In today’s era of soundbites, headlines, and short-form media dominance, how politicians, policymakers, and content creators choose to frame the issues they discuss is becoming increasingly salient. In this blog, I will discuss what framing is, how people are using it to persuade others on issues of contraception and abortion, and why it’s important today.
A Brief History of Framing
Theories of framing help us understand the social construction of arguments on contraception, abortion, and the debates for and against each. These topics are particularly loaded, and the people debating them often have strongly held opinions. The way that people frame their arguments for or against contraception and abortion tell us a lot about their values, their beliefs, and the facts they are operating on. Analyzing the frames that groups and individuals employ can help us ‘read between the lines’ and see past the words people are saying through to the meaning they are trying to convey.
Originally stemming from Gregory Bateson’s early work, the literature on framing has grown significantly, and in several different directions. Bateson defined framing as a type of meta-communication, writing that “framing—in the sense of an understanding of the situation—…is dynamically built and altered in and through the parties’ interaction” (94). That is to say, we develop an understanding of the situation we’re in through our interactions with each other. Bateson’s ideas of framing were independently developed in two fields of social science, social psychology (and later, social movements), and policy analysis.
Social psychologist Erving Goffman’s work on symbolic interactionism grew from Bateson’s work and focused on the “definition of the situation” through frames (10). Goffman postulated that frames guide the ways actors in an interaction perceive and interpret their realities and represent these realities to themselves and others. Social movements took this social psychology conception of frames and developed it further. The frames that social movements scholars describe are strategic, conscious, intentional, cognitive attempts at coalition-building. Building on Goffman, David Snow and Robert Benford wrote several core conceptual works on framing and social movements with their work gaining widespread adoption.
Developed separately from the literature on frames in social psychology and social movements, the literature of policy frames was largely developed by Donald Schön and Martin Rein. Schön and Rein took issue with the prevailing political science and policy research literature of the time because it was based on the core assumption that all of the actors in the situation were working from the same starting point or set of facts and was focused on decision-making and problem solving. Instead of problem solving, Schön and Rein argued that policy development was really about problem setting. Schön’s early work discussed how the reality of the problem appears to different policy actors in different, typically irreconcilable ways due to actors’ differing lived experiences, perspectives, roles, and access to information. Schön argued that, because of these different definitions of the reality of the problem, once we’ve settled on a way of thinking about a certain situation, we have a strong desire to stick with it. Schön later joined forces with Martin Rein and developed a body of work on what they termed “intractable policy controversies.” The duo theorized that these controversies were the result of the ‘incommensurable’ values and views that policy actors used to define or frame the policy problem at hand; the resulting incommensurable problem definitions made policy actors unable to agree on the facts of the situation and enabled them to “argue past each other” (95). If we can’t agree on the definition of a problem, it’s going to be impossible to agree on a solution to that problem.
Policy actors often highlight particular features of a situation and name them using language that reflects their conception of the problem, often employing metaphors (ex: family planning, housing decay). In highlighting and naming certain features of the problem, policy actors are inadvertently (according to Rein and Schön) selecting those features and selecting out or ignoring other features. As actors single out and name certain features, they build a coherent narrative and express their conceptualizations of the problem through storytelling. Policy positions then rest on frames, “underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation” (23).
As institutional actors develop their policy frames, there may be a struggle over the naming and framing of the problem, resulting in a framing contest. In framing contests, policy actors try to convince others to join them by emphasizing certain components of their chosen frames. But framing contests are impossible to resolve rationally, as the evidence used by one actor to support their frame is interpreted within the context of the chosen frame of the colleague they are trying to convince: “either new facts can be deemed irrelevant or frames can be modified to include them” (934). For example, those who believe that life begins at conception and those who believe that life begins at fetal viability or birth have incommensurable values and views, causing them to develop incompatible definitions of the policy problem that lead to the intractable policy controversy of abortion legality. Both groups then engage in a framing contest, using their respective frames to persuade others to join them.
