Does Land Use Regulation Lower the Average Price of Housing in Cities?

June 2024

Anthony Yezer (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2024-03

Abstract: A substantial empirical literature finds a positive partial relation between indexes of land use regulations and differences in the asset price of  housing among cities. A complimentary theoretical literature concludes that this result arises because planning restricts laissez faire housing supply. The theoretical models use highly stylized characterizations of the effects of land use regulation. This paper provides, for the first time, a formal analysis of the theoretical effects of four stylized specifications of land use restrictions. The sign of the relation between regulation and the average price of housing in cities varies among the four alternatives. Furthermore, analysis of a realistic representation of planning demonstrates that regulation is likely to lower average housing price. Therefore, empirical evidence that housing prices vary directly with regulation could indicate positive amenity effects or benefits of planning and that higher housing prices justify added planning restrictions.

JEL Codes: R14, R31

Key Words: Housing price, land use regulation, standard urban model

Institutions, International Financial Integration, and Output Growth

March 2024

Sunil Sharma (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2024-01

Abstract: The paper investigates the long-run output effects of international financial integration, and in particular their dependence on a country’s institutions as proxied by the quality of governance and the level of domestic financial market development. The econometric framework takes account of heterogeneous short- and long-run dynamics, state-dependent thresholds for governance quality and financial development, cross-sectional dependence, output levels and growth rates, and the potential endogeneity of international financial integration. New indices capturing multiple dimensions of governance quality and domestic financial markets are used. Using a sample of 49 relatively large advanced and emerging market economies over the period 1971-2015, the empirical results suggest that a country’s output benefits from international financial integration if it has sufficiently good governance and a reasonably developed domestic financial system; and above the thresholds such benefits generally increase with measures of good governance and the development of the domestic financial system. Output gains from international financial integration are estimated to be modest, especially for less developed countries.

Estimating Returns to Schooling and Experience: A History of Thought

November 2023

Barry Chiswick (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2023-12

Abstract: This paper is a review of the literature in economics up to the early 1980s on the issue of estimating the earnings return to schooling and labor market experience. It begins with a presentation of Adam Smith’s (1776) analysis of wage determination, with the second of his five points on compensating wage differentials being “the easiness or cheapness, or the difficulty and expense” of acquiring skills. It then proceeds to the analysis by Walsh (1935) estimating the net present value of investments at various levels of educational attainment. Friedman and Kuznets (1945) also used the net present value method to study the earnings in five independent professional practices. Based on the net present value technique, Becker (1964) estimates internal rates of return from high school and college/university schooling, primarily for native-born white men, but also for other demographic groups.
The first regression-based approach is the development of the schooling-earnings function by Becker and Chiswick (1966), which relates the logarithm of earnings, as a linear function of years invested in human capital, with the application to years of schooling. This was expanded by Mincer (1974) to the “human capital earnings function” (HCEF), which added years of post-school labor market experience. Attractive features of the HCEF are discussed. Extensions of the HCEF in the 1970s and early 1980s account for interrupted labor marker experience, geographic mobility, and self-employment and unpaid family workers.

JEL Codes: I24, I26, J3, J46, J61, O15, B290

Key Words: Human Capital, Schooling Earnings Function, Human Capital Earnings Function, Schooling, Labor Market Experience, Women, Immigrants, Less Developed Countries, Self-Employed, Unpaid Workers

Illuminating Africa?

November 2023

Tanner Regan (George Washington University)
Giorgio Chiovelli (Universidad de Montevideo)
Stelios Michalopoulos (Brown University, CEPR and NBER)
Elias Papaioannou (London Business School, CEPR)

IIEP working paper 2023-11

Abstract: Satellite images of nighttime lights are commonly used to proxy local economic conditions. Despite their popularity, there are concerns about how accurately they capture local development in low-income settings and different scales. We compile a yearly series of comparable nighttime lights for Africa from 1992 to 2020, considering key factors that affect accuracy and comparability over time: sensor quality, top coding, blooming, and, importantly, variations in satellite systems (DMPS and VIIRS) using an ensemble, machine learning, approach. The harmonized luminosity series outperforms the unadjusted series as a stronger predictor of local development, particularly over time and at higher spatial resolutions.

JEL Codes: O1, R1, E01, I32

Keywords: Night Lights, Economic Development, Measurement, Africa

International Spillovers of Quality Regulations

June 2023

Ariel Weinberger (George Washington University)
Luca Macedoni (Aarhus University)

IIEP working paper 2023-10

Abstract: This paper investigates the positive international spillover effects of non-discriminatory product regulations, such as quality standards. We incorporate regulations into a multi-country general equilibrium framework with firm heterogeneity and variable markups. We model regulations as a fixed cost that any firm selling to an economy must pay, consistent with stylized facts that we present. We demonstrate that in the presence of variable markups, the fixed cost generates a positive spillover on the rest of the world as it induces entry of high-quality firms, and it improves the terms of trade of the non-imposing countries. We argue that the benefits of such regulations are not fully realized under non-cooperative policy settings, leading to a call for international cooperation in setting regulations. We estimate our model and apply its gravity formulation to quantify the global welfare consequences of altering regulatory policies, the extent of the positive externalities across countries, the effects of cooperation, and the comparison with further tariff liberalization. Our analysis reveals that the entry of new high-quality firms, rather than changes in terms of trade, is the main quantitative driver of international spillovers.

JEL Codes: F12, F13, L11

Keywords: Allocative Efficiency, International Spillover, Quality Standards, Variable Markups, Trade Policy

Outward and Upward Construction: A 3D Analysis of the Global Building Stock

October 2023

Remi Jedwab (GWU & NYU)
Thomas Esch (DLR-DFD)
Klaus Deininger (World Bank)
Daniela Palacios-Lopez (DLR-DFD)

IIEP working paper 2023-09

Abstract: The developing world has built structures on an unprecedented scale to accommodate population growth, demographic change, and urbanisation. The horizontal and vertical structuring of the building stock resulting from this “megatrend construction” strongly influences urban and rural poverty, sustainability, resilience, and quality of life. However, due to data constraints, little is known about how and why 3D building patterns vary globally, and in the developing world in particular. This study uncovers novel facts on global 3D building patterns as a result of outward and upward preferences in construction and investigates their relation to the development process. To this end, novel ground-breaking high-resolution data on the area, height, and volume of the global building stock is combined with a unique series of analyses undertaken at different spatial domains. The results show that building stocks per capita increase convexly with income, but that income only explains two-thirds of international volume differences. Additionally, while building upwards systematically drives international volume differences, low-rise buildings, not high-rise buildings, still dominate construction patterns. Also, megatrend construction is not just a phenomenon of megacities, as small settlements account for the largest share of global building volume. Finally, the presented analyses on construction preferences help assess construction needs by providing crowding measures and forecasting volume requirements in major developing economies.

Keywords: World in 3D; Construction; Urbanization; Vertical and Horizontal Expansion; Development Process; Global Socio-Economic Development; Housing; Poverty; Sustainability

Missing Persons: The case of public participation in AI strategies

August 2023

Susan Aaronson (George Washington University)
Adam Zable (Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub)

IIEP working paper 2023-08

Abstract: Governance requires trust. If policy makers inform, consult and involve citizens in decisions, policy makers are likely to build trust in their efforts. Public participation is particularly important as policy makers seek to govern data-driven technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). Although many users rely on AI systems, they do not understand how these systems use their data to make predictions and recommendations that can affect their daily lives. Over time, if they see their data being misused, users may learn to distrust both the system and how policy makers regulate them. Hence, it seems logical that policy makers would make an extra effort to inform and consult their citizens about how to govern AI systems. This paper examines whether officials informed and consulted their citizens as they developed a key aspect of AI policy — national AI strategies. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), such strategies articulate how the government sees the role of AI in the country and its contribution to the country’s social and economic development. They also set priorities for public investment in AI and delineate research and innovation priorities. Most high-middle-income and high-income nations have drafted such strategies. Building on a data set of 68 countries and the European Union, qualitative methods were used to examine whether, how and when governments engaged with their citizens on their AI strategies and whether they were responsive to public comment. The authors did not find any country which modeled responsive democratic decision making in which policy makers invited public comment, reviewed these comments and made changes in a collaborative manner. As of October 2022, some 43 of the 68 nations and the EU sample had an AI strategy, but only 18 nations attempted to engage their citizens in the strategy’s development. Moreover, only 13 of these nations issued an open invitation for public comment and only four of these 13 provided evidence that public inputs helped shape the final text. Few governments made efforts to encourage their citizens to provide such feedback. As a result, in many nations, policy makers received relatively few comments. The individuals who did comment were generally knowledgeable about AI, while the general public barely participated. Policy makers are therefore missing an opportunity to build trust in AI by not using this process to involve a broader cross-section of their constituents.

JEL Codes: P48, P51, 038

Keywords: trust, AI, political participation, governance

Data Dysphoria: The Governance Challenge Posed by Large Learning Models for Generative AI

August 2023

Susan Aaronson (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2023-07

Abstract: Only 8 months have passed since Chat-GPT and the large learning model underpinning it took the world by storm. This article focuses on the data supply chain—the data collected and then utilized to train large language models and the governance challenge it presents to policymakers These challenges include: • How web scraping may affect individuals and firms which hold copyrights. • How web scraping may affect individuals and groups who are supposed to be protected under privacy and personal data protection laws. • How web scraping revealed the lack of protections for content creators and content providers on open access web sites; and • How the debate over open and closed source LLM reveals the lack of clear and universal rules to ensure the quality and validity of datasets. As the US National Institute of Standards explained, many LLMs depend on “largescale datasets, which can lead to data quality and validity concerns. “The difficulty of finding the “right” data may lead AI actors to select datasets based more on accessibility and availability than on suitability… Such decisions could contribute to an environment where the data used in processes is not fully representative of the populations or phenomena that are being modeled, introducing downstream risks” –in short problems of quality and validity (NIST: 2023, 80). Thie author uses qualitative methods to examine these data governance challenges. In general, this report discusses only those governments that adopted specific steps (actions, policies, new regulations etc.) to address web scraping, LLMs, or generative AI. The author acknowledges that these examples do not comprise a representative sample based on income, LLM expertise, and geographic diversity. However, the author uses these examples to show that while some policymakers are responsive to rising concerns, they do not seem to be looking at these issues systemically. A systemic approach has two components: First policymakers recognize that these AI chatbots are a complex system with different sources of data, that are linked to other systems designed, developed, owned, and controlled by different people and organizations. Data and algorithm production, deployment, and use are distributed among a wide range of actors who together produce the system’s outcomes and functionality Hence accountability is diffused and opaque(Cobbe et al: 2023). Secondly, as a report for the US National Academy of Sciences notes, the only way to govern such complex systems is to create “a governance ecosystem that cuts across sectors and disciplinary silos and solicits and addresses the concerns of many stakeholders.” This assessment is particularly true for LLMs—a global product with a global supply chain with numerous interdependencies among those who supply data, those who control data, and those who are data subjects or content creators (Cobbe et al: 2023).

JEL Codes: 033, 034, 036, 038, P51

Key Words: data, data governance, personal data, property rights, open data, open source, governance

The Effects of Climate Change in the Poorest Countries: Evidence from the Permanent Shrinking of Lake Chad

August 2023

Remi Jedwab (George Washington University)
Federico Haslop (George Washington University
)
Roman D. Zarate
(World Bank)
Carlos RodríguezCastelán
(World Bank)

IIEP working paper 2023-06

Abstract: Empirical studies of the economic effects of climate change (CC) largely rely on climate anomalies for causal identification purposes. Slow and permanent changes in climate-driven geographical conditions, i.e. CC as defined by the IPCC (2013), have been studied relatively less, especially in Africa which remains the most vulnerable continent to CC. We focus on Lake Chad, which used to be the 11th-largest lake in the world. This African lake the size of El Salvador, Israel, or Massachusetts slowly shrunk by 90% for exogenous reasons between 1963 and 1990. While water supply decreased, land supply increased, generating a priori ambiguous effects. These effects make the increasing global disappearance of lakes a critical trend to study. For Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Niger – 25% of sub-Saharan Africa’s population –, we construct a novel data set tracking population patterns at a fine spatial level from the 1940s to the 2010s. Difference-in-differences show much slower growth in the proximity of the lake, but only after the lake started shrinking. These effects persist two decades after the lake stopped shrinking, implying limited adaptation. Additionally, the negative water supply effects on fishing, farming, and herding outweighed the growth in land supply and other positive effects. A quantitative spatial model used to rationalize these results and estimate aggregate welfare losses taking into account adaptation shows overall losses of about 6%. The model also allows us to study the aggregate and spatial effects of policies related to migration, land use, trade, roads, and cities.

JEL Codes: Q54; Q56; Q15; Q20; R11; R12; O13; O44

Key Words: Climate Change; Aridification; Shrinkage of Lakes; Natural Disasters; Environment; Water Supply; Land Supply; Rural Decline; Agricultural Sectors; Adaptation; Land Use; Africa

The Role of Social Connections in the Racial Segregation of US Cities

July 2023

Tanner Regan (George Washington University)
Andreas Diemer
(Stockholm University (SOFI))
Cheng Keat Tang
(Nanyang Tech. University)

IIEP working paper 2023-05

Abstract: We study the extent of segregation in the social space of urban America. We measure segregation as the (lack of) actual personal connections between groups as opposed to conventional measures based on own neighbourhood composition. We distinguish social segregation from geographical definitions of segregation, and build and compare city-level indices of each. Conditional on residential segregation, cities with more institutions that foster social cohesion (churches and community associations) are less socially segregated. Looking at within-city variation across neighbourhoods, growing up more socially exposed to non-white neighbourhoods is related to various adulthood outcomes (jailed, income rank, married, and non-migrant) for black individuals. Social exposure to non-white neighbourhoods is always related to worsening adulthood outcomes in neighbourhoods that are majority non-white. Our results suggest that social connections, beyond residential location or other spatial relationships, are important for understanding the effective segregation of race in America.

JEL Codes: R23, J15

Key Words: Residential and Social Segregation, Networks, Social connectedness

Public Disclosure and Tax Compliance: Evidence from Uganda

June 2023

Tanner Regan (George Washington University)
Priya Manwaring
(University of Oxford)

IIEP working paper 2023-04

Abstract: Public disclosure of tax behavior is a promising policy tool for raising tax compliance in low-income countries with limited capacity for alternative enforcement mechanisms. Through a field experiment involving over 65,000 taxpayers in Kampala, we study effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers and provide evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance. The threat of publicly disclosing delinquency raises compliance, but subsequently disseminating delinquent behavior lowers compliance of others. Public recognition backfires, lowering compliance both for those promised recognition and for those who receive information about compliant taxpayers. These results are consistent with a model of tax evasion with privacy costs to tax eligibility status and limited shame of delinquency. Disseminating tax behavior reduces compliance by lowering compliance beliefs as measured in survey data. Overall, public disclosure policies in this context are limited at raising revenue and enforcement reminder nudges more effective.

JEL Codes: O18, H30, H26

Key Words: property tax, tax morale, public disclosure, shaming

The Occupational Attainment of American Jewish Men in the Mid-19th Century

March 2023

Barry R. Chiswick (George Washington University)
RaeAnn H. Robinson (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2023-03

Abstract: This paper is concerned with analyzing the occupational status of American Jewish men compared to other free men in the mid19th century to help fill a gap in the literature. It does this by using the 1/100 microdata sample from the 1850 Census of Population, the first census to ask occupation. Two independent lists of surnames are used to identify men with a higher probability of being Jewish. The men identified as Jews had a higher probability of being professionals, managers, and craft workers, and were less likely to be in farm occupations or in operative jobs. Using the Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI), the Jewish men have a higher SEI overall. In the multiple regression analysis, it is found that among Jewish and other free men occupational status increases with age (up to about age 44 for all men), literacy, being married, being native born, living in the South, and living in an urban area. Controlling for a set of these variables, Jews have a significantly higher SEI, which is the equivalent of about half the size of the effect of being literate. This higher occupational status is consistent with patterns found elsewhere for American Jews throughout the 20th century.

JEL Codes: N31, J62, J15

Key Words: Jews, Occupational Status, Duncan Socioeconomic Index, 1850 Census of Population, Antebellum America, Labor Market Analysis, Human Capital

Early pension withdrawal as stimulus

February 2023

Steven Hamilton (George Washington University)
Geoffrey Liu (Harvard University)
Tristram Sainsbury (Australian National University)

IIEP working paper 2023-02

Abstract: During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Australian government allowed eligible individuals to withdraw up to A$20,000 (around half median annual wage income) across two tranches from their retirement accounts, ordinarily inaccessible until retirement. Based on historical returns, the modal withdrawal by the modal-aged withdrawer can be expected to reduce their balance at retirement by more than $120,000 in today’s dollars. One in six working-age people withdrew a total of $38 billion (on average, 51% of their balances). These transfers represented a liquidity shock and were much larger than those considered in the literature to date. Using administrative and weekly bank transactions data, we find a high marginal propensity to spend (MPX) given the size of the transfers of at least 0.43 within eight weeks, spread broadly across categories (including around half or more on non-durables) and across withdrawers. The response to the second withdrawal, which two-thirds returned for and which occurred after activity had recovered, was even larger at 0.48. Withdrawal and spending are predicted strongly by numerous measures of poor financial health, high pre-withdrawal rates of cash withdrawal and gambling, and younger age. The MPX of rational, forward-looking but liquidity constrained consumers can be expected to asymptote to zero as the transfer size rises, while that of present-biased consumers can be expected to remain high. Our findings overwhelmingly are consistent with the latter, suggesting roughly 80% of withdrawers were present-biased. In selecting strongly on the present-biased, the program presents a sharp trade-off between effective macroeconomic stimulus and suboptimal retirement saving policy.

JEL Codes: E21, E63, E71, H31, H55, J32

Key Words: Stimulus, retirement saving, marginal propensity to consume, present bias

Exciting, Boring, and Non-Existent Skylines: Vertical Building Gaps in Global Perspective

September 2022

Remi Jedwab (George Washington University)
Jason Barr (Rutgers University-Newark)

IIEP working paper 2022-11

Abstract: Despite the widespread prevalence and economic importance of tall buildings, little is known about how their patterns vary across space and time. We focus on vertical real estate, aiming to quantify differences across major world regions over time (1950-2020). To do so, we exploit a novel database on the location, height (above 55 meters), and year of construction of nearly all tall buildings in the world. We propose a new methodology to estimate the extent to which some world regions build up more than others given similar economic and geographic conditions, city size distributions, and other features. Our analyses reveal that many skylines may visually appear more prominent than they really are once one includes all tall buildings and core controls, which alters how regions are ranked in terms of tall building stocks. Using results by city size, centrality, height of buildings, and building function, we classify world regions into different groups, finding that international tall building stocks are driven by mostly boring skylines of residential high-rises, and to a lesser extent exciting skylines of skyscrapers and office supertall towers. Finally, land-use regulations and preferences, not historical preservation nor dispersed ownership, likely account for most observed differences.

JEL Codes: R14; R30; R38; R31; R33

Key Words: Buildings Heights; Skyscrapers; Global Real Estate; Housing Supply

A Missed Opportunity to Further Build Trust in AI: A Landscape Analysis of OECD.AI

September 2022

Susan Ariel Aaronson (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2022-10

Abstract: OECD.AI is the world’s best source for information on public policies dedicated to AI, trustworthy AI and international efforts to advance cooperation in AI. However, the web site is also a missed opportunity to ascertain best practice and to build trust in AI not just for citizens of reporting nations but for the world. The author came to that conclusion after examining the documentation that nations placed online at OECD.AI. website. She utilized a landscape analysis to group these policies reported to the OECD by country and type, whether the initiative was evaluated or reported on, and whether it provided new insights about best practice trust, in AI, and/or trustworthy AI. Some 61 countries and the EU reported to the OECD on their AI initiatives (for a total of 62). Although the members of the OECD are generally high and high-middle income nations, the 62 governments providing information to OECD.AI represent a mix of AI capacity, income level, economic system, and location. Some 814 initiatives placed on the website as of August 2022, but 4 were duplicative and some 30 were blank, leaving 780. Of these, countries claimed that 48 of these initiatives were evaluated. However, we actually found only four evaluations (and one in progress) with a clear evaluative methodology. Two initiatives were labeled evaluations but did not include a methodology. Many of the other 42 were reports rather than evaluations. In addition, only a small percentage (41 initiatives or 5% of all initiatives) were designed to build trust in AI or to create trustworthy AI systems. National policymakers and not the OECD Secretariat decide what each of the 62 governments choose to put on the site. These officials don’t list every initiative their country implements to foster AI. But their choices reveal their priorities. Most of the documentation focuses on what they are doing to build domestic AI capacity and a supportive governance context for AI. We also found relatively few efforts to build international cooperation on AI, or to strengthen other countries’ AI capacity. Taken in sum, these efforts are important but reveal little effort to build international trust in AI.

JEL Codes: A1, 034, 032, 038, 057

Key Words: AI (artificial intelligence) trust, trustworthy, policies, innovation

Wicked Problems Might Inspire Greater Data Sharing

September 2022

Susan Ariel Aaronson (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2022-09

Abstract: Global public goods are goods and services with benefits and costs that potentially extend to all countries, people, and generations. Global data sharing can also help solve what scholars call wicked problems-problems so complex that they require innovative, cost effective and global mitigating strategies. Wicked problems are problems that no one knows how to solve without creating further problems. Hence, policymakers must find ways to encourage greater data sharing among entities that hold large troves of various types of data, while protecting that data from theft, manipulation etc. Many factors impede global data sharing for public good purposes; this analysis focuses on two. First, policymakers generally don’t think about data as a global public good; they view data as a commercial asset that they should nurture and control. While they may understand that data can serve the public interest, they are more concerned with using data to serve their country’s economic interest. Secondly, many leaders of civil society and business see the data they have collected as proprietary data. So far many leaders of private entities with troves of data are not convinced that their organization will benefit from such sharing. At the same time, companies voluntarily share some data for social good purposes. However, data cannot meet its public good purpose if data is not shared among societal entities. Moreover, if data as a sovereign asset, policymakers are unlikely to encourage data sharing across borders oriented towards addressing shared problems. Consequently, society will be less able to use data as both a commercial asset and as a resource to enhance human welfare. This paper discusses why the world has made so little progress encouraging a vision of data as a global public good. As UNCTAD noted, data generated in one country can also provide social value in other countries, which would call for sharing of data at the international level through a set of shared and accountable rules (UNCTAD: 2021). Moreover, the world is drowning in data, yet much of that data remains hidden and underutilized. But guilt is a great motivator. The author suggests a new agency, the Wicked Problems Agency, to act as a counterweight to that opacity and to create a demand and a market for data sharing in the public good.

JEL Codes: 024,034/032, 038, 045, C45 

Key Words: data, AI, public good, wicked problems, data-sharing

Ajay Chhibber’s 10/4/22 Letter to the Editor in the Financial Times

Letter: IMF is just doing its job, calling out the UK’s stance

From Ajay Chhibber, Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University

 

 

The article “IMF attack on Britain divides opinion” (Report, October 1) was not so much an attack on Britain as an admonishment of the irresponsible and erratic fiscal policy of the new UK government led by Prime Minister Liz Truss and Kwasi Kwarteng, her chancellor. The IMF has in the past been accused of soft-pedalling and self-censorship when it comes to bad policies in richer countries, especially in the G7, and it is good to see it step up to the plate and call it as it sees it — a poorly designed fiscal programme in an advanced G7 country. The IMF must be the premier institution for global macroeconomic policy and financial stability. It must be allowed to provide proper surveillance and comment on G7 country policies which can harm themselves but also have huge spillover effects on the global economy.

Ajay Chhibber Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University; Non-Resident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, US

Quantifying the impact of the latest U.S. tariff sanctions on Russia – a sectoral analysis

August 2022

Simon A. B. Schropp (George Washington University)
Christian Lau (Sidley Austin LLP)
Olim Latipov (Sidley Austin LLP)
Kornel Mahlstein (Sidley Austin LLP)

IIEP working paper 2022-08

View the technical appendix here

Abstract: Following the recent G7 Summit in Germany, the United States announced a new sanction package that imposes significantly higher tariffs on products from Russia. These tariff increases concern 570 groups of products affecting more than $2 billion in imports from Russia. The declared objective of these tariff increases is to impose steep economic costs on Russia, while minimizing costs to U.S. consumers. The United States is also considering disbursement of revenues collected from these new tariffs to Ukraine.
Using a sector-specific partial-equilibrium model and the most reliable data available, this paper quantifies the welfare impact that the U.S. tariff increases will have on the Russian and the U.S. economies, respectively. We find that the new U.S. tariff sanctions will affect $2.6 billion of U.S. imports from Russia (or 8.7% of total U.S. imports from Russia). Moreover, these new tariff measures may decrease Russian welfare by $181 million per year, while imposing annual costs of $90 million on U.S. consumers. The United States can hope to collect $241 million per year in tariff revenues that may then be used to financially support Ukraine.
Our sectoral analysis shows that the U.S.’ choice of target sectors produces mixed results. On one hand, the sanctions cover dozens of sectors whose inclusion produce particularly large welfare losses to Russia and/or high welfare gains to the United States. Yet, the sanctions package also raises serious questions about its effectiveness for other sectors. For example, higher tariffs for several selected sectors result in zero harm to Russia, and/or greater harm to the United States than to Russia. These and other insights may provide guidance for the design of future tariff sanctions by G7 Members and other Allies.

JEL Codes: F02, F13, F15, F52

Key Words: International trade; Russia; economic sanctions; import tariffs; economic impact; partial equilibrium; sectoral analysis; welfare analysis; pass-through

Ask a local: Improving the public pricing of land titles in urban Tanzania

June 2022

Tanner Regan (George Washington University)
Martina Manara (London School of Economics)

IIEP working paper 2022-07

Abstract: Information on willingness-to-pay is key for public pricing and allocation of services but not easily collected. Studying land titles in Dar-es-Salaam, we ask whether local leaders know and will reveal plot owners’ willingness-to-pay. We randomly assign leaders to predict under different settings then elicit owners’ actual willingness-to-pay. Demand is substantial, but below exorbitant fees. Leaders can predict the aggregate demand curve and distinguish variation across owners. Predictions worsen when used to target subsidies, but adding cash incentives mitigates this. We demonstrate that leader-elicited information can improve the public pricing of title deeds, raising uptake while maintaining public funds.

JEL Codes: O17; H40; R21; D80

Key Words: property rights; willingness-to-pay; public pricing; local publicly provided goods

Modernizing and Reshaping the Bretton Woods Institutions for the 21st Century

September 2022

Ajay Chhibber (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2022-06

Abstract: This paper lays out the contours of a reformed Bretton Woods Institutions – the IMF, the World Bank Group (WBG) and the WTO – that the world needs for the 21st century. Some of the challenges the world faces today – rising inequality, growing nationalism and protection are what led to World War II from whose ruin emerged the current Bretton Woods international financial architecture. While these institutions performed well over their first 50 years – they have been struggling in more recent times as problems of rising inequality, financial instability and protectionism have re-emerged. But in addition, the threat of climate change and ecological stress, rising disasters, and a more inter-connected world with new threats like cyber-security and pandemics require a new international financial architecture. A modernized and re-invigorated set of Bretton Woods institutions to help address and mitigate these challenges, with a global remit and the mandate to monitor agreed global rules and enhanced resources not only to help individual countries but also to address global problems.

JEL Codes: F40, F60, F02, E00, Q00, G20

Key Words: Bretton Woods, IMF, WTO, World Bank

Consumption Cities vs. Production Cities: New Considerations and Evidence

June 2022

Remi Jedwab (George Washington University)
Elena Ianchovichina (The World Bank)
Federico Haslop (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2022-05

Abstract: Cities dramatically vary in their sectoral composition across the world, possibly lending credence to the theory that some cities are production cities with high employment shares of urban tradables while others are consumption cities with high employment shares of urban non-tradables. A model of structural change highlights three paths leading to the rise of consumption cities: resource rents from exporting fuels and mining products, agricultural exports, and premature deindustrialization. These findings appear to be corroborated using both country- and city-level data. Compared to cities in industrialized countries, cities of similar sizes in resource-rich and deindustrializing countries have lower shares of employment in manufacturing, tradable services and the formal sector, and higher shares of employment in non-tradables and the informal sector. Results on the construction of “vanitous” tall buildings provide additional evidence on the relationship between resource exports and consumption cities. Finally, the evidence suggests that having mostly consumption cities might have economic implications for a country.

JEL Codes: O11; E24; E26; O13; O14; O18; R1; R12

Key Words: Structural Change; Urbanization; Consumption Cities; Macro-Development Economics; Industrialization; Natural Resources; Deindustrialization; Construction

The Vortex Book Launch Event

Monday, April 25th, 2022
12:00 – 1:30 p.m. ET
via Zoom

Picture of Jason and Scott holding their newbook

IIEP was to invite you to this event, co-sponsored by the Humanitarian Action Initiative (HAI), the Master of Arts in International Affairs (MAIA) program at the Elliott School, and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. Authors Jason Miklian and Scott Carney presented and hosted a discussion of their new book, The Vortex: A True Story of History’s Deadliest Storm, an Unspeakable War and Liberation. It is a timely book that tells the story how a storm that killed half a million people in 1970 is an omen for the worst case scenarios of our collective climate change nightmare. This incredible true story is told through the eyes of a soccer star turned soldier, a Miami weatherman, a drunken and genocidal President, a Boston teacher turned aid worker and a student turned revolutionary who all played crucial roles in Bangladesh’s birth. Drawing upon more than 1,000 sources and interviews compiled over five years, The Vortex shows why every new megastorm is a roll of the dice that can obliterate existing political order and rip societies into conflict.

Professors Marcus D. King and Deepa Ollapally (George Washington University) provided discussant remarks.

About the Speakers:

Picture of Jason MiklianJason Miklian, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Development and Environment, University of Oslo. Miklian has published over 60 academic and policy works on issues of conflict and crisis, based on extensive fieldwork in Bangladesh, Colombia, India, and the Congo. He serves on the United Nations Expert Panel on Business and Human Rights, has won several awards for his academic publications, and serves as an expert resource for various government knowledge banks in the US, UK, EU and Norway. Miklian has also written for or been cited in an expert capacity by the New York Times, BBC, The Economist, Washington Post, Financial Times, France 24, The Guardian, The Hindu (India) and NPR.

 

Picture of Scott CarneyScott Carney is an investigative journalist and anthropologist, as well as the author of the New York Times bestseller What Doesn’t Kill Us. He spent six years living in South Asia as a contributing editor for WIRED and writer for Mother Jones, NPR, Discover Magazine, Fast Company, Men’s Journal, and many other publications. His other books include The Red Market, The Enlightenment Trap and The Wedge. He is the founder of Foxtopus Ink, a Denver-based media company.

 

 

About the Discussants:

Deepa OllapallyPicture of Deepa Ollapally is is a political scientist specializing in Indian foreign policy, India-China relations, and Asian regional and maritime security. She is Research Professor of International Affairs and the Associate Director of the Sigur Center. She also directs the Rising Powers Initiative, a major research program that tracks and analyzes foreign policy debates in aspiring powers of Asia and Eurasia. Dr. Ollapally is currently working on a funded book, Big Power Competition for Influence in the Indian Ocean Region, which assesses the shifting patterns of geopolitical influence by major powers in the region since 2005 and the drivers of these changes. She is the author of five books including Worldviews of Aspiring Powers (Oxford, 2012) and The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge, 2008). Her most recent books are two edited volumes, Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia (Routledge, 2017), and Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). Dr. Ollapally has received grants from the Carnegie Corporation, MacArthur Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Asia Foundation for projects related to India and Asia. Previously, she was Associate Professor at Swarthmore College and has been a Visiting Professor at Kings College, London and at Columbia University. Dr. Ollapally also held senior positions in the policy world including the US Institute of Peace, Washington DC and the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India. She is a frequent commentator in the media, including appearances on CNN, BBC, CBS, Diane Rehm Show and Reuters TV. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

 

Marcus D. KingPicture of Marcus King is a John O. Rankin Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Elliott School’s Master of Arts in International Affairs Program. King previously served as Director of Research and Associate Research Professor. As a professor, Dr. King draws on experience in public service, research, and the private sector. He joined the Elliott School in 2011 from the research staff of CNA Corporation’s Center for Naval Analyses where he directed studies on security, resilience, and adaptation aspects of climate change. He was also Project Director for the CNA Military Advisory Board (MAB), an elite group of retired admirals and generals constituted to provide recommendations and reports on how these topics affect U.S. national security. From 2003 to 2006, King was Research Director of the Sustainable Energy Institute; and Senior Manager for Energy and Security Programs at a private consultancy. During the Administration of President William Clinton, he held Presidential appointments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where he represented the United States for negotiation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Office of the Secretary of Energy where he directly supported the Deputy Secretary and participated in negotiations on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the Russian Federation. Dr. King served as a globalization planning fellow in Georgetown University’s Office of the President and as an adjunct assistant professor. He is a member of the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board. His present research focuses on identifying ties between water scarcity and large-scale violence. King is a regular contributor to radio, television and print media.

 

China’s Irreconcilable Choices on Ukraine

Friday, April 22, 2022,

11 a.m.-12:30 p.m. ET

Lindner Family Commons (in-person) and via Zoom

At this event Evan Feigenbaum will discuss how China bridges the geo-economic and geo-political terrain in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. How does China manage its relationships with the U.S. and Russia? How do they triangulate? How can China simultaneously be an ally to Russia and a stakeholder in the global system? Immediately following his keynote remarks, we’ll hear from discussants from the economic angle and the Eurasian/Russian angle to flesh out other viewpoints and highlight tricky issues. The event will conclude with a robust audience Q&A.

Speaker

Evan A. Feigenbaum is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi on a dynamic region encompassing both East Asia and South Asia. He was also the 2019-20 James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, where he is now a practitioner senior fellow. Initially an academic with a PhD in Chinese politics from Stanford University, Feigenbaum’s career has spanned government service, think tanks, the private sector, and three major regions of Asia. He is the author of three books and monographs, including The United States in the New Asia (CFR, 2009, co-author) and China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford University Press, 2003), which was selected by Foreign Affairs as a best book of 2003 on the Asia-Pacific, as well as numerous articles and essays.

Discussants

Michael Moore received his B.A. in liberal arts from the University of Texas at Austin and his M.S. and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is Director of the Masters of Arts in International Economic Policy program and has been a faculty member at the Elliott School since receiving his doctorate in 1988. Professor Moore teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in international trade theory and policy as well as international macroeconomics. He also has taught international economics to US diplomats at the Foreign Service Institute and students at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Sciences-Po) in Paris. He has published in numerous academic journals including the Journal of International Economics, International Trade Journal, Canadian Journal of Economics, Review of International Economics, European Journal of Political Economy, and Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, and has been a contributor to five books. His commentary has appeared in numerous media outlets, including The Washington PostThe Financial Times, CNN, CBC, NPR, and NBC.

 

This event is part of our China conference series and is cosponsored by the Sigur Center and GW-CIBER.

Review of Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress, by Steven Pinker

Originally published 1/28/2022

Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress, by Steven Pinker, New York: Viking, 2018.

Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress is a remarkable book. It offers a concise summing up of ideas of the Enlightenment. Subsequent scientific discoveries, research and accumulated data are deployed in defense of the Enlightenment – and its associated ideas of progress in history – with great force of argument. The book offers a compelling perspective on the human project of building a better world, drawing on two centuries of improvements in individual wellbeing; this is placed in a contemporary social context, offering an insightful diagnosis of current social problems, and proposed applications of Enlightenment ideas as a basis for addressing them. The book has limits; Pinker’s sometimes narrow reading of the economics literature leads him to underestimate the scope of challenges to addressing problems including extreme inequality. But even adding the needed nuances – and acknowledging the salience of some existential threats – still leaves a strong case for predicting continued human progress. As one would anticipate, Pinker’s science-championing case for the existence of progress is evidence-based; this represents about three quarters of the book. He argues that history since the Enlightenment represents improvements in essentially every human dimension, and mostly on this basis he predicts that these trends will continue. He presents data from a variety of sources showing social progress along many dimensions – a picture that specialists may take for granted but the majority of other readers are unlikely to be (fully) familiar with, including improvements in life expectancy, incidence of diseases, indicators of food insecurity, education levels, poverty, average income and working conditions.

In a broad review of historical trends, Pinker discusses a range of indicators of progress. In the category of harm reduction this includes much reduced incidence of wars, use of cruel and capital punishment, and violence in general. In expansion of human wellbeing this includes improved measured happiness and the greater extent of democracy and rights. For some of his points, he seems more vulnerable to a critique of simple extrapolation into the future, at a moment when there are reasons to anticipate a discontinuity, or major regime change. Pinker acknowledges that we face substantial challenges; but relies too much on an arguement that current problems can be viewed as similar to ones that humanity has successfully overcome in the past.

Pinker makes the claim of progress also for the extent and stability of legal environmental protections. It is reasonable to argue on the basis of history that protections and many improvements, for example under US law, will ultimately prove resilient, supported by continued rapid growth of knowledge – despite renewed political opposition in the U.S. Pinker acknowledges that we will be strongly challenged by climate change, and by the political difficulties in establishing and then enforcing international agreements. But he does not sufficiently explain and explore the qualitative difference between addressing externalities in a country and global public goods to demonstrate that his arguments are fully developed. The difficulties of providing needed global public goods represent a serious threat to continued progress. While there is plenty of room for optimism, success is too far from guaranteed to be convinced solely by the arguments here.

If there are well-defined mechanisms leading to the prediction of a permanent positive slope to the process of progress, then it would be advantageous for it to be spelled out more explicitly and precisely. In the meantime, Pinker relies primarily on his interpretation of the historical experience that in the past humans have repeatedly successfully risen to the main challenges of the day. He makes this argument as well as anyone; but the argument is still an inherently limited one. However, Pinker’s arguments for a virtuous cycle of progress, though not fully spelled out, do suggest one plausible mechanism: that education drives progress in moral as well as other spheres, and that the historical process put into place by the Enlightenment drives further education. (In principle, this could be modeled, and tested in its implications.) Education has already been demonstrated to have many positive effects; these include increased income, health, longevity, freedom of choice, and happiness; and reduced criminal behavior and other social pathologies.

In the chapter on education, Pinker refers to attitudinal evidence that “educated people really are more enlightened, less racist, sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, and authoritarian. They place a higher value on imagination, independence and free speech. They are more likely to vote, volunteer, express political views, and belong to civic associations… they are also likelier to trust their fellow citizens.” Thus Pinker’s view is that through education, rationality can be nurtured in individuals; and that both education and rationality appear to grow and develop together in societies over time.

For the education sector, Pinker emphasizes training in rational critical thinking; and learning about how to recognize and counter cognitive biases – which, he points out, must be done in a pedagogically viable matter or otherwise may be a waste of time. Daniel Kahneman, the Nobel laureate in Economics, along with other behavioral economics researchers, have identified many cognitive biases. One of the most consequential is confirmation bias, the human propensity to accept data or arguments that fit with our own opinions, much more rapidly than those that are contrary to them. But with proper motivation, most likely in an educational setting, by learning about these biases and practicing methods to counteract them, individuals can get to the truth much more quickly.

Pinker supports requiring students to explain the reasons for their opinions, which in itself may make people conscious of implicit assumptions, and problems in their own thinking of which they were unaware. Another tactic is requiring students to have experiences taking each side of debates, particularly switching sides in the middle of a debate. These approaches assume that teachers who are committed to rationality will (continue to) design and manage the educational system. Relying on school lessons may be a very gradual process for making progress indeed. Pinker repeatedly points out the greater degree of rational thinking among millennials (so far) than among boomers. In fact, at one point in the book he suggests that progress is made one funeral at a time. I doubt I have ever a read a sentence so simultaneously optimistic and gloomy…

Pinker emphasizes that the case for science rests both on the inherent value of knowledge, and the fact that science is a necessary foundation for almost all other forms of progress on human wellbeing. His case for humanitarianism is well presented, drawing on the philosophies of Spinoza, Kant, Hobbes, Rawls, Sen, and Nussbaum, among others (even if the effect may be more to cheer up and energize the children of the Enlightenment than to convince anyone else). However, in matters such as the impacts of extreme inequality, Pinker does not seem to take into account the full arguments and implications of Rawls, Sen, and others. The book tries to be global in perspective and it is because of the limitations of data that the evidence may be viewed as relatively weighted toward recent Western history. Given that, I did not think he was as overly relying on European history as a guide as it might otherwise appear. He argued that enlightenment themes had emerged in other cultures in other times; and that the positive trends over the last
two or three centuries that he cited apply not just to the west but also to the “rest,” at least wherever data were available.

In his chapter on reason, Pinker deserves credit for featuring so prominently a theory that makes his case for the near-inevitability of progress more challenging. He explains Dan Kahan’s important cultural cognition theory that the problem of people holding onto false beliefs goes further in its implications than the well-known confirmation bias problem discussed earlier, that people give more weight and indeed seek out evidence that supports their prior beliefs and less weight to evidence that is contrary to their prior beliefs. Pinker reviews literature explaining how the problem
is even more difficult to solve; and can lead to higher social costs in that the costs of cognitive bias-related behavior are potentially far higher than individual costs to those who hold or espouse them.

Pinker cites Kahan as saying that beliefs can become symbols of cultural allegiance; and that people either confirm or deny the beliefs they hold in order to express who they are – not what they know. Moreover, a given belief – depending on how that belief is framed and who are seen to support it – can become a way of expressing and demonstrating allegiance to one cultural group. And that in this sense a belief signifies not factual understanding but rather the fact of sharing values of a group with which one identifies. As a result, if one belief is associated with the beliefs of a person’s own social-identity group, they will have a strong tendency to accept it and downplay even strong arguments against it. Beliefs commons are apparently amplified with social media, as with resurgent climate denialism. Since the book was published, more examples have emerged, such as beliefs in the ineffectiveness (or even harm) of wearing a mask, dangers of covid vaccines, and imaginary voting machine conspiracies. In Kahan’s approach, the failure of people to acknowledge the validity of scientifically demonstrated results does not signify their ignorance, let
alone stupidity.

Importantly, Pinker notes Kahan’s argument that this behavior can be understood as rational and self-interested; and that the result can be a kind of large scale market failure that Kahan calls the “tragedy of the belief common.” The analysis essentially compares the benefits and costs of adopting scientifically false beliefs for an individual, with costs and benefits for society as a whole. For example, if a social conservative were to express that he accepts the evidence on human-caused global warming, then the benefits to him personally are very small, in that almost no one can individually have an effect on major policies such as those to address climate change. But the costs for the individual expressing them may be substantial, if it makes him appear not to be a fully committed member of his social-identity group. Thus the individual costs for making a statement that he knows to be factual, but that is considered almost heretical in his group, may be much larger than the benefits to the individual. And the result may be that everyone in that group (let alone others) is harmed, such as by extreme impacts of climate change in the future. But there remains room for optimism, in that if Kahan has identified a fundamental “social cognitive bias trap” then it should be to our benefit that we are more aware of it, so that we can begin to address it.

Pinker notes that unscientific beliefs – such as that there is no global warming – are not perfectly correlated with other scientific assessments for which evidence is strong. This is a reason for some optimism. Pinker states that people may change their mind sometimes quickly and sometimes at the same point as others in their group changed their minds when the evidence becomes very strong, such as when it becomes something that they can see directly. This could represent a kind of rapid shift from one stable equilibrium to another. A partly complementary explanation is the role of social signaling. It is costly for a person to adopt scientifically illiterate positions (such as climate denialism) if they have important relationships outside their belief commons group – even though taking such stands can establish their membership credentials among others in the belief commons. But to the extent adopting unscientific beliefs harms a person’s standing outside their (narrower) social reference group, they would be glad to abandon their public adherence to it. Thus if that signal starts to become less salient to group membership, they may be happy to stop sending it as soon as possible…

Regarding the dramatic progress against extreme poverty, Pinker’s accurate criticism of the fallacy of conflating absolute poverty with relative inequality is necessary and important. Discussing changes in inequality as if they were the same as changes in poverty is a fundamental error made in many discussions about matters of progress. Indeed this point can be argued even more strongly than in the book. This may have helped readers to appreciate the gains against poverty, on which – fortunately – Pinker is largely correct. Although he relies on limited sources, a wider survey would have further strengthened the case that progress against poverty has been stunning and historic.

On the other hand the weight of the evidence thus far shows that high and rising inequality do in fact pose other fundamental problems to society and the economy. Unfortunately, Pinker followed his good presentation of gains against poverty with a discussion of inequality that appeared to show a lack of appreciation of mechanisms by which extreme inequality poses genuine risks to society, democratic polity, and economic growth. There is no mention of the strong evidence that these negative effects have occurred both historically and recently. Pinker draws on only a very select part of the literature on the negative impact of inequality on growth, such as some work by sociologists, whom he says “most damagingly” drives a nail in the coffin of the idea of negative effects of inequality. In recent years, economics has been able to expand its causal analysis, including not only results of randomized controlled trials, but also through a range of well established statistical methods that can be “as good as random.” Using such methods, rigorous, convincing economic studies have confirmed that extreme inequality slows growth and retards the progress of other indicators of human wellbeing, including health. The effects of inequality can operate over the very long term, such as by leading to socially unproductive institutions that are very difficult to alter; and by driving the particular direction of technology in ways that can cause lasting harm. No society can be said to be immune to stagnation traps.

