melts down, similar to what happened at Chernobyl. The fossil fuel generating plants did not have the capacity both to provide power to the population and to cool the nuclear reactors. The policy in Russia was that power would be provided first to the nuclear plants and then to the population. This was certainly the correct policy in terms of preventing long-term environmental damage, but it meant that the population would be short of electricity during the winter. At the very least, this would lead to great discomfort.

An additional problem was that there were Y2K problems with the automatic systems of fossil fuel plants in Russia and Ukraine. However, the plants could be operated manually, and they were. Concerted efforts by U.S. and European organizations working with Russian and Ukrainian engineers and managers led to the repair of essential equipment. However, the complete absence of problems in these countries on January 1 was a great surprise for those who had been involved in the efforts.

## THE EVACUATION DILEMMA

The U.S. Departments of State and Defense faced critical decisions in 1999. Should emergency equipment and supplies be pre-positioned overseas in order to protect American

citizens living and working abroad? If supplies should be pre-positioned, where were they needed? Furthermore, should American dependents be evacuated from countries that seemed most at risk? If so, the evacuation of American citizens might lead to social disorder among the local inhabitants and hence to political problems in these countries. In the spring of 1999 U.S. government agencies realized that they needed good information in order to make these decisions.

Eventually, three sources of information were created. First, interagency working groups were formed in each country; that is, in each embassy the representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, U.S. AID, and others shared the task of gathering information about the local utility services. Second, in addition to talking with the local providers, they also talked with people in international organizations who were familiar with the local providers of electricity, water, health care, transportation, etc. Third, the embassies questioned multi-national corporations. In the fall of 1999, there came a time when the people engaged in gathering this information realized that multi-national corporations, which were also at risk due to possible loss of services from the same utilities, did not seem to be greatly concerned. When government officials asked people in the corporations for their assessment, they were told that the corporations had been working with the local utilities, which were in good shape. Hence, by November 1999 the US government had reason to believe that there would be very few significant disruptions around the world. The decision was made not to pre-position large amounts of equipment and supplies and not to evacuate American citizens. However, in Russia and Ukraine embassy employees and their families were allowed to leave if they wanted to.

### **WHY DID THE GOOD NEWS NOT GET OUT?**

Given that the government had information that most equipment had been fixed and that there would be few disruptions, why did this information not get out to the general public? Previously, the government had indicated that, although the electric power grid as a whole would not collapse, local disruptions of power and other utilities could be expected (Bennett, 1999; Koskinen, 1999)

When the press was asked why they did not publicize the good news, the answer was, "Good news is no news." The good news did have the effect of preventing the publication of stories about possible disasters, but it was not considered newsworthy to report that disruptions would not happen.

Other factors were at work as well. Corporations were reporting that they were ready. But it was not clear what "ready" meant. Did that mean that disruptions would not occur or that organizations were ready to deal with disruptions? Were the corporations giving an objective assessment of their situation or speaking for effect – to prevent a loss of customers or a drop in stock prices? The government had long stated that its goals were both to repair equipment and to prevent public panic. So, if officials said that the government and businesses were ready, were they giving a truthful assessment or attempting to prevent public panic? Uncertainty continued to be high, not only for the public, but also for those working on Y2K projects.

## WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

Email and the Web were critical for the successful outcome. There was unprecedented cooperation among businesses and governments. Top management involvement expedited work. International associations acted both to share information and to gather reports on the progress of making repairs.

There were fewer problems with embedded systems, fewer virus attacks, and less “unusual behavior” (meaning public panic) than was expected. Indeed there were fewer problems for customers than usual!

Y2K led to a rise in the perceived importance of the IT sector in businesses and government. Organizations created new maps of their business processes and became more aware of their vulnerabilities to suppliers and to local utilities. Many proclaimed that the IT community rose to the challenge.

Some efforts begun by Y2K projects will continue. For example, the Department of Energy will continue to work with Russian and Ukrainian nuclear plants. The Department of Defense has become more aware of its vulnerabilities. Ambassador Percy Mangoela, head of the UN Informatics Working Group, said that he would try to improve the functioning of UN agencies through greater use of email and the Web.

Y2K was the first crisis of a knowledge society, a crisis created by an error or oversight in man-made equipment (Muller, 2000).

Several reports have now appeared describing how organizations prepared for Y2K and what has been learned (Clarke and Murphy, 2000; McConnell, 2000; Koskinen, 2000). Although most analyses have focused on what IT managers have learned, a broader curiosity is possible. We need to have a better understanding of why people were slow to understand the seriousness of the Y2K problem (Umpleby, 1999). Y2K can be thought of as a large-scale social experiment. Societies around the world were exposed to the same threat at the same time. Consequently there is much that social scientists in many disciplines can learn from Y2K (Umpleby, 2000). It is possible to do studies which compare the response to Y2K in various countries (Pozdniakov and Umpleby, 2000). Important lessons have been learned about the management of information technology and about project management, but there is much more that social scientists and system scientists can learn from Y2K.

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