Persuasion & Moral Conviction
Persuasive frames, particularly those that invoke emotions of disgust and anger, work to moralize and polarize those that encounter them. Unlike other negative emotions such as sadness or anxiety, both disgust and anger are “other-condemning” emotions that work to suppress and regulate immorality, making them useful tools for persuasion. Persuasive frames that raise concerns of contamination and impurity inspire disgust, which serve to moralize the issues the frames are addressing. Persuasive frames that raise concerns of harm and injustice evoke anger, which not only moralizes the issues the frames are addressing, but also polarizes them.
Once it is established, moral conviction is hard to shake as one’s level of moral conviction on a particular issue tends to remain stable over time. Moral conviction also makes policy controversies all the more intractable by inhibiting discussion; “moral conviction is unique in that moralized claims are perceived as objective statements of fact that are universally applicable to others, regardless of their agreement with the claim” (76).
In their study of debates on state-level abortion restrictions, Mucciaroni and colleagues found that use of morality frames by both sides of the debate increased when one side escalated moralized rhetoric, prompting the other to respond with its own rhetoric in kind; the legislative debates they analyzed conformed to “the logic of a game of tit-for-tat” in which legislators on both sides of the debate generally ‘cooperated’ by focusing on the benefits of their preferred policy but would deviate from this strategy and ‘retaliate’ when their opponents framed the issue at hand in “highly moralized, judgmental terms” (170).
Framing Contraception
Contraception has often been an ‘intractable policy controversy’ in the United States, with many different frames used in arguments concerning contraception over the years. In 1873, the Comstock Act framed contraceptive information and devices as “obscene, lewd, or lascivious,” “immoral,” or “indecent” materials and prohibited their sale, possession, gifting, shipping, or import. The Comstock Act, particularly the sections governing birth control, was robustly enforced and many doctors were arrested and charged after distributing information on how to prevent pregnancy. After much lobbying from contraception advocates like Margaret Sanger, the Second Circuit court allowed a medical exemption to the Comstock Act’s prohibition on the shipment of contraceptive information and devices in their 1936 case U.S. v. One Package of Japanese Pessaries.
While contraceptives were no longer legally considered obscene material on the federal level, the proceeding decades would prove to be a period of progress and contention for contraception. In 1960, the Food and Drug Administration approved the oral contraceptive pill and cultural perceptions of contraceptives began to shift. The Supreme Court established the right for married couples to use contraception in 1965’s Griswold v. Connecticut and seven years later it extended this right to unmarried couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
In the 1960s, motivated by the U.S. “baby boom” and concerns over international population growth, some policy actors began shifting to an economic or class equity frame. The federal government began subsidizing contraceptives in 1964 as part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty and in 1970 Title X of the Public Health Services Act established the first dedicated federal family planning program, further increasing access to contraceptives among low-income individuals. That same year, Congress required states to offer family planning benefits to Medicaid enrollees. While all of these developments pushed contraceptives further into the realm of everyday healthcare and social welfare, there was still significant opposition to this framing, especially among religious groups.
In the landmark 1973 decision Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established the right to an abortion through fetal viability (typically no earlier than 24 weeks of pregnancy). While not directly about contraception, the decision “supplied a new starting point from which disagreements about reproductive issues would be rearticulated” (936). In the decades that followed Roe v. Wade, contraception remained on the American policy agenda through debates about access, appropriate use, and safety and effectiveness as a result of several factors, including: the development of anti-impotence drugs, technologies to improve fertility, and new contraceptives; the increasing use of sex education in public schools; and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, policy actors again shifted frames. Building on the civil rights and women’s rights victories of the preceding decades, policy actors began centering gender equity, integrating the healthcare and economic/class equity frames in a distinctly gendered way. In 2000, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that employers failing to cover contraceptives within prescription drug coverage were engaging in discrimination per Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act). A year later, a federal district court determined in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. that the exclusion of contraceptives from healthcare benefits meant female employees received inferior benefits, again citing Title VII. Despite the progress made in these cases, the issue of insurance coverage for contraception remained unsettled at the national level and the inclusion of contraception under the umbrella of ‘health care’ was uncertain.