Moreover, Pinker’s evidence – from limited sources – that people are concerned about their absolute wellbeing and not with fairness or with relative comparisons also misses convincing evidence from both psychology and economics that people do indeed care very much about their relative standing, and will in effect give up money to be in a less unequal environment. And while of course perceptions of relative status and unfairness are not identical and should not be conflated, research has separated these concepts carefully and concluded that each are important and can have negative effects. Pinker concludes over-emphatically stating that “Economic inequality, then, is not itself a dimension of human wellbeing.” This is not just a matter of perspective; it is an empirical question, and a topic being studied with ever-improving research methods. One would not make such a statement about the structure of Jupiter, or some other subject on which active research continues, let alone when it contravenes the weight of the evidence to date. Thus, ironically, this part of the book seemed more “ideological” than scientific. In addition to the empirical evidence, from a philosophical viewpoint Pinker’s earlier presentations of ideas of Rawls, Sen, and Nussbaum, are not followed up for their explicit implications for the individual harm caused by extreme inequality, in my reading making this after all an essential dimension of wellbeing. Hopefully, Pinker’s tangent will not lead readers to assume there must be something wrong with the many other parts of the book that he got right.

A couple more quibbles: Although the existential risk of artificial general- (or super-) intelligence is outside both his and my expertise, I thought Pinker underestimated the risks. In my reading, he downplayed them to a greater extent than some of the experts he counted as in the not-worrying camp. The timing of the concerns may be further in the future than some project, but it is a challenge unlike any other that humanity has faced. In a more general sense, his arguments rely on the assumption that several other existential risks are also not high. And social acceptance of the findings of science, including those necessary to address deep challenges, is not guaranteed. The strength of reaction could potentially continue to grow stronger, the more “threatening” the advances of science become to some world-views. This type of reaction can be found in developing and developed societies alike.

However, Pinker’s examples of successful progress toward more civilized norms and behaviors over time are numerous and impressive. One reason this is important is that it became difficult to defend the idea of moral progress after the Holocaust and other horrors of the 20th Century. This book provides a perspective that deserves attention, as Pinker presents data showing different forms of progress over the decades and centuries. For example, violence, wars, and genocides have been steadily decreasing, when viewed over a sufficiently long time horizon.

Despite a few drawbacks from an economics perspective, and some overly stretched conclusions, this is a very important book, and I have been recommending it very widely.

How Benchmarks Affect International Asset Allocations and Capital Flows

Originally published on August 22, 2017

As financial intermediaries tracking popular stock and bond market indexes (“benchmarks”) grow in importance around the world, the issue of which countries belong to relevant international benchmark indexes (such as the MSCI Emerging Markets) has generated significant attention in the financial world (Financial Times, 2015). The reason is that the inclusion/exclusion of countries from widely followed benchmarks has implications for the allocation of capital across countries.

As institutional investors become more passive, they follow benchmark indexes more closely. These benchmark indexes change over time, as index providers reclassify countries, implying that investment funds have to re-allocate their portfolio among the countries they target. The capital flows generated by these portfolio re-allocations are important because worldwide open-end funds that follow a few well-known stock and bond market indexes manage around 37 trillion U.S. dollars in assets (ICI, 2016).

As we document in a recent study (Raddatz, Schmukler, and Williams, 2017), these changes in benchmark indexes can produce unexpected effects in international capital flows, caused by portfolio reallocations of both passive and active institutional investors. These reallocations are not necessarily related to economic fundamentals, and affect asset prices as benchmark changes are implemented.

As institutional investors become more passive, they follow benchmark indexes more closely.

One clear example of these unexpected reallocations happened when MCSI announced in 2009 that it would upgrade Israel from emerging to developed market status, moving it from the MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index to the World Index. When the upgrade became effective in May 2010, Israel faced equity capital outflows of around 2 billion dollars despite its better status. The reason is that Israel became a smaller fish in a bigger pond. Israel’s weight in the MSCI EM Index decreased from 3.17 to 0, while it increased from 0 to 0.37 in the MSCI World Index. Israeli stocks in the MSCI index fell almost 4 percent in the week of the announcement and significantly underperformed the stocks not included in the index. The week prior to the effective date (when index funds rebalanced their portfolio) there was a 4.2 percent drop in the MSCI Israel Index, versus a 1.5 fall in the Israeli stocks outside the index.

The effects of index reclassifications go beyond the countries and asset classes being specifically targeted. Spillovers could occur to other countries that share a certain benchmark with countries affected by reclassifications. A clear example of this is the upgrade in June 2013 of Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the MSCI Frontier Markets (FM) Index to the MSCI EM Index. Together, these two countries were around 40 percent of the MSCI FM Index before the reclassification. When this reclassification took place, funds tracking closely the MSCI FM Index had to sell securities from these two countries and use the money to invest in the rest of the countries in the MSCI FM Index. This resulted in significant capital inflows and stock market price increases in countries such as Nigeria, Kuwait, and Pakistan.

These movements in financial markets have led to speculations and market movements related to potential new reclassifications.

These movements in financial markets have led to speculations and market movements related to potential new reclassifications. One recent and prominent example is that of China. For the past two years, MSCI delayed numerous times the introduction of China A-shares as a part of the MSCI Emerging Markets. Finally, in June 2017, it confirmed the inclusion of only a fraction of these stocks, creating capital inflows into the Chinese stock markets, and increases in stock prices (Financial Times, 2017). Chinese sovereign bonds may see similar capital inflows if J.P. Morgan, Citibank, and Barclays decide to add China into their flagship bond indexes (CNBC, 2017).

Academics, financial institutions, and policy makers have already started paying attention to the potential effects of benchmarks on capital flows and asset prices, as well as on herding, momentum, and risk taking (BIS, 2014; Arslanalp and Tsuda, 2015; IMF, 2015, Shek, Shim, and Shin, 2015; Vayanos and Woolley, 2016). More work in this area would be welcomed as passive investing continues expanding.

Looking for the full paper? Visit our website for Williams’s “International Asset Allocations and Capital Flows: The Benchmark Effect” and more work from our affiliates.

References

Arslanalp, S., Tsuda, T., 2015. Emerging Market Portfolio Flows: The Role of Benchmark-Driven Investors. IMF Working Paper 15/263, December.

BIS, 2014. International Banking and Financial Market Developments. BIS Quarterly Review.

CNBC, 2017. Chinese Stocks got their Global Stamp of Approval, and now Bonds may be next.

Financial Times, 2015. Emerging Market Investors Dominated by Indices. August 4.

Financial Times, 2017. China Stocks Set for $500bn Inflows after MSCI Move. June 21.

ICI, 2016. Investment Company Institute: Annual Factbook.

IMF, 2015. Global Financial Stability Report.

MSCI, 2016. Potential Impact on the MSCI Indexes in the Event of the United Kingdom’s Exit from the European Union (“Brexit”). June.

Raddatz, C., Schmukler, S., Williams, T., 2017. International Asset Allocations and Capital Flows: The Benchmark Effect. Journal of International Economics, 108, 413-430.

Shek, J., Shim, I., Shin H.S., 2015. Investor Redemptions and Fund Manager Sales of Emerging Market Bonds: How Are They Related? BIS Working Paper 509.

Vayanos, D., Woolley, P., 2016. Curse of the Benchmarks. LSE Discussion Paper 747.

Wall Street Journal, 2014. Colombia Wins Investors’ Favor – And That’s the Problem. August 13.

Comparison of Adaptation and Resilience vs Development Programs: Differences and Implications for International Organizations

IIEP Blog, Stephen C. Smith, 6 April 2017, Revised and Expanded 9 August 2018  

Do we need specialized agencies for climate adaptation and resilience funding and technical assistancesuch as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), or is it sufficient to channel climate-related support through the World Bank and other established mechanisms? Running an agency is expensive so the answer will depend in significant measure on whether there are qualitative differences between climate assistance[1] and traditional development assistance.  We can identify several features by which adaptation programs (investments) differ in degree as well as in kind from standard development programs (investments). In discussing these matters with policymakers and lenders at the World Bank and other agencies, I find this remains a live and still-contested issue.  Here are my perspectives, having worked on the issue of supporting adaptation in developing countries with high poverty levels for almost a decade.

  1. There are always interactions between government policy and economic behavior of individuals, households, firms, and other organizations (referred to collectively as economic agents). But addressing this interaction takes on central importance for resilience investments and adaptation responses in ways that remain unconventional as development assistance and investments.  Investment and advice in the setting of interactions between government-led policy adaptation (also called planned adaptation), and autonomous adaptation by economic agents is a specialized problem requiring specialized skills.[2]
  2. For adaptation investments, accounting for both negative and positive spillover effects (or externalities) are of great importance and generally will play a stronger and differentiated role than for conventional development activities. Negative externalities can occur when climate change causes migration into settled areas, and heightens competition for natural resources such as water and opportunities such as jobs. When climate change stresses communities and the response is to increase their exploitation of natural resources, this has negative externalities, including impacts on neighboring communities. One consequence can be an increase in domestic conflict. This highlights a challenging but essential need to maintain balance in governance reform between achieving stronger state capacity, and safeguarding and improving citizen protections; this is of special relevance to adaptation and resilience investments.[3]  Even without the threat of violent conflict, the consequence of badly managed interactions can be to slow or even to reverse progress against poverty.
  3. Autonomous adaptation can also generate positive externalities (positive spillovers) that can be encouraged, notably social learning across neighboring communities; encouraging and augmenting this learning process can result in enhanced productivity of resilience investments. When communities invest in locally beneficial environmental activities such as reforestation and erosion control this can also provide positive benefits downstream (literally down the watershed and figuratively with other spillovers). Such activities and investments rise to a higher priority, and differ in kind from conventional development assistance.
  4. To accomplish such reforestation and erosion control goals, with or without external investment, in general communities must solve collective action problems (to work together without too much free riding on others’ contributions). As a result, technical assistance and other “soft investments” for communities in establishing institutions and procedures to solve adaptation related collective action problems can create value; such investments differ from most conventional development investments.
  5. Government responses to climate change (adaptation and resilience more generally) can have direct and indirect international political repercussions that differ in degree and form from most development investments; for example, well-meaning government restrictions on housing (and economic activities in general) in low-lying areas can stimulate international as well as national migration pressures. Assistance (soft investments) in addressing these concerns also differs in degree and form from conventional development finance.
  6. Deep uncertainty is pervasive in planning resilience investments to a much greater degree than is present in most conventional development investments. (With deep uncertainty we don’t even know the probability distribution of various outcomes, as we would in the face of simple risk; in particular while we may know that some severe outcomes are possible we cannot assess the odds of their occurring.) Correspondingly, related behavioral responses to deep uncertainty also likely differ from those of conventional risk, as do potential solutions.[4]
  7. For climate change impacts, future disruptions are highly uncertain; but if they occur they are more likely permanent or at least long-term, with future unknown further changes, and very costly to address. Thus, real options are of central importance in adaptation and resilience in ways and to a degree never encountered or addressed in conventional development finance. (A real option is the ability, but not the obligation, to undertake an action with uncertain future benefits through an immediate commitment of current resources.)[5]
  8. Climate mitigation is a global public good: lower greenhouse gas emissions anywhere leads to less climate impact everywhere. Less obviously, adaptation and resilience may have global (or at least cross-national) public good features because its benefits (or costs, as in the case of maladaptation) can reach across national borders and population groups, to a greater degree than do traditional development investments.  Resilience investments that have cross-border – if not global – public goods characteristics might not provide high enough net domestic benefits to be selected on domestic criteria alone. For adaptation, there are also knowledge spillovers for comparably situated countries, for example from one island nation to another; and it is likely that many activities producing such cross-national benefits would not be selected on the basis of purely domestic benefits.  It is unusual for development projects to consider cross-border impacts, though in some cases they do and presumably in more cases they could.  Finally, special attention may be given to cases is which adaptation and mitigation are complementary activities, that is, when a resilience investment simultaneously benefits both.
  9. Natural resource use responses can heighten the risk of conflict as well as creating negative spillovers for resource availability for other countries as well as domestically. For example, consider climate change-induced increases in deforestation; this can occur when climate change leads to the need for new farmland or grazing land and farmers clear forests. (In addition, loss of forests directly through drier conditions could have similar effects). Deforestation can harm the ecology of neighboring countries as well as heighten greenhouse gas emissions. Deforestation and other responses such as building dams can also lead to downstream problems. Accounting for risks of spillovers and strategic interactions is also relatively specialized and traditional development banks have limited experience with it either broadly or for the case of climate adaptation.
  10. More generally, it is highly plausible that domestic (endogenous) environmental damage compounds with global warming induced (exogenous) climate change in ways not addressed in conventional development investments and that may be better addressed through specialized joint provision of knowledge and investment. Meanwhile, climate change increases the vulnerability of the poor and near-poor in new ways and through new channels.[6]
  11. The complexity of investments and needed innovations in financial instruments may become a constraint on adaptation and resilience financing in ways that differ from most development investments. For resilience, valuation approaches for investment in capabilities for deeply uncertain future shocks are not well understood.
  12. Building resilience may require investments over a considerable period of time before the intended outcomes are achieved, and this poses possible tensions between building resilience and the urgent need for people, communities, and nations to adapt to current and looming climate impacts now. In the long run, not all adaptation responses are resilience maximizing, and in some cases might decrease long run resilience; an example is pressure to extract more from natural resources and to do so more quickly. Development assistance has less often faced (not taken into account) such compounded problems.
  13. Another way of framing some of the issues is that conventional assistance is designed to foster positive development, not to respond to development-in-reverse. Although framing it that way may make it sound like a traditional division of “relief vs development” dichotomy, relief is focused on current shocks such as damage from floods, not permanent shifts such as secular drying, deforestation, decreasing water tables, and inundation.
  14. There are vital and important roles for less specialized agencies in general and multilateral development banks notably the World Bank-IDA in particular. One role is to assist with implementation of projects designed by specialized agencies, as is true for the case of the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR). More generally it is good to “let a thousand flowers bloom” in approaches to the problem to help learn what works best, and to tap the substantial development resources of the multilateral development banks and other agencies.  But there is a strong case for supporting specialized entities like PPCR and the GCF for supporting and financing adaptation and resilience solutions.

[1]The focus of this blog is exclusively on adaptation/resilience in low income and vulnerable middle income countries, not on mitigation.  That is: to respond to the substantial amount of harmful climate change that is inevitable even if the ambitious Paris targets are achieved.

[2]See A.S. Malik and S.C. Smith, “Adaptation to Climate Change in Low-Income Countries: Lessons from Current Research and Needs from Future Research,” Climate Change Economics, 3, 2, 2012

[3]Smith, S.C., “The Two Fragilities: Vulnerability to Conflict, Environmental Stress, and their Interactions as Challenges to Ending Poverty,” in The Last Mile in Ending Extreme Poverty, ed. L. Chandy et al, Washington: Brookings Press, 2015, p. 328-368

[4]In particular, ambiguity-averse behavior may play an important role.

[5]As one example, investment today in (incremental) organizational capacity capital (such as training of community groups and or of officials) provides a real option to use this organizational/ social/ human capital in combination of expensive capital in the future when needed. For a general framework with different examples see Linquiti and Vonortas 2012

[6]Smith 2015 (as in Note 3).

Sending the Wrong Message to Investors: Donald Trump and the Rule of Law

Originally published on March 24, 2017

Markets are all about signals – they send messages to investors about the future. In the four months since the United States Presidential election, global markets have generally risen. Investors see opportunities in the President’s plan to build infrastructure and cut taxes.  However, market actors crave predictability, transparent regulatory processes, and evenhandedness — norms underpinning the rule of law. Some of the President’s recent actions signal a decline in the rule of law and as a result of this signaling, foreign and domestic investment in the US is likely to decline.

In countries with strong rule of law, government officials and agents, as well as individuals and private entities, are held to account. Laws and regulations are clear, publicized, stable, and just, applied evenly, and protect fundamental rights. Policymakers enact, administer, and enforce the laws and regulations in an accessible, fair, and efficient manner, while the court system provides a timely and even-handed approach to justice.  Market actors know that although policies may change, these norms of good governance will persist.  Thus, in the U.S., corporate investors presume that they will not be discriminated against because they hire Muslims, favor climate change accommodation, or choose to move their operations overseas.

President Trump has used his words and actions in ways that undermine confidence that companies and individuals will be treated in a transparent, equitable, and accountable manner.   In early December, Trump stressed that rather than applying the same tariffs to all companies, he would use punitive tariffs to punish some companies that source overseas.  First, under the Constitution, trade policymaking is a shared responsibility between the Executive and legislative branches.  Congress has not indicated that it wants to single out specific companies for their production and employment decisions.  Hence, this approach is undemocratic, undermines longstanding U.S. mores of evenhandedness, and violates trade commitments under the WTO, the international trade organization created by the U.S. to discipline such practices.   While it is laudable that the President elect wants to preserve jobs, executives may hear that the Trump Administration will act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.  Secondly, Trump-affiliated companies are not modeling positive behavior.  Trump subsidiaries and licensees make eye­glasses, perfume, cuff links and suits in Bangladesh, China, Honduras and other lower-wage countries, not in the USA.  Executives may read into his actions that he is above the law and not fully committed to his own policies.

In a similar manner, Trump’s refusal to put his family’s assets in a blind trust or to be fully transparent about his taxes and investments signals the wrong message about the rule of law. Without a blind trust, he risks conflicts of interest and raises questions about whether Executive Branch decisions are made in the public interest or the interest of his firm or cronies.  Executives may read into this behavior that it is ok to have such conflicts of interest.  Moreover, the U.S. may find it hard to promote good governance overseas when our new president’s approach to governance is opaque, unpredictable, and unaccountable.  Trump signals that his interests take precedence over the public’s right to know or the interests of other investors, who will not have the same access he and his family have to make good market decisions. Here again, his actions convey that the U.S. will not adhere to the same levels of transparency, accountability, and evenhandedness investors have long expected.

Trump’s executive order on immigration provides another example of his failure to act in an evenhanded manner.  The President did not widely consult with immigration experts and agencies; his Administration did not consider that many American firms employ individuals with green cards from many of the countries he targeted.  The general counsel of Microsoft, Brad Smith, noted that the company was led by an immigrant and had some 76 employees blocked from entry to the U.S. for 90 days under the executive order.  Meanwhile, top officials from Apple, Facebook, and other companies also spoke out against the order noting that it may undermine the Constitution’s long-standing principle of nondiscrimination among individuals of different religions.

Investment is not only about policy choices; it is also about signaling.  President Trump has indicated that he (and hence the US) are less committed to longstanding mores of good governance such as transparency, accountability, and evenhandedness.   Investors, especially foreign investors, may send a signal in return by reducing their investments in U.S. markets.

Susan Ariel Aaronson is Research Professor and Cross Disciplinary Fellow at the George Washington University, where she teaches corruption and good governance.

A Quick and Dirty Critique of Trump’s First Trade Policy Agenda

Originally published on March 2, 2017

This week, the Trump Administration issued its first report on the Trade Agreements Program, which also contains a short overview of how the Trump Administration views trade and will use trade agreements and protectionism to shape the trade environment.

I have three broad comments.

1. First, I think that we are the recipients of a head fake. Many analysts have described the Trump Administration as torn between economic nationalists like Navarro and Bannon, trade professionals (who are inclined towards a rule of law/sovereignty approach like Lighthizer), and the investment bankers like Wilbur Ross at Commerce or Gary Cohn who are likely supporters of market opening measures and trade agreements. However, this divide is a side show to the real play. The President’s trade policy approach – the focus on protectionism rather than market opening trade agreements – will enable him to centralize trade policy making in the White House. Just as he is taking power from the Department of State to make foreign policy he is taking power from the Congress, the USTR, and the Department of Commerce with this focus on protectionism. I see this as not only a form of breaking down the Administrative State, per Bannon, but taking more of the shared authority from Congress. It would be interesting to compare pp. 13-14 with the objectives delineated in Trade Promotion Authority 2015.

2. I found it shocking to see no mention of digital trade (the fastest growing sector of trade) and the importance of information flows to trade on pp. 13-19-of the report. President Trump and his posse have a distorted view of the US economy perhaps based on his experience and connections (steel matters to real estate and casinos matter to hotels) and his donor base. Steel and casinos are a minor component of the US economy and certainly not going to grow and create many jobs. The Internet and digital trade will create many more jobs, new professions, and much more economic growth. Internet companies are, however, not part of his worldview.

As Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Center for Global Development and I have written, “The truth is, bilateral trade talks simply would not be useful in negotiating rules to govern cross-border information flows, one of America’s most important exports. The platform for facilitating information flows–the internet– is designed to be universal, open, and global. Hence, the system of rules governing trade in information flows needs to be global as well.” So digital trade doesn’t fit his trade paradigm.

3. Finally, the President issues his agenda as part of the annual report on the “trade agreements” program. Since 1934, Congress has required the president to report on what he/she is doing to use trade agreements to open markets overseas, create jobs, and further the rule of law on trade. I fear these 7 pages are evidence that economic nationalism will trump the economic interest of the American people and the companies they have created.

Nobel Peace Laureate Muhammad Yunus Visits IIEP

Originally published on October 27, 2016

Beginning this year, GW’s Elliott School is managing/coordinating the Grameen Bank and Trust Bangladesh internship program, which provides internships in Bangladesh for both GW and other students (graduate as well as undergraduate).  The Grameen Bank is one of the key pioneers in the microfinance movement in developing countries.

As part of inaugurating our new partnership, Professor Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Laureate and Grameen Bank founder, joined us for the day (on October 26, 2016).   IIEP was happy to serve as one of the cosponsors of his visit.

In the morning we held a faculty breakfast for Prof. Yunus and IIEP Affiliated Faculty.  After a social gathering, we met around the table over breakfast.  James Foster gave a very nice introduction for those who hadn’t met Prof. Yunus, drawing on Prof. Yunus’s Vanderbilt years (where James taught before joining the GW faculty seven years ago).

yunus1

Professors James Foster and Stephen Smith met with Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus

Prof. Yunus presented his history with Grameen in a very humble way, saying he had no detailed plan, but proceeded by solving problems as they appeared to him.   He went to villages, where residents explained their problems with loan sharking.  In response, he lent villagers some of his own money.  Then, when it got to point where he couldn’t continue or expand on that basis, he went to a bank to borrow funds for Grameen – somehow persuading bank officers that backing his idea for lending to the poor would work.  Prof. Yunus reminded participants that Grameen is not an NGO; rather, it is an institution owned largely by its borrowers (essentially, what we call a credit union in America).

In this regard, he spoke also about his emphasis on, and advocacy for, social enterprise, the Grameen Trust being the largest, building on his 2008 book, Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism (which I highly recommended in my review of the book for the Stanford Social Innovation Review).

yunus2

Professor Stephen C. Smith and Muhammad Yunus

In the afternoon, we held a special edition of the Development Tea, at which Professor Yunus discussed his work and broader development questions with graduate students from both economics and international affairs.  Prof. Yunus then addressed a large audience at Lisner Auditorium, at which Pres. Knapp awarded him the George Washington University President’s Medal.  GW President Steven Knapp hosted a special luncheon discussion in Yunus’s honor, and Elliott School Dean Reuben Brigety did the same at dinner, each engaging a mix of faculty, students, and alumni.

At IIEP, we are looking forward to continuing our exchanges with Prof. Yunus and Grameen in the coming years, and we encourage our undergrad and grad students to consider applying for this valuable internship program.

Notes: You can find more information about Grameen Bank at http://www.grameen.com/.  Its importance for development and poverty reduction is examined in my textbook with Mike Todaro, Economic Development, 12th Edition, in the Chapter 11 Case Study; and some of its programs are reviewed in my book Ending Global Poverty.

Reflections on COP21 and the Paris Climate Agreement

Originally published on January 11, 2016

IIEP Director Prof. Stephen Smith and GW’s Director of Sustainability Dr. Kathleen Merrigan represented GW as UNFCCC Observers for the final week of COP-21 in Paris.


This blog post is an edited version of tweets and notes from IIEP Director Stephen Smith‘s stay in Paris for the COP21 climate conference, from December 6-12.

The Setting

Paris was a City of Christmas Lights. The Eiffel tower flashed stroboscopically every hour, while also displaying messages about climate change issues. And there was enough brilliance also at the COP21 climate conference to reach a pretty good conclusion.

eiffelCOP21

Central Paris and the COP21 convention area had extra security. The Champs–Elysse Noel carnival was crowded with families, though vendors of gaming and stocking-stuffers and snack booths said business was way down due to the recent terrorist attacks.

Many of those present at COP21 expressed a sense of being present at a world historic event. The conference center was filled with drama throughout the week.

The Drama Built in the Final Days

The biggest issues were termed “differentiation, ambition, and finance” (in other words, the obligations of developing countries, the target maximum warming level, and who would pay). Successive draft agreements with scores of alternative phrasings set side by side in brackets were printed and poured over by negotiators and observers. At least once, delegates were seen waiting in line at the documents booth to get a still-warm revised version. Remaining wording differences contained some controversial assumptions about technology progress, and critically, many nuances of legal obligation – could any one of these wording differences sabotage an agreement?

Dramatic Conclusion

Early afternoon on December 12 – a day after the conference had been scheduled to end – the proposed final version was distributed to 196 parties (country delegations) and placed online. All multiple wording choices had been eliminated in a final up-or-down version of the document. The drama reached its peak when the conference president, French Foreign Minister Luarent Fabius, said:[1] I’m looking at the room, I see the reaction is positive, I’m hearing no objection, the Paris climate agreement is accepted!” and gaveled the process completed. The conference plenary hall, where all delegations were present, rose as one to their feet with cheers and applause. But it was a long and difficult process to get there.

Problems of Consensus

For years it seemed dubious that a COP forum could reach a meaningful agreement. Consensus on formulations involving more than one hundred countries is very unusual. For example, since 2001, WTO negotiations have gone nowhere; and regional country subgroupings became the basis for new (ratified or proposed) trade agreements. But no economy can function without underlying institutions –formal and informal rules of economic life. What could be done for climate negotiations if there were just a couple of holdout countries? In a bankruptcy, a judge can compel holdout creditors to accept a “haircut”; similar arguments have been applied to sovereign debt crises or in particular to banks in a developed country holding debt of a developing country facing insolvency. The UN Security Council can take action against a country that is acting in a way to threaten the peace or the security of populations (particularly genocide). Plausibly, in an extreme scenario, action for global climate protection could become a Security Council matter. So should complete consensus trump everything on global climate agreements? But consensus has been the COP rule and somehow had to be worked with.

The Role of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions

Can country contributions lead to a better and sustainable equilibrium – one that addresses free riding at least to an acceptable extent? Perhaps side pressures and side inducements – or the opprobrium of responsibility for a failure at COP21 – was great enough, even for countries with a lot of money to lose such as Saudi Arabia. The Obama administration’s leadership role at COP21 was of great importance if not essential.[2] Does agreement suggest that the international economy is moving to a new equilibrium regarding acceptable climate practices? In the agreed framework – a key difference from the earlier Kyoto Protocol – each country submits an “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution,” or INDC. Each country prepares and submits an INDC with its greenhouse gas mitigation and climate adaptation commitments and how it will achieve them. It is good news that by now most countries have submitted INDCs formally to the UN, including even Bolivia, Sudan, and Venezuela.[3] It is new to this agreement that every country – developing as well as developed – will present their plan to the world and update it at least once every five years with the condition that each country’s new plan is strengthened. Also, the INDC process gave a recognized forum for countries that want to take a lead, including several in Europe, to continue to do so, being able to point to agreement of other countries, even if not binding.

NOAA and NASA at US Pavilion – COP-21 included what could be described as a mini-World’s Fair with dozens of country and regional pavilions; but many found the US Pavilion the most impressive with its presentations of climate science research.
NOAA and NASA at US Pavilion – COP-21 included what could be described as a mini-World’s Fair with dozens of country and regional pavilions; but many found the US Pavilion the most impressive with its presentations of climate science research.
The Role of Agreements among Subsets of Countries

In addition to the individual country INDCs, in the COP negotiation process, key groups usually involved big-emitters of greenhouse gases (rather than regional groupings as in recent trade agreements). As the World Resources Institute reports,[4] China is by far the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, accounting for more than a quarter of all greenhouse gases. Additionally, the U.S. share is over 14% – more than double that of China on a per capita basis. Add European Union emissions[5] to those of the US and China and you account for half of greenhouse emissions. Then add India, Russia, Japan, and Brazil, to account for over two-thirds of all emissions. From the viewpoint of reaching agreements these seven actors are relatively few compared with the 196 countries that were parties at the COP21 meetings.

Small numbers agreements can provide a big start. Probably most important was September’s U.S.-China agreement announced during Xi Jingping’s White House visit, that China ensures that its carbon pollution peaks by 2030, while US emissions fall at least 26% by 2025 (from 2005 levels). It is clear that this and other pre-COP21 joint statements of agreement mattered. Such bilateral or small-group agreements were complemented by larger-coalition formation that evolved during the process of COP21 itself, notably including the “High Ambition Coalition,” which grew to include the US and more than 100 other developed and developing countries. While prior declarations have emphasized the goal of keeping temperature increases to now “well below” 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, this Coalition pushed for explicit recognition of a new aspirational target: a promise to “pursue efforts” to contain the global temperature increase to less than 1.5 degrees Celsius. The weakened “pursue efforts” language seems to have been in part a compromise with Saudi Arabia, which wanted no mention of a 1.5-degree aspiration because it implies the need for relatively rapid phase out of fossil fuel use. China apparently disliked the High Ambition 1.5-degree proposal also, calling it a kind of performance (i.e. a publicity stunt). However, the very act of making 1.5C a reference point may have real effects.

The Central Role of Market Mechanisms and Technological Progress

The agreement commits countries to a transition to non-carbon based economies by the end of the century. This is credible in part because of the central role of market mechanisms; parts of the agreement – perhaps even its signals – facilitate and incentivize private capital flows into renewable energy and other climate-benefiting investments. Private initiatives also spur complementary green energy investments, as seen from the fanfare accorded to the Bill Gates-led Breakthrough Energy Coalition (dubbed the 30-billionaires club).

Attention is needed also to agriculture, which causes almost 25% of greenhouse gas emissions. The agreement features a prominent role of preserving and reestablishing nature in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost effective way – that also supports the nearly half of humanity that depends on natural resource based livelihoods. It appropriately stresses better planning of human land use, but also highlights the value of preservation of intact ecosystems and biodiversity in nature. Incentives are to play a key role.

The UN Remains Centrally Important

It is not obvious, but simply agreeing to state shared aspirations could lead to real change. Today, individual countries provide substance, and agreements move up toward multinational agreements as different groups of countries reach accords, which was critical to the culmination of COP21. The UN is providing real leadership, through a framework for setting goals and targets that reflect scientific knowledge; basic behavioral economics suggests that reference point setting can make a real difference. Smaller sets of countries can build up agreements that result in movement toward these goals. Local governments and other state actors, environmental campaigners, and corporations in various sectors can build on the 1.5-degree goal as a framework for pushing policy and philanthropic goals, or taking corporate actions that create good will (and even may end up saving money). For example, an often-seen protest sign read “Keep it in the Ground” – apparently some estimates suggest that ¾ of all fossil fuel reserves will have to be left un-mined or undrilled to prevent greater than 1.5C warming. Talking with a few of these campaigners (some of them students active in the divestiture movement), and sensing their fervor, my guess is that this movement grows quickly.

Mini Eiffel Tower at the Convention, which became one of the sites of protest demonstrations and posters.
Mini Eiffel Tower at the Convention, which became one of the sites of protest demonstrations and posters.
Higher Aspirations as Global Insurance

Among other things, having such a 1.5-degree aspiration provides more insurance: 2 degrees C might be the best available estimate of a threshold for unacceptable damage, but this estimate might be too high. Extra insurance always costs more, but it can be worth it to reduce the risk of catastrophe. And in general, targets often get missed by a little bit in relation to a publicized visible reference point: so better to overshoot 1.5 degrees by half a degree than to overshoot 2 degrees by a similar amount. Another reason to seek more stringency is because technical evaluations have suggested the INDCs submitted so far – even assuming they will be fully realized in practice – still result in much higher expected warming (about 2.6 degrees C).

Country Insurance

The insurance theme was sounded in various ways. As expected, progress and problems of providing rainfall insurance to farmers were discussed. My interactions at the conference clarified and stressed the need of developing countries for country-level climate insurance, living as they do with increasing risk and uncertainty. While that point is clear, I hadn’t appreciated the scope of substantial activities already implemented. Two groupings of countries, one in the Caribbean and the other in Africa, have been willing to pay into such funds despite their limitations, making this a more commercially viable strategy. Payouts to participating countries have already been made. But so far, these insurance systems have important limitations. Participants agreed that there were significant opportunities for improvement, including risk that measurements will be wrong or indeed that the wrong kinds of data measurement will be prioritized. Likely, there may be some related incentive issues to be resolved.

Some final notes.

GW Elliott School MA graduate, Koko Warner, who later received her PhD from the University of Vienna, is now an Academic Officer at the United Nations University in Vienna; she has focused a lot of her attention on the climate insurance field, and she has emerged as an important voice in the climate adaptation policy debate. Of course, learning about such important work by GW graduates is very rewarding.

Conversation with Dr. Koko Warner, Elliott School alum. Also pictured with us is Isaac Anthony, CEO of The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
Conversation with Dr. Koko Warner, Elliott School alum. Also pictured is Isaac Anthony, CEO of The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility.

Going forward, there are plenty of opportunities for important research projects. Some address questions about climate insurance. Others will address unsolved problems in mechanisms for mobilizing and allocating funds for climate adaptation in least developed and vulnerable countries. Generally, there is a need for more integration between the setting of targets and economic analysis of costs and benefits of alternative strategies to achieve them. Much research, policy analysis, and political balancing remains to be done.

But this month, in the City of Light there was also Enlightenment. Enough at least to remind us that the world is not yet covered in darkness.

[1] * Je regarde la salle, je vois que la réaction est positive, je n’entends pas d’objection, l’accord de Paris pour le climat is accepted!” The last two words were in English

[2] It also seemed that US leadership helped mitigate diplomatic damage done by the 2014 Snowden revelations that NSA spying tipped off US negotiators on other countries’ strategies at a prior COP.

[3] See http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx

Technically each new plan has to be at least as strong as its predecessor but it is referred to as a ratchet. Stronger contributions are needed because so far the individual country commitments do not add up to nearly enough mitigation to keep temperature rises to below 2 degrees C.

[4] See http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/06/infographic-what-do-your-countrys-emissions-look.

[5] The EU of course is really up to 28 actors, but on environment policy EU countries have been far more unified than on fractious topics like fiscal and monetary policy and immigration.

Thoughts on the Senate Finance Committee hearing

Originally published on January 27, 2015

Like many trade junkies, I am listening to the Senate Finance Committee hearing.  Unfortunately, it is a dance around the key questions.
Here’s some things USTR should do.

  1. USTR needs to address how it (or the USG) can use trade agreements to help the middle class.  USTR must provide clarity on whether trade agreements really create or destroy jobs.. the current mercantalist language is not helpful.   Our tax system favors investment in technology, not people. We never link US trade policy to the larger context of tax, education and social welfare policies.  We have to explain these links in order to explain why individuals can’t and shouldn’t hold trade policy responsible.
  2. USTR must clearly explain that trade agreements can’t directly include actionable provisions to address income inequality but that trade agreements may indirectly affect income inequality within and among nations.   Everyone now understands that globalization has made it easier for businesses to rely on workers from other countries who are willing to work for lower pay, while technologies such as robots and computers have rendered many jobs obsolete. But policymakers also made some decisions that perhaps without intent facilitated economic inequality and economic insecurity.  In recent years, some countries (and US states) have made it harder or less attractive for workers to organize and bargain collectively.  At the same time, some workers have turned against unions an organization working in their interest.  In the wake of these developments, unions have declined and worker bargaining power has decreased. At the same time, corporate officials have focused on quarterly results rather than investing in the skills and long term productivity of their employees.  Some people blame trade policies and agreements for these problems and do not believe that trade creates jobs or raises wages.   Scholars have determined that while trade plays a role, the most important factor contributing to rising income inequality is not trade, but rapid technological growth in exportable sectors.  However, technological change, while scary and threatening to jobs, is essential to productivity and economic growth.  The US must find ways to encourage technological change while making sure that trade agreements are not written in ways that could foster further income inequality by favoring certain interests at the expense of the broad interest.  So as example, agricultural subsidies or export subsidies, while politically necessary, do not help us use trade agreements to ensure that we do not foster income inequality.
  3. What is USTR doing to involve the American public (not Wash representatives of civil society, business and labor) in developing and understanding trade?
  4. What changes can USTR make to trade policymaking to involve more Americans more directly?  Why not experiment? Why not ask Americans to suggest language related to the free flow of information?  Perhaps this brainstorming could yield new ideas?
  5. USTR must rethink its template for trade agreements. If these agreements are to promote “middle class” jobs, employment and labor issues must be embedded throughout the agreement.  The agreement also addresses labor issues in the services chapter; in the chapter on regulatory coherence; and indirectly through language related to investor state dispute settlement. The services chapter could be helpful to individuals who want to move to other countries to sell services over borders, although most such chapters generally address skilled labor such as architects.  However, critics of TTIP raise concerns about proposed language in the investment and regulatory coherence chapters; they fear it might lead to a labor rights “race to the bottom.”  They argue that these chapters are designed to reduce regulatory burdens by eliminating alleged unnecessary or costly regulations.  But one man’s costly regulation is another man’s much needed job protection. Since the US and EU have relatively similar labor costs and productivity, firms may choose to produce and invest in the venues with less or less expensive regulations.  Since the US has not ratified the same ILO conventions related to health and safety as has the EU, generally US workers have fewer protections and employers have relatively lower costs (despite an appreciating dollar). Moreover, the US and the EU have not clarified how they will achieve regulatory coherence given different approaches and levels of regulations, nor have they explained how higher standards can be maintained in the venues that have such higher standards. Activists are concerned that in the interest of achieving regulatory convergence and reducing administrative costs, policymakers could undermine domestically determined regulations. But we do not know how much convergence policymakers want to achieve or if the main threats to higher labor standards are within EU member countries and between US states, rather than between the two trade giants as a whole
  6. USTR needs to be more transparent about how trade agreements affect Internet openness and freedom and how USTR might use trade agreements to challenge filtering and censorship.  But the exceptions here are key: when can nations limit the free flow of information to protect privacy and national security?
Picture of Steve Suranovic

Why a UN Climate Agreement Will Not Be Reached

Originally published on September 22, 2014

This week the UN will convene a climate summit where Secretary General Ban Ki Moon will ask leaders to bring “bold announcements and actions that will reduce emissions, strengthen climate resilience, and mobilize political will for a meaningful legal agreement in 2015.”

For those who have marched in cities around the world this weekend demanding change, the Summit offers a new opportunity to finally set the world on a corrective path that will avert an imminent global disaster.   This summit follows on the heels of previous UN conferences in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, and Doha, each of which had ambitious goals but which failed to prompt world leaders towards substantive action.   Frustration and disappointment has become the norm. As Felipe Calderon, chairman of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate said, “If the evidence is so clear, why have we not acted?”

This summit has little chance for success. Even if it did result in some agreement by leaders, the eventual successful implementation would be extremely unlikely. The simple reason is that the world is severely addicted to fossil fuels and because of that, even the recognition and acceptance of the problem is simply not sufficient to inspire coordinated action.

A convincing argument can be made using an analogy between an individual’s addiction to cigarettes and fossil fuel usage by society.[1]  Smoking is commonly recognized as an addiction and it is important to note that smoking exhibits a similar pattern of costs and benefits over time as fossil fuel usage. Both cigarette and fossil fuel consumption generates immediate benefits to users; smoking causes the seductive effect of nicotine in the brain and social camaraderie among peers; fossil fuels provide affordable energy for transportation, heating and electrical needs – it is a part of everyone’s daily life. Both smoking and fossil fuels have the potential to cause long term damage in the future: with smoking comes the higher incidence of cancer, heart disease, and emphysema; with fossil fuels comes the potentially deleterious effects of super storms, droughts, and rising sea levels caused by climate change.   Finally, both smoking and fossil fuel usage are difficult and costly to discontinue: smoking cessation causes sometimes severe withdrawal costs and continual urges for resumption; fossil fuel substitution requires costly replacements of energy systems and higher energy costs.   In addition, the future effects of both smoking and fossil fuel usage are uncertain. Smoking does raise the probability of contracting a disease, but, as many as 50% of smokers never experience these negative effects. Fossil fuel consumption may certainly be raising global temperatures, but knowledge of who will be affected, to what degree, and when, remains speculative at best.

It is the presence of withdrawal costs that makes smoking addictive. Because it is painful for smokers to quit, even those with full understanding of the potentially detrimental future effects, can become trapped in their current habits and smoke until it kills them. Similarly, high relative costs of energy substitutes will also make it difficult to kick the fossil fuel habit as well.

Consider the campaign aimed at breaking the addiction to smoking, which began in earnest after the 1964 US Surgeon Generals report.   Since then, anti smoking groups have initiated educational campaigns, advertising bans, higher taxes, and successful litigation against cigarette companies. The efforts were a success with a substantial reduction in adult smoking rates in the US from over 40% in the 1960s to around 20% today.

In the early stages though, resistance to change was strong and many people simply denied that smoking was harmful. Today the vast majority of people, including smokers themselves, accept the dangers posed by smoking. Still, despite that knowledge, it may seem somewhat surprising that fully one-fifth of the US adult population continues to smoke. If we consider smoking around the world, noting that many similar regulatory programs and high taxes have been imposed in Europe and elsewhere, it is surprising that as much as 30% of the adult male population continues to smoke. Thus, despite many successes over more than a 50-year campaign, it has been grudgingly difficult to break peoples’ addiction to cigarettes.

Now consider fossil fuel usage. As described above, fossil fuel usage displays a similar pattern of costs and benefits over time as cigarettes and thus can be thought of as an addictive process.   However, fossil fuel usage is different from smoking in an important respect that will make breaking this addiction many times more difficult.

To curtail smoking one has to convince an individual to change his or her behavior in order to have a long term positive effect directly upon him or herself.   In contrast, with fossil fuels one must convince billions of people to change their behaviors in order to have a positive impact on future generations of people. Individual action on fossil fuel usage will have no meaningful impact on the future outcome for oneself, or the world. In fact, even if hundreds of millions of individuals in several large countries change their fossil fuel usage it will still have little effect on climate change if the rest of earth’s population maintains its current habits. This means that climate change mitigation is a collective action problem, on top of being an addictive process, and this is the reason the UN is convening regular summits to reach a collective agreement.

But while collective action can work when the benefits of the actions will have immediate positive impacts, it is unlikely to work when the benefits are highly uncertain and in the distant future. Also, although world leaders may pay lip service to climate change mitigation and even implement policies to prompt modest reductions in fossil fuel use, significant reductions in carbon emissions in democratic countries will ultimately require the support by a majority of the national electorates. With respect to smoking abatement policies, such as higher taxes and strict regulations, the majority of the population are non-smokers who are perfectly willing to support such restrictive policies. In addition, the cigarette industry is a very small sector relative to the size of the entire economy so legal attacks against it provoked little resistance. In contrast, policies to restrict fossil fuel usage and carbon emissions will affect 100% of the world’s population and impact industries that are the largest companies in the world employing tens of millions of people. The supply chains for fossil fuels and the profits that flow from them are well understood and both directly and indirectly benefit everyone on the planet. Attempts to break these fossil fuel “habits” will be met with an indefatigable resistance that will include continuing propagation of climate change denials and intense lobbying against any policy change that threatens these well-established patterns.  For these reasons, UN summits have virtually no chance for success. It won’t matter how many meetings are held or how many marches take place.

All hope need not be lost though. There are several viable alternatives to collective action. However, one of these alternatives faces high uncertainty regarding its potential effectiveness. And although the second option has high potential to be effective, it faces substantial resistance even from those most concerned about climate change.

The first option is a concentrated effort to reduce the cost of switching to low carbon alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and nuclear. If alternatives can satisfy consumer energy demands at a lower cost, then consumers will surely demand them. However, one additional requirement for this to work is that energy companies must be able to make greater profit supplying these alternatives than they can supplying fossil fuels.   Only in this way will there be a rapid changeover sufficient to crowd out fossil fuel usage. Whether low cost and highly profitable alternatives can be found quickly enough is highly uncertain.

The second possible solution is to use geo-engineering efforts to directly offset the greenhouse gas effect caused by rising carbon dioxide levels.  Several potentially viable options have been proposed including carbon capture methods and use of atmospheric reflective materials, which could be implemented at a relatively modest cost. However, despite the fact that it was scientific discoveries that have motivated the demand for fossil fuels during the past two centuries in the first place, people nevertheless resist the application of science to mitigate the negative effects that are resulting from its use.   Even if one accepts that there is a scientific consensus of the anthropogenic effects on climate change, that consensus does not imply that the only way to solve the problem is by forcing the reduction in fossil fuel use.

For these reasons the world would do well to abandon its efforts to reach climate change agreements. These efforts will be fruitless and are likely to result in rising hostilities as climate policy advocates increasingly chastise world leaders for their inaction while demonizing the oil, coal and gas companies who are simply delivering the world’s energy needs in the most habitually, efficient way.  The more effective approach is to use science to solve the problem caused by science. Better to pour collective efforts into the development of viable and profitable non-carbon energy sources and in the event that does not succeed, to be ready to act with effective science-based interventions that can help regulate and control the earth’s climate.

[1] For a more complete analysis see Suranovic, Steven (2013), “Fossil Fuel Addiction and the Implications for Climate Change Policy,” Global Environmental Change, 23(3) 598-608.

Why the U.S. and EU are Failing to Set Information Free

Originally published on July 2, 2014

Tim Berners-Lee, the architect of the World Wide Web, taught us that the Internet we have is a function of the choices we (users, companies, policymakers etc…) make about information flows. As an example, in 1995, Berners Lee chose not to patent his work on the World Wide Web because he feared patenting could limit the universality and openness of the web. He continues to advocate. In March 2014, he called for an online bill of rights and created a new organization to ensure that the web would remain the “web we want”—open, free and neutral. With his actions, Tim Berners-Lee has shown us that it is not easy to set information free.[1]

Policymakers also must make tough choices about information flows. On one hand, they want to encourage the free flow of information in the interest of educational, technological and scientific progress. On the other hand, they need to control and at times limit the free flow of information, in order to achieve important policy objectives including maintaining Internet resiliency; preventing spam, piracy, and hacking; protecting national security and privacy; and protecting intellectual property. They struggle to balance, let alone achieve these goals.[2]

In my research I examine how the U.S. and the EU tried to use trade policies to advance the free flow of information while simultaneously taking other steps to control or block the free flow of information. Policymakers turned to trade rules because information often flows across borders; moreover trade agreements are binding and enforceable.

However, the free flow of information affects many other policies beyond trade, including human rights. In 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59 (I); members stated that “freedom of information is a fundamental human right and…the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” Under international human rights law, states are obligated to take practical steps to give effect to the right of freedom of information, but may also restrict freedom of information in order to respect the rights or reputations of others, protect national security and public order, and protect public health or morals.[3] Hence, the free flow of information is also a security,[4] trust, foreign policy, and governance issue.

Information is also a global public good that governments should provide and regulate effectively. Because the benefits of a public good are available to everyone (no one can be excluded), private companies and individuals often need incentives to provide new information. Moreover, everyone is hurt when individuals, companies or governments horde or hide information (Maskus and Reichman: 2004, 284-285; Kahn: 2009). The Internet has made it cheaper and easier to trade information (such as digital news, data, and entertainment); to collaborate and work across borders; and to fund and sell goods and services across borders (McKinsey: 2014). If governments and their citizens could devise shared rules to encourage the free flow of information, more people would have greater access to information, and more information would be created and exchanged (McKinsey: 2014, Tietje: 2011).

Since the first years of the 21st century, business leaders, policymakers and activists have tried to create shared principles to encourage information flows. They began by developing principles to guide their behavior at the OECD, APEC and other venues. But these principles are voluntary and not universal. Meanwhile, some academics and companies began pushing for very specific language in trade agreements; they wanted to promote the free flow of information and limit trade barriers to the free flow of information (Kommerskollegium: 2014).

Today, data flow issues are key components of 3 ongoing negotiations: The U.S. and the 27 nations of the EU have been negotiating T-TIP (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; the U.S. and 10 other nations bordering the Pacific have been negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); and some fifty members of the WTO (including the 27 EU) are negotiating the Trade in Services Agreement of the WTO (TISA). However, many governments have not responded positively to U.S. and EU efforts to set information free. Officials and citizens from these governments worry about their ability to control or limit information flows as well as their dependence on U.S. companies to provide web services (which often must comply with U.S. rules on privacy and national security.) Some scholars note that the U.S./EU approach appeared hypocritical and inconsistent. The U.S. controls the free flow of information to protect intellectual property and national security but labels it protectionist when others do so. The EU controls the free flow of information to protect intellectual property, to protect privacy, and to prevent holocaust denial and hate speech (Aaronson and Townes: 2012, Aaronson and Maxim: 2013). Moreover, neither the U.S. nor the EU link policies to promote the free flow of information with policies to advance Internet freedom; both seemed to develop policies in bureaucratic silos, without weighing how such policies might affect the Internet as a whole. In June 2013, after important media outlets publicized the revelations of former NSA analyst Edward Snowden (Davies: 2014), internet activists began to point out the contradictions in U.S. and EU policies.

As of this writing, June 2014, the EU, the U.S. and their negotiating partners have been unable to find common ground regarding how to promote the free flow of information; limit information flows in the name of national security; and protect privacy. The U.S. and the EU are also divided over when to restrict (or censor) information; whether localization of servers is protectionism; and whether U.S. and EU firms should export Internet related technologies (from servers to malware) that could be used to undermine the human rights of information online, while allowing exceptions to protect national security; public information, while allowing some exceptions to the free flow in the interest of protecting national security, public morals; or public health.[5] But in 2013, we learned that the U.S. National Security Administration (and those of several other countries) had taken steps that limited, hijacked or transformed information flows. Some states including several EU countries found in the Snowden revelations an opportunity to wrest greater market share from U.S. internet dominance. Hence, although these states generally support free flow, they also adopted policies that some labelled data protectionist or data nationalism. Consequently, I argue that trade agreements have yet to set information free and may in fact be making it less free.[6]

Nonetheless, U.S. and EU trade policies are a work in progress; you and I can still have significant influence over their direction. We can encourage trade officials to think more holistically about the balance between the free flow of information and the need to control information flows in the name of privacy and national security. Policymakers should begin by developing shared principles for maintaining the One Global Internet and to delineate steps to take when countries do not live up to these principles. Secondly, governments should include language in trade agreements that relate to the regulatory context in which the Internet functions including free expression, fair use, the rule of law, net neutrality, and due process. Finally, when they negotiate trade agreements, policymakers should use language to encourage interoperability.

For more information about trade and information flows, view the Prezi at http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/governance/taig

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2011112

Susan Ariel Aaronson is Research Professor of International Affairs at GWU, where she directs the Trade and Internet Governance Project. She also directs a fellowship program-the eBay Policy Scholars. Her current research looks at government creation, purchase, and use of malware and its implications for economic growth, trust, and human rights.

[1] Joe Mullin, “Tim Berners-Lee Takes the Stand to Keep the Web Free,” Wired, 2/08/12,

http://www.wired.com/2012/02/tim-berners-lee-patent/, last searched 6/15/2014; on Lee in 2011, see Tim Berners-Lee: Spies’ cracking of encryption undermines the web,”

and Jemima Kiss, “An online Magna Carta: Berners-Lee calls for bill of rights for web,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/12/online-magna-carta-berners-lee-web,

Last searched 6/18/2014.

[2] Tietje notes that this challenge is not new; nations had to collaborate to deal with Morse code, the telegraph and the first transatlantic cable from 1858-1866 (Tietje:2011).

[3] Toby Mendel, “freedom of Information as an Internationally Protected Human Right, ND, http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/foi-as-an-international-right.pdf.. The limitations on freedom of expression are spelled out in Article 19 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Article 19, “Limitations,”   http://www.article19.org/pages/en/limitations.html, last searched 6/24/2014.

[4] Tim Berners Lee, an engineer widely credited with creating the concept and protocols of the Internet has outlined the security risks to the Internet. http://www.w3.org/Security/faq/wwwsf1.html#GEN-Q1

[5] NA, “US Tables New TISA Proposal to Ensure Free Flow of Data,” 5/15/2014, http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-05/16/2014/us-tables-new-tisa-proposal-to-ensure-free-flow-of-data-network-access/menu-id-710.html. On TTIP, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/. On TISa negotiations, pl. see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA),” https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/services/trade-in-services-agreement.html#membership; and on TPP, see https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/, all last searched 6/18/2014.

[6] Much of the initial research in this article was based on a study funded by the Ford and MacArthur Foundations, as well as the Minerva Initiative, “Can Trade Policy Set Information Free? Trade Agreements Internet Governance and Internet Freedom: 2012).

The Internet That Connects Us–that brings us news, culture, ideas, goods and services–Is Also Increasingly Dividing Us

Originally published on July 1, 2014

GWU’s Institute for International Economic Policy has long been involved on Internet foreign and economic policy issues where officials must work with other governments and multiple stakeholders to achieve policy balance.  (http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/governance/taig/ )

We work at the intersection of the Internet, economic growth and trade, and human rights.  We are currently researching government use of malware across borders; and the evolution of U.S. and EU trade and digital rights. Please visit the site and review our publications and conferences.

This summer we are proud to host IGF-USA 2014 at GWU on July 16th, 2014. In the wake of the Snowden revelations digital rights are key concerns for IGF-USA attendees. One panel at IGF-USA will focus on these human rights concerns.

The panel will include:

Scott Busby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor;
Avri Doria, an expert on human rights, ethics and technological change;
Deborah Brown, from the Association for Progressive Communications; a long time internet rights activist;
Alberto Cerda, Professor of Law at the University of Chile and also a Fulbright Commission scholar pursuing a doctoral degree in law at Georgetown University;
Ben Blink of Google’s Free Expression team;
Carolina Rossini of Public Knowledge will moderate

Panelists will address the following and other topics:

-How can U.S. stakeholders help reinforce the continued preeminence of human rights concerns in global Internet governance conversations and meetings?

-How does the U.S. government understand its obligations to protect the human rights of non-Americans in the digital realm?

– Given the dominance of the U.S. government in the realm of global communications surveillance, how can the U.S. role model best practices with respect to protecting human rights in the digital realm?

-Should activists work towards an enforceable system of human rights online?

Dr. Susan Aaronson (saaronso@gwu.edu) is pleased to answer any questions about IGF-USA 2014 and/or specifically this panel. Follow IIEP on Twitter (@IIEPGW). Follow IGF-USA on Twitter (@IGFUSA2014) and Facebook.

PPP’s Impact on Poverty Rates Highlights the Value of Multidimensional Poverty Measures

Originally published on May 9, 2014

Last week the International Comparison Program published Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) numbers for 2011. Based on surveys of prices in almost 200 countries, these numbers aim to effectively create a set of exchange rates that equalize what each country’s currency can purchase. PPP influences several economic outcomes of interest. For example, as highlighted by The Economist, the new PPP numbers mean that by the end of this year China’s economy, measured in Gross Domestic Product PPP, will likely be larger than the U.S.’s economy.

The new PPP values also have a significant effect on poverty rates. Initial calculations by analysts at the Brookings Institution and the Center for Global Development (see below) indicate that applying the new PPP reduces the number of people in extreme poverty by hundreds of millions of people. Because relative prices in many countries are lower than previously estimated, millions of individuals in India, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Kenya, and many other countries whose incomes were previously counted as below the $1.25 per day cutoff for extreme poverty will now be categorized as above the extreme poverty cutoff, according to these calculations.

The World Bank is expected to release new poverty numbers based on the PPP soon, but in the meantime other analysts have already estimated the dramatic changes in poverty numbers that the new PPP values are expected to generate.  The Brookings Institution’s Laurence Chandy and Homi Kharas wrote an illuminating blog post calculating the changes in global and national poverty rates. The Center for Global Development’s Sarah Dykstra, Charles Kenny and Justin Sandefur wrote a blog post with their calculations and analysis, engagingly titled Global Absolute Poverty Fell by Almost Half on Tuesday. Chandy and Kharas point out that not only does the PPP revision reduce the number of people whose incomes are below the $1.25 per day cutoff, but it will also change the cutoff itself, which is based on poverty lines in the world’s 15 poorest countries.

Understanding and accurately measuring poverty are critically important. Eradicating extreme poverty by 2030 is becoming a central goal of the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the High-level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and other global development actors. Incorporating the latest price data into measures of extreme poverty is necessary to accurately assess the scale and distribution of the problem and to gauge progress in combating it.

However, the startling impact that the PPP revision can have on poverty rates also points to limitations of income-based poverty measures that by their nature rely on relative price patterns across countries. As Dykstra, Kenny and Sandefur point out, nothing changed in the lives or opportunities of the hundreds of millions of people who had been classified as living in extreme poverty but will suddenly no longer be, given the PPP revisions. The authors conclude, “In fact, if the new PPP numbers suggest anything, it is that the quality of health or education or access to services associated with a given income has just gone down.”

Their statement highlights the reality that the challenges poor individuals face are not just lack of income – which is what the $1.25 measure captures – but also lack of quality health care, education, nutrition, sanitation, housing, and other basic needs.

The limitations of income-based poverty measures highlighted by the PPP revisions point to the value that can be derived from multidimensional poverty measures. The most widely used such measure, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), was developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) and UNDP and is used in over 100 countries to measure deprivations at the household level in health, education, housing, sanitation, water, energy, and assets.

Unlike income-based poverty measures, the MPI is not dependent on the PPP, inflation, or other macroeconomic variables. Rather, the MPI directly measures deprivations in critical aspects of poor individuals’ lives, such as child mortality, nutrition, sanitation, school attendance, and access to water. The MPI uses the Alkire-Foster measurement method and is decomposable by dimension, household, and sub-national region. Several national governments have adapted the measure to create national poverty measures and a Multidimensional Poverty Peer Network is working to strengthen country applications.

Income-based poverty measures play a critical role in assessing poverty, designing poverty reduction strategies, and evaluating impacts. Multidimensional poverty measures do not replace income-based poverty measures. Multidimensional measures complement income-based measures by providing a comprehensive picture of the breadth of deprivations that poor household experience and – importantly – the extent to which households experience multiple deprivations.

Is measuring both overkill? Interesting to researchers but not relevant to the targeting or implementation of poverty reduction activities? Sabina Alkire, Jose Manuel Roche, and Andy Sumner find that patterns of multidimensional poverty differ from patterns of income poverty across countries; and examining India, Alkire and Suman Seth find that patterns of income poverty reduction within the country differ from patterns of multidimensional poverty reduction. This suggests that using only one type of poverty measure to target program efforts may miss large numbers of poor households. Furthermore, understanding the specific deprivations and combinations of deprivations that households in different communities and regions face can help inform programs to focus on the sectors of greatest need and on households with multiple deprivations.

To eradicate extreme poverty, we need to apply all the tools at our disposal. When it comes to metrics, this means measuring both income poverty and multidimensional poverty. Especially when statistical earthquakes like a revised PPP strike.

Picture of Steve Suranovic

Fair Trade and the Multilateral Trading System

Originally published on April 29, 2014

Co-Authored by Pegi Ylli.

In the past century, the world’s economies have grown at a phenomenal rate leading to rising standards of living across the world as billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. Despite these advances though, there remains an unfortunate regularity; income inequality remains uncomfortably high, while income and standards of living among the poor in the poorest countries lag far behind the high incomes and standards in the developed countries in the world. Clearly many people are being left behind, inspiring a search for solutions.

For some observers, the primary reason for the growth of living standards within developed economies is the expansion of markets and an international division of labor based on comparative advantage. One solution for poorer countries, then, is to facilitate their entry into the international trading system by promoting the liberalization of international trade and investment. This is the primary goal of the multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Another approach to the lagging living standards in poorer developing countries is embodied in the alternative trade organizations that have arisen; most importantly the fair trade labeling initiatives. In this system, specific products that are traded internationally, such as coffee, tea and cocoa, can receive a Fair Trade label after a Fair Trade labeling organization has adjudged that a fairer share of the final price has accrued to the poorer farmers of the product and that the product is produced under fairer labor conditions. A fair price to the poorer farmers is usually a guaranteed minimum dollar amount per unit designed to provide the farmers with something closer to a living wage. Fairer labor conditions generally means the establishment of longer term contracts between intermediaries and the primary good producers and adherence to sustainable farming standards.

Proponents of each approach to economic development tend to view the alternative approach with suspicion. Thus, proponents of free trade and the WTO system tend to believe that fair trade is a subjective concept that does not translate into simple and widely acceptable policy guidelines. The guidelines that are used to justify a label are somewhat arbitrary and may lead to greater inefficiencies in production resulting in more harm than good. In contrast, some proponents of fair trade tend to consider the large inequalities in income to be caused largely by the promotion of freer international trade and believe that the WTO expansion contributes to the promotion of poverty. In their view, fair trade is a superior substitute to the multilateral trade system. Other supporters of fair trade, however, believe it is acceptable to “mainstream” fair trade products by working with large-scale multinational firms who benefit from the multilateral trading system. Under this view, fair trade is complementary to the system of multilateral trade liberalization, and the two can advance together.   To better understand the interaction between these two systems, it is worth elaborating on the features of both.

Free Trade Promotion and the Multilateral Trading System

Some critics of the WTO contend that the poor nations of the South are “straitjacketed by … (the) trade rules in the WTO (and) cannot use import duties to protect their weak economies, their fledgling industries, or their small farmers from unfair international competition” (Jaffee, 2007). In this view, the WTO rules allow rich countries to take unfair advantage of poorer countries. However, this view is a misrepresentation of the WTO. In actuality, there are no WTO “rules;” instead there are promises made by each participating country to liberalize its own trade policies. These policies are liberalized not to some harmonized standard, but instead to a lower level than that same country had in place prior to the agreement.   Developing countries are not expected to maintain the same low tariff barriers as developed countries; instead they are allowed much more flexibility in setting tariffs than the most advanced countries. For example, whereas average bound (or maximum) tariff rates in the US are about 3.5% and in the EU 5.2%, middle income countries are allowed to maintain higher tariff bindings (WTO). Brazil has bound tariffs at an average of 31.4%, Argentina at 31.9% and Chile at 25.1%. For poor developing countries, the negotiated maximums are even higher. In Guatemala, the average bound tariff is 41.2%, in Nicaragua 40.7% and in India 48.6%. Although developing countries currently set, or apply, their tariffs at a much lower rate (on average at about 12%), these countries have the ability to raise tariffs in times of trouble without violating their international WTO commitments.

The area of agricultural policies is where developing countries can rightfully complain about the multilateral trading system. Developed countries support their agricultural industries with a complex system of domestic support programs and export subsidies, usually to the benefit of entrenched interests and to the detriment of farmers in less developed countries.   However, the WTO is a forum that can be used to pressure developed countries into liberalizing their agricultural industries via adjustment to the Agreement on Agriculture within the WTO. Indeed, because further WTO adjustments (like completion of the Doha round) can only occur if there is a consensus, coalitions of developing countries have been able to prevent a Doha deal if it does not include acceptable changes in agricultural policies.   That there is no comprehensive Doha deal even after more than a decade of discussions is testament both to the new power of developing countries within the WTO system, as well as to the power of entrenched and resistant agricultural interests in the developed countries.

Many of the inequities and disadvantages for farmers in the South are because free trade does not prevail in those markets. Instead, powerful agricultural interests in the North work against the goal of trade liberalization in precisely those product areas in which the South has the greatest advantages. Although trade barriers are much lower in developed countries, they remain notably higher in agricultural goods and in textile and apparel products. The WTO goals are to reduce or eliminate these discrepancies, but unfortunately, despite decades of discussions to reduce or eliminate special protections for developed country agricultural industries, very little progress has been made.

The Fair Trade System

The goals of the fair trade system focus on one issue that is not a focal point of the free trade system, namely inequality. Laura Raynolds describes the movement as “a critique of historically rooted international trade inequalities and efforts to create more egalitarian commodity networks linking marginalized producers in the global South with progressive consumers in the global North” (Raynolds, 2009). This alternative trade model aims to establish better prices, long-term trade contracts, and resources for improving social and environmental standards for Southern producers of commodity goods. In short, fair trade is designed to provide compassionate consumers in the developed countries who care about poverty alleviation with a simple method to ensure that a greater share of commodity revenues goes towards improving the livelihoods of the poorest farmers.

Certification is central to how the fair trade system ensures product quality and production sustainability. Fairtrade International is an organization that monitors production, trade groups, and the Fairtrade certification process to assure that a set of principles is upheld.Fairtrade certification promotes these main principles: fair prices, fair and safe labor conditions, direct trade, democratic and transparent organizations, community development, and environmental sustainability (Fair Trade Resource Network). The Fairtrade label thereby assures Northern consumers that Southern producers were treated according to these principles and thus that their purchases will help alleviate poverty.

We may well ask why these goals of the fair trade movement are not satisfied by the multilateral trading system in the WTO. One reason is that free trade’s goal is not reducing inequality, per se, but rather the improvement of economic efficiency, which would generate a greater amount of goods and services available for consumption. This outcome could reduce poverty if the additional surplus were distributed to the world’s poor. However, if greater efficiency leads to production that is only consumed by the world’s wealthy, then the poor may be left further behind. For most free market advocates, improving world standards includes a twofold solution of maximizing production via free trade, then redistributing income so that the poor can enjoy a share of the extra benefits.

The fair trade system can complement to the free trade system because it offers a mechanism by which income can be transferred from rich to poor along a commodity chain. Because the fair trade system is voluntary, it does not violate any of the WTO trading principles and can operate independently alongside a free trade system. One problem with fair trade though is that the certification and monitoring process incurs extra costs that are then passed onto to the conscientious consumer.   The lower these implementation costs can be maintained, the larger can be the transfer to poorer farmers.   If these costs are too high though, the fair trade product premium will be higher, reducing the number of Northern consumers who would be willing to participate. One big advantage to fair trade, compared to outright foreign aid or charity, is that it does not look so much like charity.

A second reason that fair trade can complement the multilateral trading system is that it aims to correct for unfair outcomes. The poor may not be sharing the benefits of freer trade because free trade has not been achieved in many commodity markets. Already we have suggested that tariffs remain high for agricultural products. Protection reduces competition for import competing firms and results in economic inefficiencies. Additionally, many have argued that there is a concentration of market power along many commodity supply chains (Nicholls and Opal, 2005). These supply chains are like an hourglass, in which many producers supply many consumers on the other end, but the product must pass through the hands of a small number of wholesale intermediaries. If competitors cannot enter, these intermediary firms act like a monopsony, forcing a lower commodity price and taking advantage of poorer farmers while capturing a greater share of the surplus value generated by trade.

Imposing a minimum price floor for fair trade products raises the producer price closer to the price they would obtain in a truly competitive market, that is, a market in which intermediaries could not exercise their monopsony power.   The fair trade labeling process therefore creates a non-governmental method of maintaining a minimum wage and can therefore correct for an unfair outcome (Hayes, 2006). In this case, the price floor guaranteed to farmers through the fair trade system helps create an outcome closer to what would have arisen with free trade in a competitive market.

This complementarity of fair trade with the multilateral trading system has prompted some in the fair trade movement to support “mainstreaming.”   This involves partnering with big corporations and expanding marketing efforts through these new channels, thereby attracting a greater consumer base, increasing awareness, and giving producers more trading options. The promise of mainstreaming is the potential for rapid growth of the fair trade market.

However, fair trade purists believe that fair trade is a model for an alternative trading system that might one day substitute for the free trade multilateral system. In this view, “mainstreaming” is a sellout that threatens to divert fair trade away from its core values of establishing partnerships with like-minded organizations.

The Future of Fair Trade

Some resolution of the growing rift between the two approaches to fair trade may be necessary before fair trade can expand beyond its current niche market. In either case, expansion would require consumer acceptance of higher prices for commodity products and consumer awareness of alternative trading methods. An increase in the production of fair trade goods would also require quality controls and proper labeling. If fair trade wages continue to increase, other producers might claim to have fair trade products too, in order to benefit from higher prices, although those goods may not necessarily abide by the true certification guidelines. Also, if consumer demand for fairly traded goods rises substantially, the demand for conventional products would fall, causing a reduction in those prices, and perhaps reducing the wages of workers in the conventional markets. Thus, expansion of fair trade faces many obstacles to overcome in the future.

Fair trade is making strides towards achieving fairness in the global economic community by directly addressing the existing inequality gap between the developing and developed world, but for the moment it seems to have achieved little more than niche status. The fair trade movement will need to solidify its vision for the future if it can have a chance for further expansion.

Works Cited

Hayes, Mark. “On the efficiency of fair trade.” Review of Social Economy 64.4 (2006): 447-468.

Jaffee, D. (2007). Brewing justice: Fair trade coffee, sustainability, and survival. Univ of California Press.

Nicholls, A., & Opal, C. (2005). Fair trade: Market-driven ethical consumption. Sage.

Overview of fair trade in n. america. (2013, 09). Retrieved from http://www.fairtraderesource.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/Overview-of-Fair-Trade-in N-America-vSeptember2013.pdf

Raynolds, L. T. (2009). Mainstreaming fair trade coffee: from partnership to traceability. World Development, 37(6), 1083-1093.

The World Trade Organization. (2014). Retrieved from http://www.wto.org/index.htm

Musing on Netmundial

Originally published on April 28, 2014

Netmundial, the multistakeholder meeting organized by the government of Brazil, was an inspiring mess. On one hand, it was the place to be–a Woodstock for internet activists and innovators. The Brazilian government paid tribute to these individuals and used the opportunity to signal that it intended to play a leading role in global Internet governance. On the other hand, the Brazilian government did not clarify the objectives, strategy, and desired outcomes for the April meeting. They did make it clear that the conference would yield a declaration with two sections: principles and a road map… But attendees were unclear as to how will policymakers use these principles and road map? Did the organizers intend to create a road map that could ensure that governments and business adhered to those principles?

On the day before the conference as well as conference day 1, I asked everyone I could: Are we creating norms or just a process to move Internet governance forward? Do governments sign the final document or do they nod in assent? How will assent be determined and by whom? Are we (representatives of business, academia, and civil society) speaking for ourselves or for groups we supposedly represent? I received a multitude of different answers. Fellow attendees—representatives of business, government, technical groups, academia, and civil society were diverse, opinionated, and divided.

By day one, it became quite clear that governments were playing a leading role in determining the language of the final principles and roadmap. And representatives of some governments such as the U.S., Kenya, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Germany as example, seemed very effective in working both the process and outcomes. Government delegates from these countries spoke frequently, issuing positive comments regarding NGO concerns, and suggesting language that facilitated consensus.

As in any formal negotiation, attendees moved in and out. Groups of NGOs, governments and businesses gathered in rooms near to but outside of the main conference room, massaging the documents.

NGOs were divided on what the final declaration should say. Some insisted on language that would ban surveillance; but they didn’t seem to recognize that the government officials present didn’t represent surveillance agencies or their legislatures and hence could not make such commitments. Others seemed content to have some language, albeit vague—The final declaration states on p. 11 “Mass and arbitrary surveillance undermines trust in the Internet and trust in the Internet governance ecosystem. Collection and processing of personal data by state and non-state actors should be conducted in accordance with international human rights law. More dialogue is needed on this topic at the international level using forums like the Human Rights Council and IGF.” But the declaration did not prod member states to commit to initiating such dialogue. Hence, we will all need further direction to find our way home towards an Internet where some governments constantly monitor our every keystroke.

The delegates also achieved vague language on cybersecurity. They agreed “It is necessary to strengthen international cooperation on topics such as jurisdiction and law enforcement assistance to promotecybersecurity and prevent cybercrime. Discussions about those frameworks should be held in a multistakeholder manner.” But here again, they could not agree on how because Netmundial could not commit government officials to any actions.

The preamble of the Netmundial final document says it all. “This is the non-binding outcome of a bottom-up, open, and participatory process involving thousands of people from governments, private sector, civil society, technical community, and academia from around the world. The NETmundial conference was the first of its kind. It hopefully contributes to the evolution of the Internet governance ecosystem.” [1] Notice the use of the words “nonbinding” and hopefully contributes. However, here’s what gives me hope. I met a lot of people—young and old, technically savvy and human rights literate from all corners of the globe. These people have significant expertise in cooperating to make the Internet safe, open, evenhanded and stable. They deserve our admiration, patience, and feedback as they work to maintain a multistakeholder approach to Internet governance in a world where governments (supposedly representing us) set the rules and can commit to action.

Susan Ariel Aaronson is Research Professor of International Affairs at GWU and the author of several studies on trade, internet governance and human rights. She is currently studying government purchase and use of malware as a trust, economic, and human rights issue.

1http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf

The Future of Part-time Jobs in the US Economy

Originally published on November 18, 2013

The Future of Part-time Jobs in the US Economy

For some time, people have feared that firms will replace full-time jobs with part-time jobs in order to cut back on costly benefits and taxes. This speculation has been spurred by debate over the Affordable Care Act, which mandates that employers with more than 50 employees provide health-insurance coverage to those who work 30 or more hours per week.

Using data from job site Indeed.com, I recently explored both the supply and demand for part-time jobs.  There has been a relatively small increase on both sides, suggesting there may be benefits for some job seekers and employers in part-time jobs, but the vast majority of future employment will continue to be full-time.  You can read more on the Indeed blog by following the link.

Janet Yellen leading the Fed – the Perspective of Two Female Economists

Originally published on October 10, 2013

Janet Yellen leading the Fed – the Perspective of Two Female Economists

President Barack Obama’s nomination of Janet Yellen as the Federal Reserve’s next chair is historic, marking the first time a female has headed the central bank in its 100-year history. There is no question that Yellen, currently the Fed’s vice chair, is qualified to take the helm. But the nomination also has special significance for students at GW.

This is a link to an an op-ed today in the Hatchet about Janet Yellen that I co-authored with Amy Guisinger, Ph.D. candidate in economics and a research assistant at the Institute for International Economic Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs.

Sen and his Critics: The Momentous and the Inconsequential

Originally published on August 8, 2013

In a 1925 pamphlet “The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill,”John Maynard Keynes made a compelling argument against Britain’s rapid return to the gold standard after the Great War, and emphasized the human cost of conservative policies in terms of high unemployment and labor action – predictions that were well borne out by events. The quality of the mind behind the careful arguments commanded respect. Churchill upon receiving a letter from Keynes which said: “Dear Chancellor of the Exchequer, What an imbecile Currency Bill you have introduced!” responded with: “My dear Keynes. Apologies for not writing sooner… I will read your article enclosed and reflect carefully, as I always do, on all you say” (pp 749-50). The adverse consequences of the British austerity policies are carefully documented in a recent IMF World Economic Outlook (pp. 110-2).

With this precedent in mind, I had high expectations for an article entitled “The Economic Consequences of Professor Amartya Sen” by economist Arvind Subramanian, a fellow Washingtonian with an office nearby. I imagined he might analyze and perhaps critique the key policy recommendations in the new book by Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions. Or perhaps provide a reasonably engaging account of the many ways that Sen’s research has reoriented development policymaking to focus on human outcomes.

Instead I was left wondering whether the author had read this book or any of Sen’s works at all. In a classic polemical style, Subramanian assigns the name “Redistribution through Rights and Entitlements” or “RRE” to the imagined enemies of the good – the many programs he sees as responsible for busting the Indian budget. He never defines the term RRE, only condemns it, then proceeds to apply it far too liberally. Is redistribution really the only reason a government provides public goods and services? No, there are clear efficiency reasons for doing so, including to sustain long-term economic growth as well as advance human capabilities. In table after table of data, Drèze and Sen document how India has neglected critical investments needed to deliver sustained growth – including basic activities of government like those described by my friend Indira Rajaraman as cited in his article. Subramanian neglects this neglect – and its detrimental effect on long-term growth.

Indeed, Subramanian gives sparse evidence that he understands the broader philosophical issues, including the justification of these investments – that it is not just growth, but rather the quality of growth, and especially its inclusiveness across groups of people and dimensions of wellbeing, that are important and hence what we should be aiming for. Sen’s broader conception of growth and development is now the accepted understanding of diverse economists including Nobel Laureate Jim Heckman at Chicago and Angus Deaton at Princeton. Sen and Drèze laud India’s progress in growth narrowly defined, but then rightly critique the low inclusiveness of that growth in comparison to other countries in the neighborhood. They express a wider concern about the sustainability of that growth if it continues to fall short in inclusivity terms.

Since we are speaking of the economic consequences of Sen, then clearly all of the budget breaking RRE policies like energy subsidies are supported by Drèze and Sen, right? Of course not! Time and again Drèze and Sen rail against fuel subsidies and other giveaways that benefit primarily the richer folks. They provide reasoned assessments about the policies they support and those they don’t. But these clear distinctions are not relevant for Subramanian, who attributes the lot to Sen and company.

Surely the programs supported by Sen must represent a large portion of government expenditures in India, and are directly responsible for the various macroeconomic ills recounted by Subramanian, right? No, the programs supported by Drèze and Sen represent a relatively modest proportion of the budget. Even the Asian Development Bankconcludes that India is way below other countries in terms of public investments and social assistance programs (as a share of GDP), with only half the average level of social protection expenditure as a proportion of GDP across lower middle income countries in Asia.  If there has been an increase of 75% in these meager expenditures – which is less than the increase in GDP during the same period – and India is still way below average, then this clearly indicates just how low the original figures were. In addition, the evidence provided of links from ‘Sen policies’ to the macro problems Subramanian raises is, to put it nicely, rather thin. For example, my family in Chennai has seen a proliferation of imported food products in recent years, which begs the question: how much of the food price rise (or other ills) is attributable to the actions of another Washington neighbor (and erstwhile fellow GWU professor) Ben Bernanke? Subramanian is short on causal evidence about the economic consequences of Professor Sen.

If the main arguments on economic consequences fall short, Subramanian’s final reflections display a vivid lack of comprehension of Sen’s work for someone who alleges to have been an admirer. Subramanian struggles with the idea that Sen could support public action to provide cereal directly to families to combat malnutrition, when his work on famines identified terms of trade issues as the cause and not aggregate shortages. Why the difficulty? Isn’t it obvious that malnutrition and famine may have very different proximate causes and hence different solutions? Or that if the cause of a problem is market-based, the solution need not be? Subramanian also finds it difficult to accept that Sen can support freedom on one hand and public action for food on the other. Perhaps a quick read of Sen’s Development as Freedom would remind him of the notion of effective freedom, which is enhanced when a marginally nourished family now has the capability to be sufficiently nourished due to public action. It would also reveal that Sen the academic and Sen the advocate have always been one and the same, and moreover that the quality of the mind behind the careful arguments should command respect.

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Will a TAFTA make any difference at all?

Originally published on March 19, 2013

(Cross-posted on Aspenia Online)

In his State of the Union address in February US President Barack Obama announced the start of negotiations on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union. The stated intention of this Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), as well as that of the other ongoing US trade negotiation – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – is to create jobs.

The politician’s logic is simple. By negotiating for reduced barriers to trade from our trade partners, in the form of lower tariffs and changes in regulatory policies for services and investment, our exporting firms can expand into new markets and reach new customers, creating new job opportunities for domestic workers. The regrettable cost of a free trade agreement – again, from the politician’s perspective – are the concessions that must be offered. These include reductions in home trade barriers and regulatory changes that open up market access to foreign companies and generate a loss of jobs in the import-competing sectors.

The economic case for free trade is a bit different. Economists focus on the well being of consumers and ask what will achieve the highest overall standard of living. To the economist, free trade reduces discriminatory taxes and regulations and opens up markets to greater competition. Competition forces firms to continually reduce costs and innovate to improve the quality of their products in order to remain in business. As a result consumers can buy better products at lower prices, and one’s income generates a rising standard of living.

One key difference in these two rationales is that the economics case for free trade does not depend on the other country’s decisions. Increased competition from lower tariffs generates benefits for domestic consumers whether the counterpart liberalizes or not. Unilateral free trade is a winning scenario. In contrast, to the politician unilateral free trade offers concessions without providing job-creating benefits. It is a losing scenario.

Nevertheless, since the Great Depression of the 1930s, trade liberalizing efforts have progressed, in the GATT, the WTO, and in the formation of free trade areas – under the politician’s logic. Economists have gone along with this process because it has offered a politically viable method to achieve the goal of trade liberalization. And via this method, tariffs did come down substantially around the world and international trade has grown phenomenally since the 1930s, which has surely contributed to the improvement of living standards around the world.

However, now that negotiations in the Doha round of the WTO have stalled for over 10 years and multilateral trade liberalization has ground to a halt; now that free trade areas around the world have grown to more than 200 in the past few decades; and now that discrimination in trade has become more the norm than the exception, it is unclear whether the continuing expansion of free trade with an agreement like the TAFTA is still satisfying the economic objective of spurring competition, raising economic efficiencies, and improving standards of living.

First, consider trade in manufacturing goods. The average weighted US tariff on imports from the EU is at 1.1%, while the average weighted EU tariff on imports from the US is at 1.5%. Reductions of these tariffs to zero will have an almost imperceptible effect. In agriculture the tariffs are only slightly higher. For example, the average weighted US tariff on agricultural imports from the EU is just 2.1%. Thus, even trade liberalization in agriculture, which is much more heavily protected, is unlikely to have much effect for either bloc. Of course, there are some regulatory issues that could be settled, such as the future rules regarding hormone–treated beef and genetically modified organisms, but they have been under constant discussion and it seems likely that the US will continue to demand greater access while the Europeans will continue to resist.

An ambitious negotiating agenda would put the larger issue of domestic agricultural support policies in play, with the hope of implementing major reforms to reduce the distortions that continue to affect agricultural goods like cotton, grains, and sugar. However, it is largely the intractability of this issue, caused by the unwillingness of all sides to compromise, which has led to successive failures of the multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round. Even a relatively minor problem, like trade in bananas, took over 15 years of continual wrangling between affected countries to reach an agreeable resolution last fall. Thus, it seems unlikely that much progress will be made on this front.

Another hidden problem that arises as new free trade areas are formed is the set of special restrictions that go into place to prevent third countries from receiving the same preferences offered to the free trade partner. These “rules of origin” specify what portion of a product must originate in the FTA member country to be granted duty-free entry under the FTA. The rules vary from product to product and necessitate a careful, and economically costly, accounting of a product’s production pedigree. This exercise is becoming increasingly difficult, and pointless too, because, as Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the WTO, recently said, products are no longer Made in the UK or Made in Switzerland, rather they are Made in the World. Supply chains stretch across multiple continents making national origin an increasingly arcane concept. Nonetheless, national origin becomes increasingly embedded in these regional trade agreements.

One final suspicion I have about the new TAFTA is that it is really intended to do two things that have little to do with improving living standards in the affected regions. First, it is meant to offer easy talking points to support the notion that governments are trying to do something to get their countries out of the economic quagmire that they remain stuck in. Because a TAFTA will have few large economic impacts, it is a tepid response that sounds bold but will not upset very many constituents. Secondly, a TAFTA may be inspired by a continuing desire to isolate China and ward off the competitive pressures that emanate from Asia. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the only FTAs the US is actively discussing comprise Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic partnerships that exclude the one country whose trade has been growing the fastest. No wonder China feels like they are being treated as an economic enemy rather than a friend and partner.

Overall, it quite possible that a TAFTA will not have much of an economic impact, will not tackle the persistent distortions in agriculture, will introduce even more trading costs in a world with increasingly discriminatory trade policies, and may even irritate other important countries that feel they are being left out of yet another trade liberalizing deal. Thus I wonder if TAFTA is worth the effort, especially if it is just being done to score a few political points. On the other hand, it is encouraging that in these troubled economic times politicians still think it prudent to support some kind of free trade deal.

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A Fair-Market Solution to the Gas Shortage in the US Northeast

Originally published on November 9, 2012

Hurricane Sandy left devastation in its wake and has created numerous hardships for the residents of the area that will continue for some time to come. One of the problems affecting most residents, even those whose homes were not significantly damaged or did not lose electricity, is the ongoing gas shortage. New York State, following on the heals of New Jersey, announced gas rationing to go into effect today. This is in response to the continuing long lines at service stations throughout the area. The problem is that these mechanisms do not allocate gas fairly, wastes valuable resources, and prolongs the suffering.

Long lines mean that people and businesses are diverted from their usual activities to acquire this needed commodity. The wait is frustrating and leads to anger and unrest often because some people in line have a very high immediate need for gas while others have noticeably less need. Some people need gas to run their business, or to operate their emergency vehicles, others like retired people need gas because they will drive to the post office and store 3 times a week; some need gas to run their generators because the power is still out at their business or home, others need gas to run their lawn mower this week.

The allocation mechanism with lines is simple though; it is first come, first served. Unfortunately, the people with the most time to wait in line, like a retired person for example, are also the ones who probably have lesser need for the gasoline right now. Those desperate for gas are more likely to try to cut ahead in line which is sometimes enough to provoke violence. This is a reason police officers have been assigned to keep order at service stations. But it also means more worker time (policemen) is diverted from other activities towards gas rationing.

In the end, the line, and the rationing, will mean that everyone lucky enough to get gas after the long wait (and some might be turned away if gas runs out) will get the same amount; in other words, high need people and low need people will be treated equally. Of course, government leaders have appealed to people to buy only what you need, but because there is uncertainty about when gas supplies will be restored, every individual believes they need the maximum amount they can get, and so these appeals are rarely heeded.

There is a fairer and simpler allocation mechanism available, but unfortunately most people don’t understand it and would not accept it in this situation. Nonetheless, this mechanism would assure that the limited available gas goes to the consumers and businesses that need it the most. The mechanism would eliminate the lines and allow people to use their valuable time more productively. And the mechanism would help to bring greater gas supplies to the area more quickly so that life could return to normal.

That mechanism is the free market price mechanism. Here’s how it would work. First, when the storm hit, gas supplies suddenly dropped, largely because electricity outages froze the pumps. The sudden need for gas for generators and because of future uncertainty about supply, led to an increase in demand and the formation of lines. In a free market, service stations with gasoline to sell would recognize the line as a gas shortage and would raise their price immediately to make more profit. Knowing what price is needed will be difficult with so much uncertainty, but a rule of thumb would be to raise the price until the line disappears, and you return to your normal sales rate. However if you fear that supplies will not be arriving as usually scheduled, the owner might raise the price even further to shorten the sales rate. What price would be needed is hard to guess, but perhaps in this situation the price might be raised to $8 or $10 per gallon, or even more. Different service stations would raise the price to different levels. Those with a lower price increase would see their gas disappear faster as consumers would choose the lower priced gas.

With high prices, demand will fall. People with low gas needs will conserve gas or stay home and wait for the prices to fall. People with intermediate needs will look for energy alternatives. They might drive to Pennsylvania to get the cheaper gas because even going out of the way is cheaper than paying the high local price. Still, the people who most need the gas, for example, the emergency and delivery vehicles, will recognize their high need and will buy gas despite the high price.

I understand that this mechanism does not produce happy people, but then neither does waiting in line with the alternative mechanism. The underlying shock remains the same; there is still, say, 50% less gas to go around and somebody is not going to get their usual amount. There is no way around that until gas supplies return to normal. However, with the price mechanism the businesses and individuals who need gas the most at this moment will be able to drive into a service station, without waiting in line, and buy gas in the midst of the crisis.

Furthermore, the price mechanism will send a signal to gas suppliers elsewhere that if you can quickly move gas into the area, you can make a big profit. The bigger the price increase, the bigger the profit and the more swiftly profit seeking oil companies will move gasoline into the area. Consider a simple example. A tanker truck is about to deliver gasoline to a service station in Pennsylvania. But when the price rises in NJ, it makes sense to give up the PA delivery and sell it for a higher price in NJ. Since the station is now selling gas for $8, say, they will pay the tanker company much more for the shipment. If the price rose to $12 a gallon … then tanker trucks from Colorado might begin to show up! The supply response will be larger the greater the price increases. In contrast, when prices are kept low, as is typical in these situations, oil companies have no greater incentive to move gas to NY and NJ and so the gas shortages will last longer.

Of course, the price mechanism creates some equity problems and this is the major reason it is rejected by most people. The first reaction to price increases is to ask how a service station owner could be so callous as to try to make more profit when people are suffering in the aftermath of a natural disaster. The second reaction would be that wealthy people can afford the high prices and will get all the gas, while poorer people will suffer.

There are several ways to assure greater fairness despite the high prices though. First, is to recognize that high prices assure that gas goes to the greatest needs and that may not always be to wealthier people. (For example, consider a small delivery business with high daily gasoline needs). Second, recognize that the needs of poorer people are not always better served with low prices and lines. Poorer people still need to wait in long lines, probably taking them away from a job with a necessary income. Furthermore, lines allocate more on the basis of luck and persistence rather than based on low income. Third, if moral indignation is to be raised, it is better if it is turned to social pressure to return the extra profit to the community rather than pressure to avoid the price increases in the first place. I imagine that even service station owners, living in a distressed community, will exhibit compassion for their neighbors. Suppose service station owners who increase their prices, decided to open a window and offer cash payments to buy gasoline to customers in distress. That owner would contribute money to a family whose home was destroyed but not to the family whose lawn might not be mowed this week. Or, perhaps the owners would contribute a large share of the profit to local charities who are better equipped to determine who in the community is in more desperate need. Relief organizations can help poorer families too, perhaps by giving out gas vouchers that can be redeemed at local service stations and are reimbursable to the gas supplier at full market price at the time of the transaction. Many other solutions like this exist that would allow the price mechanism to allocate gas on the basis of greatest need, but at the same time provide compensation to the poorer families and to those in most distress in the community.

The price mechanism will not work perfectly but it seems likely to work more efficiently and will resolve the problems faster than the alternative. However, the price mechanism is never given a chance. This is largely because the general public and policy makers do not understand or accept that profit seeking behavior in this situation will eliminate lines, allocate temporarily scarce gasoline to its most important uses, and promote a more rapid return to normal supply levels. Profit seeking in this instance, (though not in all instances I should add), serve the public interest as well as the private interest. Nevertheless, although the price mechanism is accepted in normal times, people do not accept its benefits in situations like this. Instead, politicians have put into place anti-market legislation such as price gouging laws, which appease the public, but which only serve to make a very bad situation even worse.

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Campaign Promises and Anti-Competitive Jobs Policies

Originally published on October 8, 2012

Reposted from Aspenia Online.