In 1998, Maryland became the first state to mandate insurance coverage of contraception by law; 27 states would follow suit by 2011. The Maryland law still allowed exemptions for some religious organizations, deferring to their assertions that contraception was not “regular” health care. In her 2011 analysis of the oral and written testimony to the Maryland legislatures about the mandate, Amy Cabrera Rasmussen built on the work of Schön and Rein and described a framing contest between supporters and opponents of the mandate. In this framing contest, Rasmussen found that supporters used two inclusive frames (a medical frame and a gender (and class) equity frame) and opponents used three exclusionary frames (a market-based frame, a religious frame, and an elective/immoral procedure frame).
Using a medical frame, supporters of the mandate argued from a public health perspective that mandating insurance coverage of FDA-approved contraceptives was just part of providing quality healthcare. They supported their arguments with evidence from the safety and effectiveness studies of the contraceptives in question and linked contraception to positive health outcomes for constituents and cost savings for the government through a reduction in unintended births.
Supporters also used what Rasmussen termed a gender (and class) equity frame, adding class in parentheses to illustrate how supporters were adding elements of class to a more widely used gender equity frame. Supporters used this frame to argue that mandating insurance coverage of contraceptives was an issue of equity, a successful strategy that would later be used in the 2000 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission suit and the 2001 federal district court case Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. mentioned earlier. Supporters often combined this frame with the medical frame, connecting a lack of contraceptive coverage to negative health outcomes that were clearly gendered. They also clearly linked issues of affordability, unintended pregnancies, and the health and well-being of women’s children and families, effectively classing and gendering the issue simultaneously. Supporters used evidence of women’s greater out-of-pocket healthcare costs, much of which were contraceptive costs, to illustrate their point that insurance companies not covering contraceptives placed an additional burden on women alone. Supporters also used the popularity and widespread insurance coverage of the male impotence drug Viagra, introduced earlier that year, to further their argument that the reluctance or refusal of insurance companies to cover contraceptives was evidence of gender bias.
Using a market-based frame, opponents of the mandate argued that mandating insurance coverage of contraceptives was an inappropriate government overreach in response to an issue that was being adequately addressed by the market. These opponents expressed concern about a hypothetical average worker who would need to work more hours to afford the premium increases that may result from the mandate. Rasmussen noted that opponents using this frame did not address issues of gender equity or parity (and surmised that their ‘hypothetical average worker’ must have male) and argued that this placed the market-based frame “firmly in opposition” to the gender (and class) equity frame (944). Other opponents used a religious frame to argue that mandating insurance coverage of contraception constituted “unfair treatment” of Catholics and others who opposed expanding access to contraception for religious reasons (944). These opponents argued that even though there was an exemption process for religious organizations, religious citizens who disagreed with contraceptive accessibility may still have to pay into government programs that included contraceptive coverage.
Opponents using a religious frame also often used an elective/immoral procedures frame, arguing that contraception “belonged outside the range of “regular” health care issues because it was more appropriately categorized as a type of elective health care, akin to abortion and other “lifestyle” services,” arguing that some oral contraceptives acted as abortifacients (945). Framing contraception as a method of triggering abortion (i.e. an abortifacient) is “one of the most powerful ways to place contraception outside the category of health care” (945). One Catholic Bishop particularly disagreed with the premise that contraception was part of basic healthcare for women, arguing that it was more of a solution to a lifestyle issue and comparable to diet drugs, anti-smoking aids, and plastic surgery.
In preparation for an anticipated framing contest surrounding the inclusion of contraceptives in the Affordable Care Act’s preventative care mandate, Rasmussen noted that there had been “a pattern of increasing support for inclusive frames in the context of contraception and health care,” with the gender (and class) equity frame having particular success (948). However, she also noted that many legislators still somewhat respected exclusionary frames, particularly the religious frame, by including religious exemptions and conscience clauses in many of their policies.