As the US Presidential election enters its final month, both candidates are emphasizing how their policies will create more jobs for Americans, while at same time criticizing their opponent for either not creating enough jobs or actually destroying them.   President Obama criticizes Mitt Romney for having fired workers or having outsourced jobs when he was at Bain Capital.  Romney argues that President Obama hasn’t been tough enough on the Chinese and that has contributed to a loss of US manufacturing jobs.  With US unemployment uncomfortably high at over 8% for almost four years running, voters clearly want to hear ideas that will promote a rapid increase in employment.  Unfortunately though, the arguments being made by both candidates are unlikely to improve outcomes for most Americans and instead are symptomatic of the continuing influence of special interests over both political parties.

If politicians were really concerned with the general well-being of Americans they would spend more time talking about what is best for average households and consumers and much less about jobs.  They would explain how free markets, when subject to certain rules, can deliver the goods and services that consumers most desire at the lowest possible prices, thereby improving most everyone’s welfare.  And, they would argue that the best mechanism available to achieve that outcome is competition.  What government can do to help create prosperity is to implement policies that promote rather than restrict competition.  And yet many of the policies being suggested by both candidates will restrain competition with the promise of creating jobs.  This promise to create jobs via direct government intervention is a ploy by special interest groups that has permeated the political conversation for many years.  And voters are being duped!

Consider the argument that our trade deficit with China must be eliminated in order to create jobs.  Many citizens accept the notion that buying American goods is better for our economy than buying foreign goods.  Why do they believe that?  The argument is that when you buy a US made good you support a US worker, but when you buy a foreign product you help a foreign worker instead.  But this notion is incomplete because it doesn’t look far enough into the economic mechanisms at work.   When an American buys a Chinese made good, an exchange of currency must first occur.  A hundred US dollars, say, must be exchanged for 630 yuan.  The American then uses the 630 yuan to buy the Chinese made product, some of which pays the salary and supports a job for a Chinese worker.  But what happens to the one hundred dollars?  It is acquired by a Chinese resident.  If he were to purchase a US good for $100 then some of that will pay the salary of a US worker and support his job.  Trade would also be balanced and presumably everyone would be content: trade seems fair!

But what if the US dollars are acquired by the Chinese government and held as reserves.  In this case the money does not support a US export and an American job, right?  Well, this is wrong!  The reserves acquired by the Chinese government are saved in the US, mostly by buying US government securities.  When the US government borrows money it does so because it will spend it immediately on military, highways, education and transfers to other people. The borrowed $100 supports US jobs just like when it is spent on US exports, it just takes another step through an intermediary before it gets there.  The critical difference is that this job effect is hidden, non-obvious, and ignored by all the groups that want citizens to believe that buying American and eliminating deficits with China is good for the country.

Policies that restrict imports from China, or would force Americans to buy American products to reduce our purportedly unfair deficits, are not good for the average American.   Instead they are only good for a small group of special interests; these interests are the firms that compete directly with imported products and the workers who work in those industries.  However, these policies will also reduce competition and result both in higher prices and a reduction in product qualities for these goods.  Most Americans are consumers of these goods, not producers, and so the majority of Americans will lose.  The small minority who will gain from higher profits and enhanced job security will be obvious for all to see, but the losses felt by most Americans, though larger in total value, will be dispersed across a large number of US consumers and so will be difficult to see and measure.  This is how special interests capture the political process and fool average Americans into thinking that what is bad for them is good.

Or, consider the issue of outsourcing.  The popular opinion is that outsourcing is damaging to the economy because it involves laying off American workers and substituting them with less expensive foreign workers.  The immediate effect is indeed harmful to those American workers who lose their jobs.  However, if we consider the process more completely, a firm that outsources is engaged in a reorganization intended to make itself more competitive, which means finding ways to improve its products qualities and/or reducing costs.  It is true that the firm’s management, and the workers who remain employed, will profit from this adjustment.  But this is good profit because it achieves a better product with lower costs that are passed on to the benefit of American consumers.   Thus, the process of outsourcing will lower the cost for many American consumers, the sum of which can outweigh the losses incurred by the laid off workers.

The next part of the process is crucial though and not always fulfilled.  In a well functioning free market, workers that are laid off seek new jobs in other organizations and after a short period are re-employed in an industry where their skills are more needed than at the previous firms.   When an economy is booming, people don’t complain as much about outsourcing because workers find new jobs quickly.  So what should be done if workers can’t find new jobs because the unemployment rate exceeds 8%?  There are several approaches.

President Obama’s approach is to demonize firms who outsource and propose policy changes that will punish outsourcing firms with higher taxes.  In other words, change business incentives so they will hire more domestic workers.  The workers whose jobs are threatened by outsourcing welcome these policies.  However, this approach will also make the US firms less competitive and once the economy picks up again, the anti-competitive policies are likely to remain in place permanently.  Thus, the policies are pro-(potentially-outsourced)-worker but anti-consumer.  Nevertheless, because the potentially outsourced workers who benefit are small in number while the consumers who lose are large, it represents another example where a smaller special interest gains protection at the expense of a larger group of Americans.

An alternative approach is to seek to maintain competitive forces but solve the underlying market failure.  Outsourcing is not a market failure …  nor is a trade deficit a market failure. Instead the failure is the lack of alternative jobs for the workers who have been laid off.  In a well functioning market, as in boom times, workers in contracting industries would find other jobs quickly and the pressure for special protection would be mild.

Unfortunately, solving the underlying growth and employment problem is very difficult.  Richard Fisher, the President of the Dallas Fed bank and a member of the FED Open Market Committee candidly admitted at a speech at the Harvard Club last month that,  “Nobody really knows what will work to get the economy back on track.”  This statement applies to both Presidential candidates and to their economic advisors.  Nonetheless politicians know that they must propose something because of citizen pressure.  And so they propose a collection of policy options that respond to the loudest voter concerns and which they hope, and maybe even believe, will work.

The real problem though is that special interests, in this case import competing firms and their workers, are using the situation to convince voters and the candidates to rally around anti-competitive policies.  These policies are claimed to be effective in creating “JOBS” …  meaning jobs in the aggregate economy that will reduce the unemployment rate.  But that won’t happen!  Instead these policies will secure “jobs” …  meaning perhaps a few hundred thousand jobs in select industries that happen to be located in important swing states.  Politicians claim that these policies will punish the unfair actions of foreigners and help all Americans.  But they won’t!  The cost to secure these jobs will be paid by the vast majority of Americans who do not work in import competing industries and who will suffer a decline in the purchasing power of their already tight household budgets.

In Richard Fisher’s remarks he also noted that CEOs are refraining from expanding their businesses and hiring more workers in large part because of uncertainty about the future.  One source of uncertainty is the continual suggestion of bold new policies.  Will the next administration touch off a trade war with China?  Will firm reorganization decisions today result in higher tax liabilities in the future?

If Americans are lucky the Presidential candidates will forget about these promises once elected.  Possibly cooler, non-political heads in the US Treasury will prevent the declaration of China as a currency manipulator.  Possibly, export oriented US firms will use their influence to prevent the government from implementing policies that punish outsourcing and from declaring a trade war on China.   But on the other hand, maybe they won’t!

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Should the US Retaliate against China’s Currency Manipulation?

Originally published on September 28, 2012

By Michael Bush* and Steve Suranovic

Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, focused much of his attention last week connecting the decade-long skid of the U.S. manufacturing sector with President Obama’s trade policy on China, specifically Obama’s failure to apply the currency manipulator label. The large trade deficit with China, presumably the result of the undervalued yuan, provides voters with a visual manifestation of high unemployment and stagnant incomes. China is an easy target. Trade sanctions against our largest trading partner, the argument goes, would reduce the trade deficit, level the playing field for U.S. producers, and create American jobs. This message plays especially well in manufacturing‐heavy cities like Cleveland, OH, where recently reinforcements arrived with a provocative documentary titled “Death by China.” However, labeling China’s monetary policy currency manipulation is not only misleading, but the recommended trade remedies that would follow are likely to hurt, more than help Americans.

For starters, China has not actively lowered its currency value. Like many other U.S. trading partners, China has adhered to a fixed currency regime for over two decades. To maintain that fixed rate, and because of high demand for the yuan during the past decade, China’s central bank has purchased over a trillion dollars of currency reserves that are invested mostly in U.S. treasuries. These actions by China’s central bank are what Romney and others refer to as currency “manipulation”. However, this characterization overlooks three important things: first, a fixed currency regime is not unique to China; second, the yuan has been appreciating against the dollar for almost a decade; and third, currency appreciation does not automatically eliminate trade deficits.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), over 100 countries have some form of a fixed exchange regime. Thus, it is misleading to single out China as a currency manipulator when other U.S. trading partners engage in the same practice. Regardless, China has adopted a crawling peg system, which permits the central bank to periodically adjust the yuan with respect to the dollar. Since 2005, the yuan has appreciated by 23 percent in nominal terms. Taking into account inflation, that number increases to almost 50 percent.

To put a nearly 50 percent appreciation into context, as well as provide a historical touchstone, Congress proposed legislation back in 2005 that would slap a 27.5 percent tariff on all Chinese imports. Why 27.5 percent? At the time, this was estimated to be the amount the yuan was undervalued. Fast-forward to today, the Chinese yuan has appreciated by almost twice that amount and the U.S. still has a trade deficit with China! One might argue that a 50 percent increase in the value of the yuan simply wasn’t enough to do the job. In this case, consider the 1980s when the U.S. faced worrisome trade deficits with Japan. Since the 1980s the yen has appreciated by 220 percent to the dollar and yet this has not prevented a sizeable US trade deficit with Japan in every year since.

This evidence alone should give hesitation to anyone who thinks a simple currency adjustment will eliminate the trade deficit and create U.S. jobs. Trade deficits are influenced by much more than just the currency value; notably low U.S. savings and high consumption levels.

In addition, while changes in currency values would probably have a negligible impact on the trade deficit, sanctions against China would hurt more Americans than they would help. U.S. consumers who buy Chinese clothing, furniture, toys, appliances, electronics and many other products would have to pay more for these items. Holidays would become much more expensive! And, it would likely be the less wealthy who will suffer the greatest reduction in purchasing power. Moreover, the retaliatory tariffs that China would most certainly pursue would harm U.S. companies that export to China, as well as the U.S. affiliates in China that ship goods back to the U.S. So, who will benefit from the tariffs? The U.S. industries and associated workers that compete with Chinese imports will prosper most, but this represents only a small fraction of U.S. stakeholders.

Thus, while politicians claim that America will gain from getting tough on China, the reality is that a subset of influential U.S. producers will benefit at the expense of most American consumers. This should hardly be surprising given the perennial accusations that powerful lobbies have commandeered international trade negotiations. Rather than blaming China for the turbulent economy, Americans would be much better served by looking internally and addressing its savings problem while simultaneously reining in its own spending. Unfortunately, this does not play well on the campaign trail. To be fair, President Obama’s position on China, though not as strident, is not markedly divergent. Regardless of what side of the aisle it originates from, public censure of China is more political maneuvering than sound economic policy.

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* Michael Bush is an MA student at the Elliott School of International Affairs.

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Some Media Exaggeration

Originally published on September 26, 2012

Today I noticed a prime example of how the media can exaggerate a story.  The charitable interpretation is that they do so merely to provoke viewer interest.  The cynical view is that they do it to provoke a popular bias.  Regardless of the motivation though, its effects perpetuate gross misunderstandings of news events and taints the popular discussion of important policy issues.

The story in question is a report about the launch of China’s first aircraft carrier.

Fox news with Bret Baier reported it this way:  “China is taking a huge step towards eventually challenging the US for naval supremacy in the Pacific.  Correspondent Adam Housley on what could be a military sea change.”   Watch the story and see if you agree that it suggests a major and worrisome development.

However, then look at this article today in the New York Times, which offers some important details. The most important of which is this sentence: “China does not have planes capable of landing on the carrier and so far training for such landings has been carried out on land,…”  Hmmm…. an aircraft carrier with no planes!  Is that a real threat?  I’m no military expert, but come on!

Of course the statement at the start of the FOX broadcast isn’t wrong since they did say “China took a huge step towards EVENTUALLY challenging the US …. “   It’s just that they didn’t really give the extra details that would suggest eventually might be 10-20 years away.

Bloomberg reported it this way …  quite a bit more neutral in its presentation.

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What if China Stumbles?

Originally published on August 30, 2012

Economic storm clouds continue to form around the world.  The problems in Europe threaten not only Europe, but the rest of the world economies too.  Even the countries that weathered the 2008 storm relatively easily, such as Brazil and China, are now developing symptoms of economic distress.   Following a several month stay teaching and traveling in some of the major cities in China, I come away with a more pessimistic outlook about China’s future than most of the Chinese people I have talked to.  If my pessimism is borne out, the effects could be very serious for China and the rest of the world.  However, there are some things the US could do now to avert a possible catastrophe.

A quick visit to China’s most vibrant cities like Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen suggests a country that is jumping ahead of the rest of the world.  Arrive at their newly designed airport terminals, ride their clean and efficient subway systems that extend to all parts of the city and continue to be expanded, gaze up at hundreds of modern skyscrapers towering over head and spread out across the cities, travel between cities on their high-speed trains traveling over 300km per hour (Beijing to Shanghai .. 1300km  .. in just over 4.5 hours), walk through the shopping malls and see the customers in the Gucci, Chanel, and Louis Vuitton stores, choose from a growing assortment of tony restaurants and stay at one of the hundreds of 5-star hotels, and it is easy to see why so many first-time visitors to China come away with a sense that China is poised to take over the world.

However, these obvious displays of the real progress that China has made over the past 30 years belie a very different experience hidden beneath the shiny surface.  In the wake of the world financial crisis in 2008 China maintained its high growth largely by expansive government support for infrastructure projects.

As a result investment spending in China has recently approached 50% of its GDP (this compares with about 15% on average in the US).  Much of that investment has been in the form of apartment buildings sprouting up across cities throughout China.  This has contributed to the real estate bubble that is beginning to burst.  Other investment has been channeled through the state-controlled banking system to build capacity within state-owned enterprises.  This investment keeps China’s GDP growing at a heady pace, however, this cannot be maintained forever using this same approach.  For government directed investment to work as a long term strategy, the investments must yield a return eventually, and this is the rub.

Travel between cities in China and you will see numerous newly built 20-30 story apartment buildings, many constructed as complexes with several similar buildings side-by side.  During the daytime one can marvel at the rapid progress.  But at night one will notice something strange … many of the buildings have very few lights on.  Many finished buildings have no lights at all …  they are completely unoccupied.  People in China say it is very common for buildings to have numerous vacant flats.  People buy them hoping to ride their investment to higher future values, but don’t rent them out because current prices fetch no renters.  As a result there is enormous excess capacity in the property market at the current price levels.  Some experts say that one-quarter of all housing is unoccupied in China.  The only way to clear this capacity is either to wait a very long time for the economy to catch up, or for prices to plummet.  At some point soon, if not already, the realization should set in that it does not make sense to build even more unoccupied apartment buildings.

I suspect a similar excess capacity is developing in the industrial sector as well, especially since the government has been pushing loans out the door to keep GDP growing.  Those investments will pay off only if demand for the companies’ final products grow sufficiently fast.   However, with stagnating demand for goods and services from Europe and the rest of the world economy, Chinese businesses are struggling.  I spoke with someone who works for a company that supplies intermediate inputs to private businesses in China in a wide range of sectors.  This company hasn’t made a profit in over six months.  Numerous manufacturing sectors are cutting back as they face the drop in world demand for their products.  (Exports in July rose only 1% compared to 11% the month before.)  At some point soon, if not already, the realization should set in that it does not make sense to expand factories even more if the market demand is not there.

In the best scenario, a significant economic downturn will be averted in China in the next few years.  Most people I talked with in China expect that the Chinese government will prevent a serious economic crisis.  If China’s downturn is mild, there is little to worry about in the US.  Even if China continues to expand at breakneck speed, it cannot, and will not, become a dominant economic power anytime soon.  Numerous impediments prevail including China’s inefficient state-owned enterprises, its tightly controlled banking sector, its archaic legal system, its problems with local corruption, and its non-convertible currency.  A significant improvement in these conditions is decades away in China and so there should be few fears that China will soon catch up and dominate the Western countries economically.

Militarily the story is similar (though I am no expert here).  Although the Chinese are eager to improve their military technological capacities, and are taking steps to do so, they are a long way away from duplicating US capabilities.  Only note that China launched its first aircraft carrier this year … and that was a refurbished Russian model.  Another refurbished aircraft carrier was launched last year …  as a hotel.  The US by comparison has 11 active carriers with 3 more under construction.

Despite these obvious realities, Chinese fear-mongering has become a popular activity in the US.  What most don’t realize though is that the threat from China becomes greater the worse their economy becomes.  Most China observers, and the Chinese themselves, recognize that the most important consideration of the Communist Party in China is the preservation of the Communist Party.  This is natural.  If there were a significant downturn in the Chinese economy though, it may seriously threaten the Chinese peoples’ faith in the Party and could in turn lead to political instability.  Many times in history we have seen regimes, whose existence is threatened by a loss of confidence from their own people, attempt to deflect criticism by creating an external enemy.  Nationalism is a powerful political antidote for destabilizing domestic troubles.

This tendency is not unique to China or to Communist regimes.  US politicians have already begun to do the same thing by blaming China for many of the US economic problems, including the persistently high unemployment rate.  China, in turn, responds tit-for-tat to every unfair trade charge the US makes against them.  In times of growing economic prosperity, these kinds of charges and counter-charges are innocuous.  However, when economic conditions get tough, these spats can quickly get out of control as they can also serve as a tool for political diversion.

Currently there is growing tension in the South China sea.  This summer China has taken control of several disputed islands in the region to the dismay of the Philippines and Vietnam.  The US calls for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of these disputes, but at the same time is slowly ramping up its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region much to the dismay of China.  This kind of situation could easily erupt into unnecessary hostilities, which become more likely if economic troubles at home continue to grow.

As an American, traveling in China is wonderful because the Chinese people love Americans.  A person couldn’t ask for more hospitality and kindness.  But that goodwill can change on a dime if America can be portrayed as contributing to China’s decline.  There is a very strong nationalism in China that can be turned on in an instant if the conditions are right. Already, China’s internal press is sharply criticizing America’s growing presence in Asia.

The safest US response with difficult times ahead is simple: stop portraying China as a villain.  Here are a couple suggestions.  First, work China into the Trans-Pacific Partnership discussions.  A failure to do so either means the US is not fully committed to the principles of rising prosperity through trade, or the US really is working with other countries in the region to put China at a disadvantage.  A second simple fix is to stop blaming cheap Chinese products, intellectual property infringements, and China’s undervalued currency for US economic problems.  Of course, there are bilateral issues and problems, but these should be worked out in a cooperative manner not in a confrontational way.  America is not stronger because it talks tough to China, as some US politicians seem to think.  America will remain strong only by maintaining its unparalleled military capacities AND by looking internally and focusing attention on its own economic problems.

Another Look at the US Macro Data

Originally published on July 27, 2012

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released new US real GDP data today.  They released both the first estimate (called the ‘advance estimate’ to emphasize that they are using “incomplete source data”)  for the second quarter of 2012 as well as revised estimates for 2009 through the first quarter of 2012 as part of their “regular annual revision of the national income and product accounts (NIPAs)”. Unlike the last two years, this year’s revised estimates weren’t particularly surprising. So, we can be comforted by knowing that although the US economy looks to be as bad as we thought, at least it’s not worse.  Similarly, the estimate for US real GDP growth in the second quarter, although pretty sluggish (just 1.5 percent at an annual rate), was about what economists were expecting.

Since there doesn’t seem to be much new news to write about, and the “accuracy-timeliness tradeoff” of macroeconomic data releases just isn’t firing me up today (although, for those interested, here’s a presentation from a related talk I did in June), I thought I’d write about a different data series today.  It’s US real GDP per capita.  We don’t look at this number too often in the US, but a reporter friend of mine asked me about it today, so I took a look, and now I think it deserves more attention than it’s getting.

Here’s a graph to consider:

The top red line is annual US real GDP (in 2005 chained dollars on the right axis).  The lower blue line is annual US real GDP (in 2005 chained dollars) per capita (on the left axis).  The key thing to note is that both series peaked in 2007 and then dropped during the Great Recession of 2007-2009.  By 2011, US real GDP had returned to where it was in 2007 (and, although hard to tell by the scale of the graph, has now slightly surpassed the peak).  The per capita measure, however, is still well below its peak in 2007.  The problem is that the US population grows about 1% per year, and US real GDP hasn’t kept pace with that in the recovery.  I think the per capita measure gives us a better sense of the tepid recovery and emphasizes what US households are feeling.  I’ll be keeping a closer watch on this number in the future.

Why I signed the Manifesto for Economic Sense

Originally published on July 22, 2012

I am generally not the sort to sign petitions or other declarations, particularly not ones called “manifestos”.  Last Friday, however, I ran into the Manifesto for Economic Sense when I read a very interesting post on the IMF’s staff report on the UK by Jonathan Portes (Director, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London) in his nicely named blog, “Not the Treasury View” (referring to the UK Treasury).

After carefully reading the manifesto yesterday I decided to sign it and write about it here in this post.  I have become more and more concerned about the push towards “austerity” by governments around the world at this time when unemployment rates are in general well above their long-run averages.  My review of the historical evidence suggests that there is very little reason to think that austerity will do anything but make the global recovery even slower and more painful than it already is.  In signing the manifesto I am adding my voice to those of a growing number of economists calling for more government spending rather than less until we recover fully from the Great Recession.

First, here’s an illustrative graph using US data (for many European countries it is even more extreme).  The graph shows the broad U6 unemployment rate for the US: “Total unemployed persons, plus all ‘marginally attached’ workers, plus all persons employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all ‘marginally attached’ workers.”  It also shows my estimates of the contribution of “permanent” movements in this measure as compared to “temporary” movements along with gray bars indicating recessions as dated by the NBER. The model I used is from my paper “Asymmetry in the Business Cycle:  Friedman’s Plucking Model with Correlated Innovations.”  I apply it here to the U6 unemployment rate to put it in terms of unemployment instead of production, but the results are similar if I use GDP.

According to most economic models, demand-focused policies will only affect the temporary component.  You can see that this means that based on the graph above I won’t advocate for these policies very often, but right now is one of those rare times.  It currently looks like the US is stuck with over 4 percentage points of excess (broad) unemployment.  If we could get more of these people working then they could increase production.  Why would economies produce less than their potential?  If you ask a business owner, they’ll say they cut back on production when they don’t see enough demand for their products.  So, we need demand from somewhere.

We have a simple equation for aggregate demand: (AD):  AD = C + I + NX + G.  C represents consumption spending by households, I represents investment spending by firms, NX represents net exports, and G represents government spending.  So, if AD is already less than what it could be, then we can’t cut back on government spending without further harm to the economy unless at least one of the other three forms of spending taking up the slack.  Let’s discuss the options in turn.

First, household consumption.  Some very interesting research suggests that having our economy so dependent on consumption spending is one of the reasons we got into the current mess.  For their individual well-being, households need to be cutting back on spending, not increasing spending right now.

The US was hoping exports might take up the slack, and there has been some movement in that direction, but now with Europe in their own mess and emerging economies slowing as well, it doesn’t look anyone can depend on exports right now.

In terms of firm investment, firms could be ramping up new projects, but firms won’t produce more if they don’t expect there to be buyers. Since households aren’t in a position to increase spending substantially any time soon, even record-low interest rates can’t entice firms if they don’t see any customers in the mood to buy.

With C, I, NX, and G all looking sluggish, we may be in for a very slow recovery.  What about the argument that monetary policy can be used to stimulate the economy and offset the impact of reduced government spending? Central banks are doing what they can, but in the US and Europe they are at the limits of their traditional tools.  They can use more unconventional approaches, but they are also finding themselves politically constrained by, in general, the same argument pushing austerity on governments.  Furthermore, loose monetary policy over several years does come with some negative side-effects.  I’m particularly concerned about households not having the incentive to save. If households are supposed to be cutting down their debt and saving more to put themselves in a better economic position for the future, then we shouldn’t be discouraging that behavior at the same time.

Once the economy fully recovers (which I do believe will happen one way or another eventually, but eventually could be many years out at the rate we’re going), then government spending can and should be reduced. But even when we’re back to producing all we can we don’t actually need to bring the average deficit to zero or have a plan to pay off the debt.  Despite the analogies being thrown around by various politicians, governments are not the same as households.  Countries are expected to go on in one form or another forever, so they just need to pay the interest on their debt, they never have to pay it off.  In fact, there are reasons governments should have at least some amount of debt.  For example, US government debt is considered a safe asset that many households want to hold to save for retirement.  It’s also the usual way that monetary policy is conducted – buying and selling government bonds – so we need enough government bonds to exist for central banks to conduct their regular business.

Of course we want our governments to choose carefully what to spend on and be responsible with our tax money, but the costs of government spending are incredibly low right now due to low interest rates and the stimulative effect of government spending on the economy when we’re below potential.  It seems like now is the perfect time for spending on those projects like roads and other infrastructure that people value.  That will be much better for the economy than austerity.

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The WTO, Clove Cigarettes, and Individual Freedom

Originally published on April 9, 2012

The US lost an appeal last week in a WTO dispute case involving the regulation of cigarettes.  The case was brought by Indonesia against a new US ban on the sale of clove and other flavored cigarettes.  As usual critics of the WTO are arguing that the WTO is infringing on US rights to establish its own health and safety standards.  In actuality, the WTO agreement acknowledges a country’s right to establish any standards it likes, as long as the standard treats domestic products in the same way as foreign products.   As an example, in the WTO, countries have agreed that you can’t ban unfiltered cigarettes from foreign sources, but not ban them from domestic sources, even if reducing the consumption of some unfiltered cigarettes would have a positive health impact.  Why not?  Because to do so would unfairly discriminate against foreign producers.  You can ban all unfiltered cigarettes if you want, because that will conform with our promise to provide national treatment.

Indonesia successfully argued to an independent and objective panel of experts that US policy violated national treatment because the ban covered only some flavored cigarettes but not all flavored cigarettes.  In particular clove cigarettes, exported largely by Indonesia, were banned, but menthol cigarettes, produced largely in the US, were not banned.

Now we can go on and on about whether menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes are like products.  If they are like products, the US loses; if they are unlike the US wins!  A case can be made that since they are both flavored they are alike. However, because they have different characteristics and are smoked by different groups of people they are unlike.  For me this issue is only interesting because lawyers are paid a lot of money to make arguments to determine an answer to a question like this, which, to my mind, is largely unanswerable.   In the end if you are in the US and you want the law to stand, then you will believe the “unlike-product” arguments (and there are many), while if you are Indonesian and want the law to fall, then you will believe the “like-product’ arguments (and there are many).   If you are on the panel and must decide,  …  maybe you decide on the basis of the “preponderance of the evidence;” or maybe you decide based on who spoke most authoritatively or was best-dressed.  Who knows?

But what I want to consider from this case is something more fundamental …  namely …  why can’t I buy and smoke a clove cigarette (assuming the US refuses to change its law)?    I am an adult who knows about the risks of smoking …  in fact I have studied it professionally.  I also know that one clove cigarette (or even a whole pack) is unlikely to harm me or anyone else near me.  I might enjoy the smell and the feel of it …  I know because I have smoked a few of these in my day and they are very pleasant.   But as it stands now, it is illegal for anyone to sell a clove cigarette to me.

I understand the arguments.  I know that it is not really me the law is designed to protect.  Instead it is targeted at teens.  The law is meant to prevent teens from being seduced into smoking by the aroma of cloves.  If they start smoking they might become hooked (although some won’t) and become lifetime smokers (but some will quit earlier).   Those that do smoke their whole lives may put a strain on the health care system and inflict a cost on others.  Of course, for those that die early, they will not inflict the cost of long term elderly care which is estimated to be much more expensive.  The net cost to society by unhealthy smokers has been estimated by some researchers (not all) to be negative …  meaning smokers may actually save society money because on average they will die younger.

In the end, the ban is really targeting just a small group of people in the entire population.  That we have to restrict the freedom of everyone in order to have this small effect on a small group seems innocuous to most people, especially since most people don’t really want to smoke a clove cigarette.  In a sense the government is only preventing a potential freedom rather than an actual one.  Also, most people are perfectly happy to support rules designed to make people healthier, especially when they have heard some of the arguments about how other people’s smoking behavior is a drag on state budgets.

For me though, I keep thinking about my sixth grade class.  I can remember several occasions when Sister Assumpta would punish the entire class, forcing us all to do some annoying exercise, all because of the bad behavior of one or two students.  I remember the feeling of injustice.

That same feeling of injustice wells up inside me when I think of issues like this.  Sure, the burden imposed on me by not having the freedom to smoke clove cigarettes is about as innocuous as the burden of writing a sentence 100 times in my notebook.   It isn’t much!  Still I wonder why I have to be restricted from an activity because of the presumed bad behavior of others.

Like why can’t I buy gin on Sunday evening in VA?  Why do I have to pay over $10 to buy a pack of cigarettes in NY?  Why can’t I smoke an occasional joint?  Why can’t I self-administer a strong pain reliever?  Why can’t I have a partner of the same sex and enjoy the same government benefits as a husband and wife?    Why can’t I commit suicide?  Why can’t I …..  the list can go on and on.

In all of these cases, individual freedoms are restricted in the name of some larger social good.  Proponents always believe that society is improved when these restrictions are in place.  They believe they know what’s good for you and are happy to put in place restrictions to engineer a better outcome.   Opponents of such “sensible” laws are often demonized or vilified.  Most people don’t really care because the restriction doesn’t affect them directly …  therefore if they must take a position it is natural to choose the do-gooders.  As a result, restrictions on individual freedoms are easy to implement.

Still, if we keep on this road, of accepting small reductions in individually unimportant freedoms for the sake of a presumed larger good, we risk losing more and more freedoms.   Soon, we will have more restrictions on what we can eat.  Food may be taxed differentially to shift our consumption in presumably healthier ways.  Our entire lives may become more and more “controlled” to create a more perfect society.

Remember though that every one of these restrictions of freedom are based on a presumption that someone else knows better than you do what is best for you.  Someone else’s preferences, intelligence and calculations are accepted as better than your own preferences, intelligence and calculations.

Sometimes …  occasionally, I’d like to smoke a clove cigarette.  Why can’t I, again?

The Politics of “Energy Independence”

Originally published on March 31, 2012

Oil prices are in the headlines at the moment. This may not a big surprise given that gasoline is above four dollars a gallon in many parts of the country. (Although it could be worse, we could be in Germany.)

Economists like James Hamilton and Olivier Blanchard and Jordi Gali have looked into how oil prices affect the economy. But oil is also interesting because it matters to politics.

Given the panic at the pump, we thought it might be interesting to highlight some work that Francisco Flores-Macias at LCM Commodities and I did recently. Paco and I were interested in finding out what makes legislators votes for or against measures that support the domestic oil industry. (You can download the working paper version here.)

In the past week, for example, the Senate rejected (51 – 47) a proposal to eliminate subsidies for the major companies producing oil in the United States. President Obama has also argued that oil companies are hitting Americans in two ways: with high prices at the pump and by taking large tax cuts they don’t need. (Incidentally, the U.S allocates over two and a half billion dollars a year to promote petroleum production.)

The question is why. We could think of a few explanations. It’s possible, for example, that “Big Oil” is behind U.S. policies, as is often suggested. There are a lot of jobs at stake in the domestic energy industry, which is also likely to matter.

But we also wanted to know if ideas mattered. In particular, we wondered whether more hawkish senators, we thought, might be prone to analyze the international environment in terms of conflict and would be more skeptical about relying on the international market for the supply of a strategic resource like oil as a result. Dovish senators, in contrast, would see less of a problem in letting the global market continue to supply a large amount of the country’s petroleum needs.

In fact, we did find a fairly robust association between oil production in the state with voting in favor of domestic oil, suggesting that the jobs argument holds water. But we also found that if jobs matter, so do ideas. As it turns out, the “hawkishness” variable affected vote choice even after controlling for a broad range of confounding factors, including party identification and the state’s oil production levels.

In yesterday’s Energy Committee hearing Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) lamented that: “We are held captive by global markets that we have no control over.” He then voted for eliminating subsidies for the oil companies, yet our analysis suggests that the votes with similar sentiments to him may be up for grabs. Skepticism about global markets, after all, seems to have been what is needed to tilt Democratic senators from non-oil producing states towards voting for subsidies for the oil industry in the past.

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Apple, Foxconn and Fair Labor Standards

Originally published on March 30, 2012

The titles of yesterday’s news stories offer an unambiguous condemnation of unfair labor practices at Apple’s Foxconn assembly plants in China:

Apple’s factories in China are breaking employment laws, audit finds;

Update: Apple supplier Foxconn hit on poor working conditions;

Illegal overtime reported on Apple assembly line;

Apple supplier audit finds major wage and overtime violations.

However, rather than joining the chorus of outrage against greedy firms who exploit workers in foreign countries and take jobs away from American workers, I want instead to suggest some of the unmentioned effects of well-intentioned fair labor regulations.

First, a bit about regulations in general.  A regulation is a command issued by a government that a person or company must do something in a particular way.  Failure to do so results in some penalty or punishment.  By design, a regulation restricts freedom.  Presumably that restriction of freedom is acceptable because it is restricting the freedom to do a bad thing.

Consider labor regulations of the sort Foxconn was found to be violating.  One violation was that workers were found to have worked more than the allowable maximum of 36 hours of overtime per week.  Another involved the underpayment for overtime work.

Regulations like these are needed to prevent the exploitation of workers ….  (and I’m sure most people would agree that 35 hours of overtime per month is not exploitative but 37 hours surely is!)

Possibly many readers may have worked more than 36 hours of overtime at some point in their lives.  Whether you were exploited depends on the circumstances.  Once regulations are formulated it quickly becomes clear that the rule cannot apply to everyone.  So the rules are usually written to exclude certain types of workers.  This is one reason regulations often take dozens of pages to explain; because all of the exceptions must be outlined.

For example, the overtime rule is likely to apply only to wage workers but not salary workers.  If you are a salary worker you might be expected to work say 60 or 80 hours a week …  as you might if you are a young lawyer or doctor.  This would not be considered exploitation, I suppose, because high income earners cannot be exploited in this manner.  Of course, if you are a wage worker who wishes to work 60 hours per week, even for a month in an emergency circumstance,  (perhaps to become a higher income earner to pay some bills) you would not be allowed to do so because of the regulation.  Your freedom would be restricted …  but it is for your own good.

Now lets come to the process of maintaining a regulation such as this.  As soon as a labor regulation like this is in place, a firm must prepare for the potential that someone might charge a violation.  So the first order of business might be to implement an overtime tracking system to document and prevent excessive overtime.  That means the company needs to assign some personnel to the issue.  The more regulations there are, the more documentation and procedures will be needed and the greater the number of workers to be assigned.  Of course, these will be higher paying jobs because the firm will need accountants and computer programmers and legal experts to manage the regulations.  We might call them regulation management.

On the other side we have the auditors, the checkers and verifiers.  Once the regulations are in place we will need to hire some people to check and see that the rules are being followed.  That’s what the Fair Labor Association was doing with Foxconn in China.  They were hired to audit the labor practices to see if there were violations.  Who hired them?    Apple Computer did; …  largely because stories in the press about worker exploitation in China threatened to tarnish their reputation and cost them millions.  Of course to protect that reputation costs million as well.   They must pay for the audit, the regulation management team, and the public relations staff involved in the incident.  Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, even traveled to a Foxconn assembly plant in China to showcase the efforts that Apple is making to do the right thing.

All of this activity takes a lot of time and costs a lot of money.  The time takes highly trained individuals away from the immediate task of the company; namely to design and produce fantastic computer products.  Therefore it will mean that fewer consumer products will be built.

And who pays for it all?  If you said that it comes out of the high salaries of top executives at Apple Computer, you are probably wrong.  Instead it is more likely to come from the slightly higher prices that will now be charged for IPhones and IPads.  Even an extra 50 cents will generate tens of millions of extra dollars to pay for all of these regulatory costs.  But higher prices, even a little bit, will reduce the total number of products sold and so fewer consumers will be able to enjoy the product.

In the US the process can play out a little differently and the money stakes are even larger.  In the US it is typical for some law firms to seek out disgruntled workers at large corporations who have been exploited by the violation of US labor laws, perhaps the underpayment of overtime.  If evidence can be gathered that the violation is a standard practice throughout the company and not an isolated incident for a few employees, then the law firm can file a class action suit against the company.   I spoke with a couple of lawyers last week who work on such cases and learned that most large corporations settled these cases before going to court in order to avoid the excessive defense fees.  When they settle, employees in the class action suit will get some compensation for the company’s wrongdoing …  perhaps as much as a few hundred dollars each.   The big winners in all of this though are the law firms who sometimes walk away with millions or billions (yes, billions!) of dollars in the settlement.

So, here’s a quick assessment of the expected effects of the labor regulations in this case.  First, the exploited workers get a small share of wages returned and a feeling that justice has been done.  Second, numerous regulatory management jobs are created for college-educated upper middle class workers. And finally, a small group of already wealthy lawyers, become fabulously wealthy.   Who pays? That would be the consumers who buy the product.  They pay a little bit more for this product and have a little bit less left over to buy other things.

On a final note, take this story about labor law and extrapolate the effects across numerous regulations, industries and issues.  Think about all the examples of somebody doing something to protect themselves against regulatory lawsuits.  If this assessment of the effects is accurate, then what we have, perhaps, is an ingenious system that purportedly protects the poor and defenseless members of society, (and maybe does a little bit) but which actually serves to transfer a lot of money from average consumers into the hands of a smaller group of upper middle class and wealthy people.

Oh, by the way, there is an alternative system …  but rest assured that system has been denigrated sufficiently that anyone who defends it is quickly branded a naïve and insensitive cad.  So I better not mention it.

Health Insurance Mandate Confusions

Originally published on March 28, 2012

As I listen to the discussion this week concerning the Supreme Court arguments on the constitutionality of the health insurance mandate, a couple of confusions seem apparent in the arguments some are making.

Supporters of the mandate are arguing that the product of health care is unique because everybody has to buy it.  This argument obscures an important point: the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate is not that you must buy health care but rather that you must buy health INSURANCE.  Insurance is a different product than health care.  Insurance is a way of pooling risk across a group of individuals who have some probability of experiencing a loss from some event.  It is just that in this case the insurance is for adverse health outcomes.

Without government intervention, an individual could choose to self-insure …. meaning he or she would choose simply to pay for health care costs from their own pocket rather than relying on a health insurance plan.  Thus, even if you accept that everyone may use health care at some point in one’s life, it is not valid to say that everyone needs to buy health insurance at some point in one’s life.

Actually, I would even argue that it is not true that a person must or will buy health care during his life.  One can certainly choose, and some religions do choose (there is a religious exception to the mandate allowed), not to avail oneself of modern medicine.  If one does choose so, that decision may reduce the overall quality of life and may result in earlier death, but it is not impossible to live in such a manner, perhaps for a very long time.  Indeed, through most of human existence, humans have lived without effective medical care, which has only developed in the past few millenniums.  Health care, though important for a higher quality of life, is not as necessary as food and water.  Thus, if any product satisfies the condition that all must buy it, food and water surely rank higher.

But, some have said, what if a person does self-insure and then ends up in the emergency room with serious injuries.  What would happen if he didn’t have insurance and if the required medical expenses were much larger than the individual could afford.  There are several possible outcomes.  In a free market, the person with no insurance would have to spend only up to one’s affordability; perhaps an operation would not be an option and he would only be able to afford pain relievers.   This kind of outcome is the risk one takes for not having health insurance and sharing risks with others.

The other outcome is what would really happen in America though.  That’s because hospitals are required by law to cover an uninsured patient in an emergency situation.  Thus, if to avoid death in an emergency an operation is medically advised, then by law the hospital will have to provide it to the uninsured person.  This supports the argument that by not buying insurance you are affecting others in the health care market, since the cost of your operation will be shifted to others.  However, it was pointed out in court yesterday that this problem arises entirely because of the government law that emergency room care must be provided to the uninsured.

Justice Sotomayor responded to this issue by saying, “what percentage of the American people who took their son or daughter to an emergency room and that child was turned away because the parent didn’t have insurance — do you think there’s a large percentage of the American population who would stand for the death of that child – ….  (when) they had an allergic reaction and a simple shot would have saved the child?”

Her point is that US citizens demand the emergency room care law because the alternative is unconscionable.  There is a problem with her argument though, because she is assuming that the alternative to a government mandated emergency care law is that children will die due to lack of a simple injection.  This seems to me to be the wrong counterfactual.  Instead, citizens in a community, state, or country that see uninsured children dying for lack of a simple shot would, of course, find it unconscionable, and would set up charities to pay the expenses of uninsured children in this situation.  Charitable hospitals would likely arise to offer free services for basic emergency care, funded by donations from compassionate community members.   In other words, taking emergency room care out of the hands of the government does not automatically imply that compassionate outcomes disappear.  Instead other private institutions will arise to take up the slack.

What private charities might not provide is unlimited coverage for the uninsured in all circumstances.  For example, if an alcoholic could be saved with a kidney transplant, private charities might not be willing to cover his uninsured expenses, instead opting for pain medications to keep him comfortable for the remainder of his life.  In contrast, a government program to cover everyone’s medical expenses might finance the kidney transplant because the expenses are spread over a larger group of present and future taxpayers and they will never even know how and why their taxes are being affected.

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Resolving Broken Promises: A Recipe for Economic Recovery

Originally published on March 23, 2012

The US economy is growing stronger every month. GDP, total employment, and the stock market index are all rising, while the unemployment rate is finally coming down. Still, despite the good news, there seems to be a notable lack of excitement and exuberance. This good news has been too long coming and the pace of economic growth remains lackluster compared to previous economic recoveries. In addition, many serious problems remain and their solutions still seem out of reach.  Read the rest at Aspenia Online ……

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses – Part VII: Price Spikes Policy Solutions

Originally published on March 14, 2012

Price Spikes

Even Stronger Safety Nets – To protect against the unconscionable consequences of spikes it becomes all the more important to expand nets and programs to respond quickly to protect child nutrition. Lustig recommended that countries “use targeted safety nets – cash transfers, food stamps, school feeding programs, food-for-work, food distribution programs” that reach poor families and vulnerable people.

Emergency Controls on Biofuel Supports – Several speakers noted that it is essential to place limits on OECD demands – and legislative mandates – for biofuels. At least, to roll these back during times of sharp price spikes.

Better Food Stock Reserves – De Janvry, drawing from the report he helped prepare, underlined that the now “low level of world food stocks [is] clearly associated with price spikes.” Thus he emphasized the need to “secure a minimum level of world food stocks for price stability,” and that the global community must as he put it “re-open the debate on coordination of storage policies.” Torero similarly proposed the need for a global emergency grain reserve to handle food price crises. Several other speakers concluded that regulation and global coordination of food stocks, food reserves, and other policies are now more important. von Braun also recommended establishing a “grain reserves policy at global level,” which would include an “emergency reserve, shared physical reserves, and a virtual reserve.” A new organization would engage in curbing food price volatility: an “international grain reserves bank.” Participants raised thorny questions about how to make such a bank work in practice; creating one is probably some years off.

Keeping Speculation in Check – De Janvry and the high level panel called for improved international trade rules (through the WTO), and to regulate speculation – keeping it from becoming a destabilizing force.

Keeping International Trade Open – von Braun stressed the priority of keeping trade open “at times of global and regional food shortage,” concerns also raised by other speakers.

Better Monitoring and Information Dissemination – Torero proposed an international working group to regularly monitor the world food situation and trigger action to prevent excessive price volatility. This was similar to one of the roles proposed by von Braun for creating “a new multilateral organization… to watch matters and to guide policy.” Recently, the World Bank has begun such an effort, publishing a Food Price Watch series. In a piece of optimistic news, the report for November 1, 2011, the Bank reported that various factors “bode well for food prices in the coming months.”

Regulate as Needed – But not Heavy-handedly – In addition, regulation cannot be too heavy-handed because “Unconditional control of speculative transaction would undermine the stabilization effect,” as Torero noted. So, a balance has to be found.

Need for Better Global Governance Alain de Janvry proposed that “With globalization”, there is “no food security without global governance,” and asked a basic question, “Can the world get organized to avoid recurrent food crises?” But markets and global governance solutions are not enough. The involvement of the citizen sector is also vital.

The three changes in food price dynamics – toward higher prices, greater variance, and dangerous price spikes – have harmed many people living in poverty. But as a result of the conference, it became clear that much has already been learned about causes, current responses, and innovative longer-term solutions.

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses – Part VI: Price Volatility Policy Solutions

Originally published on March 14, 2012

Volatility 

Safety Nets – People living in poverty will benefit from expanded safety nets, social protection and especially policies and programs that can respond quickly to protect children’s basic nutrition. Nora Lustig posed it as a question, “Even if aggregate poverty measures show a decline (most don’t), shouldn’t we protect the extreme poor from becoming poorer as a result of higher food prices?”

Trade Rules – Like other analysts, de Janvry and the high level panel called for improved international trade rules (through the WTO). De Janvry also noted that “negotiations on agriculture were conceived and conducted in the context of structural overproduction” by major producers who subsidized production and exports. WTO negotiations failed to resolve this problem.

Global agreements for Food Access – Addressing the emerging problems, de Janvry proposed that “negotiations need be reopened from the perspective of access to food for consumers in poor countries,” particularly “Multilateral rules for disciplines on export restrictions, better respect of contractual obligations by commercial actors,” and protection of “poor consumers from undue competition by rich consumers.”

Any Biofuel Policy Should Stabilize – De Janvry also noted that mandates for using biofuels could be used “counter-cyclically.” This means that only when food prices are so low that they harm small farmers would we stimulate demand – for example through corn for use as ethanol – but remove subsidies and mandates as soon as prices start to rise to where they can harm poor consumers. As a key part of this, “Mandates and subsidies for biofuels should be coordinated to help stabilize world food prices instead of contributing to price spikes.”

Help Subsistence Farming as a Safety Net – De Janvry, drawing from the HLPE group, also recommended a “focus on subsistence farming as a cheap and effective safety net for the poorest rural and peri-urban” people.

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses – Part V: Price Trend Policy Solutions

Originally published on March 14, 2012

In Search of Economic Policy Solutions

Participants proposed economic policy solutions to address each of the three changed food price dynamics.

Price Trends

Increasing Food Supply – Participants agreed that the food supply must be increased, including promotion of agriculture growth that benefits the poor who are engaged in this sector, with technology and institutional innovations. Alain de Janvry reported on a high level panel of experts (or HLPE) in which he took part, making global recommendations on food security, part of a major effort hosted by the world’s major forum for cooperating for food security hosted by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization. One of several findings he reported was that for keeping longer term price trends in check it is necessary to counteract rising scarcities by investing in sustainable agricultural growth.

Focus on Africa – There was universal agreement among participants on the need for a focused new green revolution of productivity advances for sub-Saharan Africa. As Keith Fuglie noted, this is the one region in which productivity growth has stalled where productivity gains elsewhere otherwise continue to impress. And yet Africa is the part of the world where the greatest future population increases are predicted based on its current level of poverty.

Limit the Trend of Conversion of Food to Biofuels – De Janvry noted findings that “Rich countries’ demand for food grains as a source of energy crowds out poor people’s demand,” so that “Food demand in developed countries must be curbed when in conflict with poor countries’ food security.” Curbing demand most importantly means not diverting food to use as an energy source.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation – Several speakers noted that we must address climate change before it gets much worse. For example, Maximo Torero pointed to the value of investments by national governments in climate change adaptation and mitigation using the full potential that agriculture offers. He stressed investments in smallholder productivity, in the face of climate change. De Janvry pointed out that this requires “investment in sustainable agriculture for productivity growth, in context of climate change and resource scarcities.”

Decreasing Waste– Besides increasing output, Torero stressed the need to reduce waste, both reducing postharvest loss in developing countries, and gross and unnecessary waste in the rich countries, noting unnecessary high losses in each part of the world.

Realizing Market Benefits – Markets can be a great help in keeping price increases in check. When prices rise, this should create an incentive for people to invest in agriculture, increasing its productivity. When these constructive market forces are impeded, people living in poverty also suffer through higher food prices. This may involve changing some counterproductive policies, as well as implementing the new policies with great care.

The Hidden Good News in the February 2012 Employment Numbers

Originally published on March 11, 2012

Much has been made of the 227,000 jobs estimated to have been added to the US economy in February 2012 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see, for example, this New York Times article from Friday).  This is a good number – anything greater than 150,000 generally results in a sigh of relief amongst economists – and better than expected.  For example, the Survey of Professional Forecasters released in the middle of February forecasted only 160,000 jobs to be created per month on average for the first three months of 2012.  Given that the January numbers were also revised up to 284,000, it looks like the forecasters are going to be way off this quarter (although they were even more pessimistic back in November – they had previously forecast only 121,000 jobs to be added per month for the first quarter of 2012).  These numbers are still well below what we’re used to seeing in a robust recovery, where monthly job creation on the order of 500,000 is not unusual, but they’re big enough that they more than cover new entrants to the labor market.  This means it should be whittling away at the unemployment rate.  So, why did the unemployment rate stay the same, at 8.3%, rather than drop?  This is actually the good news I have been waiting for.

Why would I possibly argue that an unemployment rate staying at 8.3% is good news?  Well, if jobs are being added but the unemployment rate isn’t dropping it means that more people must be out looking for jobs.  This is why the unemployment rate tends to lag in recoveries – people get discouraged when the labor market looks rough and stop looking for work.  As the economy starts to look better we may actually see the unemployment rate rise a bit with discouraged workers coming back into the labor market and again looking for jobs.  This is an exciting development since it suggests there is a bit more optimism for the economy out there.

Here are a couple of graphs for thought.  First, here’s the civilian participation rate, i.e. the percentage of the civilian population either employed or actively looking for a job:

Image

As you can see, we have some way to go to get back to the peak of over 67% that we had in the late 1990s.  There are some reasons we may not get back to that level, in particular the aging of the population resulting in a greater proportion of our population in retirement, but it seems like we might expect to get back to near 66%, where we were before the Great Recession.  Currently we’re at only 63.9%.  But, that’s a little tick up from January’s 63.7%.  Hopefully that pattern will continue.  But, that may mean stagnating unemployment rates for a while.

If we’re looking for discouraged workers going back to the labor market, perhaps we should instead look at a broader definition of the unemployment rate.  Here is a graph of the U6 unemployment rate that includes discouraged workers and those that have part time jobs but want full time jobs:

Image

Here we can see a strong decline of late – this is the good news that is hidden in the more narrow unemployment rate.  A number of people, including Paul Krugman, argued that this was the number we should be watching back in the recession.  It may also be the right one to watch in the recovery.

I should mention a couple of other perspectives on the reduced participation rate over the last few years.  The Economist magazine came out with an interesting article this week which discusses an argument from Alan Krueger, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, that some of the discouraged workers went back to school so the lower participation rate of the last few years isn’t as bad as it may first appear.  I wouldn’t, however, push that idea so far as to claim that the Great Recession was good for these individuals or for the economy as a whole. That would be similar to arguing that a tornado is good for a town because they get to rebuild a nicer town afterwards.  If these people really thought that an education was going to make their lives better they could have gone to school instead of working – they originally made the choice to work instead of going to school.  I generally believe people know best about their life choices.  There may be some reasons to question that belief, but I think it’s a good place to start from.  Still, in the face of unemployment they chose to expand their education instead of facing the possibility of long-term unemployment.  This was probably a good choice for them and for the economy as a whole.

Returning to the relationship between labor force participation and the unemployment rate, one of my favorite blogs, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s macroblog, had an interesting post on Friday.  The Atlanta Fed has a cool new tool on their website called the Jobs Calculator that was designed to calculate the net employment change needed to achieve a target unemployment rate after a specified number of months, but it can also be used to do several other fun thought experiments.  For example, in the blog post from Friday Julie Hotchkiss, an economist at the Atlanta Fed, used the Jobs Calculator to estimate what the unemployment rate would have been in February if there hadn’t been the tick up in the participation rate.  She estimates that it would have been about 8%, about three tenths below what it was reported to be in February.  I also find it interesting that the default settings show what the payroll numbers would need to be to keep the unemployment rate constant at its current value, holding constant the current participation rate.  Apparently it’s now below 95,000 jobs per month.  So, any month where we see job creation over that number means either the unemployment rate should fall or the participation rate has risen.  Either one of those is good news.

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Elections, Jobs and What to Do About China

Originally published on March 7, 2012

REPOSTED FROM ASPENIA ONLINE

As the Republican candidates campaign in the Midwestern states – states that are suffering from several years of high unemployment, a decade of factory flight to Mexico and China, and more than a generation of increased import competition with industrial and manufacturing decline – they are asked what they, as president, would be prepared to do to alleviate these problems.  Because all of these problems will remain mostly unchanged by the November elections, both the Republican nominee and President Obama will want to present a convincing plan to attract votes in these important swing states.      Unfortunately, what is being offered as a solution by both parties may attract votes, but is unlikely to be very effective in resolving the underlying problems; in fact, some of the proposed solutions may make things worse. ….   to read more click HERE.

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses – Part IV: Food Price Spikes

Originally published on March 5, 2012 

Food Price Spikes

Food price spikes are not unprecedented. Indeed, there have been larger ones previously, particularly in the 1970s. But food price spikes have returned with a vengeance in this century.

Joahcim Von Braun, Professor at the University of Bonn and former Director General of International Food Policy Research Institute, set the stage a few days before the main conference at a policy forum. Speaking of the big spike in 2007-08, Von Braun said that “changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot fully explain the recent drastic increase in food prices.” Instead he said the new spikes are driven by three new factors:

Energy market linkages – high prices of oil are not just raising the costs of fertilizer but also incentivizing farmers in rich countries to use their crops for biofuel. Financial market linkages – there is a clear and growing link between food market volatility and financial crises.

Financial market linkages – there is a clear and growing link between food market volatility and financial crisis.

Speculation linkages – the “speculation effect partly depends on the ‘nervousness’ of the market,” as von Braun explained; “What is called speculation actually stabilizes prices when the market is less nervous,” because it can push markets to find prices consistent with supply and demand more quickly. But speculation is destabilizing “when the market becomes nervous as a result of changes in fundamentals, policies and structures.” Shifts in sentiment can result in spikes.

Presentations of other speakers echoed problems of energy market linkages, making it one of the strong consensuses of the conference. Professor de Janvry noted the “intrusion of energy demand in food markets” would have to be confronted. Dr. Torero proposed policies and technology investments to “minimize food-fuel competition.”

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses – Part III: Food Price Volatility

Originally published on February 24, 2012

Increasing Food Price Volatility

We know that climate change is coming, but the local details remain clouded: we are not sure yet which areas will be dryer and which prone to more flooding, for example. But as it is all but certain that volatility will increase. As Dr. Maximo Torero, an economist and division chief at International Food Policy Research Institute pointed out, in a hotter world, weather will be significantly more variable, which means that agricultural output will be more volatile also. Even if some aspects of today’s price volatility is a passing phase due to unregulated financial markets and other bad policies, volatility in some form will be with us. So we have to take it seriously, and plan to cushion people living in poverty from its harmful effects.

Torero, and Professor Carlos Martins-Filho of the University of Colorado, showed that excessive food price volatility has greatly increased. Torero also showed that most of the factors pushing up food prices are also worsening the volatility of those prices. For example, just a few countries account for the majority of exports of most staples – a monopolistic power or reliance on just a few sellers that can also increase volatility. In addition, he noted that government mandates to use ethanol also increases volatility as well as price. And as volume in futures markets has increased, this also makes the price of food vulnerable to volatility; high volatility attracts more financial market participants, who learn that they can make money on trading – which can amplify instability. Finally, high futures market prices lead also to high spot market prices, a consequence of speculation.

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses – part II: Rising Price Trend

Originally published on February 22, 2012

The Rising Food Price Trend

What of the new trend toward steadily rising food prices? Food prices are about 80 percent higher than they were in 2000, reversing a long declining trend of previous decades. Nora Lustig, Professor of Economics and of Latin American Studies at Tulane University, summarized causes of the decade long trend to higher food prices, and of the 2007-8 and 2010-11 food price spikes. Some parts of the price increases reflect longer-term forces that if left unchecked will lead to higher future food prices, including diversion of food to biofuels production, increase in demand for grains through shifts to meat production due to higher incomes in China and elsewhere, a possible slowdown in productivity growth of agricultural commodities, higher energy prices affecting agricultural input costs, and running out of new land to be brought into farming. Finally there is the negative impact of climate change on developing-country food production – already having some impact years before initially predicted, with far worse impacts very likely ahead of us.

Long-term forces cannot explain the volatility, let alone the spikes. But the spikes were exacerbated by a number of unfavorable policies including various forms of interference with food prices – such as subsidies and mandates for biofuels. As Alain de Janvry, a professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of California at Berkeley, pointed out, “the demand for energy is simply so big compared to the food market that it could completely overwhelm any price predictions that one could make if one does not take into account the way these energy policies are going to be made.”

Furthermore, there is not a large global market for food in relation to total demand. Most countries strive for food self-sufficiency, largely for national security reasons. Embargoes of food exports by such countries as Egypt, Vietnam, and Russia reflect this reluctance to allow a freer global market when it comes to food.

The World Bank reported in 2008 that growth in output per acre had been leveling off, and that prices would continue rising. In fact, as Nora Lustig pointed out, prices have increased far faster than even the World Bank had predicted. As Lustig reminded the audience, food is the “most basic of basic needs; for the poor, food has no substitutes.” She pointed out that while “food is energy for human survival,” instead, she said, “food commodities have turned into industrial commodities, energy for machines.” This result is less energy for people – at best, more expensive energy – when so many remain deprived of even a minimum of calories. Lustig’s review confirmed “a majority of studies show that those who get hurt outnumber those who benefit” when food prices increase, and in addition the “severity of poverty” impact is higher. Indeed, “in many instances rural poverty goes up as well.”

The story of the 21st century so far is one of rising food prices – and according to most projections this will continue in coming decades. In contrast, the story of the 20th Century was the opposite – with food prices falling close to 1% per year. Dr. Keith Fuglie, an economist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, pointed out that in the early decades falling costs of shipping steered prices lower, sending food from where it was grown cheaply and abundantly to where food prices were high. In the later decades of the 20th century, rising output per acre drove prices down. Today, that yield growth is slower; but Fuglie found we are still getting gains despite smaller additions to inputs than before (especially the smaller fraction of workers in agriculture). This is a new and encouraging discovery. It should be putting downward pressure on food prices – and otherwise perhaps prices would be rising even faster. Looking ahead, these forces may continue to keep increasing food price from speeding up further. Findings like Fuglie’s help reassure us that, while new problems complicate work toward a world free of hunger, with continued commitment the goal can still be attained. But Fuglie also found that these gains were not present in Africa, where most of the increase in population is expected. And although very encouraging, his work is retrospective – it does not take into account the projected worsening of environmental stresses not only from climate change but from localized deforestation, water scarcity, falling water tables, declining soil fertility, outright erosion, salination, and other pollutants.

A Review – Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses *

Originally published on February 22, 2012

Introduction

On September 30, IIEP held a daylong conference on “Food Price Increases: Causes, Impacts and Responses.” IIEP brought eight leading experts to GW to examine the reemergence of the “food problem”: prices have reversed their downward trend of much of the 20th century; over the last decade global food prices have risen about 80%. In response, the number of people suffering from hunger as measured by the Food and Agriculture Organization has increased by more than 100 million people. But variance also seems to have increased significantly – returning to volatility not seen since the 1970s. Finally, a third feature emerged – two sharp upward food price spikes – that demanded improved understanding. More than 100 participants attended the event. The speakers presented new, groundbreaking research addressing each of these three changes in food price dynamics.

* Parts of this review first appeared in an article in World Ark:http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/heifer/worldark_201202/#/14

Unemployment Rate Forecasts

Originally published on February 12, 2012

As a regular contributor to the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) I am always curious about the forecasts my fellow contributors are making.  The latest set of forecasts came out on Friday and this time I was particularly focused on the unemployment rate forecasts.  There has been much talk about the importance of the unemployment rate at the time of the presidential election, and the SPF has been shown to produce pretty good forecasts of the US unemployment rate.  The unemployment rate for last month was 8.3%, a surprisingly good number.  The unemployment rate has fallen faster over the last few months than forecasters predicted in the SPF just last quarter, although some of the decline was due to people leaving the labor force rather than job creation.  Following the surprising performance of the unemployment rate generally, the SPF forecasters indeed changed their forecasts substantially this round.  Here’s a graph:

SPF Median Forecasts of the US Unemployment Rate

The key forecast I was looking at was for 2012Q4 – right around election time.  As you can see, the forecasters now see a much better labor market outlook for the end of 2012 than they did just three months ago.  The median forecast has dropped from 8.7% to 8.1%.  It has not, however, dropped below the threshold of 8% (my personal forecast is currently right at 8% for November 2012).  I think there is something to round numbers in human psychology, but I also recognize the importance of trends.  A declining unemployment rate, particularly one that is declining faster than previously predicted, looks good for the incumbent.  One question that remains for me, however, is has this decline come too soon?  If the improvement slows before the election, will voters forget that not so long ago we were wondering if the unemployment rate might go back up above 10% or at least not drop below 9% before the 2012 election?

Transparency is Supply Side Governance: We also need trust from the demand side

Originally published on February 7, 2012

The World Bank extractives governance web site (GOXI) asked me  and others to set up a discussion on the new transparency initiatives and whether or not they are supportive of development. I focused on  Dodd Frank and EITI.  I think they are a good start, but only a start.  Comments much appreciated.

It is too early to assess the impact of EITI and Dodd-Frank transparency initiatives on development.  Nonetheless, enquiring minds such as GOXI readers understandably wonder if these initiatives have had unintended consequences for their supposed beneficiaries.  While we have case study evidence about EITI, we have limited data on its impact on development, quality of governance or other factors.  Meanwhile, the SEC has yet to issue Dodd-Frank regulations.

Instead, herein I critique both initiatives for their strategy and indirect effects.  I argue that both strategies focus on the supply side of governance—they do not empower individuals to demand their rights; nor do they help these societies achieve accountability or trust between the government and the governed.

Let’s begin with EITI.  EITI is a limited partnership-with a confused purpose and strategy. EITI doesn’t say this explicitly, but it is aimed at prodding resource rich developing countries to create a feedback loop between the government and the governed.  The people should monitor government and act as a counterweight to corrupt policymakers who may pocket or misuse the revenues from resources.  But EITI is incomplete because it does not require a public debate on the use of extractive industry revenues which belong to the people.  It calls for adopting states to develop a multistakeholder group to monitor the government’s reportage of royalties.  But that group is not required to educate legislators or to hold public hearings.  Moreover, more recently, the EITI Secretariat now promotes EITI as a “standard” for resource revenue management. Supposedly, some policymakers want to get Chinese, Indian and other state run firms to act responsibly regarding governance of extractives. Hence Norway, the US and several other industrialized countries have announced they are adopting EITI, but it is unclear how that will influence other countries such as China or Indonesia.

EITI seems to work best in countries like Liberia and Ghana where policymakers want to achieve better governance and where civil society, a free press, and democratic debate are respected.  Nonetheless, in countries like Azerbaijan, policymakers have used EITI to signal better governance and perhaps to attract more diversified investment.

In a study of EITI partner views (out of date now); it was clear that EITI supporters have widely divergent views as to what EITI should do, what it should ask adopting states to do, and how it should be monitored and assessed.[1]  Developing country policymakers like EITI-because it is voluntary, relatively cheap and supported by WB/EITI+. Many industrialized country policymakers like EITI because it can help them change conditions in some countries without direct conditionality. EI executives generally like EITI because it is not a mandate. And finally, many developing country NGOs like EITI because it stimulates governance learning and training and best practices information. However, some implementing governments have not allowed civil society to fully participate in EITI or provided civil society with the information to hold governments to account. In many implementing countries, the public and legislators may not be aware of EITI. Hence, the public is a silent partner in EITI. Without an empowered public, citizens cannot act as a counterweight to resource corruption.  I believe EITI is too focused on NGOs rather than educating and empowering the broad citizenry, and it is not helpful in nations where civil and political rights are not respected.

Let me now move to Dodd-Frank’s conflict mineral provisions.  These provisions requires firm where “conflict minerals are necessary to the function of the product” to disclose steps they and their suppliers are taking to ensure that revenues from trade in conflict minerals don’t finance conflict in the Manu Basin. We may look back on this strategy in ten years and wonder why US (and perhaps soon European policymakers) used corporate governance rules to deal with the problem of ethnic tension, inequality, and inadequate governance in the Manu Basin.  Certainly, how, where and what firms source matters and such information should be disclosed to investors. Such information is material, and so the idea behind this provision makes sense. But it is not the best way to address this problem.  U.S. policymakers and activists failed to weigh the trade spillovers of this strategy.  Congolese activists, diplomats, and UN experts have reported that many tech firms are sourcing outside of DRC and nearby countries.  So far, the strategy has resulted in less trade for people of the region and less access to opportunities. The UN Group of Experts admitted Dodd Frank has already had mixed results. While a “higher proportion of conflict minerals are not funding conflict,”  the Group also  admitted the people of the Manu Basin are experiencing more economic hardship, smuggling, criminalization of minerals trade and less government revenue.[2]  Meanwhile, US security lawyers are laughing all the way to the bank as they debate what “necessary to the functioning of the product” means.

Like EITI, Dodd-Frank conflict minerals does little to empower people of the Manu Basin to demand and monitor good governance. But there are ways to supplement this initiative. Why not provide funding to the public to monitor on the ground activity?  As example, AID donors could provide cell phones with apps or platforms such as Ushahidi or community that allow users to anonymously report corruption or illicit trade.

In sum, although these 2 initiatives have brought some rays of light to inadequate governance of extractives, they have done little to empower the public and to build trust between the government and the governed. Such trust is an essential component of the feedback loop necessary to achieve better governance. Hence the designers of EITI and Dodd-Frank should think a little more about how to work with more of the people they hope to help.


[1] Aaronson 2011, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1739912

[2] Letter Fred Robarts, Coordinator, Group of Experts on the DRC,  to SEC/ Ref S/AC.43/2011/GE/OC.86, at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-346.pdf

Groundhog Day Economic Forecasts

Originally published on February 2, 2012

Happy Groundhog Day IIEP Blog Readers!

This morning I recorded an interview with Marketplace Morning Report, to be aired on February 2nd in honor of Groundhog Day.  The segment was about economic forecasting.  Originally the woman I was corresponding with to set up the interview wanted me to talk about my own forecasts.  Although I do prepare some forecasts for the Survey of Professional Forecasters, I regularly admit that I generally don’t trust economic forecasts, particularly my own.  Her response to my hesitation in sharing my forecasts with 5.9 million listeners (according to her count), was “as long as you’re a little more accurate than Pux Phil, I’m sure you’ll be fine.”   Sadly, I’m concerned that when it counts the most, economic forecasters may not be any more accurate than a groundhog.

You might think, hope even, that economic forecasters should be more reliable than a groundhog.  When it comes to recessions however, even the best forecasters out there seem to fail miserably to predict both when we’re going into one and when we’re coming out of one.  In fact, in an article I wrote with my colleagues Fred Joutz and H.O. Stekler, we found that although the Federal Reserve staff, quite possibly the best forecasters for the US economy overall, know whether or not we are in a recession currently, they cannot predict whether or not we will be in one just one quarter in advance.  This is a big problem since monetary policy actions tend to take at least a couple of quarters to take effect.

Researchers continue to search for ways to improve models that forecast recessions.  One of my favorite models is the one by Marcelle Chauvet and Jeremy Piger which currently suggests only a 2.7% probability of a recession.  But, even this model is just trying to catch a recession as it is going on, not predict it in advance.  Until researchers find a model that better predicts recessions, perhaps we should not expect so much from our forecasters and policymakers.  Maybe recessions are just unpredictable.  Or maybe we just need to find the right groundhog…

A Different Structure for Making Trade Policy

Originally published on January 31, 2012

President Obama has proposed a new cabinet agency to subsume the Commerce Department, the US Trade Representative and the Small business Administration. He has justified this new department as creating greater efficiencies, enhancing business results, and saving taxpayer money. Although the President has outlined his strategy, he has not made an effective case to Congress for this change in structure. His ideas are especially worrisome regarding trade. Congress created the USTR to take control over trade negotiations out of the Department of State, which was seen as favoring international interests over domestic needs.

Although Congress and the executive share responsibility for trade policymaking, Congress sets the direction for trade policy and exerts oversight on how the executive branch implements and enforces trade laws. Congress holds the Executive on a tight leash, because it forces the President to seek Congressional approval to negotiate trade agreements (trade promotion authority). Congress needs a consistent, effective staff to advise members as they weigh trade policy. Why not embrace the idea of Senator Max Baucus who has long called for a Congressional Trade Office, to help members address the increasingly broad array of issues, from internet freedom to food safety, that are currently trade issues? This office would provide Congress with independent, nonpartisan and neutral trade expertise, enable more members of Congress to meet their trade responsibilities, and play an important role in monitoring trade negotiations and trade enforcement.

Members of Congress are more likely to embrace a structural change in the executive branch if they have the staff and expertise to monitor what the Executive is doing.
Susan Ariel Aaronson, Associate Research Professor, IIEP and Visiting Fellow, Quality of Governance Institute, Gothenberg, Sweden. She teaches courses in trade issues and in corruption/good governance. She is interested in the relationship between respecting human rights and economic growth.

The Macroeconomic Impact of Regulatory Agency Spending

Originally published on January 29, 2012

Hello again readers of the IIEP blog!  Today I’d like to share with you a post I co-authored with Kathryn Vesey, Research Associate at the GW Regulatory Studies Center (where I am also affiliated), as well as a Master of Public Policy Candidate at The Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration. She and I have been working on a project examining the impact of regulatory agency spending on the macroeconomy.

With the U.S. unemployment rate still painfully high at 8.5%, politicians in Washington and on the campaign trail continue debating over what steps government should take to help put Americans back to work. One popular argument in that vein has been that government regulation is the enemy of job creation, a claim that may be more driven by rhetorical salience than evidence. On this subject, a recent article in the Washington Post reports, “Economists who have studied the matter say that there is little evidence that regulations cause massive job loss in the economy, and that rolling them back would not lead to a boom in job creation.”

A recent empirical study conducted by the Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Policy Studies tells a different story however. Using the Regulators’ Budget data as a proxy measure of regulation over time, this study estimates that reducing the total budget of all U.S. federal regulatory agencies by just 5% (or $2.8 billion) would result in an increase in real private-sector GDP of $75 billion annually, as well as 1.2 million more private sector jobs each year. They put it another way too, claiming that firing one regulatory agency staff member will create 98 jobs in the private sector.

This study’s provocative findings have been widely cited by politicians, advocacy organizations, and the media as evidence that cutting regulation will create jobs and grow the economy, even making an appearance in an official congressional report on the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2011). But are these figures, which seem so surprisingly high, really definitive?

We set out to answer that question, first by attempting to replicate the authors’ study following their steps exactly. What we found is that when we use the same data and identical model specification, we do in fact arrive at the same dramatic results. However, we also find that those results are extremely sensitive to small alterations in the specification used.

For example, the Phoenix Center uses the “Regulators’ Budget as a share of private GDP” as the variable for regulatory activity in their Generalized Impulse Response Function (GIRF), which they then use to simulate a “regulatory shock” to observe how the other two variables in the model (private GDP per capita and private sector jobs) respond. However, we tried a number of small changes to the specification, for example replacing the Regulators’ Budget as a share of private GDP with the Regulators’ Budget measured in billions of 2005 dollars – a specification we argue is more appropriate, as it does not require holding private GDP constant in one variable while allowing it to vary in another.

This alternative model leads us to very different results. The Phoenix Center study found a statistically significant, negative relationship between the Regulators’ Budget and private sector GDP and employment. On the other hand, according to our preferred model, we find a positive relationship where a 5% increase in the Regulators’ Budget is associated with a 0.28% increase in private sector employment and a 0.14% increase in real private GDP. However, these results are not statistically significant and therefore indistinguishable from no effect.

This lack of statistical significance is not surprising for several reasons. First, there is bound to be much variation in private sector employment and private sector GDP not accounted for by this macroeconomic model with just three variables. Second, it is quite likely that different types of regulatory agency budgetary spending have diverse effects on the economy, and that these effects may vary at different times. And third, as is the case with more commonly used proxies for regulatory activity, such as number of pages in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations, the Regulators’ Budget is a blunt measure of regulation. The taxpayer costs of staffing and running federal regulatory agencies (as measured by the Regulators’ Budget) may not correlate well with the societal impacts of the regulations they issue.

Of particular concern with respect to using Regulators’ Budget data as the proxy for regulation is one substantial outlier in the budget – Homeland Security budgetary spending (mostly attributed to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)). As the graph below illustrates, this area of regulation has been by far the largest driver of regulatory agency spending growth in the last decade since the Department of Homeland Security was created after September 11th. Based on this insight, it would seem that this outlier may be partially responsible for the model’s lack of stability.

Data Source: Weidenbaum Center, Washington University and the Regulatory Studies Center, The George Washington University. Derived from the Budget of the United States Government and related documents, various fiscal years.

It is also important to recognize the limitations of vector autoregressive analysis in general and its applications in the Phoenix Center study in particular. Vector autoregressive models have been commonly used for macroeconomic analyses for 25 years. They can be extremely beneficial for describing data, and oftentimes for forecasting purposes too. However, as Stock and Watson discuss in a 2001 paper, “small VARs of two or three variables” – such as the one used in the Phoenix Center study – “are often unstable and thus poor predictors of the future.” Moreover, drawing structural inferences from VARs is difficult and requires one to make weighty assumptions.

Regulations have significant economic and social costs and benefits, as well as important distributional effects. The recent increase in awareness of this reality among citizens and politicians has the potential to affect positive changes to the U.S. regulatory system, making it smarter, more transparent, and more accountable. However, in order to keep the conversation constructive, it is important that the evidence drawn upon in the public discourse about regulation be meaningful and well-informed. Our ongoing analysis seeks to do that.

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Trade, Politics, and the Growth of Government

Originally published on January 26, 2012

In President Obama’s State of the Union address this week, he criticized countries that don’t play by the rules of international trade.  He noted that his administration had initiated nearly twice as many trade cases against China as the previous administration.  He criticized countries (read China) who let movies, music and software be pirated.  And he exclaimed that it is unfair if foreign manufacturers get a leg up because of foreign government subsidies.

To resolve these problems and to help promote jobs in the US, President Obama then announced the creation of a NEW Trade Enforcement Unit that will be responsible for investigating unfair trading practices in countries like China.  Finally, he said that if only the playing field were level, America would always win.

To the American people, especially to labor union workers or others whose jobs may be threatened by rising imports, this new initiative will surely be welcomed.   The President has proclaimed that he has been tough and will get even tougher on China.

But what is really the point of this new unit?

The US already has numerous agencies charged with monitoring foreign countries’ trade policies and protecting US companies from unfair trade actions.  The Executive branch’s US Trade Representative (Ron Kirk) is the lead organization in this effort.  The USTR represents the US at the World Trade Organization, negotiates free trade areas, including the new Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), and monitors foreign practices that negatively affect US exports, including intellectual property violations.  It is responsible for the several WTO dispute cases that the US has ongoing against China and other countries.   To protect against unfair trade practices we have several trade laws including the antidumping code, the anti-subsidy code and the safeguards procedures.  These are administered jointly by the International trade Administration in the Department of Commerce and the US international Trade Commission.   These agencies are also currently investigating several cases against China and others.  Other agencies are also involved in trade policy matters including the Department of Agriculture and even the Defense Department.

So what will this Trade Enforcement Unit do?  My guess is that it will spend an enormous amount of time trying not to step on the toes of all the other authorities that already have jurisdiction in these matters.  One might argue that the unit could serve as a coordinator between all these different units, except that the President’s office is already supposed to be doing that.  If the Trade Enforcement Unit is housed within the USTR office, then it will just be a new name placed around a group of individuals who are already supposed to be doing this anyway.   And furthermore, if the President wants to take stronger actions against China or others, he already has some authority to do that within the current structure.

So, why do we need a NEW Trade Enforcement Unit?

The answer must be political.  The President wants another bullet point that he can refer to in speeches highlighting how he is getting tough on China and protecting workers against unfair trade practices.  As a result, the Obama administration is doing what all political leaders tend to do …. create more initiatives.  For leaders to justify their existence they need to demonstrate that they are doing something.  And the easiest thing governments can DO is to create more government.  The greater the number of NEW initiatives the greater the number of talking points one will have in campaign speeches.

In this case, I expect the Trade Enforcement Unit will be inconsequential.  The unit will probably consist of a small group of government workers, maybe many reassigned from other units so it may not even involve the growth of government.  The unit will spend a lot of time coordinating with others and may be given credit for some of the initiatives that are already being investigated …  this, because in the end, the unit will have to be shown to be a success.  So this announcement is not a big deal.

However, the political incentive to DO SOMETHING whenever a problem is identified, has contributed to the growth of government across all administrations.  This has led to the creation of new government agencies and the growth of existing agencies as each one is asked to expand their services with each new administration.  The Trade Enforcement unit won’t affect the size of government much …  but when we recognize the incentive behind this benign announcement and expand this action across numerous issues, numerous years, and numerous administrations  … the effects are not so benign.

Fed Watching

Originally published on January 20, 2012

Hello readers of the IIEP blog!  Since this is my first time posting here, let me briefly introduce myself.  I am an associate professor of economics and international affairs here at The George Washington University and an affiliate of the Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP).  My specialty is empirical macroeconomics.  This means I get surprisingly excited about the new data we get from recessions – yes, someone has to be happy about recessions and that job falls to me. To be clear, recessions themselves don’t actually make me happy.  I definitely did not enjoy the last one here in the US and I don’t wish a recession on anyone.  However, the data we get from recessions, data that may help us to make better forecasts and policy decisions so that we can avoid recessions in the future, bring a certain twinkle to my eye.

One of my roles here is that I am IIEP’s resident Fed watcher.  Beyond actually being able to see the Federal Reserve building through the windows of the Institute, I regularly Google “Federal Reserve” and see what people at the Federal Reserve are up to and what the press and others are saying about the Fed.  After the excitement of the past few years I have recently reduced the frequency of my searches, having grown a bit weary of the Fed’s repeated forecasts of sluggish growth and promises of low interest rates until at least the middle of 2013. Yesterday, however, I thought to poke around a bit and found that in the flurry of academic activity at the end of the year I missed a major controversy.  Although the traditional comment period may have passed, I feel the need to blog about it – which brings me to my first IIEP blog post:

In my search for recent posts about the Fed I was drawn in by the clever title of the Daily Show’s “America’s Next TARP Model.” I enjoyed the part about the kitten known as Professor Butterscotch that was just about to get tenure – because he was an actual professor.  However, I did not enjoy the fundamental misunderstanding of the actions of the Federal Reserve evidenced in the piece.  In particular, under the video on the Daily Show’s website is the following caption:

“A Bloomberg report reveals that the U.S. government loaned banks $7.7 trillion in secret bailout funds at no interest and then borrowed the money back at interest.”

The first misunderstanding in this caption is that it was not the U.S. government who loaned these funds to banks.  Instead, it was the Federal Reserve, the US government-chartered central bank.  This is important because the Fed is charged with serving as the lender of last resort – and that’s the role it played when it lent money through the discount window to struggling banks in the height of the financial crisis.  On the rest of the misunderstandings, let me quote John Williams, President and Chief Executive Office of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco from the FRBSF Economic Letter I happened to read yesterday as well:

“Now there are many myths associated with these emergency programs. I would like to take this opportunity to dispel some of them. First, these programs were not “secret.” The fact is that all of these programs were publicly announced and reported on regularly. Indeed, the amounts lent in each program were shown on Fed financial documents made public every week. The only thing that wasn’t disclosed at the time was the names of specific borrowers and the amounts lent to them. Second, this lending did not put taxpayer money at significant risk. All of the lending was backed by good collateral and the vast majority of it has been fully repaid. Indeed, these emergency lending programs alone generated an estimated $20 billion in interest income. That income, like all the net income the Fed generates after its expenses, went to the U.S. Treasury. Third, borrowers did not get below-market interest rates. Many of our programs charged penalty rates so that borrowers would want to go back to the private markets as soon as they opened up again. Fourth, the Fed is audited. Our financial books are subject to a stringent reporting process and regularly reviewed by Congress (see Board of Governors 2011).”

Let me emphasize what I think is the point John Stewart and others have been missing:  the net income from the lending programs went to the Treasury.  This means that yes, the banks made profits, but so did the U.S. government – on money created out of thin air!  This is where it really matters that it was the Fed that did the initial lending.  The Fed has the power, given to it by Congress, to create new money.  Lending the new money to banks, even if the banks turn around and lend it to the government, keeps the interest rate lower than it otherwise would be.  In particular the interest rate was lowered for government borrowing.  So, rather than costing the taxpayer money, the lending by the Fed lowered the interest the government had to pay and also prevented financial collapse.  This sounds to me like a win-win.

Why don’t we just let the government print the money so they can have it directly without having to sell bonds or even collect taxes?  We’ve seen what happens when countries do that – they no longer only print money based on the needs of the economy.  Instead, they end up printing money whenever there’s a bill they have to pay.  Eventually the increase in the supply of money devalues the currency.  It makes a lot of sense to have the power to print money in the hands of people whose reputations rely on keeping inflation low and who have to return the profits to the government.  This way the government, and therefore the taxpayers, gets the benefit of the printing of the new money while also maintaining a hopefully more stable value of the currency.

It is possible that in some other blog post I may criticize the Fed – I do not always agree with their actions or policies, and keeping interest rates so low for so long scares me.  But serving as the lender of last resort to prevent an economic catastrophe is exactly what Congress created the Fed to do, and I believe that’s what they did with their emergency lending programs.  And, they did it with little risk to the taxpayer.

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A WARNING about the US-China Relationship

Originally published on November 20, 2011

In the past week President Obama has taken several opportunities to stand up to the Chinese and reassert American dominance.  This BBC article describes the past week’s events in three Acts.  In Act One the US moved swiftly to advance the Transpacific Partnership, which would create a free trade area among major countries in the Pacific Rim, but for now would exclude China.  While China was told the door was open, the underlying message was that entrance would require some swift internal changes on their exchange rate policy and the protection of intellectual property.  In Act Two, President Obama announced the deployment of up to 2500 troops in Northern Australia.  Although President Obama asserted this had nothing to do with China, no one really believes that.  Finally in Act Three in Bali Indonesia, President Obama signaled his desire to discuss the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea (or is it the West Philippine Sea, or the East Vietnamese sea??)  Naturally, the smaller nations in the area welcome the presence of the US in negotiations with China over rights in the area.  Equally naturally, China finds the US presence to be especially unwelcome and would prefer to deal with each nation separately.  To add further to the dispute, India announced today its intention to explore for oil in the South China Sea.

In normal times a little bit of angry rhetoric between countries is harmless.  Leaders posture and pronounce but little else comes of it.  Hopefully that will be true this time too.  However, we are not living through normal times.  The economic climate in the world is increasingly dismal.  There is a strong chance that sluggish growth and high unemployment will remain for some time in the US.  In China there is a real danger that growth could slow tremendously and they will suffer their first major recession since the transformation to freer markets began in the late 1970s.  If this economic malaise continues, popular discontent may rise up in both countries and leaders will seek ways to quiet their masses.

One effective technique is to turn popular anger outward rather than inward.  Politically, it is preferable that unhappy citizens vent their frustrations towards a foreign enemy than towards the current leadership.  The political incentives are similar in China and the US.  The blame game can be effective if you can convince one’s citizens one of two things:  either 1) that the current troubles are really being caused by the unfair actions of other parties, or 2) that the greater prosperity of an external group is a sign of some inequity.  The first of these is currently being applied by the Obama administration as well as by many in the Republican presidential field (with the exception of Jon Huntsman).   The second is the more likely response of the Chinese as they fend off accusations of blame from the US, their much more prosperous trading partner.

The main problem with these public pronouncements is that they can lead to real hostilities with shots being fired and soldiers being killed.  Hopefully, it will not come to this.  But simply imagine a year or two from now.  Imagine the US Presidential election with even more accusatory rhetoric from both political parties each trying to demonstrate they will be “tough on China!”  Imagine the US economy continuing to struggle, and China’s economy beginning a serious economic downturn.  Under such circumstances, minor incidents could have serious repercussions.

Recall the incident 10 years ago when a Chinese jet damaged a US reconnaissance plane in flight forcing it to land in China.   A similar incident today after a period of harsh rhetoric could escalate into something much more serious.  In China there is a well-known reluctance to “lose face” in the arena of public opinion and thus they may be encouraged to stand up to the Americans.  However, the reluctance to lose face would be just as strong in the US after a period of harsh rhetoric.  Neither side would be able to back down from such an incident for fear of looking weak against its professed antagonist.

If economic conditions in China led to internal instabilities, the Chinese government might be inclined to divert its citizens’ attention by wrestling control of energy resources in the South China sea, or by reasserting its professed rights over Taiwan.   If the US responds by defending the rights of the Asian countries, China could easily rally internal popular opposition to the interference by the US hegemon in the Asia region.

Again, hopefully, these scenarios will never occur.  I raise them merely to suggest that they are plausible under the right set of circumstances.  Some of those circumstances, like the length and severity of the economic downturn, are difficult to prevent.  However, some of the conditions, like the accusatory rhetoric against each other, can be avoided.  A better approach to problems in the US-China relationship is to discuss them in diplomatic circles.  Exchange rate policy and monetary policy coordination can be (and is) discussed on a continual basis in meetings between government officials at many meetings between the countries.   Intellectual property rights are also discussed by government and the businesses that are directly affected by enforcement problems.   The underlying problems are real but they will take a long time to resolve.  For example, China cannot immediately solve intellectual property problems.  The changes will take decades and China is working slowly in the right direction.  But, even if they picked up the pace, it is unlikely to have noteworthy effects in the short term.  In much the same way the US cannot just snap its fingers and resolve its unemployment problems.  Achieving an outcome requires much more than desiring the outcome.

For these reasons it would be prudent for leaders on both sides to avoid the accusatory rhetoric and prevent two associated face-saving problems.  The first problem is that public pronouncements that another country change its ways is more likely to inspire resistance to change rather than the change that is desired.  What proud country wants to be seen capitulating to the demands of another?  And both the US and China are proud countries.   Secondly, the accusations can paint leaders into the corner suggested above:  if real hostilities ever accidentally broke out, neither country would be able to renounce it previous positions and unnecessary military escalation could become a reality.

President Obama suggested last week that China needs to act more like a grown up in the world.  My suggestion is that both countries act grown up, which means not using accusatory rhetoric against the other in public for political purposes.  I am doubtful that such restraint will prevail, however, there were some hopeful signs of cooperation on the South China sea issue at the end of the East Asia Summit in Bali.

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More US-China Sparring

Originally published on November 15, 2011

The US and China stepped up their sparring against each other last weekend in Honolulu at the APEC summit.  Reuters reports, “While insisting he wanted stable ties with China, Obama in quick succession demanded it “play by the rules” of international trade, said its export-driven powerhouse “throws the whole world economy out of balance,” and insisted it act like a “grown up,” rather than posturing as a developing nation.”

China was quick to respond, arguing that it would only abide by trade rules that it participated in negotiating, not ones unilaterally determined, as I suspect China views the US demands to raise its currency value.   Legislation, stalled in the US Congress, would label China a currency manipulator and make it easier to initiate trade remedy actions against Chinese imports.  From China’s perspective, its currency has been held semi-fixed at the same or rising value for the past 20 years.  This is similar to many other countries that continue to maintain fixed exchange rates to promote stability and reduce uncertainty in international transactions.  While it is certainly true that a low currency value can make exports easier and inhibit imports, contributing to China’s trade surplus with the US, it is also true that many other factors influence trade imbalances, including price and interest rate differences, savings rates, and the potential for future economic growth.  Indeed even at a fixed exchange rate, China’s exports are already becoming more expensive because inflation is rising by as much as 2-4% faster than in the US.  Additionally, an appreciation of China’s currency alone offers no guarantee that it will make any dent in the US trade deficit.  In many episodes with other countries in the past, appreciating currencies did not make a significant dent in a country’s trade surplus with another.  The best example of this, perhaps, is the large appreciation of the Japanese yen during the 1980s and up till today which has still not caused our trade deficit with Japan to turn to surplus.  The point then is that too many other factors cause trade imbalances to expect that a simple yuan appreciation will cause a big turnaround in our trade deficit.

Instead our continual sparring with China over currency and other matters, is likely to do little more than irritate the other and result in increasing trade actions and reactions rather than dramatic changes in trade imbalances that will miraculously resolve the US unemployment problem.

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US-China Policy Makes US Look Weaker

Originally published on October 6, 2011

The US is the largest economy in the world. Sure China may be number two, but when you consider it in per capita terms the US is near the top and China is closer to 100 in rank. The US has the most integrated market, its labor force is highly skilled and flexible, it has innovative entrepreneurs that are the envy of the world, it has a smoothly functioning and reliant legal system, it preserves and promotes intellectual property creation, it has an higher education system that attracts students and researchers from all over the world, and it has a living environment and opportunities that attract people in much greater numbers than we would like to admit. Add to that a military capacity with power and reach that is truly ominous in comparison to any other country and you have a country that is the equivalent of the NY Yankees in the 20th century.

Yes, the US economy is stumbling and the mood for the future is dour. But many other countries, including China, have conditions that are far worse in many respects. China is strong militarily, but they can’t project power on the other side of the globe like the US has done (rightly or wrongly) in Afghanistan and Iraq. China just commissioned its 1st aircraft carrier! The US has 11 with three more under construction … more than all other countries combined. China’s economy is expanding but they face enormous internal stability problems. They have an immature financial sector, a highly dubious legal system, and the potential for rural-urban migration in future years in numbers that exceeds the population of the US. They also have an aging population entering retirement, as does the US, only China’s is 5 or 6 times larger. And still their per capita income is only1/6th that of the US.

The US unemployment rate is currently over 9%. But is this something the US cannot endure and overcome? The unemployment rate was well over this in Spain and some other European countries during our previous boom years. In South Africa the unemployment rate is 25% … that’s as high as it was in the US at the height of the Great Depression in 1933. Remember, that while 9% unemployment is twice as bad as 5 years ago, there is still 91% of the labor force working. (some will say it is much less because of discouraged workers but I am trying to tell the “glass half filled’ story!) An impressive variety of goods and services that households buy remain on the shelves and while economic growth has slowed, the US economy continues to produce a vast amount of goods and services every year and will surely continue to do so.