Framing Abortion
Framing of abortion has been even more contentious throughout U.S. history. The dominant frame used by the pro-life movement throughout the 20th century was the fetal personhood frame. The fetal personhood frame asserts that because life begins at conception, fetuses are people who are entitled to the full rights of personhood. This allows pro-life activists to assert that abortion is tantamount to murder. This frame has been rejected by the judiciary in a significant number of cases, most notably Roe v. Wade, leaving the frame to activists and lawmakers hoping to make emotional and cultural appeals. Those using the fetal personhood frame often focus on the fetus’s ‘right to life,’ characterize fetuses as ‘babies’ that need to be ‘saved’ and use strategic visual imagery such as pictures of mutilated fetuses or pictures of a fetus’s feet, which develop a resemblance to infant feet early into pregnancy.
Around the turn of the 21st century, as contraception and abortion were steadily gaining public support, the pro-life movement began shifting focus away from the fetus and towards the woman carrying it. Accused for decades of being against women’s rights, the pro-life movement began to reframe and rebrand themselves as pro-woman. Arguing that abortions were dangerous, often coercive, and had long-lasting physical and emotional consequences (such as post-abortion syndrome), pro-life activists began lobbying for abortion restrictions in the name of ‘protecting women.’ A product of gender paternalism, this pro-woman frame offered “strategic opportunities for anti-abortion lawmakers to appear softer and more reasonable than the violent anti-abortion movement of the past” (208). Activists and legislators using this frame typically focus on educating women and protecting them from the harms of abortion resulting from negligent providers, women’s own ignorance, or the medical procedure itself. For example, activists and legislators using this frame often use the language of “offering” women “opportunities,” “education,” and “objective information” about their fetus, often in the form of ultrasounds. While some activists continued using the fetal personhood frame in conjunction with the pro-woman frame (for example, “love them both” campaigns), the pro-woman frame became the dominant frame of pro-life activists and lawmakers in the 2000s and 2010s. In her analysis of 1,706 state-level abortion restrictions proposed in all 50 states from 2008-2017, Amanda Roberti found significant adoption of the pro-woman frame by antiabortion lawmakers: the pro-woman frame was used in 70% of state abortion restrictions while just 38% of the restrictions used the fetal personhood frame.
While not originally created for interpreting debates on abortion specifically, another frame that has been used to interpret debates on abortion is the populist argumentative frame. Introduced by Michael Lee in 2006, this frame distills populism into four key elements: the ‘people,’ their enemy, the ‘system,’ and an “apocalyptic confrontation.” The frame starts with an identifiable, unchanging ‘people’ who are “heroic defenders of “traditional” values” (358). The people share in-group values and beliefs and are characterized as fundamentally good, “ordinary, simple, honest, hard-working, God-fearing and patriotic Americans” (358). Equally important to the identity of the people as their shared characteristics is their shared enemy. In fact, Lee asserts, “the rhetorical development of the “people” and their enemy is a symbiotic process” (359). The two identities are developed in contrast with one another; my enemy is everything I’m not.
Often represented by troubled Washington bureaucrats or political elites, the people’s enemy “has an unyielding commitment to hoarding power and to the destruction of “traditional” values. In whatever manner the “people” and their “traditional” values are defined, the enemy stands in opposition” (359). The enemy has corrupted or defiled a democratic political and economic system that was once fair, creating a crisis that requires action from the people. The ‘system’ is comprised of any number of sites within the political and economic system in which power is distributed and governed. The perversion and co-opting of “the deliberative processes on which the nation was founded” by inside-the-beltway political elites acts as the impetus for an “apocalyptic confrontation” (360). This confrontation acts as recompense for the injustice of the status quo or impending wrongs or crimes and is presented by populist leaders as “the vehicle to revolutionary change. If the system rhetorically accelerates the populist crisis, apocalyptic confrontation is its boiling point, a zero-sum portrayal of a mythic battle” (362).