So how must it look when a dominant country like the US stumbles economically and rather than looking inside itself to resolve its inner imperfections, instead it looks outside its borders to the things it cannot control and blames others for its problems. By this I mean the new Senate bill seeking to brand China as a currency manipulator. This action looks weak, not strong, … even more so because the target of our accusations is decidedly poorer and weaker than the US. Do people really believe that China can exert so much influence over the US economy via its exchange rate policy as to force the current recession and the loss of millions of US jobs? Not only is this outcome not in China’s own interests, it is not the likely effect merely by running trade surpluses with the US. (see my previous post explaining why the lost jobs argument is specious). Furthermore, even if China let its currency float freely, there is no guarantee that it will rise in value to the level some American observers would like.

Politicians are trying to rally American support around a policy position that has very little hope of generating the intended outcome. They are trying to act tough on China, largely because they have very little else to go home and tell their constituents. Within six months politicians will be campaigning for re-election and what are the accomplishments they can tell their constituents about? Not many! A bill that gets tough with China will give them something to ballyhoo.

There is one reason passage of this bill will create jobs though. What the bill seeks is to allow exchange rate undervaluation to be used in the determination of anti-subsidy actions. These actions allow an industry in the US to obtain higher import tariffs if it can be shown that a foreign government has implemented targeted subsidies on exports and if those exports cause injury to the import-competing firms. These actions require firms to file petitions with the US government, which in turn requires skilled legal assistance. These investigations must be then be conducted by government employees. If these petitions rise in number due to the new law we can count on more lawyer, lobbyist, and government jobs will be required to make the process work. On top of that we can surely expect that the Chinese would immediately file a complaint with the WTO and claim that the US was violating its trade commitments. This will inspire further investigations that will take years to resolve requiring even more Washington lawyers and lobbyists. In fact we may even see the Chinese hiring US lawyers to help them in their dispute with the US (many law firms in DC specialize in helping foreign countries with their trade disputes). Now it is highly unlikely that this bill will create millions of jobs. However, it is virtually certain to create hundreds or thousands of high-paying jobs for Washington lawyers and lobbyists. Is this the best way to devote our economic resources … enabling lawyers to earn millions of dollars arguing that government X violated promise Y and caused harm to firm Z? Hardly! Instead it will make a country that traditionally has championed free trade and free markets, look hypocritical, petty, and weak.

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Misguided China Bashing

Originally published on September 30, 2011

As economic troubles around the world continue to mount there is increasing pressure uponpoliticians to do something forceful to revive their economies while deflectingcriticism from themselves. One traditional method has always been to blame foreigners for one’sdomestic troubles. In the 1980sthe US blamed Japan and worried that its economic strength would soon lead to adiminished US presence. Today thesame process is playing out only this time China is the presumed enemy.

This week Senator Schumerfrom NY introduced another bill that would brand China as a currencymanipulator and allow the US to take more forceful action against theirpresumed unfair trading policies.   This action follows on a report issuedearlier this month by the EconomicPolicy Institute indicating that the US trade deficit with China has cost theUS 2.8 million jobs.   Theirline of reasoning is immensely popular and goes as follows:  because China fixes its currency at avalue deemed too low by US observers, Chinese goods are kept artificiallycheap, inspiring larger US imports of Chinese goods.  The relatively high $ value makes US goods more expensive tothe Chinese thereby discouraging US exports.  Thus, if only China would allow its currency to rise invalue, then Chinese imports would fall, US exports would rise, trade will bebalanced and US jobs will be created. It is a convincing story … except for the fact that is not entirelycorrect  …  the errors lie in the parts of thestory that are missing, the untold story that make the causes and effects quitea bit more complicated.

Let’s firstlook at the 2.8 million jobs supposedly lost due to the trade deficit.  Now to be fair, if you read the reportcorrectly, EPI doesn’t actually say that jobs are lost, only that the jobs are“lost or displaced.”  Displacementis a more accurate term because the jobs are less likely to have been lost dueto the trade deficit than they are to have been moved to the non-tradablesectors in the economy.  In otherwords the trade deficit doesn’t cause a loss of jobs as much as it causes adisplacement to other sectors of the economy.

To see whylet me illustrate the fallacy of trade deficit induced job losses.  Between August 2010 and July 2011 theUS imported $288 billion more from China than it exported.  If trade had been balanced instead,then either there would be $288 billion more in exports (thereby creatingmillions of jobs) or $288 billion less in imports (creating millions of jobs inimport-competing US industries), or some combination of the two.  Seemingly the deficit resulted in moremoney flowing out of the country to buy the extra imports, than flowed back into buy our exports.  That lostmoney and the corresponding lost jobs is what EPI is counting in itsestimate.  The fallacy is that themoney is not lost and it does not stay in China.  What China has done with that extra money is purchase assetsin the US.  In other words, theyhave lent the money back to us and are allowing us to use it instead.  More technically, any trade deficit(current account deficit really) is offset by a financial account surplus ofequal value, implying that our balance of payments with China is always inbalance … there is rarely any money lost.

Most of themoney that China has lent back to the US has been loans to our federalgovernment.  During the past decadeChina has purchased around $1.1 trillion dollars of US treasury securities.  This is money the US governmentborrowed to finance its deficit spending. In other words, that $1.1 trillion of money was spent by the USgovernment, inducing demand for US products and creating jobs for USworkers.

So how manyjobs were created by that $1.1 trillion of spending?  Well, for that we could use EPI’s own estimates of the jobcreating effects of fiscal stimulus. Across a variety of articles (See hereor here),EPI’s estimates range anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 jobs created for every $1billion of additional government expenditures.  Because $1.1 trillion of those expenditures were made possibleby Chinese loans during the past decade, EPI should conclude that the Chinesetrade deficit “created or displaced” 5.5 – 11 million jobs during the pastdecade because of the added fiscal stimulus made possible by their loans to us.

Thus, usingEPI’s methods, but evaluating the FULL effects of the trade deficit with China,could actually lead one to the conclusion that there was a net increase in thetotal number of jobs.  (I’m notsaying this happened, I’m just applying their method in a more completefashion.)  It is worth mentioningat this point that if you look at a graph of the US trade deficit with respectto the world, and compare it to the US unemployment rate during the past 30years avery curious thing is seen: whenever the US trade deficit is rising, US unemployment is falling andwhenever the trade deficit is falling US unemployment is rising.  This is exactly the opposite of whatyou would expect if trade deficits really did cause job losses!

So EPI’sreport is propagating a fallacy. It is suggesting that the trade deficit with China is costing the USmillions of jobs.  It is inspiringpoliticians to stoke up populist support against external entities, surely as away to divert attention from their own mismanagement at home.   This is a common political ployused by politicians many times before. When economic times get rough at home, better to stoke up anger againstan external threat, instead of turning attention inward.  This political inclination has led todamaging trade wars in the past and even more damaging shooting warssometimes.

The Chineseeconomy is currently in a precarious position.  Although the impression in the West is that their economy isbooming at the expense of ours, in reality the Chinese government may have runout of tools to keep things bubbling along.  China is facing rising goods inflation and risingwages.   They have a propertybubble that looks ready to burst. They face another round of slow demand for their exports and risinganxiety at home.  Put that togetherwith a rickety financial sector, a legal system that is years behind the West,and a government that often corrupt and determined to remain in power, and youhave an economy and a society that is just trying to keep things together…  not one ready to take over asleader of the world.

Even ifChina responded to US demands right now and gave up defending their currencyvalue, the result might not be what the US hopes for.  Suppose for a moment that the Chinese suddenly allowed theyuan to float freely.  No morecurrency manipulation!  Because ofthe new uncertainties in the Chinese economy though and the prospects ofproperty price declines, many wealthy Chinese might take that as an opportunityto move money to the US and other countries.  In other words, in the present environment, the effect mightbe capital flight form China.  Ifthat were to occur the yuan would fall even further in value making Chinesegoods even cheaper.  Strangerthings have happened in international currency markets.

My point thenis that our ability to adjust simple levers, like the exchange rate value, (orforce other countries to do so) and generate improved outcomes such as jobcreation at home is extremely limited. The world economy is too complex to expect that a simple adjustment inthe dollar-yuan exchange rate will suddenly create millions of US jobs.  Our politicians would do better to getour own house in order instead of trying to pin the blame for our troubles onother countries.  The blame game isa diversionary tactic and US citizens would be smart not to buy into it.

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Developing a Moderate Party Platform – Part II

Originally published on September 19, 2011

For a competitive 3rd party to arise it will have to have a unifying theme that can be used to establish positions across a range of economic and social issues.  To be effective, that theme will have to attract supporters from the right and the left.  Perhaps the best candidate for that unifying theme is the growing disdain the general populace has for special interests.  Conservatives and liberals alike complain about the problems caused by special interest politics.  Almost everyone can tell a tale about a policy or process that causes them to lose (screws them over) while at the same time benefiting some special interest.   Anger arises in people who feel they have been ripped off.

One problem with the special interest issue though is that everyone is a part of some special interest.  If you work in a specific industry, you have an industry interest.  If you are part a union you have a labor interest.  If you are over 65 you have a senior interest and health care interest.  In you are male or female, you have a gender interest.  If you have faith in a God you have a religious interest.  Belong to a particular race and you have a racial interest.  If you are an immigrant, a consumer, gay or lesbian, a friend of Israel, or have a child with autism, then you have characteristics that establish a special interest.

It is also natural to support policies that favor your own special interest.  If you are a farmer, agricultural subsidies make sense; a worker in an import-competing industry, then protection against Chinese imports makes sense; a senior citizen, then social security and medicare in its present form is an absolute necessity; work at Goldman-Sachs, then government bailouts are needed;  if you are poor and unemployed then benefit expansions are good; own your home then the mortgage interest deduction is important;  ….  I can go on and on.

The main problem with special interest policies is that each one is discriminatory; each special policy bestows benefits on some group of people at the expense of others.  Usually supporters of a particular special interest policy will argue that their policy is good for the nation.  But, usually that’s not true.  Supporters of import protection will say the policy will save or create jobs, but they won’t talk about the higher prices to consumers.  Supporters of bank bailouts will say the actions prevent the collapse of the financial sector, but they won’t say much about the risk to taxpayers.  Social security and medicare beneficiaries will say that those benefits are only fair because they made payments into the system previously, but they won’t be willing to consider that generous future benefits will have to reduce the disposable income of future taxpayers.   Unfortunately everyone considers their own special interest a necessity, or a right, and will argue that the elimination or change in their policy will surely harm the nation.

A potentially successful moderate platform could include a goal to reduce the influence and sway of all special interests.  This is the kind of unifying theme that could draw bipartisan and independent support.  Unfortunately an effective strategy to reach that goal is elusive.  Consider the recent suggestions to simplify the tax code.   This is a laudable goal since, as I’ve heard Lawrence O’Donnell on MSNBC say,  “everyone knows the tax code is unfair!”  The tax code contains all sorts of special exemptions for this or that interest group.  Eliminating, or at least reducing, these exemptions are something many people can support.  However, because every powerful special interest will fight to retain their handout, it will be difficult, or impossible, for politicians to actually make these changes.

The growth of the lobbying industry is a clear indication of how special interests increasingly control government.  That growth makes sense once the government starts handing out more and more special favors.  If you are a special interest group and you see others getting special benefits then it only makes sense to hire some representatives for yourself and have them track and attempt to influence the policy changes under discussion by government.  If government is writing new rules that favor some over others, one might as well try to make sure some of those rules favor you.

One reaction to this situation has been attempts to limit the influence that lobbyists have over politicians.  Campaign finance reform, rules regarding political action committees, and many other examples, are attempts to restrain special interest influence.  Despite these rule changes, lobbyists and special interests continue to exert their control

A moderate candidate with a platform to tackle the special interest policies could focus national attention on the problem.  Unlike a Republican or Democrat, a moderate candidate would be free to highlight that some special interest policies benefit traditional conservative interests, while others benefit traditional liberal interests.  Surely one reason for the continuing growth of government influence in both Democratic and Republican administrations is because each party in power directs policies towards their own special interests.  The problem is on both sides of the aisle, which may be why a candidate from either side will be unlikely to tackle the problem.

Lately there has been a lot of talk of sacrificing for the good of the nation.  President Obama has said that millionaires and billionaires need to contribute more.  A moderate candidate might be the only one who could explain and emphasize that the shared sacrifice all Americans should consider is a willingness to accept the elimination or adjustment of policies targeted at their own special interests.  Chances are very good that the benefits each of us will reap when others’ special interest policies are revoked will more than outweigh the losses we will incur by losing our own.  The goal should be a government that does not discriminate, rather than the government we now have in which special interest discrimination has become its very foundation.

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Hurricane Irene and Global Climate Change

Originally published on August 30, 2011

The hype and hoopla about Hurricane Irene this past weekend offers a potential window into understanding the global climate change debate … but not because of claims that this is evidence of climate change itself but rather because the reaction to the hurricane represents a natural human response in this day and age.

As the hurricane developed and approached there was an impressive display of scientific evidence including the satellite images, wind speeds taken by planes flying through the hurricane, the projected paths using numerous simulation models, and the potential strength and wind speeds at various points along the projected path.

Together with the indisputable immediate scientific evidence and the “disputable” projected evidence there came pronouncements of the historic nature of the storm like … “worst storm to hit the East coast in a hundred years.” There also came all sorts of projected effects: storm surges destroying the barrier islands, high winds, downed trees, lost electricity, etc. In New York City, there were scenarios of broken skyscraper windows and storm surges that flooded subways and covered significant parts of Manhattan and Long Island. As is natural, most of the devastation was projected to occur along the coast since as I heard over and over, the storm surge does the most damage and the winds are highest there.

Of course I am sure there are examples of almost all of these effects happening in one place or another because of the storm: windows were broken, storm surges did do damage, floods occurred and electricity was lost. However, the overall extent of the damage was much less than was projected and predicted. What is more notable though, is that the places with the greatest devastation, like parts of Connecticut and Vermont (and I’m sure others) were not the places that were being hyped as the storm was approaching.

Thus while scientific evidence was very useful in predicting the path of the storm and the potential effects it ‘could’ have, science is not precise enough to predict the overall extent of damage that will be caused nor the precise locations that have more reason to worry.

The same might well be true about global climate change; namely, even though scientific evidence is very good at predicting the types of possible impacts that higher carbon emissions might have on the planet, it might not be very good at predicting the overall extent of the damage caused or who is more likely to be affected. As with the hurricane we might expect global climate scientists, and the media that reports about it, to exaggerate or hype the scenarios that are most dramatic. But also, we may expect, as with the hurricane, that the unexpected effects of global climate change may turn out to be more significant than the anticipated and exaggerated ones.

One more thing … because of the hurricane warning and the hype about its potential effects, many people responded by leaving the beach areas, boarding up windows, stocking up on food, water and candles, and staying out of harms way. Surely this contributed to lower overall damage. In a similar vein we might well expect that people will adapt to the effects of global climate change as it slowly impacts the world’s ecosystems. As they adapt to the changes, the overall impacts will be reduced.

Lastly, it is worth highlighting the scale of the differences between these two processes. Predictions about the hurricane involved scientific measurements of a relatively simple weather system, examples of which scientists have had the chance to observe over and over again across decades of hurricane seasons. Global climate change involves measurement of a hugely complex array of variables spread across the globe, other examples of which are scarce, if they exist at all.

My question then is: If we can’t precisely predict the impacts of a hurricane system one week in advance, why should we expect the 50-100 year predictions of global climate change scientists to be accurate representations?

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Developing a Moderate Party Platform – Part 1

Originally published on August 27, 2011

The Wall Street Journal this week suggests that we should “Expect a Third-Party Candidate in 2012.” The authors claim the US is “in the midst of what we would both call a prerevolutionary moment, and there is widespread support for fundamental change in the system. An increasing number of Americans are now searching beyond the two parties for bold and effective leadership.”

This idea is a recurring theme in American politics especially because there is a large swath of people who do not identify perfectly with the conservative right or the liberal left. These citizens often identify themselves, or are called, unaffiliated, independent, or moderate. From observers firmly ensconced on the right or left, these citizens are sometimes considered unprincipled, confused, or muddled in their thinking!

To be sure, the political opinions of those who consider themselves moderate or independent are highly varied. A good place to explore the diversity of opinion on political issues is a 2011 Pew Research report titled, Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology. According to that report, 35% percent of voting Americans are classified as “Mostly Independent.” Among these Americans some tend to lean more Republican or conservative on some issues, some more Democratic or liberal. Thus even though there seems to be a large voting bloc in the “middle” of the political spectrum, that does not imply that all of these voters share a sufficient number of viewpoints to form a competitive 3rd party. For example, among the three groups in the survey classified as independent, 73% of the respondents in one group believe businesses make too much profit while only 13% of respondents in another group believed the same.

Nonetheless, if a 3rd party does emerge, it will have to be located in the moderate segment of the political spectrum if it is to be competitive with the prevailing parties. Only a “moderate” platform has a chance to attract enough Democrats and Republicans to one day capture a majority of votes.

But herein lies the dilemma. If moderates and independents do not share a sufficient number of viewpoints, then how can a new 3rd party unite them?

One critical feature of an effective 3rd party is that it has a simple unifying principle that will attract supporters. For example Green parties in Europe elect candidates that have strong environmental concerns. In the US, the Tea Party is effective partly because it stands on one simple principle; smaller government. However, the Tea Party is not a true political party. It has no central organization, and no convention organizing a slate of candidates at different government levels.

For a competitive 3rd party to arise it will have to stand for more than simply a position on one particular issue; instead it will have to have a unifying theme that can be used to establish positions across a range of economic and social issues. In this post, and several others to follow, I will identify what I see as some of the similar characteristics of many moderate-independents and based on this reflection suggest a few unifying principles that could possibly form the basis for a successful third party.

First, I think that most moderates-independents are located where they are on the political spectrum because they recognize that there are valid arguments made by both parties. Sometimes they are convinced by a conservative argument, sometimes by a liberal argument. There is a good reason for this. It seems unlikely to me that in the grand scheme either the conservative policies and positions are 100% correct and the liberals 100% wrong, OR liberals are 100% correct and conservatives 100% wrong. Instead there are strengths and weaknesses to every position and it is more likely that in the grand scheme both sides have some arguments that are stronger than the other side AND both sides have weaker arguments. Also, different people evaluate these strengths and weaknesses differently, which is why reasonable people can come to different conclusions.

In contrast, staunch conservatives and solid liberals (i.e., ideologues) are more inclined to believe that their opinions and positions are 100% correct and whoever disagrees is 100% wrong. Anger and hostility in political discourse arises because individuals can’t understand why others don’t see the logic of their own arguments and beliefs. To the ideologue the truth is crystal clear and any deviation from that ideology is considered unprincipled, ignorant or even traitorous. For example, many staunch conservatives are certain of their Christian principles, that the US is a Christian nation, and in their opposition to abortion and gay marriage. This is why every Republican candidate for President must declare his or her allegiance to these principles to have any chance of capturing the Republican nomination. On the other side, many solid liberals are certain in their belief in science and the ability to use human intelligence to guide the economy and society towards more just outcomes. This is why the left is so quick to discredit any viable political candidate on the basis of a presumed lack of intelligence. These unflailing beliefs also make ideologues inclined to view the opposition as an enemy that must be defeated. Victory presumably means ridding the country or the world of people who think incorrectly from their point of view.

Moderates-independents, on the other hand, are more inclined to accept that the truth is nebulous and that our ability to perceive it is limited. Consequently moderates-independents are more inclined to accept diversity of opinion on different topics. And it is also why independents themselves hold a diversity of opinion.

But a moderate position need not be an unprincipled one. It need not consist of a compromise in which principles are weakened in an attempt to appease the rigid sensibilities of the right and left. Instead a moderate position can be based on the recognition of the diversity of opinion and the search for principles and policies that allow people with different belief systems to live amongst each other. More on how to do this in later posts.

Finally it is worth noting that moderation has a long philosophical history as an ideal worthy of striving towards. Aristotle noted in the Ethics that, “ …virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success.” For example the mean virtue of courage lies between the deficiency of cowardice and the excess of rashness. Similarly temperance is a mean virtue between the deficiency of insensibility and the excess of self-indulgence. Today’s recommendation that several glasses of red wine per day could improve one’s long term health represents a moderate consumption ideal that lies between the deficient teetotaler and the excessive alcoholic.

I am not suggesting that conservatism is a form of deficiency and liberalism a form of excess, or vice versa, although I am sure many readers would be happy to provide examples why this is the case. Instead I merely wish to suggest that some middle position between extremes can be a virtue. A principled moderate platform that can appeal to people who lean a little left as well as those who lean a little right is possible. Stay tuned for further thoughts on this.

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Why the US is Not Greece

Originally published on August 18, 2011

For over a year now we have been hearing about the government debt problems in Europe; especially in Greece, but also in the larger economies of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and even France. Greece’s outstanding public debt is now about 150% of its annual GDP. In Italy it is over 120%, in Ireland about 95%, France 85%, Portugal 82% and Spain 65%.

These worries and figures invite comparison to the US. In the US, total Federal outstanding debt to GDP is almost 100%. Another figure sometimes presented though is Federal debt held by the public, which stands at about 60%. The second figure eliminates the public debt purchased mostly by the Social Security Administration. The so-called trust fund – this is the excess of SS tax revenue over SS disbursements (which have been substantial in past years) – has been invested in US Treasuries.

In any case, because many observers keep mentioning default in Greece and other European countries, and because of the debt ceiling debate in the US, it is worth asking whether the US is in danger of becoming another Greece. The short answer is no.

There is virtually no chance the US will default and be unable to pay back principal and interest on its maturing treasury bonds. This conclusion was no different a month ago before the debt ceiling deal and before the S&P downgrade. As I have explained elsewhere, even if we had not raised the debt ceiling, the US would have continued to pay back principal and interest on its bonds. Other bills would not have been paid, but these bills would have. The simple proof of this lies in the fact that the US treasury market faced no disruption leading up to the debt ceiling deal. That means that the collective opinion of bond holders, which is whose opinion matters most, was that there was no chance of imminent default. In fact, even after the S&P downgrade, which was mild at best from AAA to AA+, demand for US Treasuries rose, indicating that they continue to be viewed a safe haven for investors.

Greece, on the other hand, (and Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), could conceivably default. (Although Greece is perhaps the only place where default is plausibly imminent) But one might ask, if US debt as a percentage of GDP is on a path to the same level as Greece, won’t the US eventually face the same default potential. Again the answer is no!

The important difference is the currency the outstanding loans are denominated in and the source of that currency. In the case of Greece, it has borrowed Euros mostly. However, Greece does not control the number of Euros that are issued; that is controlled by the European Central Bank (ECB). In contrast the US debt is denominated in dollars, and it is the US Fed that is the issuer of those dollars.

Consider an extreme case. Suppose one day the US Treasury needs to issue $50 billion of new debt in order to finance the government budget deficit and pay back maturing securities. Suppose further that our debt has risen so much that tax revenues alone don’t even cover the repayment of maturing bonds. Suppose also that nobody wants to buy newly issued government bonds – which would allow us to rollover and extend repayment – without demanding an oppressively high interest rate. Well, if the US ever reached that situation, and I should point out that we are nowhere near this kind of scenario, then the problem could be immediately ”solved” and default avoided if the US Fed under Ben Bernanke simply purchased the $50 billion in new bonds. To pay for it the central bank must merely make an accounting notation that says the government now has a $50 billion credit on its account. In this way money is created out of thin air to finance the government’s borrowing and to rollover the outstanding debt. (Note: This power is what drives Ron Paul nuts!)

Now one could say that because the Fed is independent of the federal government, it could refuse to make the transaction. This is true, however, given the problems associated with outright default and the simple ability to “solve” the problem by printing money, it is reasonable to expect that the Fed would relent and money would be printed in this case. This is about as dire a situation we could imagine in the US and in this case it is reasonable to conclude that the US would not technically default.

The same is true in any country that borrows in its own currency and controls the issuance of that currency. Thus it applies to Japan, whose government has debt over 200% of GDP. Japan is unlikely to default on its debt. However, this conclusion does not apply to any country that borrows in a currency that it does not issue. Since Greece does not issue Euros its excessive debt makes it a viable candidate for outright default. The same was true for many other countries in the past: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to name a few.

The ECB could offer to buy all the debt that Greece needs to issue to maintain its large budget deficits, however, this would result in an increase in the overall euro money supply and those euros would circulate throughout the euro zone. The ultimate effect of extra money circulating in an economy that is not growing sufficiently fast is inflation. Too much money chasing too few goods puts upward pressure on prices of goods and services. And this would negatively affect all countries in the Euro-zone acting much like a tax on all of the EU’s citizens.

Indeed, any country that finances its deficits by printing money is using inflation as a hidden tax. The alternative to printing money is to raise taxes to balance the budget (or decrease government spending). However, inflation lowers the purchasing power of everybody’s money, which essentially shifts buying power from all citizens to the government in this case. It also effectively lowers the real value of the outstanding government debt. This is because inflation lowers the purchasing value of the repaid principal and interest and creditors get back less than was originally expected. This is sometimes referred to as a partial default. We might also think of it as a “stealth tax” because no one can easily connect the loss of purchasing power to the actions of the government. It is also why it is always the most politically expedient exit strategy for governments.

As a quick example, suppose someone lends the government $1 million for one year at the interest rate of 3%. At the end of the year this person will receive back $1,030,000. But suppose inflation during this period unexpectedly turns out to be 10%. This means that it will now cost $1,100,000 to buy what last year cost $1 million. Thus the $1.03 million returned by the government is actually worth less than enough to keep even. The debtor gains at the expense of the creditor.

Back to the EU, this is one reason the ECB doesn’t want to bail out Greece, Portugal, Ireland, etc. The more it does, the more inflation is likely eventually and the more everyone in the euro-zone have to pay for the excesses of the minority.

One other solution for Greece is to drop out of the Euro zone. In this case they would reestablish the drachma as their national currency. But then what would they do with their Euro debt? The most likely recourse would be to renege on euro repayment and convert them to drachma. Thus a creditor might be told they won’t get paid back in euro but in the equivalent in drachma instead. Of course this would be less valuable to the creditor since drachma could only be used to buy goods in Greece, not in the wider EU, and because the new Greek central bank would be able to lower the value of these drachma by printing money and creating inflation in the economy. In this way the burdens of excessive government borrowing would be shifted to the creditors holding Greek bonds and to the Greek people. Because money is printed, causing inflation, this amounts to a partial default. Again, this is not a technical default because all the bonds will be repaid in full, but they will be repaid with currency that is worth less than originally expected.

Now back to the US. Since the US borrows in its own currency, there is no reason for it to ever technically default. It will always find a way to pay back its outstanding principal and interest. However, because the US can print money to finance budget deficits, it could default partially via inflation. A stealth default is possible. In this case, everyone gets the nominal value of their money back as promised, only those repayments won’t buy as much as originally expected. This is a real worry that China has: the fear that their more than $1 trillion of US debt is eventually paid back with dollars that will not purchase as many goods and services.

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Why Excessive Debt is the Real Problem – Part II

Originally published on August 16, 2011

One of the main reasons for the unemployment problem around the world is excessive debt. Only when we eliminate the underlying source of our problems will we be able to sustainably reduce the unemployment rate. In my last post about debt I talked about mortgage debt. This post is about government debt.

Consider the Greek debt problem. Examples of Greek government largesse are easy to find on the internet. For example, government workers get some of the best benefits anywhere in the world. All are paid in 14 monthly paychecks per year. (the two extra amount to negotiated bonus payments). Some workers can retire with a full pension as early as age 45. Pensions of deceased military officers continue to be paid to their unmarried daughters for life or until she weds. Some union members were once granted free unlimited transportation on the national airline. The state railroad payroll is 4 times larger than total ticket sales. There are many more examples like this.

To finance these generous benefits, and to remain popular, the Greek government had to borrow enormously. When the economic crisis hit in 2008, Greek government debt had already reached 100% of GDP. This year Greece’s total debt is expected to exceed 150% of GDP, which amounts to over $450 billion. And still the Greek government continues to run large budget deficits to fulfill promises that are clearly untenable.

The situation is a mess and the problem just keeps getting pushed further into the future. One necessary outcome is for Greece’s budget to be balanced quickly or even moved into surplus to reduce their enormous debt. However, if this is done too quickly it could cause sharp contractions in economic activity making it even harder to pay down the debt. The Greek people have already risen up riotously this year (and last year) to protest the proposed cuts in government programs or increases in taxes. After all, profligate or not, the Greeks feel entitled to these promises, just like Americans feel entitled to their Social security, Medicare and tax breaks. They are surely not willing to rein in excesses without a fight. Besides what is excess to one person is another person’s monthly paycheck.

Greece’s government doesn’t want to make the needed budgetary changes (no sane politician would!) because the changes are very painful and unpopular. So the only way to continue the largesse, quiet the protests, and move along is to get someone to lend them even more money. But with a CCC bond rating (worse than junk bond status) they can’t borrow on the private market unless the interest rate was extremely high to compensate for the high risk of default. The risk premium on short term Greek bonds currently exceeds 25% and borrowing at that rate would push up their deficits and debt even faster.

In July 2011, for the second time, the EU stepped in to provide up to $160 billion in loans to allow Greece to continue to borrow at relatively low interest rates and with longer maturities. In essence this is like an increase in Greece’s debt ceiling, allowing it to continue running deficits. However, these EU bailouts are funded by the other EU countries. Thus, if Greece can’t repay these loans, the losses will be borne by taxpayers in the other EU countries.

Of course, in accepting these bailouts Greece is required to bring its budget into balance in a reasonable time period. Interestingly Greece has not been doing a very good job at this. In the first half of 2011 – this is after the bailout loans they received last summer – the Greek budget deficit rose 24%. Of course some of this has to do with the fact that the economy is stagnant and unemployment remains above 15%.

So growth is slow to nonexistent, tax revenues are falling, government promises remain generous, and any attempt to reduce spending leads to massive riots in the streets. So why do they keep getting bailed out?

There are several reasons.

First, creditors – that is, the institutions holding the $450 billion in Greek bonds – want to get their money back someday. (Note it is not the bank’s money in jeopardy.. it is depositor’s money .. that’s the people’s money) If Greece defaults then some creditors may not get anything back. Better to get a deal and wait longer than get nothing. Also, defaults can be disorderly as creditors line up trying to squeeze as much value out for themselves as possible. For example, if Greece owes $50 billion but only $25 billion in cash, who gets paid and who doesn’t? Figuring that out can sometimes take years.

The bailouts amount to promises that creditors will get their money back eventually, but will have to wait longer for it. So the bailouts buy time. For Greece though, the bailouts result in forced austerity, especially for those most dependent on government programs or those who pay taxes … which, of course, means pretty much everyone, … hence the riots in the streets!

Actually it is worth noting that another way to solve the problem for Greece is an outright default. If Greece defaulted, they would have to first settle with the creditors to decide who will not be repaid (this is a contentious process) and second balance their budget immediately because no one will lend them money for a long while. Thus the austerity will be even more painful in the short run. If Greece receives bailouts, then the austerity still has to happen, but it will be spread out over a longer period into the future. One question worth considering is whether it is better 1) to suffer a greater austerity quickly, resolve the debt problems (basically determine who is getting money back and who isn’t) and move on with a healthy balance sheet, or, 2) to suffer a longer and milder, though still painful, austerity and hope that the economy can grow and change into a healthy one in the distant future?

Perhaps the bigger problem for the world economy, though, is contagion. Many observers say Greece is small and so the problems there don’t matter much. That’s true, Greece is about the size of Maryland. But Portugal, and Ireland, and Spain and Italy are facing similar problems. If Greece’s problems migrate to these other countries then creditors will worry about the value of their loans to these countries too. And these loans are much bigger.

If Greece defaults, maybe the banking institutions can handle the losses. But what if Portugal, or Ireland, or Spain, decides to default? These could be large enough to force innumerable financial bankruptcies and threaten the entire financial system. Or what about the EU and IMF bailout of Greece? Again the values aren’t that large. But, what if the EU needs to lend money to Portugal, Ireland and Spain to keep them afloat too? (Note: they’ve already begun to do this!) How deeply into debt and how much risk are the Germans, French and other EU members willing to bear?

The essence of the true problem then is that numerous financial institutions around the world have taken deposits from its citizens and have saved the money by lending it to governments. Some of that money is in jeopardy of not being returned in full, but no one knows whose money is most in jeopardy or when those losses will materialize. Add on to this the US debt ceiling debate and the downgrading of US debt by S&P and we have financial institutions around the world questioning the true value of an enormous amount of their outstanding loans. It is worries like these, spread across the globe, that prevents the expansion of credit and the necessary risk taking that inspires economic growth. Sure, lending is occurring, but it is mostly safe and highly secured loans. These can keep the economies of the world running in place, but it is unlikely to fuel the rapid expansion we need to bring unemployment rates down.

If we want to solve the unemployment problem, there is no recourse but to alleviate the debt problems. There remains too much risk and uncertainty about the true value of outstanding loans for the world markets to function effectively. This is a reason why a large stimulus program may not work in this environment. Yes extra government spending can increase demand and create a few jobs for a little while, but this probably won’t speed up the debt restructuring. So if after the demand boost runs out, there remains a large number of underperforming loans, then we will also remain stuck in a stagnant economy. Only now we will be stuck with an even scarier level of government indebtedness that in turn could exacerbate the debt problems.

A useful analogy may be to think of the debt problem described above corresponding to a car that has been downshifted into 2nd gear. A fiscal stimulus represents stepping on the accelerator. Yes, the more we step on the gas (the bigger the stimulus) the faster the car goes, but if we remain in 2nd gear we’re in danger of burning out the engine. We can only return to a comfortable highway speed by upshifting to 3rd or 4th gear, and that requires resolving the debt problem first.

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S&P Comments Blame Administration more than Tea Party

Originally published on August 13, 2011

A Politco story released this week regarding comments by S&P senior director Joydeep Mukherji is being used to suggest that Tea party intransigence is the root cause of the debt downgrade. However, I think the finger is really pointing at the Administration instead.

Joydeep Mukherji said the stability and effectiveness of American political institutions were undermined by the fact that “people in the political arena were even talking about a potential default,” “That a country even has such voices, albeit a minority, is something notable,” he added. “This kind of rhetoric is not common amongst AAA sovereigns.”

It is worth noting that had the debt ceiling not been raised then it would have been up to the Treasury under Secretary Geithner, in consultation with the President and Congress, to decide which bills would be paid and which would be suspended. Tea Party Republicans, like Michelle Bachmann, assumed that the government would never default on our debt obligations. It was accurate to say that the government would not have to default since there were plenty of revenues coming in to cover all principal and interest repayments. Instead, the government could have suspended payments on discretionary programs and the effect would be much like a partial government shutdown. These effects would not be small or inconsequential but they would not amount to a default on debt.

However, this isn’t what the administration was saying. In Timothy Geithner’s Jan 6, 2011, letter to Majority leader Harry Reid he implores Congress to reach a deal to raise the debt limit.

He says in paragraph two, “Failure to raise the limit would precipitate a default by the United States.” He also says in the letter that failure to raise the debt ceiling would not be the same as a partial government shutdown. He wrote, “Those government shutdowns, which were unwise and highly disruptive, did not have the same long-term negative impact on U.S. creditworthiness as a default would, because there was headroom available under the debt limit at that time.”

In other words, the reason things would be different this time, is because we would fail to make our interest payments. At the end of the letter, he describes likely economic impacts of failure to raise the debt limit, most of which would clearly be the consequence of an actual default on US debt repayment. Thus, Geithner is strongly suggesting that the US might be inclined not to make some debt repayments if the debt ceiling were not raised.

Or listen to Obama’s Economic advisor Austen Goolsbee in January. He talks about default as if we would not make repayment of our principal and interest and does not make the distinction between discretionary spending and repayment of debt. Clearly he describes as catastrophic the impact of debt default.

But then listen to President Obama later in June. In this clip President Obama seems to equate the term default with not paying some government bills. So, for example, if the government did not pay some social security obligations, one might say the US had defaulted. So maybe when he says default he doesn’t really mean a debt default. However, at the end he asks whether we really would choose to send interest payments to China to avoid default on the debt rather than sending out social security checks. He doesn’t answer the question, but if I had to infer what his preference was based on the way he presented it, I’d have to say he’d prefer to pay the SS checks. The inference is that had the debt ceiling not been raised, the President may have been inclined to “really default” on some interest payments.

These are the voices S&P is more likely referring to, especially since these are the individuals who are empowered to administer the payment of government obligations. The administration could have avoided this criticism by saying throughout the crisis that the full faith and credit of the US would not be impaired EVEN IF we hit the debt ceiling. They then could have explained the serious repercussions if we were forced to go through a partial government shutdown. However the administration didn’t do that. Instead they told the default implication story over and over again and did not accurately reflect the true situation. That is …. unless it really WAS President Obama’s intention to default on debt to avoid a reduction in social security and other government payments!!

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Why Excessive Debt is the Real Problem – Part I

Originally published on August 12, 2011

In the national conversation about the economy the continual refrain is that we need to create more jobs. However, one of the main reasons for the unemployment problem around the world is excessive debt. Only when we eliminate the underlying source of our problems will we be able to sustainably reduce the unemployment rate.

A little bit of debt is never a problem. Most households borrow money to buy a home and a car and successfully pay back these borrowed funds over their lifetimes. Financial institutions are the vehicle that allows some people’s savings to be used to finance other people’s consumption. It is important to remember that banks receive money from people who say, “I want to forgo consumption today and wait to consume in the future instead.” to other people who say “I want to consume more today and pay it back by consuming less in the future.” These institutions create contracts, what we commonly call loans, which specify the terms of the repayment. These are promises that borrowers have made to pay the money back with extra interest payments according to some predetermined schedule.

Debt becomes a problem whenever a borrower discovers that he cannot repay the lender according to the original contract. Actually, the problem may occur even earlier when the creditor begins to suspect that the borrower will not be able to fulfill the contract.

Consider the US mortgage market. In the US today more than 20% of home mortgages are underwater (over 11 million in number). Because of the collapse of home prices, the home values, which serve as collateral, are less than the value of the mortgages. If a household stops making payments, the bank will foreclose, reclaim the house and try to sell it at the market price to recoup as much value as possible. This process takes time, is costly, and results in the bank receiving much less than the amount of money originally owed. It also means that someone’s savings, the bank depositors for example, will not get back all of the money they lent. This is an example of a partial default: the lender/saver didn’t lose all of their principal and interest, only some of it.

What is the best way to resolve this situation? Well, that depends on whether you are the lender or the borrower. The lender wants the original contract fulfilled; it wants to get all the principal and interest that was promised. The first best option, then, is to hold out and demand full repayment. If the borrower really can’t pay now, one way to fulfill the contract is to agree to an extension. Simply give the borrower more time to pay it back, but of course, charge more interest as well. This way all the money gets repaid with interest, but it takes longer to get it back. This is the second best option for the lender. The third best option would be to renegotiate the contract, agree to a partial default, and accept less than was originally expected. This is what happens in a foreclosure when the borrower is underwater.

From the borrower’s perspective it is not clear what the best outcome is. If borrower continues payments for long enough then he can hope the value of the house eventually rises above the mortgage value. But what if the price remains depressed for a very long time? Imagine paying on a $500,000 mortgage every month when the house is now worth $300,000? If that situation persists, it will not inspire household confidence and consumer demand. Furthermore, the household is stuck. The family can’t move anywhere without coming up with an extra $200,000 to pay off the old mortgage. (Imagine 11 million households in this situation to understand why consumer demand and confidence is so low.)

If the borrower walks away from the mortgage and suffers foreclosure they will have to leave the house and move elsewhere, most likely into a rental unit. The household will also suffer a stain on its credit rating for many years. Its reputation will be tainted and the household would have to live for a while without being able to borrow. On the other hand, all of the negative equity will be erased so the household’s balance sheet will immediately look healthier. The family is also free to move elsewhere and is no longer mired in a depressing situation. To use a fishing analogy, this is the “cut bait, and run” approach. One advantage to this latter approach is that both the household and the bank can accept the losses and move on, rather than being mired in a long, drawn out struggle to fulfill, perhaps unrealistic, promises.

One reason for the poor economic performance we now are living with is that there are millions, maybe hundreds of millions of debt contracts in the world, similar to the one described above, that are in jeopardy of full or partial default. That means there are numerous financial institutions that will not be getting back the full amount that was originally promised. Now some people might be inclined to say, “so what if the banks lose money?” That’s fine except for the fact that the banks didn’t use their money to make all these loans .. they used our money. By that I mean any money deposited in a financial institution. It means checking accounts, savings accounts, and retirement accounts, etc. If you engage with any financial institution; a bank, an insurance company, a mutual fund etc. then you have contributed to the pool of savings that has been lent out to someone else. And therefore your money is at risk of not being returned to you in full.

The struggle that is playing out now and will continue for several more years is a struggle to determine who is going to pay more and who less. Banks are struggling to maintain the performance of their loans, so they can preserve value for their shareholders and depositors. They don’t want to be the ones to suffer losses. When banks receive government assistance it is a way of unloading some of their burdens on the taxpayers of the country. It also allows the burden to be spread over a larger number of people and over a longer period of time. This way somebody else pays for the losses incurred due to the decisions of the bank.

With this explanation as background, I can now say, in a very indefinite way, when we will be out of the current crisis. It will be once the number and value of the debt contracts that are in danger of total or partial default becomes manageable. Even in a healthy economy there are non-performing loans. There are always some loans contracts that are not fulfilled. But in good times these losses are just swept into slightly higher interest rates that all depositors and borrowers pay for. No one notices. In financial crises, those non-performing loans are too large to go unnoticed. They threaten bank failures, they threaten bank runs and they cause high unemployment, stagnant growth and a loss of confidence.

Once we clean up most of these nonperforming or partially performing loans, confidence will be restored, consumers will start buying more, banks will start lending more, and the economy will move along at a healthy clip. Only then will the unemployment rates fall in a sustainable way. How long it will take to get there though, is anyone’s guess.

In my next post I’ll discuss the problems with government debt, using Greece as the example. The government debt problems are also excessive but they have slightly different characteristics and raise other issues.

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Evaluation BS

Originally published on August 9, 2011

The economic news is riveting this week especially to an economist, but it amazes me all the BS I hear and read about as people are asked to assess the situation. Harry Frankfurt, a Princeton philosophy Professor, wrote a brief treatise titled “On Bullshit” a few years ago in which he tried to answer an obvious question, “Why is there so much BS out there?” One answer he gave was that too many people are expected to have an opinion about matters in which they do not know very much. Another reason must be the 24 hours news and commentary shows that some people are addicted to. It is curious how having more time to report the news does not result in much teaching about how things like the economy work.

So let me mention just a few things that have irritated me in the last few days.

1) I just watched a FOX report on the decline of the market today and they were showing how the market went down even faster while President Obama was making his speech in the afternoon. I’m a novice about stock trading but wouldn’t it make sense that trades that took place at 1:45pm or so are probably based on orders received sometime earlier and that it is unlikely that traders are evaluating the President’s speech, feeling bad about its implications, and then in real time placing more sell orders? Someone please correct me if I’m wrong.

2) I can’t believe how nasty people have been in their comments about S&P. Again I am not an expert on S&P but I do know that they are an independent company that makes risk evaluations on different types of assets. They have been in business for a very long time and they are staffed by a group of professionals that are trained in risk analysis. If they do their job right they should not be swayed by outside opinions of what the ratings should or should not be. Their business is based on their reputation and so they have an incentive to do the best independent evaluation they can provide to maintain that reputation. Their opinion on US debt is just that … their opinion. Yes, they did rate mortgage backed securities as too safe in the past but the risk involved in those was mostly systemic risk that was, and continues to be, very hard to evaluate.

Still it would be professional to treat them like the professionals they are rather than criticizing them as incompetent. Yes, you can disagree and argue that US treasuries are still safe and even S&P would agree that that’s true. Afterall, it is only one opinion.

Two side points. First, I’ve read several stories that some government regulations require that some companies invest in only AAA bonds as evaluated by S&P. Such regulations seem very bad form. I would suspect that rules like that were written to favor important special interests (i.e. S&P) to give them a favorable position in the risk analysis market. This downgrade could act as a wake-up call to eliminate such rules. (not to punish them but as an excuse to eliminate a bad rule) Second, I did think it was very bad form for S&P to announce that any debt deal would need to cut $4 trillion from the deficit to prevent a downgrade. That does suggest an independent agency with too much power to influence policy outcomes. S&P is an evaluator … not a policy recommendation agency, … at least not this branch of S&P. Again I think we can criticize S&P and the whole ratings system but can’t people do it in a more professional way?

3) Isn’t there an inconsistency in the statements by the administration? Wasn’t President Obama, Secretary Geithner and Ben Bernanke all claiming a few weeks ago that brinksmanship on the debt ceiling was threatening a US default? Before the agreement was reached I heard news organizations nonchalantly reporting that a deal needed to be made before the US “defaults” on August 3. I wrote in February why regardless of what the “experts” were saying there was really no chance we would default even if the debt ceiling were not raised on time.

OK, so now we get past the debt deal and to the S&P downgrade and we hear the administration saying that there is absolutely no way the US will ever default on its debt! But wait a minute … aren’t we going to get to another debt ceiling vote again at some point … and can’t the same brinksmanship occur, … and if last time you said default was possible … well, then how can you say the US will never default? This kind of wavering cannot inspire confidence in the administration. [BTW, my opinion is that the US is not in danger of default anytime soon, regardless of brinksmanship in the future and the S&P rating at AA+ doesn’t indicate that anyway]

My first two points can be explained by Frankfurt’s hypothesis, the third point cannot. The third point can only be attributed to politics … politics that is very bad for building confidence in our economy.

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Going Forward: More Fiscal Stimulus or Debt Reduction?

Originally published on August 7, 2011

As we come out of the debt ceiling debate in the US Congress and face the prospect of a word economy that seems destined to remain in the doldrums for some time to come, the debate over what to do next is heating up. Should we ignore the budget deficit and debt issues and go all in for anther massive government spending program to kick start the economy as economists like Paul Krugman suggest? Or should we follow the conservative track and put a credible debt reduction plan into place while revising the tax code and reducing future entitlement promises?

This discussion is sure to become even more heated due to the S&P downgrade of US Treasury notes and as the US Presidential race kicks into high gear by late this year. For many observers it is difficult to cut through the ideological rhetoric on both sides to decide what is the most appropriate course. Although many economists and political pundits declare that they know the answer, my suspicion is that no one really knows what is the best course to take, including myself.

But just because we must make decisions under great uncertainty doesn’t mean we can’t make decisions. Thus, rather than adding to the interminable ideological platitudes that appear online and on the nightly discussion shows, let me try to offer a more balanced evaluation by highlighting why both approaches have potential to succeed but both are also risky in different ways. I’ll suggest at the end that we might be best served to choose the less risky approach going forward.

I’ll begin with the liberal proposal that we should use Keynesian expansionary policy to put people back to work. The idea is to increase government spending, perhaps massively, especially on “shovel-ready” infrastructure and public works projects. One idea is to create a new Works Progress Administration as was created in the depression years by FDR. The WPA employed millions of unskilled US workers to construct roads and public facilities. According to Wiki, the budget in its first year was almost 7% of GDP. In today’s dollars, that would mean an expenditure of about $1 trillion per year.

The argument is that an expansion of government demand for goods and services, especially one this extensive, could substitute for the lack of private demand, and put millions of people back to work quickly. With the reduction in the unemployment rate and the rise of economic security, private sector demand might soon rebound. With confidence restored, the new WPA could then be wound slowly down as private sector job creation picks up the slack.

Proponents of this plan argue that a subsequent increase in the deficit and national debt is tolerable if the plan gets the economy growing rapidly. What is more, because interest rates are so low on US Treasuries, the cost of borrowing to finance this plan is almost miniscule.

Of course, such a plan is not without its problems and risks. One such problem is the deficit and debt problems we face. As a hypothetical, suppose the US had had a Federal balanced budget requirement for the last 50 years. Suppose further that several emergencies through the years had forced the government to run periodic deficits in some years that did not get completely paid off in boom periods. Suppose the national debt had built up to say 10% of GDP (about $1.5 trillion). If that were the US debt situation at the start of this recession few economists or political leaders would hesitate to implement a large public spending program.

The lesson we learned in WWII is that a huge government driven demand can quickly put people back to work and inspire a nation to produce again. However, it is worth highlighting that overcoming a recession by revving up a war machine in response to existential threats is not the preferred way to recover from an economic depression. Although unemployment fell to about 1% in 1944 we were also suffering about 2500 military deaths every week. Although we can certainly say we were out of the depression in the midst of WWII, we achieved that feat by enduring an even worse catastrophe.

It is also worth pointing out that the WPA was implemented in 1935 and yet unemployment remained at 19% in 1938, 3 years later, and 14.6% in 1940, 5 years later. On the surface, the massive jobs creation program had seemingly little effect. The spending that followed with the war machine was much more extensive. But one might ask then whether massive government spending to get the country out of a depression is only likely to be as effective when the country faces an existential threat as we did in WWII, but perhaps not when it is just a large public works project.

Nevertheless, the point I am trying to make is that the risk of a massive government stimulus program is relatively low when a country has not borrowed unconscionably in its past. Had the US been in that situation in 2008, there would be fewer objections to a Krugman-style stimulus. But because the US did have a reasonably high national debt to begin with, and because the recession raised the debt at an almost unprecedented pace, and because the seeds of the entire recession was excessive private debt fueling a real estate bubble, a further stimulus at this point in time must be considerably riskier. This is the concern of conservatives, which has inspired the whole debt debate. More on that in a minute …

A second big problem with another big fiscal stimulus at this point in time is the seeming failure of the first stimulus. Reasonable people could argue about whether the $800 billion stimulus bill passed in 2009 had no effect on unemployment or whether it prevented a much higher unemployment rate. If it did the latter, one could say it worked. Unfortunately though, it is impossible for anyone to know what we did not observe (e.g. a 15% unemployment rate without the stimulus) and so the former situation that it had almost no effect is more credible.

Also, if we recall the process by which the stimulus was enacted, it seemed never to adhere to the guidelines put forth by Obama’s own economic advisor Larry Summers that it be timely, targeted and temporary. Instead the stimulus funded State government shortfalls, was spread over several years, and seemed to fund a whole slough of pet projects that were lying in wait for the funding floodgates to open. Most observers on both sides agreed the stimulus was poorly designed. But one reason for that is that any stimulus will invariably be “designed” by the political process and not by some committee of wise experts. A similar outcome is likely if another stimulus were to be seriously considered.

Thus, although the idea of a stimulus is not crazy or without merit, it does carry important risks. We really cannot be sure that it would work effectively and if it didn’t, given that it would place an enormous burden on an already enormous government debt, it could put us into extreme economic jeopardy in just a few years.

That brings me to the other side of the debate. The tea party grew out of a grassroots concern for the growing size of our federal debt and the expansiveness of government. These are not ridiculous concerns or imagined problems. Through history there are plenty of examples of economic ruin caused by the excessiveness of government borrowing, and the often-concomitant increase in money supply to feed an ever-burgeoning government sector. In addition there are real concerns about the effectiveness of an economy in which a substantial percentage is driven by the non-market demands of the government sector. Many people, with good reason, believe that governments do not produce goods and allocate resources as effectively as private markets and thus are concerned about a government sector that keeps getting larger and larger with every passing year.

As with arguments about the effectiveness of Keynesian policy, reasonable people can also argue about the appropriate size of government and when the government influence over the economy is too large. Surely the presence of debt itself is not a problem for a household, a firm, or a government, when its overall size is a small share of either income or wealth. However, if an institution’s debt becomes excessive, the threat of bankruptcy and default or a long period of austerity becomes very real. One dilemma of course is that there is no simple delineation to decide when an institution’s debt becomes too large. Consequently, we have a difference of opinion among economic decision-makers.

Conservative Republicans, and Tea Party members especially, believe the debt has risen to very dangerous levels and that the country faces, either default, high inflation, or serious austerity if the present deficit course is not changed quickly and convincingly. Liberals and Democrats believe the debt, although too high, remains manageable and furthermore that the only chance to revive the stalled economy is by stimulating more government demand with continued short-term deficits. In other words they believe that additional deficits and debt are the only way to jumpstart the sagging economy.

So what’s the answer? As I suggested before, there no way for anyone to know for sure. What we hear on the airwaves and over the internet is just a lot of educated guesses. Further, as the debate heats up with rising stakes in the near future, stubborn intransigence will surely result in even more vitriolic rhetoric. Unfortunately, we are all in for a very unpleasant ride ahead.

Why can’t we discuss policy proposals and offer opinions and ideas without calling the opposing arguments, or the opponents themselves, stupid and inane?

So let me finish this discussion with what I would suggest is a more moderate evaluation of our current economic dilemma.

More fiscal stimulus ala Krugman, could expand demand, reduce unemployment and revive enough private confidence in the economy to reinvigorate rapid growth. The risk is that the positive effects are slow to appear, unemployment does not fall rapidly enough (remember the unemployment numbers after the WPA in 1935), and private confidence does not rebound. If this were the outcome, our national debt might be soon be approaching that of Japan’s at more than 200% of GDP. And with several decades building up international indebtedness (the US is a debtor nation internationally, while Japan is a creditor) the US economy could face several decades of austerity. (It is hard to know what the impact would be and how to describe it, but it would be pretty bad).

On the other hand, taking care of our fiscal deficit and trying to rein in our growing indebtedness, as the Tea party favors, could put our government on a firmer fiscal footing, restore our credit rating, restore confidence in the economy and prevent the calamity of future default and even greater austerity. If this restores business and consumer confidence, soon private sector demand may begin to revive economic growth. The risk is that quick reductions in the government deficit will lower payments to government contractors, federal workers, teachers and doctors, and thereby reduce demand for goods and services in the economy. This could cause an increase in unemployment and reduce consumer confidence even further. Getting to a healthier economy might require a worsening of the economy in the short-run, and what if that short-run is 3-5 years?

The downside of both of these approaches is pretty grim. It is why it is fair to say we are stuck between a rock and a hard place.

If I had to choose between these two approaches I would go with the approach to reduce the government deficit instead of the fiscal expansion path for several reasons. First, I think it is less risky. If the fiscal stimulus program doesn’t work then we’ll have even larger debt and economic problems in the future and it is hard to see how that won’t lead to possibly decades of economic hardship. If the balanced budget approach doesn’t work, we may suffer a little more in the short run, but at least we’ll have a smaller debt burden in the future. Overborrowing is a scourge for households, businesses and governments and it has got to be better in the long term to take every opportunity to reduce the extravagance.

Second, it is always politically expedient to raise deficits. Citizens always like more benefits and lower taxes because it seems like you’re getting something for nothing. Governments perpetuate this myth by first overborrowing and eventually by overinflating to resolve the overborrowing problem. Often, what is politically expedient, is simply the wrong thing to do economically.

Finally, I happen to believe that the private sector does a better job allocating resources to produce goods and services than government do. Government allocations are made for political reasons, and those are heavily influenced by special interests. Those special interests include big business, the military complex, labor unions, and other influential and powerful groups. Since every expansion of government debt involves raising the role and scope of government it is hard to imagine that another fiscal stimulus at this stage won’t have the same effects.

Thus for these reasons I would support politicians’ efforts to rein in the growing budget deficit even though it may contribute to the continuing stagnation of the economy. If legislators could simultaneously overhaul the tax system to take away most of the special provisions that have been given to curry favor with this or that interest group through the years, then maybe they could revive excitement in the private sector and jumpstart the economic engine even sooner. The chance of anything like this happening though is virtually zero because it is never politically expedient to rock so many special interest boats at the same time. But as I said before, if it’s NOT politically expedient, there’s a better chance that it’s the right thing to do economically.

Elite Wisdom

Originally published on May 9, 2011

Paul Krugman has an interesting piece in the NYT today titled The Unwisdom of Elites. In it he argues that policy elites are increasingly blaming the slow recovery and the other economic problems we face today on the general public. He writes that “the policies that got us into this mess weren’t responses to public demand. They were, with few exceptions, policies championed by small groups of influential people.” He goes on to point the finger squarely at President George Bush and Alan Greenspan, among others. His conclusion at the end is “We need to place the blame where it belongs, to chasten our policy elites. Otherwise, they’ll do even more damage in the years ahead.”

I agree with much of Professor Krugman’s analysis but I think there is a worrisome unstated implication. If Krugman’s analysis is right about “elites” then we should ask whether the problem disappears when a new set of elites are brought into power. For example, Krugman has been vociferously arguing for the past few years that we need a larger fiscal stimulus and that there is little need to worry about the size of our budget deficit in the present circumstances. But Krugman is clearly among the policy elites on the Democratic side; especially as a Nobel prize winner in economics and a prominent NYT pundit. If we followed Krugman’s advice on things would we avoid the pitfalls of undue influence of wise elites? Or, would we simply be substituting one set of elites for another?

In my view the policy elitism problem is prevalent on all sides of the political spectrum. Republicans may give away more to businesses through deregulation and tax cuts whereas Democrats give more away to businesses via favorable regulatory regimes and tax increases with tax break carveouts. In other words, influential groups seek to influence outcomes no matter which party is in power … all in the name of “we know better than you what is best!”

Many say we need to impose more regulations to reduce the influence of powerful business groups. The problem is that any regulatory changes always go through the same political choice process that always alters the proposals into something more amenable to the special interests.

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An Excess of Excess Reserves

Originally published on April 5, 2011

We read a lot about excesses these days: excess government spending, excess budget deficits, excess money supply expansions, excess foreign exchange reserves. One other excess worth watching in the US is excess bank reserves over and above the banks’ required reserves. These excess reserves could unleash a torrent of economic activity and spark the rapid inflation that some say is imminent.

Here’s how inflation would arise. Under a fractional reserve banking system, a bank is allowed to lend only a fraction of the money deposited in checking, savings and other accounts. In the US, large banks must hold 10% of deposits as cash or reserves at a Federal Reserve bank. (reserves are like a checking account the banks have with the Fed). The remaining 90% they can lend out to businesses or consumers. When they do, those loans are spent by the borrowers and ultimately deposited back into the banking system. These newly created deposits can stimulate further lending up to the 90% limit, thereby creating even more deposits. Since deposits are spendable by their holders they represent a part of the money supply in an economy. And since the lending of excess reserves has a multiplier effect on total deposits, it also increases the money supply several times over. There is a limit though, and in a simply situation, the total money supply increase from a one dollar increase in deposits would be the reciprocal of the reserve requirement, or (1/0.10 = 10) ten times. In other words, a one dollar increase in excess reserves can cause a ten-fold increase in the money supply. Finally, if the money supply increase is too rapid compared to the growth of GDP, then inflation will arise.

Normally, and by normally I mean in every month from Jan 1959 to August 2008, banks lent almost all of their excess reserves (the data is here). The reason is simple; by charging an interest rate on loans that exceeds the rate paid to depositors, banks make a profit. Once the financial crisis hit in September 2008 though, things changed. Suddenly banks were holding on to excess reserves rather than lending them out; the risks were too great. In successive months excess reserves exceeded required reserves by two, three and four times. That trend continues today. In the latest Fed report excess reserves in the US banking system topped 1.3 trillion dollars. This means excess reserves are almost twenty times required reserves. Never before has this occurred.

But is this dangerous? What is the problem?

The main problem is a potential one; namely the inflationary impact if these reserves were quickly lent out to the public. If this were to occur the US money supply could rise ten times the excess reserve level, or by well over 10 trillion dollars. For comparison sake the M1 money supply currently is about 1.8 trillion dollars. Putting more than five times the current money supply into circulation suddenly is certainly enough to cause a severe hyperinflation.

However, this is not happening yet. The inflationary effect of the Fed’s expansionary monetary policy (like the QE2) has not occurred in part because these lendable reserves remain unlent. That could change soon though especially since inflation is unlikely to occur until after economic growth begins to pick up steam. In other words, good news today that our economic troubles are passing may be the harbinger that unleashes these reserves and spurs the inflation that so many people worry about.

But this inflation is not a foregone conclusion. The Fed has an important new tool at its disposal to prevent the rapid expansion of loans. Beginning in late 2008, as the financial crisis hit, the Fed implemented a new rule allowing it to pay interest on excess reserves held by banks at the Fed. This means that the Fed essentially changed excess reserve holdings from a checking account for banks into a savings account. To prevent lending from rising too rapidly, and thus to stem the inflationary pressures, the Fed can simply raise the deposit rate on excess reserves. This power gives the Fed considerably more leverage to control the outstanding money supply and thus allows it to control inflation more effectively.

Let’s only hope the Fed can manage these excesses as adeptly as they promise.

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A Season of Silliness and the National Debt Ceiling

Originally published on February 25, 2011

In Alan Blinder’s commentary today, “The Economic Silly Season is Upon US,” in the WSJ, he emphasizes how “silly” legislators have become in their proposals and debates. It is true that politics often does seem absurd, but rather than pointing fingers and calling people silly, it would behoove us to try to understand the constraints imposed in the political system that lead legislators into these silly positions and statements.

For example, after Blinder explains how any reduction in the national debt requires a cut in expenditures and/or an increase in taxes, he suggests that it is silly to simply command the debt not rise by refusal to increase the national debt ceiling. Although he accepts that this approach may be a tactic to force necessary cuts, he argues that it might also damage the creditworthiness of the US government in order to achieve something the Congress has the power to do anyway.

This conclusion ignores the political realities though. Although Congress has the power to balance the budget and reduce the national debt, individual legislators have little personal incentive to vote to do so since it would open them up to damning criticisms in their next election campaign and threaten to thwart their own personal goals. This is a reason why some “device,” like a refusal to raise the debt ceiling could force the changes and allow legislators some political cover from future criticism. Any action that will effectively reduce the deficit must be politically palatable to a majority of voting members to have any chance of passage. Having some scapegoat to point the finger at is sometimes effective. Most States have the statutory requirement to balance their budgets … and this rule provides the necessary leverage to tie legislators’ hands. It provides the political scapegoat that is needed in most instances. In this way legislators can truthfully say, “I didn’t want to cut your benefits, or lay off workers, or raises taxes; but the law made me do it!”

Refusing to raise the debt ceiling might also provide political cover since it would force unpalatable cuts in spending to comply with the law. Critics of this approach, including Blinder, argue that it would damage the creditworthiness of the US government. However, for several reasons this outcome seems highly unlikely.

For example, there is little to no chance that a refusal to raise the debt ceiling would force a default by the US government on its debt. Interest payments on the debt, while sizeable, would surely be considered a top priority, precisely because maintaining these would be necessary to assure investor confidence. In other words, if the debt ceiling is raised the US government can and will continue to service its debts and live up to its previous commitments. Because investors will recognize this same strong incentive, it is unlikely they will flee US treasuries, unless of course they naively begin to believe the hyped-up rhetoric of the fearmongers.

At the same time a refusal to raise the debt ceiling would force the US government to balance its budget right now! That would mean making drastic cuts in spending or raising revenues. Basically it would force a pay as you go system in which spending must equal revenues … and if the revenues are not there, then they cannot be spent.

Given the size of our current deficit these dramatic changes in spending are likely to cause severe pain and disruption in the short run. It would be similar to a household having its credit cards cut up and forced to live solely on its annual income. Although the effect would surely be painful to endure, the household is likely to emerge healthier financially in the long run. The same may be the effect of the US government.

I am not convinced myself that refusing to raise the debt ceiling now is the best way to force the changes that legislators are politically disinclined to make on their own. However, I do think it is important to realize that imposing hard constraints, such as refusing to raise the debt ceiling, is precisely the kind of silliness we need in order to get our legislators to implement more sensible policies.

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How Public Sector Unions Can Exploit the Taxpayers

Originally published on February 19, 2011

The recent protests in Wisconsin by public sector employees against the proposed increases in employee pension and health care contributions may just be the first of the budget battles we will soon see spreading across the US. The news event also offers an opportunity to reconsider the advisability of public sector unions.

A standard argument for the right to form unions is that they provide protection to workers who may be exploited by business owners. That exploitation may include racial discrimination, low wages, inadequate benefit packages and insufficient health and safety precautions. Firms might be expected to mistreat workers in their attempt to reduce costs and achieve higher profits for themselves.

However, a public sector union presumably does not face an exploitative employer. The employer is the government itself, which is at the same time the regulator of potentially harmful business practices. The government’s aim is not to generate higher profit and therefore it should not have the business incentives that might inspire exploitation.

In a democracy, the government is really the agent of the people. The people pay for government services via their taxes. The people are the true employers of the public sector workers.

Interestingly though, when public sector workers use their collective bargaining rights to negotiate for higher wages and more generous health care benefits and pensions, they do not negotiate directly with their employer (the people), but rather with the people’s agent (the government). In contrast, a private sector union negotiates with the owners of the firm, whose own profits are negatively affected by any concessions to the union.

In the public sector though, the elected officials are not often negatively affected when concessions are made. Indeed the effects may be the opposite because elected officials receive campaign contributions and electoral support from the public sector unions. That means that the more generous elected officials are to the unions, the greater their own gain will be as well.

This process gives public sector unions the ability to “exploit” the taxpayers. A prime example of this is overly generous defined benefit pension plans for public workers. When elected officials make promises of future benefits to current public sectors employees it does not impact the current budget balance. Public employees receive generous lifetime income guarantees while elected officials get contributions that help them stay in office. The only losers are the “future” taxpayers, some of whom may not even be born yet. It is an ingenious scheme.

By virtue of the recent recession, government budgets from Greece to Wisconsin, New Jersey and California, have been thrust into deficits, revealing the long-term unsustainability of the numerous promises that have been made. Governments will go bankrupt if changes are not made. The sooner the better since the longer we wait the more difficult will be the adjustment. Concessions will have to be made, not only by public sector workers, but also at the national level by social security, Medicare and Medicaid recipients. I suspect most people don’t realize this now, …. but when they do we can expect many more marches of discontent.

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Reducing Inefficiencies in Government

Originally published on February 14, 2011

Private businesses are continually subjected to the vagaries of the market. While demand may grow steadily for long periods, unexpected shocks invariably hit from time to time. The 2008 recession is the latest episode of falling demand in a wide range of industries. The immediate effect for business is falling sales and reduced revenue. To remain in operation, businesses have no choice but to cut costs as quickly as possible.

Although the process is difficult and painful for those who lose their jobs, for the businesses themselves an economic downturn can force a kind of cleansing. The ones that survive will be those that cut costs in the most effective way, ridding themselves of unnecessary expenses or ineffective workers. For example, a firm with some employees who are lazy and unproductive may find it difficult to fire them when business is good. Once the business faces an emergency though, the least efficient workers can be released with a clearer conscience; firings become the market’s fault.

Thus, one way business weeds out inefficiencies is by suffering through a lean period of low demand and lower revenue.

Inefficiency in government could be reduced in the same way. When US legislators discuss how to reduce government spending they usually try to identify whole programs that might be cut or sharply curtailed. These proposals always generate resistance because entire groups are singled out as being a part of a wasteful endeavor. Additionally, it is hard to imagine that legislators know enough about the details of particular programs to know which are best to cut and which not.

A better approach is to reduce the budgets of all government agencies, perhaps equally, although some variation in the cuts could certainly be considered. An across the board reduction would mimic a recession, only this time it would be a government recession not a business recession. Agencies, forced to survive on less revenue, should be expected to deliver the same services but at lower cost. Of course this would not work with legislated transfer programs like social security, so the cuts could only be made on discretionary spending, including defense and on the administrative component of transfer programs. These internal investigations would have a better chance of identifying inefficiencies than legislators who are too far removed.

Of course, probably the quickest route to improve an agency’s efficiency would be to fire ineffective workers, just like private businesses do. For government though this may be more difficult if union rules make it difficult to fire people. Nevertheless, retiree positions may not be replaced and new hires may cease, leading to a reduced work force in time. This, together with other process adjustments, can lead to a more efficient and effective government at whatever level of government spending we need to achieve more balance in the budget.

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Two Moralities

Originally published on January 14, 2011

In his NYT column (Jan 14, 2011), Paul Krugman explains why he believes we are a “deeply divided nation and are likely to remain one for a long time.” He sees a moral divide that admits to no middle ground. He writes:

“One side of American politics considers the modern welfare state — a private-enterprise economy, but one in which society’s winners are taxed to pay for a social safety net — morally superior to the capitalism red in tooth and claw we had before the New Deal. It’s only right, this side believes, for the affluent to help the less fortunate.

The other side believes that people have a right to keep what they earn, and that taxing them to support others, no matter how needy, amounts to theft. That’s what lies behind the modern right’s fondness for violent rhetoric: many activists on the right really do see taxes and regulation as tyrannical impositions on their liberty.

There’s no middle ground between these views.”

Krugman may be right in his observations but is wrong in his conclusion. There is a middle ground between the two extremes he presents.

The Right is not averse to all taxation. They do not advocate anarchy, but rather limited government that provides for the national defense and the provision of social services such as fire and police protections, the road and transportation systems, the judicial system, et. al. In addition I suspect most on the Right are perfectly willing to provide modest transfers to people in need ( a safety net) via a progressive taxation system … the so-called compassionate conservatism discussed in years past. For example, most on the Right are unlikely to support a complete dismantling of the social security system.

What the Right is most vocally opposed to today, especially the Tea Party, is the excessiveness of government taxation. The moderate and restrained taxation of limited government would not be considered theft, but current taxation levels that seem to be growing uncontrollably are increasing viewed as theft by those on the Right.

The current economic slowdown has increased the tension between the Right and Left largely because the Left has used the crisis to support an even faster expansion of the role for government in the lives of people, using the arguments that it is only right (i.e., correct) for wealthier people to help out those that are less fortunate. The Right sees unprecedented Federal budget deficits, a ballooning national debt, State governments on the verge of default, government pension obligations that are enormously generous, and commentators on the Left like Paul Krugman continually arguing that all of this extra government spending has been much too small!!

The middle ground that Krugman can’t see is a system that does include government and taxes, that does protect people via a national defense and a social safety net, that is compassionate to the needs of the less fortunate … but at the same time does provide people with autonomy and freedom to control and affect their lives as they see fit. There is a compromise position that a majority of people would be very comfortable with. Unfortunately that compromise position is not even on the radar screen for commentators like Krugman on the Left and others on the Right. For them there is no happy medium, and unfortunately it is they who get most of the attention.

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Special Interest Rule Bending

Originally published on January 14, 2011

In a Dec 19 column, The Bipartisanship Racket, Frank Rich highlights precisely what is needed to bridge the divide between the hyperpartisan right and left; a common enemy. That enemy is the process in which, “both parties are bought off by special interests who game the system and stack it against the rest of us.” Can’t all sides agree that when organizations use lobbyists to bend the rules in their favor, it is not in the national interest? The problem is that the right and left see the rule-bending in different places. The left sees it in the tax policies and regulations that favor major corporations at the expense of the average worker. The right sees it in the policies that favor labor union workers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. The left sees it in our defense policies. The right sees it in our environmental and immigration policies. The trick is to get both sides to agree that rule-bending and gaming the system is equally inappropriate for every special interest that uses it … even when it’s a special interest that you support!

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Twin Fiscal Problems

Originally published on December 13, 2010

The WSJ posts two enlightening articles today. The first is by Gov. Tim Pawlenty about the inappropriateness of government unions and how generous States and the federal government have been in raising the pay and the benefits of many government workers. The extent of this problem is new to me in the past year and it represents a huge growing burden on the health of the economy. Pawlenty is right, there is no good rationale for a government union. The effect of the union seems to be to exploit the democratic process, in a legal way, that results in more transfers from taxpayers to fund higher salaries and benefits. This is great if you are a government worker and in this case you have every incentive to support the union. If this resulted in better government services at the same time it might make sense. However, instead it funds an industry that faces no competitive pressures to improve outcomes, and offers generous guarantees for employment, salaries and benefits all at taxpayers expense.

Although it is true that taxpayers could, in principle, throw the excess spenders out of office, even then it is likely to have little effect as shown by the second interesting article in the WSJ today. This one shows the unrelenting influence of special interests in the ethanol industry. Even though science now seems to refute the positive environmental effects of ethanol in lieu of gasoline, the ethanol industry and all who stand to gain from it continue to influence legislation in their favor. Even though the election seemed to send a message that voters are fed up with the ways of Washington, Washington continues as it always did. The voters can only vote into office a slightly modified legislature, all of whom will face the same distorted incentives as the previous legislatures. So why should we expect the new crop of people to change decidedly, especially when old-timers run the show?

It is like we are playing a game of rock, paper, scissors, with special interests always trumping the general interests. It would seem the only way to change the behavior is to change what legislatures are allowed to do. And that can only come through a change in the Constitution, or perhaps, adherence to the rules put forth in our Constitution. For example, the US Constitution is supposed to limit the capacity of the Federal government to do anything in special group interests: they are only to spend money on things that satisfy the national or general interest. National defense clearly satisfies this condition. Subsidies to the ethanol industry clearly do not.

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Fiscal Stimulus Effects II

Originally published on December 10, 2010

Following up on yesterday’s post there is another way to look at the extent of the fiscal stimulus effects during the economic downturn and recovery. Remember that stimulus spending over two years or so was about $800 billion in total, which is about 6% of annual GDP.

The BEA publishes a table each quarter highlighting the contributions to growth of each component of our GDP. For example, in 2010 QIII, GDP grew by 2.5% and the portion of that growth caused by government consumption and investment demand was just 0.81%. The majority of the growth (1.97%) was caused by the increase in personal consumption.

Now of course this is just a “back of the envelope” kind of calculation since the fiscal stimulus did increase transfer payments as well and that could have affected consumption a or investment spending as well. Nonetheless we might have expected a bigger share of government contribution to growth especially when all the shovel ready projects were apparently under way. Below is a table showing GDP growth, Government’s contribution to GDP growth and then what growth would have been without the government’s contribution going back to the third quarter 2008.

US real GDP growth (%)
Contribution of G (%)
US GDP growth minus G (%)
2008 III
– 4.0
+ 1.04
– 5.04
2008 IV
– 6.8
+ 0.31
– 7.11
2009 I
– 4.9
– 0.61
– 4.29
2009 II
– 0.7
+ 1.24
– 1.94
2009 III
+ 1.6
+ 0.33
+ 1.27
2009 IV
+ 5.0
– 0.28
+ 5.28
2010 I
+ 3.7
– 0.32
+ 4.02
2010 II
+ 1.7
+ 0.80
+ 0.90
2010 III
+ 2.5
+ 0.81
+ 1.69

The point to be made is the same as yesterday. The fiscal stimulus appears to have had at best just a minor impact on GDP growth. Perhaps if it were twice as big as Paul Krugman would have preferred, more of it would have been spent stimulating job creating demand. However, economic decisions tend to be made by the politicians rather than by following the guidance of their economic advisors. Larry Summers advocated at the time that any stimulus package should be timely, targeted and temporary. The final package looked anything but that.

The Fiscal Stimulus Effects

Originally published on December 9, 2010

The WSJ posts a very informative description of the government spending effects of the stimulus package today. The overall size of the stimulative effect … virtually, nada, nothing!

Allow me to elaborate by offering a few additional stats from BEA’s NIPA data.

Between 2008 Q3 and 2010 Q3 (in annualized levels)

Total Gov Consumption (Fed + State & Local) rose $75 billion
Fed Gov Consumption rose $107 billion while S&L consumption fell by $32 billion!

Over the same period, the total Govt. deficit rose by $605 billion to $1.529 trillion
The Fed Gov Deficit rose $749 billion while the S&L deficit fell by $144 billion to reach an overall S&L deficit of only $32 billion.

The obvious question from the data is what accounts for the extra $530 billion deficit increase if it isn’t from more government spending. The answer of course is in reduced tax revenues and increases in transfers.

Total Gov Revenues (Fed + State & Local) fell just $62 billion over the period.
Fed Gov Revenues fell $84 billion while S&L revenues actually rose by $167 billion!
(167-84 should equal -62; I can’t explain why it doesn’t but this is what BEA reports!)

Transfers, Interest payments and a few other things accounted for the remainder.

Total Gov Transfers (Fed + State & Local) rose $530 billion over the period.
Fed Gov Transfers rose $642 billion while S&L transfers fell by $112 billion!

The net result as reported in the article is that most of the increase in the deficit has comes from an increase in transfer payments and interest and very little in the form of increased consumption. Furthermore, borrowing to finance these growing deficits have been shifted from the States to the Federal government. In other words the States have been bailed out by the Feds with the repayment burden being shifted from the American taxpayer to the American taxpayer.

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More about Fiscal Stimulus

Originally published on November 1, 2010

Paul Krugman has another piece today in the NYT about the need for more government stimulus. So again I want to suggest conditions under which the Krugman stimulus would work and conditions under which it would not work. The key, I think, is the effect the stimulus has on people’s confidence and expectations of the future.

In my last post I emphasized that because citizens see a ballooning budget deficit and rising debt while there seems to be no clear effect of government policy on unemployment, it is dashing their confidence of the future and keeping them from resuming their old spending habits.

In the meantime Krugman says we must substitute government demand for household and business demand for as long as the private sector needs to pay down debt and resume their own confidence. This does make sense if it can work as intended, but there are several problems with the implementation.

First of all, because of the political process the types of spending that would do the most to reduce the unemployment rate quickly are not the same as the pet projects that legislators have in mind when they construct a stimulus plan. If real legislation could mimic what Obama’s own advisor Larry Summers suggested, and probably what Krugman would advise, then the plan has a better chance of working. However, a second stimulus would likely be constructed in the same way as the first and lead to too much waste.

Second, a massive fiscal stimulus now would be much less worrisome to households and businesses if government had not accumulated so much debt during the good times of rapid economic growth. Imagine if our national debt were only $500 billion dollars when the crisis began. In that case the effect of spending $1 – $2 trillion quickly to avert disaster would have been received more favorably and thus could have inspired confidence in the private sector.

This leads to two lessons; first, it suggests the importance of keeping the government budget deficits low in all periods so that fiscal policy will be effective in an emergency; and second, it suggests that the impression the government makes on the people is critically important.

Many citizens lost confidence long ago that the government could manage its budget prudently. With that impression in place any new plan to spend more is met with doubt and uncertainty. This is especially true when all of the best and brightest who should know what is best are disagreeing over policy.

All this means that even if Krugman’s policy could work in principle, it very well may not work in practice and in this situation. Households and businesses have little confidence that the government knows what it is doing. Thus, any grand proposal to spend more will only be met with falling expectation and confidence.

Krugman is right that if only people didn’t think this way, his plan could work. But there is no way a few columns in a newspaper is going to shift the beliefs of a large group of people. These beliefs were created out of years of government excesses that we cannot wish away.

Appropriate government policy today must take full account of these beliefs and expectations and policymakers need to learn how to shift them in a more positive direction. Chances are good that positive expectations will not arise from leaders within the current political parties.

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Problem with another Fiscal Stimulus

Originally published on October 30, 2010

One of the key macroeconomic policy decisions looming is whether to implement another fiscal stimulus program. Because unemployment remains stubbornly high, many are contemplating the advice of Paul Krugman that not only is more stimulus called for but the original stimulus plan back in 2009 was too restrained.

The logic behind the stimulus is straightforward. Because households have become cautious, they have reduced consumption and boosted saving or paid down debt. The reduction in consumption means a drop in demand for many products and a slowdown in sales growth in many industries. Families buy fewer TVs, go on fewer or shorter vacations, and put off purchasing a new sofa. Without a pickup in sales, businesses will not add to their workforce.

However, if the government increases its demand for products to offset the drop in demand by consumers, then businesses will sell more and hire more workers. As the unemployment rate falls, consumer confidence will rise and eventually will revert to old spending patterns. Once confidence is restored, the government stimulus can end.

The key to eliminating high unemployment, then, is the restoration of consumer confidence. But consumer confidence will not return if the government stimulus plan does not clearly arrest the unemployment problem and if confidence isn’t further dampened by fears of rising budget deficits.

The problem with the 2009 stimulus is that people are not convinced that it affected the unemployment situation but are convinced it contributed greatly to rising deficits and government debt. Because of this consumer confidence is falling over time instead of rising.

If a new fiscal stimulus plan is implemented soon, consumer confidence could fall even further if the plan doesn’t quickly and decisively reduce the unemployment rate. Otherwise the fear of excessive government indebtedness will grow even further and the slow economy will sputter along for good while longer.

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Mixing Comedy and Commentary

Originally published on October 6, 2010

James Taranto’s discussion of Green Supremacists in the WSJ highlights an interesting phenomenon in public discourse today; the mixing of comedy and political commentary. Of course in one sense there is nothing new since comedians going back to Johnny Carson, Jack Paar and Groucho Marx have poked fun at politicians. What’s different today is that many comedy shows are designed to look like newsrooms and present skits based on the content of the daily news. Some shows also do interviews with authors and politicians, mixing in discussion of current events with humorous asides.

What’s also new is that the extreme rhetoric used routinely by comedians has made its way into traditional policy discussion venues including radio talkshows and the Sunday morning opinion shows.

Taranto’s story highlights the problem with a group running a political ad in support of policies to arrest climate change. Dissenters are blown up at the end in a graphical and gruesome way. The scene certainly grabs one’s attention because it is so shocking. How someone perceives this ad depends greatly on the context.

If the ad were not an ad but a skit instead, if it appeared in the middle of a Saturday Night Live show, then everyone would know it is supposed to be humorous. Some people may take offense due the graphic nature, but most would chuckle and be ready to move onto the next skit.

However, if the ad is presented on TV, let’s say, as a political ad to garner support for climate change policies, then the ad seems violent, mean and in very poor taste. Taranto analyzes the content of the ad through this lens and notes, “The “crime” for which the children in the video are “executed” is one of omission, not commission. They are murdered not even for dissenting against 10:10’s political crusade, but merely for being indifferent to it. This is the essence of totalitarianism.”

If we assume it’s a comedy routine again though, Taranto’s concerns now demonstrate why you never try to explain a joke to someone. Of course jokes have absurdities, that’s what makes them funny! So a response to any criticism of the ad could be, “hey, can’t you recognize a joke when you see it?”

All of this is making people very confused. It is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the overblown, humorous, remarks about public policies and our leaders from the angry and bigoted remarks of others. This is a real problem.

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A US-China Trade War?

Originally published on September 27, 2010

The intensity of debate over the US-China trade relationship was racheted-up this past week especially regarding the pressure for China to revalue its currency. The clarions call in the US is to charge China with being an unfair currency manipulator. China’s response has largely been to take more WTO-legal trade remedy actions against the US, or to file complaints about US trade remedy actions at the WTO dispute settlement board. These tit-for-tat trade actions may possibly increase as the country’s look for more ways to demonstrate the unfairness of the other.

Today I noticed something else though, reading Robert Samuelson’s piece in the Washington Post today. His piece presents the now standard narrative about why China is an unfair trader, in a way that suggests that the facts are so obvious, and the responses so necessary that only a fool could accept something different. My issue is with the conviction and certainty that Samuelson displays about what is really a much more complicated issue. This I think bodes poorly for the future easing of tensions.

For example he says that, “China has never genuinely accepted the basic rules governing the world economy. China follows those rules when they suit its interests and rejects, modifies or ignores them when they don’t. ” He goes on to say that other nations would like to do this but they can’t get away with it. Of course, he doesn’t mention the many times the US has lost WTO cases only to thumb our noses at the prescription and go about our business as usual.

He goes on to claim that China’s undervalued currency “hurt(s) most trading nations, from Brazil to India.” He doesn’t mention how lower import prices help millions of low income Americans (and Brazilians and Indians) and businesses using Chinese inputs. A low exchange value has both positive and negative effects in every country and it is very difficult to know which effects outweigh the other.

He also reports with near certainty how studies show that between 300,000 and 3.5 million jobs will be created with a substantial currency revaluation. The implication is that unemployment could be reduced substantially. Of course, these same studies ignore the fact that jobs may be lost due to lower financial flows on the balance of payments, nor do they recognize the aggregate relationship that has existed for the last 30 years in which unemployment tends to rise as trade deficits fall. Would that relationship continue to prevail after a Chinese currency revaluation? I don’t know, but, the outcome on jobs and unemployment is simply not so clear.

Finally, he goes on to say that a trade war with China would be unlike Smoot-Hawley since it would only be against one nation, not every nation. He ignores the notion that success in protecting against Chinese imports may inspire protectionist movements on a much broader scale; afterall, why stop with China, we import a much larger amount of goods from other countries combined and why not create millions more jobs by choking off even more trade?

Finally, to make his point as strong as possible, he argues that the choice is between two concepts of the world order. Yes that’s right, the “world order!!” In other words, this time it isn’t just a trade war, it’s a war about whether China or the US will be the dominant player. He says that failure to act now wouldn’t be a bad idea, or imprudent; no, it will be “potentially disastrous.” (At least he threw in the word “potentially!”)

It would seem that no well–informed observer can object to this narrative. A trade war may be imminent now because by accepting this dominant narrative there is no other choice.

I for one do not accept the narrative. I believe a yuan revaluation will have both positive and negative effects in the US, in China, and around the world. I do not think we can know, that is I am agnostic, about whether the action will help “our country,” or whether it will cause our unemployment rate to fall.

I think the Chinese main goal is not to “stick it to the US,” but rather to maintain internal economic, and therefore political stability. That is in our larger interests as well. China’s faces a potential real estate bubble explosion just as we did. They are extremely worried about making quick changes that would cause a reduction in the export earnings, the failure of Chinese businesses, and a rising unemployment rate. It is not in our larger interest to push the Chinese economy into a tailspin.

Finally, China, as a proud and increasingly influential nation in the world community, will naturally resist external pressure to change its policies in the way we would like. Every nation would do the same. Thus, the more we pressure China publicly, the slower China will act. For several reasons, China would like to allow its currency to rise in value. However, they are very reluctant to make quick changes, and they certainly don’t want to appear weak in the face of foreign pressure.

So why is this a big issue now? Mostly it’s political posturing. Whenever economic conditions are bad, it is useful to find a scapegoat, somebody to blame. The same tendency is seen with rising nationalism during hard times. If leaders can find an enemy to blame and attack, then one can rally the electorate around that cause and deflect criticism of oneself. For the moment, we just face the possibility of a trade war. At least, that is much better than the alternative diversion sometimes used when things get really bad economically; an all out military war.

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A Tale of Three Hollywood Movies

Originally published on September 26, 2010

Yesterday Oliver Stone’s sequel to Wall Street, Money Never Sleeps, opened in theaters around the country. In it America will hear Hollywood’s usual message; finance and business is evil and greed is the culprit. The movie is set in 2008 just before the financial crisis hit. Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas) is out of jail after doing prison time for insider trading and is on a book tour. His book’s title – “Is Greed Good?” – recalls his famous speech made at the end of the original Wall Street movie …

“Greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, (for) knowledge has marked the upward surge of mankind.”

In an interview clip on Youtube, Michael Douglas recounts how many investment bankers have come up to him over the years to say how inspiring the Greed is Good speech was. He laments that they seemed to have missed the real message, which is, of course, that “greed is bad!”

In the new movie he gives another speech to a crowd of listeners who enthusiastically applaud at every anti-business, greed-is-bad, remark. Unfortunately for the storytellers though, this speech is not nearly as inspiring and is unlikely to be long remembered.

As the story progresses and the near financial collapse occurs, the movie shows us a mixture of fast-paced trading scenes, discussions of bubbles and the financial terminology that accompanies it, and panoramas of wealthy people living opulently. The clear message is that unrestrained greed by those in the financial sector, fueled the extravagant lifestyles and brought the financial system to the brink of collapse.

What’s touted as good in the movie are operating websites that expose the injustices of the world, alternative non-carbon based energy (in particular unlimited energy from water using fusion), and nursing. As some other movie reviewers have said, it also tries to emphasize the importance of family, although I can’t say that came across very strongly for me.

What’s missing from the film to make it worth the watch is any lesson about a viable alternative. Mostly the movie tells us, greed is out there and we’re gonna get screwed over and over again by it. This is disappointing especially because Hollywood once did know how to make movies that carried a clear lesson.

Probably the best movie about business ethics that I know about is a film called “Executive Suite.” It was a blockbuster movie back in 1954 with a cast of Hollywood legends: William Holden, Fredric March, Walter Pidgeon, Barbara Stanwyck, Shelley Winters, and June Allyson.

This story explores two separate approaches to business; the Loren Shaw (Fredric March) approach is one based on reverence for the bottom line no matter what methods are used to achieve it. He engages in blackmail to achieve his position, is proud of accounting tricks to reduce tax incidence, and is willing to push low quality products to reduce costs. The alternative is the MacDonald Walling (William Holden) approach based on hard work and innovation. Walling is the VP in charge of research at the furniture plant. His primary goal is to produce superior products that customers will desire and the workers themselves can be proud to make.

The moral superiority of one approach over the other is obvious by the end of the movie. Clearly greed inspiring hard work, innovation and pride wins out over greed inspiring fraud, blackmail and accounting tricks.

I’m sure Oliver Stone, knows these lessons. Stone provides the commentary on the Executive Suite DVD so he knows that movie well. I’m also quite sure that the producers of Wall Street don’t consider the money they will make on the movie to be objectionable. And there is good reason for that. It isn’t objectionable. Hollywood is making money by producing services that people wish to purchase in the marketplace. If they produce a superior service, they’ll make lots of money and it will satisfy their greed. That’s OK because they are following the Walling approach. It’s just too bad they don’t get that message across in today’s movies.

In America today, we need to resurrect the Walling approach to business. We need to be reminded how aspiration, inspiration and greed, appropriately directed, can generate a workplace filled with well-treated, motivated, workers striving to produce a superior product for its customers. Indeed, Hollywood can show us a way out of the current economic crisis; too bad it is not today’s Hollywood.

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The Disadvantages of a Chinese Revaluation

Originally published on September 20, 2010

The US trade deficit with China has become a lightning rod for discontent in the US Congress especially since the Chinese have responded so slowly to US requests/demands to revalue their currency. Indeed everyone seems to accept that the undervalued yuan is, at the least, responsible for our slow recovery and, at the most, is a major cause of the global imbalances that set off the economic crisis in the first place. The popular impression though, that the undervalued yuan has benefited China at the expense of the US and the rest of the world, is misguided. As with most public policy discussions it is common to hear only one side of the story. This post is meant to highlight the expected costs for the US of a Chinese revaluation; the part of the story that is not often told.