Cat Duffy used this paradigm to analyze a 2014 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the proposed Women’s Health Protection Act. She found that the populist argumentative frame, occasionally combined with the pro-woman frame, was used by opponents of the bill to derail conversations about women’s health and redirect the focus of the hearing to states’ rights. Opponents of the bill emphasized that existing state-level regulations were ‘common sense,’ that the new bill was radical and overreaching, and that the American public, the ‘people,’ supported the status quo.
The Importance of Framing in the Era of the Algorithm
An incredible amount of information is now conveyed through soundbites, headlines, and video clips often chosen specifically for you by an algorithm focused on keeping your eyes on its app for as long as possible. As discussed earlier, persuasive frames that inspire disgust and anger can be particularly persuasive. Many have suggested that content inspiring anger in particular (especially anger at an out-group ‘other’) keeps viewers’ attention longer and inspires more engagement; TikTok’s algorithm was recently found to privilege extreme misogynistic content. This prioritization of engagement at any cost has led to a phenomenon called ‘rage baiting,’ or purposefully posting content intended to make viewers angry in hopes they will ‘hate watch,’ argue in the comments, or share the content with others. In this way, social media companies’ business models rely on manipulating your emotions; social media algorithms that prioritize engagement effectively pay their creators to make you angry.
These algorithms also fuel the spread of misinformation. Dubious claims about contraception are often featured in short-form video content on platforms like TikTok, YouTube, and Instagram. In a recent study, TikTok videos about oral contraceptives had low reliability and low quality of information; while TikTok videos made by healthcare professionals included more reliable information, they also received less engagement than videos made by non-healthcare professionals. Given many social media platforms’ algorithmic preference for negative content, some creators may be focusing on negative experiences with contraception to increase their engagement, thereby increasing their earnings. In a recent analysis, twice as many TikTok videos about long-acting reversible contraceptives like intrauterine devices (IUDs) were negative in tone than positive and nearly a third mentioned distrust of medical professionals. Nearly half of TikTok creators and three-quarters of YouTube influencers who made videos about birth control recommended discontinuation of contraception.
This wave of contraceptive misinformation and disinformation comes at a critical time for reproductive rights in the United States. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization which overturned Roe v. Wade’s constitutional protections for abortion, conservative and right-leaning lawmakers are pushing further restrictions on contraception and abortion access across the country, and far-right conservatives are increasingly making the argument that “broad acceptance of birth control has altered traditional gender roles and weakened the family.” Some scholars argue that right-wing influencers creating supposed “wellness content” exploiting valid medical mistrust to discredit birth control in an attempt to return to these traditional gender roles is “a form of contraceptive coercion.”
These claims have broad reach and real consequences, with physicians anecdotally reporting an increasing number of patients coming in with concerns about birth control “fueled by influencers and conservative commentators.” Those who expressed concern that prescribed birth control may impact their future fertility (a common misconception about contraception) were less likely to use it, especially hormonal contraception. This particular claim was notably prevalent among adolescents and young adults. These claims are not only harmful on the individual level, they may also help push policy and legislative changes that limit access to hormonal birth control, particularly IUDs and emergency contraceptives which these influencers have characterized as abortifacients.
This makes it all the more important that we understand that all people who create content (politicians, traditional news organizations, influencers, and everyone in between) are doing so with a set goal and are using framing to achieve that goal. For political or “infotainment” content, this usually entails eliciting emotion to persuade viewers while simultaneously ensuring they don’t feel compelled to double check information; the information is so upsetting (and often so reinforcing to your preexisting worldview) that you inherently believe it because it ‘feels true.’ This happens to all of us, none of us should think we’re too smart or savvy to be tricked by framing. Understanding framing will only become increasingly more important with the rise of LLMs and other generative AI.
Looking Forward
In the coming weeks, I will explore three of the frames used by the Trump administration and supporters of the 2019 Title X rule change: the fetal personhood frame, the pro-woman frame (or ‘protecting women’), and the populist argumentative frame. I will give an overview of how the administration and its supporters used these frames in 2019 and explore how they continue to use these frames today.