The exchange rate is simply a price, a terms of exchange between two countries currencies, and as with any other product, price changes in either direction will help some and hurt others. In particular, an undervalued currency makes Chinese goods cheaper for Americans. This is one reason for the high level of imports from China and it is what leads to lower priced clothing, and toys, and garden tools, and appliances, and tires and all sorts of other things. In many cases the less expensive products are those purchased by lower income families who shop at Walmart and Target etc. If China raises its currency value significantly, as is desired by the US government, then these products will surely become more expensive. Low income households will suffer a reduction in their real incomes because the prices of the goods they buy will increase.

Curiously, the hope for the revaluation is that Chinese goods will become more expensive, thereby allowing US companies to compete easier by raising their prices, expanding US production and creating more jobs. Indeed, the more the prices rise and the more poor households are hurt, the more jobs in the sector will be created. This is great for an unemployed worker since having a job and paying higher prices is probably better than no job and lower prices. However, for the 90% of workers who are already employed they will just face higher prices.

Further, there is a chance that both the price effect and the job effect will be small. If importers respond to the higher Chinese prices by shifting their imports from other countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, then the US prices may not rise as much and poor families will be hurt less. However, that will also mean fewer jobs created.

Secondly, the Chinese can maintain their fixed exchange rate at a rate considered too low only by buying dollars on the foreign exchange market. These acquired dollars have been lent back to the US mostly in the form of loans when they purchase Treasury bonds. If the Chinese revalue their currency then they will lend less money to the US government.

This would come at a time when the US is borrowing more and more to finance its stimulus programs and is running larger deficits than ever before. These deficits are there, it is said, to fuel demand and allow for the creation of more jobs. However, if a source of funds to finance this spending is reduced then the US will be hurt in several possible ways. First, we might respond to the reduced Chinese lending by reducing the deficit accordingly. That would reduce government demand, presumably, and would reduce the jobs created out of that spending. In this case, the change in the Chinese currency value might create some jobs in the import competing sector while reducing jobs arising out of government spending.

Alternatively, the US could maintain its government budget deficit and borrow the money from someone else. However, to acquire extra funds may require higher interest rates to make them attractive. That would cost US taxpayers more, if not now, then in the future.

The point of this post is that a Chinese revaluation is not obviously a good thing for the US, as it has been portrayed. Instead it would have both positive and negative effects for the American people. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the positive effects would outweigh the negative effects.

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China’s Fixed Exchange Rate

Originally published on September 17, 2010

The WSJ has a good piece today (China’s Real Monetary Problem) providing better details about problems associated with the fixed value of the Chinese yuan. In particular the article explains the process of sterilization. Let me elaborate on some of the details. (see here for a textbook version of this)

In China’s case for the past 10 years or so, there has been an excess demand for yuan on the foreign exchange market that has required the Chinese central bank (CCB) to purchase dollars and sell yuan to satisfy that demand and to maintain the fixed exchange rate. If the CCB did not intervene in this way, the yuan would appreciate with respect to the dollar. By keeping the yuan at a value that is lower than what the market would choose, of course, Chinese goods remain lower in price for US purchasers. However, the foreign exchange intervention, if this is all that were done, should have another internal effect; namely the process will cause an increase in the yuan money supply internally forcing two effects. First, more yuan in circulation would lower yuan interest rates and in a world with highly free capital mobility between countries (between the US and China it is just slightly free) the lower interest rates would ultimately reduce demand for yuan by foreign investors. In the longer term, the higher yuan money supply would cause inflation and as yuan prices increase, even though the exchange rate remains fixed, Chinese goods would become more expensive to US importers and the demand for Chinese yuan would fall. In other words, internal adjustments will compensate for the lack of external adjustments.

However, the Chinese do not want inflation to rise up in their economy. They want to keep the economy on as even a keel as possible. This is the reason they sterilize. Sterilization means that for each billion US dollars purchased form foreign investors and traders to maintain the exchange rate, the CCB sells a billion dollars worth of Chinese government securities and thereby buys up the extra yuan that would have been floated on the market. In this way the internal economy is not upset by the foreign exchange intervention. The problem of course is that this also will mean that both interest rates will not fall and prices will not rise internally and therefore the excess demand for yuan will not be eliminated.

Thus the point of the article is that the problem is not the fixity of the exchange rate but the sterilization that takes place. Eliminate the sterilization and China can go ahead and keep the fixed exchange rate since internal adjustment will allow for the gradual adjustment of the trade imbalances.

Is the WTO Bad for America?

Originally published on September 9, 2010

In the first chapter of my Trade text book I describe the WTO; how and why it was set up and how it works today. The section is meant to clear up some of the misunderstandings and misrepresentations that are common about the WTO. This week I came across a prime example on an internet blog post titled “Globalism Destroys America: 10 Reasons why the World Trade Organization is Bad for America.

So let me respond to several of the points raised by the author.

Point 1 – “The WTO is not accountable to the American people or to any other voters around the globe. It is a sprawling bureaucracy that wields an almost unbelievable amount of power that is completely unchecked by democratic processes.”

In one sense this is true in that the WTO leadership is not elected by anyone. The Director General (DG) of the WTO, Pascal Lamy is chosen by the member governments and actually does not have very much power. His primary is to maintain the momentum of the Doha round trade liberalization talks, that have floundered badly, and to appoint panel members in disputes when the disputing countries cannot agree.

Most of the important decisions made at the WTO are made by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is comprised of one person appointed by every member government. The DSB in turn cedes judgments about disputes over to an independent panel of experts, either agreed to by the disputing parties or chosen by the DG. It is true these panels are unelected, but they are chosen in a process meant to make them about as impartial to the wishes of the disputing parties as is possible.

The WTO bureaucracy is hardly sprawling, consisting of just a small staff in Geneva and the extent of its power is extremely limited as well. More on that next.

Point 2 – “The WTO acts as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary in matters of world trade. The WTO has the authority to impose punishments on member nations, and it has not been shy about exercising this authority.”

If at all, the DSB is the powerful arm of the WTO, not the DG. When a panel rules against a defending country in a dispute what it is saying is that its independent judgment is such that the defendant has not lived up to one of its promises in the Uruguay round agreement. The Uruguay round, completed in 1994, consists of a set of commitments that countries have made to each other regarding a wide range of trade policies. It is important to recognize that all of these promises resulted in legislative actions that were considered by elected representatives in all of the participating countries (where elections are held). In the case of the US, the House and Senate approved these changes and the President signed off on them. Thus, everything we promised in the Uruguay round was approved by the voters via our representative democratic system.

Next, when a panel rules against a country it cannot “impose punishments.” The first thing it will do is ask the country to come into compliance. It is like saying the following: “The defendant country said it would do X, but now it is discovered by an independent panel not to have done X, so the DSB turns to the country and says, please do X.”

Often the country that loses does change it policies eventually and fulfills its original promise. That’s the way the system is supposed to work.

But what if the country refuses to do so. That too has sometimes happened. The US, Europe and others have in some instances refused to comply with a DSB panel decision. What then can the powerful WTO do?

Before answering let me point out that non-compliance is like saying: “We promised we would do X, but now were taking it back. Too bad!” Noncompliance means a country has decided not to abide by its previous promises.

In this case the DSB can impose a kind of punishment or penalty, but it works like this. The complaining country, that is being injured because the defendant has not fulfilled its promises, is now allowed to “suspend concessions.” This means that the complaining country is allowed to renege on some of its promises made to the defendant country. This is like the complaining country saying, “Since we thought we were getting X from you in return for Y (where Y is the complaining country’s promises), and since the panel has shown you haven’t given X, then we are taking back Y.

That is the extent of the “power” of the WTO.

There is more I can say about this blog post .. and maybe I will tomorrow. In the meantime if readers would like to add to this story please respond with answers to the following questions.

Reader Input:

  1. What are some examples of countries not fulfilling their WTO promises after losing a WTO dispute?
  2. What are some examples of suspended concessions by countries?
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Helping in Haiti

Originally published on January 20, 2010

I received the following request that I am happy to post. A return to normalcy is going to take a long time in Haiti and relief crews will need resources long after the event has passed. Please consider donating to the following organization.

International Medical Corps is a global, humanitarian, nonprofit organization, founded by volunteer doctors and nurses and dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through relief and development programs. Our emergency response team is in Haiti responding in force. There are still thousands of patients seeking treatment of which approximately 80% are in need of surgery and are running out of time – especially with the tremendous aftershocks still devastating this country. The team is treating crush injuries, trauma, substantial wound care, shock and other critical cases with the few available supplies – And they’re in it for the long haul.

Please check out the following link and give if you can:

http://www.imcworldwide.org/haiti

Thanks very much.

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Macro Science vs. Micro Science

Originally published on December 3, 2009

As I was reading the WSJ article today on the new doubts about the credibility of climate science I thought this situation might be analogous to something in the science of economics: the distinction between micro and macro.

First, it is easy to see the amazing advances of science right before our eyes. Science has made the computer and television and cellphones and airline travel and all sorts of other things possible. Similarly, in economics we understand all sorts of simple interactions between households and businesses and governments. We are confident that higher prices will almost always reduce demand, we know that tariffs will reduce imports and benefit domestic industries, and we know that too much money chasing too few goods will be inflationary. This interactions and these simple applications are “micro” in their orientation because they attempt to understand or explain only what is happening in a narrow range. In this micro realm we do pretty well in both science and economics.

However, climate science is “macro” in its focus not micro. Climate science is trying to link together numerous cause and effect relationships and use that to make projections and predictions about our climate 50-100 years into the future. In a similar way macroeconomics takes basic micro principles and tries to explain and predict the complex workings of our domestic and international economy. Economists should have been aware long before the current economic crisis that our predictive power over the economy is extremely limited … that is, unless we assume current trends continue (a brave assumption) and if we don’t try to project very far into the future (not very satisfying).

My point is that economics does pretty well at the micro level. It helps us understand simple cause and effect relationships and can be applied in a variety of helpful ways at a small scale. Similarly with science. However, at the macro level economics fares pretty poorly, not because we don’t understand the possible interrelationships, but rather because it is just too complicated a system to make prediction credible. Likewise then with climate science. The underlying mechanics of the science, that is the micro relationships, may have great consensus in the scientific community, but applying those principles at the global level may be as difficult or impossible as it is in economics.

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Immanently Sensible: Politically Impossible

Originally published on November 27, 2009

Charles Krauthammer’s appeal today for three simple fixes to our current health care problems seems perfectly sensible, reasonable and low in risk. Although these fixes (malpractice reform, interstate competition and deductability reform) even if well designed and fully implemented may not solve all of the problems with the health care/health insurance system, they are likely to step the system in a favorable direction. Most importantly though, they are changes that are low in risk because they do not involve a complete revamping of the entire system and more importantly, if they didn’t work they would be more easily reversible.

The problem is that simple fixes such as these are politically impossible to implement. As he highlights, powerful special interests have prevented any of these ideas from rising to the top. This is a standard story in Washington. Although the motivation for reform is to help the “consumer” of health care, the way in which reform is implemented is to protect, or advance, the interests of particular special interests like the trial lawyers group, or the union workers, or the health insurance industry. Each of these groups represent a small share of the US economy and still they command a disproportionate effect over the policy choices considered by the government.

I’ll admit that I don’t know many of the details of the current bill, but I am confident that for each set of passages in the 2000+ page bill there is a small group of individuals who recognize that the rules described in that passage will open up an opportunity for them: e.g. Group X sees benefits on pages 355, Group Y sees benefits on page 1567, etc. For the general consumer though, no one can point to a particular passage … instead consumers are expected to have faith that somehow this complicated new system will work to their benefit.

The political process that generates these kinds of outcomes is what needs fixing. Unfortunately, I haven’t heard many good ideas about how to do that. Mostly politicians say we need more “resolve.” Fred Barnes writes about this problem in today’s WSJ. He highlights how little President Obama has been able to accomplish regarding his campaign promises to change the lobbying culture in Washington. Indeed the problem has probably gotten worse. The reason is simple .. put more money on the table and more people show up to try to secure a share of it. The reverse is surely true too … put less money on the table (i.e., reduce the size of the government) and fewer people will show up. Of course, how to do that seems to be even more impossible in today’s economic climate.

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FED Independence

Originally published on November 19, 2009

An article in the WSJ by Ron Paul and Jim DeMint today discusses the issues of FED independence and transparency. They mention a “puzzling assertion made by the Fed and its supporters … that the Federal Reserve has some sort of independence from the government.” They continue to argue that the FED is not independent, but instead is a government run monopoly whose mandate to maintain stable prices has caused them to expand the money supply thereby causing an inflationary effect rather than, what they claim to be, the natural deflationary tendency caused by ever rising productivity. Indeed in their first paragraph they mention that in the past 96 years the US dollar has lost 95% of its purchasing power.

OK, but here’s what they haven’t mentioned. First, one problem with deflation, especially if it’s persistent, is that it can slow down the growth of economies. The reason is that expectations that prices will soon fall will make consumers and businesses hold off on purchases waiting until they can get the better deal. Anyone buying a computer in the past few decades knows how frustrating it can be to buy when you know that in 6 months the same expenditure will get you a faster computer with more features. Thus deflation can reduce the velocity of money, or the rate at which transactions are made. For this reason it makes some sense to maintain a low and steady inflation rate.

The second thing they fail to mention is the experience of many other countries that did not have semi-independent central banks. The problem that often arises is that legislatures are pressured to raise government spending and programs, thereby pleasing voters, but are reluctant to increase taxes to pay for these programs, which will clearly displease voters. Borrowing to finance a government deficit is always the next option, but sometimes this can be expensive especially if the government is running up large and potentially unsustainable deficits forcing them to raise interest rates to a high level to attract lenders. (currently the US has the large deficits, but not yet the very high interest rates). The other option, which seems relatively painless, is to force the central bank to “lend” the government the money it needs to finance its large deficit. Of course, central bank lending also means the printing of money, which if not counteracted by a drop in money elsewhere, is certain to have inflationary consequences.

Studies in the past have suggested that countries who have had severe hyperinflations in the past (e.g. Latin American countries in the 70s and 80s) are also those whose central bank was NOT semi-independent from its legislature. However, the countries whose central banks are more independent, like the US, have had a much lower inflationary path.

Thus, there are some good reasons to maintain FED independence that have been overlooked in this article. That’s my main point!

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Health Care Bill Details

Originally published on November 12, 2009

The Wall Street Journal today has two opinion pieces that highlight hidden details of the House health care bill that may have a major impact. The first article identifies a 69% capital gains tax increase that will hit high income individuals as of January 2011. The second identifies a nod to the trial lawyers that would encourage states to “identify an alternative medical liability law” to ensure a “fair resolution of disputes. However, the passage also states that States only qualify if its new law “does not limit attorney’s fees or impose caps on damages.”

As I mentioned in my previous posting, any bill in Congress typically has numerous add-on clauses inserted by different members of Congress. That’s what causes basic proposals to blossom to thousands of pages. But what I’d be interested in knowing is the source of each of these clauses. Ideally it would be great to know who wrote each passage. I suspect, because I have heard it mentioned, that the language in these clauses is typically written by the special interest group itself who then peddles it to a member of Congress to get it inserted into the bill. These interest groups “write” most of these bills … and yet the public has no knowledge about the authors. I wonder how many authors there are in this health care bill!!

One way to fix this imperfect information problem might be to require that every passage of a bill have authorship attached. In this way the public who will be affected by the bill would have better information concerning the role of special interests in shaping particular pieces of legislation.

Of course this might be impractical especially when a passage is changed and adjusted by numerous individuals during its development. Nonetheless, each passage should have no more than a handful of “major” authors. Another problem with such a proposal is that many interest groups wouldn’t want the public to know that they authored particular clauses (eg the trial lawyers’ association). As a result, a requirement to display authorship would quickly lead to diversionary tactics. Interest groups might outsource the writing of bills to independent consulting groups. Or, the true authorship might simply be fabricated.

Alternatively, each clause could be identified with the Congress member who inserted it. Possibly this info is already available. If so it could be helpful to publicize that info and discuss it more widely.

Although, having more of this information, especially for such major legislation as the health care bill or cap-and-trade, would be very revealing, it seems impractical to simply legislate reporting requirements. Thus, the next best alternative in a free society is to encourage more reporters, bloggers and other interested parties, to investigate these details and make it available more widely. The WSJ has done some of that work today. Surely much more of it has been done in other publications.

If you know of some, and have a link, please post it here.

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Health Care Proposal Confusion

Originally published on August 20, 2009

I have to admit that this whole health care debate confuses me. I understand some of the main problems with the current system; things like non-portability of insurance across jobs and across states, the high incidence of medical malpractice lawsuits, the large numbers of people uninsured, and the rapidly rising costs. Clearly the current system has major problems and may be unsustainable in the long term. But what I can’t figure out by reading the popular press, listening to the pundits, or reading blogs is what is the central core of the health care reform proposal and how precisely does it solve these particular problems?

 

 

There are several reasons I think an answer to these basic questions are hard to come by.First, there isn’t one reform proposal out there.Different legislators have different plans and different ideas they hope to integrate into whatever becomes the final bill.As a result discussion of the issue gets distracted away from the core elements of the plan to its particular features … like the brouhaha about death panels for example.Or, the discussion becomes overly abstract, like, do we want socialism or not?

 

Another problem arises because of the way democratic reform works in our system. Any legislator who wishes to revamp the health care system may begin with a core plan and a simple structure to solve some of the major problems. However, as the legislation works its way through committees and is discussed among stakeholders (and bear in mind with health care reform, everyone is a stakeholder) amendments are made to the core legislation. First the powerful groups will weigh in. The insurance companies will suggests adjustments to the legislation to assuage their concerns and the changes will be added to appease that group. The American Medical Assn. representing physician interests will weigh in and propose changes and adjustments. The pharmaceutical companies will propose some changes and they will be included. Etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

 

By the time a final bill is passed in committee and moved into the House or Senate, any simple plan that was originally proposed has now become a monster bill with so many pages and so many qualifications and special regulations that nobody – nobody at all – can understand the full ramifications.

 

This is one reason supporters begin speaking in platitudes. For example, President Obama said this week “What is truly scary—what is truly risky—is if we do nothing,”and “We can’t keep the system the way it is right now,”Since no one knows all of the specifics of the bill, not even the President, it is only really possible to talk about it in very general, one might say political, terms.

 

This is also why opponents search out and focus attention on the specific and suspicious minor clauses and raise these to the head of the debate.(like death panels)In any bill of monster proportions there will be plenty to object to and it is never hard to shine the spotlight on these and thereby cast doubt upon the entire proposal.

 

It is true that this is the way compromise works in a democracy.All interested parties have a chance to voice their concerns.Legislators weigh the importance of each argument, and amend the legislation whenever doing so pleases an important group.In the end every legislator cares primarily about making enough people happy so that they themselves can secure reelection in the future.That’s surely why the most influential groups are the one’s with the most money, who can, at least indirectly, influence the greatest future number of votes.

 

However, although the democratic system facilitates compromise of this sort, that doesn’t mean it generates an efficient or even a reasonable outcome. The main thing that concerns me is that complexity breeds inefficiency.The greater the number of special conditions and clauses here are in the bill, the harder it will be for system participants to figure it all out.That means health insurance companies, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies and others will all need to hire consultants and specialists to maneuver most effectively through the tangle of regulations.For well-educated professionals that will mean more jobs and higher salaries.But the more of these administrative jobs are needed to wade through the system, the more time and effort will be spent on that and the less time and effort will be spent delivering high quality healthcare.Or, if the amount of healthcare provided is maintainable, then the overall price tag will rise to pay for all of the extra administration.

 

So here’s what I’d like to see before supporting any kind of health policy reform. First I’d like to see a short, sweet and simple proposal; not one that’s thousands of pages long. Of course this is well nigh impossible since it would mean all the special interests would have to take out all their favorite clauses and the chances they would do that are virtually zero.

 

OK then, if this can’t be done then at least I’d like to see a proposal that is simple enough so that it can be explained to the average American.Someone, President Obama preferably, needs to be able to point to the different components of the bill and explain how and why it’s an effective means to solve the health care problems.How will it reduce costs … don’t just proclaim that it will?How will it solve the portability issue?How will it cover all Americans?Until at least this happens I think it’s far better if nothing is done at all.

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The Principle of Unintended Consequences

Originally published on June 29, 2009

The WSJ has an opinion piece today about how US legislation intended to clean up the environment and reduce our dependence on foreign oil led to windfall subsidies for the US paper industry inspiring a paper subsidy retaliation by our Canadian neighbors. This trade skirmish is an obvious example (i.e., obvious after the fact) of how difficult it is to predict the full consequences of particular policy actions. It should make one wonder if there will be many unintended consequences in other new legislation, like say the 1200 page Energy bill passed by the house last Friday.

One worry I always have is that the more clauses and provisions there are in any bill, the more chances there are for companies to game the system; also the more reason there is for companies to devote time and energy to studying legislation and working to influence legislation in subtle ways. The greater the complexity of our regulatory system, the more resources are devoted exclusively to understanding that system. The problem with this is that the more time a company spends figuring out ways to game the system, the less time is devoted to product improvement and customer satisfaction. Regulations intended to improve some matters, may be unintentionally making others matters worse.

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Government Ponzi Schemes are OK (!!??)

Originally published on June 22, 2009

Last week we heard the announcement of Allen Stanford’s arrest for perpetrating a ponzi scheme that defrauded investors of billions of dollars. Last year we saw the arrest of Bernie Madoff who purportedly instigated an even larger ponzi scheme. But of course, the largest ponzi scheme of all lies right in front of our eyes in full view. It’s the US government welfare scheme set up years ago. The ponzi nature of it is described nicely in Robert Samuelson’s piece today in the WP titled “Welfare in a Bad Way” .

What’s required of all ponzi schemes is that positive returns to early investors are financed with contributions of later investors. As long as one can induce a larger and larger contribution from later investors (typically by increasing the number of contributors), one can maintain high returns for the earlier investors. Of course, using the term “investor” here is inappropriate since nothing like investing is taking place. Instead it is merely a transfer from one group of people to another. What is most curious about the US government ponzi scheme is that everyone who looks at it can see exactly what it is and yet it seems to be almost impossible to do anything to dismantle it. We decry and prosecute private ponzi schemes but sit back quietly as we watch the largest one in history gather steam before our very eyes.

Ponzi schemes can last a very long time as long as the new source of contributors rises sufficiently fast and/or if the returns paid to previous investors is not too large. But deviate from these requirements and the ponzi scheme will break apart by it’s own internal logic. Changes in the US fiscal budget in the past year have clearly moved forward the time when the US government ponzi scheme will fail. To sustain the scheme for longer will require a reduction in current payouts (too hard to do politically!), or an increase in contributions, either by increasing the number of contributors (but that’s too hard since it requires a higher birth rate or more immigration), or by increasing contributions per person (i.e., higher taxes, … also not popular).

Since none of the changes that would be needed to sustain the government ponzi scheme are popular enough to allow a politician to even propose them seriously, we should expect the system will indeed break apart at some point in the future. If you’re lucky you’ll get out (meaning you’ll die) before the collapse and thus receive your better than fair share. If you’re not lucky though, ( that is if you don’t die soon enough) you’ll receive a set of broken promises and dramatic drop in your standard of living sometime in the future, just like the Madoff and Stanford investors will face today.

Any suggestions??

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Cap and Trade Protectionism

Originally published on June 11, 2009

George Will notes in his column today,

The cap-and-trade legislation passed recently by a House committee is Smoot-Hawley in drag: It contains provisions for tariffs on imports designated “carbon-intensive” — goods manufactured under less carbon-restrictive rules than those of the proposed U.S. cap-and-trade regime. Eco-protectionism is a recipe for reciprocity.

For more information check out the transcript about a Green Trade War on NPR’s Marketplace from May 26.

Protectionism can rise up in many other forms besides an increase in tariffs. It is worth noting that businesses are always eager to find ways to reduce competition. One method under our Safeguards law is to show that a surge foreign imports is injuring domestic firms. A new method after cap-and-trade legislation will be to argue that carbon-emissions by foreign firms exceed the limits required for domestic firms.

In every individual case people will wonder: are these actions merely an “excuse” that can help achieve the primary business motive to reduce competition … or are the foreign carbon emissions so substantial they threaten disastrous global effects if not reduced? Determining the answer will involve an enormous amount of calculation and investigation for each case. In this way jobs will be created for these investigations. Nonetheless, foreign firms will naturally suspect it is the former motive rather than the latter in most cases and this will surely inspire contentiousness in trade.

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A Bicycle Theory of the Economic Crisis

Originally published on June 3, 2009

There is an excellent exchange between prominent experts (Bill Bradley, Niall Ferguson, Paul Krugman, Nouriel Roubini, George Soros, Robin Wells) about the causes and prospects of the current economic crisis. It is titled “The Crisis and How to Deal with It” and appears online at the NY Review of Books.

Reading it made me think about an analogy between the progression of the world economy and the movements of a bicycle. Think of a well functioning economy like a bicycle moving rapidly along a road. The rider represents the government whose modest adjustments, left and right, keep the bicycle on a steady path. However an even greater force keeping the bicycle upright is the torque created by the spinning wheels. The torque is analogous to the forces exerted by the private market in an economy. As long as the bicycle (economy) moves sufficiently fast (grows), the rider (government) needs only exert a small level of checks and balances to keep it moving steadily forward: mostly though it is the torque (private market activities) that keep the bicycle upright and moving.

The current economic crisis is like the bicycle hitting a big bump in the road. No one knows precisely how or why we hit the bump, but hit it we did, and the bicycle (our economy) has slowed down and is beginning to tumble over. But as we all know, a slow moving bicycle requires many more adjustments by its rider; and the slower the movement, the more aggressive must be the rider’s reactions to keep the bike from falling over.

In the dialogue described above, Krugman’s argument is like saying that the bicycle is moving so slow right now that we need dramatic rider reactions (government intervention) to correct for the lack of bicycle momentum due to the slower speed. (i.e., the private sector has chosen to save much more, or demand much less, and the government must substitute by spending instead – in other words, the government must pedal for awhile. Government borrowing is not a problem, he says because the private sector is unwilling to do it itself.)

Ferguson’s argument (and others) however is a concern about another point in time during the adjustment process. He is worried about what happens later because of the massive fiscal deficits and the borrowing demands they will require. This concern arises once the bicycle has begun to gain more momentum again. Note, this is China’s major concern right now too.

So suppose Krugman is indeed right, that we need a major government corrective effort to right the bicycle. Well, what happens if, after the bicycle is about to fall over to the right, the adjustment by the rider is so strong to the left that although the bike will indeed become vertical again, it will also eventually begin to topple over leftward. If the rider cannot correct the movement fast enough a near collapse to one side will be righted only temporarily as the bicycle begins to topple over to the other side.

More specifically, a government intervention that gets the economy humming along again quickly, may also stimulate consumption (thereby reducing savings demand) and leave the government still with a huge fiscal deficit and no way to finance it without printing money. This is when the bicycle may begin to topple over in the other direction.

Krugman’s analysis would be more credible if it were apparent that the fiscal stimulus would be spent mostly in the next year and if thereafter government spending would revert to its previous levels. In other words, if the projected deficit this year were 12% but next year it goes back to 3% of GDP, then one could support the idea that the correction
is not excessive.

Finally, as with a wobbly bicycle, although reactions are necessary to keep the bicycle from falling over (Krugman is right), overreactions are almost the norm (Ferguson is probably right too), perhaps several times, before the bicycle can get back to its normal progression. If the analogy is accurate then, any improvement in the economy now, is likely to be followed by another collapse, perhaps next time with higher inflation and another economic slowdown even after markets seem to be rebounding.

With this said, hopefully the analogy is wrong.

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Cap and Trade Delusions

Originally published on May 21, 2009

This week listening to the radio I heard the cap and trade system described as something that would raise the price of carbon-based energy while lowering the cost of alternative energy. That cap and trade will raise carbon-based energy prices is correct. However, that cap and trade will lower alternative energy prices is correct only if one makes several other assumptions.

First, the statement is true if one adds the qualifier “relative;” alternative energy prices will fall relative to carbon-based energy. But this doesn’t mean alternative energy becomes cheaper, only that it becomes slightly more attractive in relation to oil and gas. Unfortunately because the price of alternative energy is currently much more expensive than carbon based fuels, this may not induce much substitution unless the price of carbon based rises substantially. Ron Bailey’s article “Cap and Trade Delusions” in Reason points out that electricity from solar energy costs 33 cents per KwH, from wind costs 9 cents per KwH and from coal costs just 6.5 cents per KwH. Cap and trade may only induce substitution to these alternatives if the carbon fuel prices rise substantially.

The statement is also potentially true if cap and trade induces sufficient innovation in alternative fuels that lowers the cost of these energy options. This is indeed likely to occur but there is no way to know how long it will take. Research has been conducted for many years on alternatives but they still don’t come close to providing energy at the same cost.

Thus, as Bailey points out, there is no way that cap and trade will not raise energy prices and reduce the overall number of jobs throughout the economy as a result of the drag on the economy. Remember that energy is an input into every good and service in the economy and with higher energy prices the cost of all goods will rise, without a comparable increase in individual incomes to compensate … That is unless you take latch onto the new rents that will accrue to the lucky few. (See today’s article by Bjorn Lomborg in the WSJ)

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How to “Do No Harm”

Originally published on May 20, 2009

Yesterday’s FT article by Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy titled, “Do not let the ‘cure’ destroy capitalism” is worth reading. In it they highlight three basic flaws with the current approach to the crisis. They are

a) an overly broad diagnosis of the problem,
b) a misconception that market failures are readily overcome by government solutions, and
c) a failure to focus on the long-run costs of current actions.

The problem is also a problem of democracy. Governments are intervening in part because its constituents want someone to solve the problem quickly. And no entity can do so much so quickly than government. This would occur regardless of which party were in power. Democratic representation will always call upon politicians to “do something” to solve distress in the market. And both parties could be expected to react in similar ways. I have little doubt that if Republicans were in power we would still have a TARP (oh right, that happened when Republicans were in power!) , we would still have a fiscal stimulus plan, and we would still have some assistance to Chrysler and GM. Perhaps the degree of intervention would be different, but Republicans would still have taken similar actions.

In the far future, the only way to prevent politicians from doing too much (and thus forcing them to do no harm) under similar circumstances will be to tie their hands in some way. There are two ways to do that. One way is via commitments to international agreements. For example, the world might be able to prevent a free fall into rampant protectionism, IF, countries abide by their WTO commitments. This is a big if (hence the capitals). A second method is with constitutional restraints. As an example state balanced budget amendments prevent states from becoming overly reckless in their spending. A similar requirement does not hold for the federal government though, and thus the US is destined to run deficits in the trillions of dollars for at least several years in the future.

My utopian vision for the future is a world in which politicans are ignored by the press and the people because everyone recognizes that they have very little ability to affect outcomes in their lives. It’s a pipe dream, I know!

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Climate Change and Uncertainty

Originally published on May 6, 2009

The two sides in debate about climate change and the proposed response of a cap and trade system are represented by two recent opinion pieces in the WashPost. Robert Samuelson presents the skeptical view in an April 29 article Selling the Green Economy. Kristen Sheeran and Mindy Lubber offer a rebuttal in the May 6 article The Cost of Climate Inaction.

My objective in this post is to highlight how the climate change issue is similar to the problem of cigarette smoking. Both problems involve actions taken today that have uncertain long term consequences. In the case of climate change the use of carbon guzzling technologies today may lead to climate change coupled with economic disasters. Sheehan and Lubber write that climate change “promises to disrupt agricultural patterns, set off a scramble for dwindling resources, raise sea levels, propel population shifts and require massive emergency spending …” However as Samuelson points out “models have a dismal record of predicting major economic upheavals or their consequences. They didn’t anticipate the present economic crisis. They didn’t predict the run-up in oil prices to almost $150 a barrel last year. In the 1970s, they didn’t foresee runaway inflation.” In other words the disasterous effects are highly uncertain.

Smoking is similar. Although there is clear statistical evidence that cigarette smoking raises the probability of contracting heart and lung disease, emphysema and other maladies, smoking does not affect all smokers this way. No one really knows why some people are affected and others are not. Nonetheless, young smokers know that whatever the probabilites are, most effects will not occur until long in the future.

In the meantime smoking generates definite short run benefits in much the same way as use of carbon guzzling technologies is cheaper than using clean alternatives. It is easy to explain why many young people choose to smoke in the face of the evidence; they clearly believe that the short term benefits outweigh the uncertain long-term costs. In the same way we can explain why energy users will prefer to keep their addiction to cheaper carbon guzzling technologies. Again the short term benefits exceed the uncertain long term costs. This is why when gasoline prices rose to over $4 per gallon in the US last year we did not hear people applauding the changes and saying how they wished the price would rise even further so they could avert the climate disaster in the future. Instead there was dispair coupled with anger directed at the oil companies. We might expect a similar outcry if a cap-and-trade system significantly raises carbon technology prices.

There is one important difference between smoking and climate change though. The long term effects of climate change are much much much more complicated and uncertain than the effects of smoking. The effects of smoking have been studied intensively for 50+ years and there are still gaping holes in our knowledge of its effects. Nonetheless in contrast to climate change effects, smoking effects are incredibly simple. With smoking we’re talking about no more than the effects of various chemical substances on an individual human body. In contrast the economic effects of climate change are so much more complicated that they really should be viewed as unknowable at this stage.

Sheehan and Lubber ignore this problem when they say, “Each new scientific report brings proof of a changing climate that promises to disrupt agricultural patterns, …” (my italics). However no objective observer should accept this proof and these promises. Sheehan and Lubber are building an argument based on faith instead.

In contrast Samuelson is absolutely correct when he says, “Actually, no one involved in this debate really knows what the consequences or costs might be. All are inferred from models of uncertain reliability. Great schemes of economic and social engineering are proposed on shaky foundations of knowledge. Candor and common sense are in scarce supply.” His argument is not based on faith, but rather on the recognition of our scientific limitations.

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The Threat of Inflation/Deflation

Originally published on May 4, 2009

Allan Meltzer has an excellent article in the NYT today about the possibility of inflation. It isn’t here yet but given the underlying conditions of high money supply (and low interest rates) and high budget deficits, inflation may come much faster than the FED is able and willing to respond effectively.

On the same day Paul Krugman warns in the NYT about the problems of wage deflation. He points out that Japan faced the same problem in the 1990s and suffered more than a decade of stagnation. His solution is greater fiscal expansion … which clearly will raise budget deficits and raise the threat of inflation that Meltzer warns about.

Unfortunately Krugman’s argument makes inflation an even greater possibility. That’s because calls for more fiscal expansion by prominent economists will make it more likely that the FED response to inflation will be too slow in coming. Remember that FED response to inflation takes time. Ideally the FED should act many months before the inflation is even apparent. But this almost surely won’t happen. The FED will more likely wait until it becomes obvious that inflation has reignited and and that time the only way to prevent overheating of the economy on the upswing would be to recreate a 1981 style recession.

Thus, I think the possibility of a double-dip recession is rising.

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More on the Economic Crisis

Originally published on April 27, 2009

This week I had the opportunity together with other local scholars to meet with Chinese trade officials visiting Washington DC to discuss the economic crisis. Commerce Minister Chen Deming’s article in the WSJ about the rise of protectionism includes some points raised in the discussion. Other topics for discussion include the following questions for which I offer some observations.

1. Recently, some U.S. macroeconomic indices have improved. Does this mean the hardest time has passed and the economic stimulus package, to some extent, has taken effect? How about the recovery prospect of US economy? What industry or sector will be the primary backbone of the future US economic development?

That some economic indicators have stopped their freefall or turned around is a good sign. As many observers suggest though, these data probably indicate a slowing of the decline at this stage rather than a reversal. Complete economic recovery will probably not return until after many episodes of improvement followed by episodes of worsening. Optimism will be replaced by pessimism many times over.

Complete recovery will surely come eventually … it always has in the past regardless of the nature of the crisis. What no one can answer is how long that recovery will take. An important element to sustained recovery though is a return to the general belief that the financial sector is sound. As long as the banks remain mired in bad debt, a return to normalcy will not occur. The financial system is like a lubricant that greases the economic engine. We learned from the Japan experience that if the financial sector remains gridlocked, no amount of fiscal stimulus matters.

It is unlikely that the fiscal stimulus plans have had much effect since very little spending would have actually occurred yet. Disbursements to agencies may have occurred but not the actual spending. The only way the fiscal stimulus could have such an immediate effect is if it raises confidence substantially. I am doubtful that it has.

As for which industry will lead the recovery that is hard to answer, especially if it is a market-led recovery. However, the nature of industry may change if government interventions are substantial. For example, subsidies to clean technologies will surely inspire rapid growth in those industries as businesses seek government handouts.

2. Will the current crisis change the US economic pattern of low-saving and high-consumption dramatically? What effect will the crisis have on the US economy in the long run?

Much depends on the length of the recession. If the recession lasts a year to 18 months and is followed by a rapid recovery, savings and consumption rates may quickly return to previous levels. However, if the recession lasts longer, or if the recovery is slow, then changing behavior in the short-term may become habitual. This is what happened to the generation that lived through the Great Depression; many remained frugal for the rest of their lives.

3. What effect will the financial crisis have on the globalization process and the pattern of international trade? For developing countries, especially those emerging economies, how will the crisis influence their economic development pattern? What lessons are there? Will the east-Asia-US supply chain be impacted?

This too depends on how deep the recession is and how long the crisis lasts. If unemployment rises to double digits in the US and around the world, protectionist pressures will grow rapidly. Already governments, including the US, are engaged in what has been called “murky protectionism;” that is, measures like industry bailouts, subsidies, increased antidumping and safeguards actions, among other things. Some of these measures are WTO-consistent, but some are questionable. If unemployment rises a lot more, the measures may become less WTO-consistent and trade disputes and verbal wars may develop.

Protectionism is always popular to jobless individuals eager to find someone else to blame, and politicians feed on these sentiments. Luckily we have a WTO in place today and thus the world should be more resilient to protectionist pressures than they were during the Great Depression. It was encouraging to hear Ambassador Kirk express support for continuation of the Doha discussions. Despite this though, I expect the Obama administration to be ambivalent about freer trade. Fundamentally they are more inclined to support workers over management. Thus while they will continue to say they want to maintain free markets, I worry that they will be more inclined to support “fairness,” which in most instances means protections for industries and their workers.

Supply chains will be disrupted around the world if protectionist measures grow. One way to prevent protection from getting out of hand is to try to keep the disputes out of the popular press. The more public the discussion, the more it will fan the flames of populist sentiment. In this light it was helpful that the US last week refrained from charging China with currency manipulation. Perhaps, now discussions regarding exchange rate policy can be done more quietly in diplomatic circles, rather than being played out in the press.

Of course, when charges against other countries do make it into the press it is necessary for countries to defend themselves. Fortunately, disputes can be adjudicated through the WTO DSB. Although this process is lengthy and has some important shortcomings, restrained use of the process can help support the agreement and perhaps keep countries from drifting too far from the core WTO principles.

4. The expansion of the virtual economy is considered one of the major causes of the current crisis. Therefore, will manufacturing “returning home” became popular again in some developed countries?

Returning manufacturing home will reduce the efficiencies that were achieved in the pre-crisis years. Admittedly, it fuels popular sentiment because it can create the appearance of saving jobs. Nonetheless, the main problem is that a greater level of less efficient employment in the short run can generate a lower standard of living in the longer run.

One thing I believe we need is better education in the US and around the world about how free markets work. In a free market, sectors are larger or smaller on the basis of comparative advantage. While some patterns may appear, any attempt to create “appropriate patterns” is contrary to the free market and should be avoided.

5. What influence will the financial crisis have on the international monetary system? Will there be some changes? Under the current international political regime, how should governments supervise and regulate financial operations across the world? Will the US dollar be impacted as the world currency? Is there any possibility of depreciation of US dollar and inflation after the Fed took such monetary policies as quantitative easing and treasury securities repurchasing?

The expansion of the US money supply and the fiscal stimulus plan raises very serious concerns about future inflation. I think the main problem involves lags in policy. At the onset of the crisis last fall the velocity of money in the economy fell quickly. The circular flow of money from sales to wages to spending is lower now partially because households have lost jobs or are worried about future job losses, because households have lost an enormous amount of portfolio and home wealth, and because banks are only lending to the very best credit risks. In response the US Fed has pumped an enormous amount of money into the economy. At the same time the fiscal stimulus bill has passed but the spending itself will take place with a lag over several years. Only a small amount will be disbursed in the next few months. Because of this drop in velocity though the main worry now is deflation not inflation.

However, deflation can quickly turn into inflation. If the banks turn out to be reasonably sound, if home values stop falling, and if the stock markets rebound a bit more and remain stable, then consumer confidence will return swiftly and with it the velocity of money could increase rapidly. But if all that happens just when the main fiscal stimulus spending occurs in 6 months or a year, and if the stock of money remains high, then the only outlet for the pressure will be an increase in prices. Inflation may ignite with a vengeance. The FED would surely respond to this with a rapid decrease in the money supply. However, because of the lag in monetary effectiveness it could take many 12-18 months before the drop in money catches up to the change in the economy. In the meantime inflation could be severe.

Although US recovery will be good for the world and would help assure the US dollar remains the currency of choice in international transactions, at the same time a rapid dollar inflation reduces international desires to hold dollars. Additionally, large US government budget deficits raise concerns about the safety of US treasuries. Of course, the US will pay back its debt, but if that debt is paid back with lower valued dollars, it will lose its attractiveness.

These things may reduce international demand for the dollar for use as an international currency. However, the diminution of dollar primacy would also require the rise of a viable alternative. At this stage there are no obvious candidates.

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Internal Protectionism

Originally published on April 23, 2009

In a comment a reader asks the following: “I still propose that until the detrimental distortions of our internal protectionism is fully understood, external protectionism cannot be fully understood either. My intuition is that they are inextricable, and that their effect on GDP and employment can only be understood if both “protectionisms” are studied as an intertwined entity.

My response: I think you are right. I think it is important to recognize that protectionism, both internal and external, are in the interests of business seeking to restrict competition. That is the key similarity. Business is always looking for ways in which they can gain advantage over their competitors. While it’s often easier to blame foreign competitors and seek trade protections, firms just as often seek internal protections from domestic competitors.

I remember reading a passage by Reagan administration OMB director James Miller who was surprised by the conversations he had with businesses about impending clean air legislation. He said (paraphrasing from memory), “…when we were considering new environmental legislation, I expected industry lobbyists to be very vocal in their opposition. Instead, industry groups would say, ‘We think this environmental bill is very important and we are willing to support it, however, you see in Section 5, sub section 3b where it says xxx. It would be much better if it said yyy’ After review we realized that a change to yyy would give this firm an advantage over its competitors.”

That is the kind of internal protection that I think you are referring to, and it is undoubtedly rampant. This is the kind of protection that Chrysler and GM are seeking today. Anything the government does for them will make it easier for them to compete against Ford, Toyota, BMW and all the others. However, for these firms the protections are obvious and make the headlines. Most of the other internal protections are buried deeply in appropriations bills and other legislative acts.

The attempt by firms to seek protections from government is one of the reasons people have become suspicious of multinational firms internationally, and large and powerful firms domestically. There is a strong suspicion that these firms are using political influence to get benefits shifted in their direction. It is also suspected that these shifts account for the extremely high compensation packages paid to the top executives. I’m sure there is some truth to all these suspicions.

A problem we face today though, in today’s economic climate, is that the blame is being misdirected towards the companies who are the petitioners for protection rather than to the government who are the providers of the special protections. It is becoming easy to indict the free market as the culprit; as the catalyst for greed and the widening disparities in income. However, I think the problem lies more in government rather than with firms.

Of course firms are greedy and want to secure the best possible position for themselves in the market. Nothing anyone does is going to change that basic motivation. However, when that greed is directed towards petitioning the government for special protections, either externally or internally, then time and energy is shifted from producing products for their own customers. If instead firms knew that governments wouldn’t, or couldn’t, offer special protections, then their greed would be redirected towards producing a better product for their customers. In other words they would be forced to compete and the most effective producers, that is those who satified customers desires to the greatest extent, would win out. In this case, profits made would be profits earned in the true sense of the word.

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Explaining the Bubble

Originally published on April 6, 2009

There is an excellent article in the WSJ today by Steven Gjerstad and Vernon Smith discussing the origins of the housing bubble. It offers a convincing case for why this housing bubble which so far has caused the loss of about $3 trillion in housing wealth has had a more depressing effect on the economy than the dotcom bubble in 1999-2002 that resulted in a loss of about $10 trillion in wealth. They also look at parallels with the Great Depression era and suggest that Friedman and Schwartz’s contention that monetary contraction was the primary cause of the banking system collapse might now be discounted because the current injections of liquidity have not prevented a similar financial sector collapse.

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Rising US Protectionism

Originally published on March 30, 2009

In a time of recession, as economic growth stalls and unemployment rises, the safety and security of workers becomes preeminent. Indeed a kind of economic nationalism develops quickly as the public demands that all government interventions are targeted to favor domestic workers and businesses.

Hence, the new US government introduced “Buy American” provisions in its fiscal stimulus package, it is reluctant to push forward the free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea, it reignited a feud with Mexico about trucking privileges under the NAFTA and now it has suggested the need to put tariffs in place to prevent outsourcing by high carbon using industries if a cap-and-trade environmental plan is put into place.

The demands for protection are high and rising. It will take tremendous political efforts to ward off these temptations. On a positive note I learned last week of Mexico’s efforts to lower protection. Although, the news of last week focused on Mexico’s retaliatory tariffs against new US restrictions on trucking, a less well known story from late last year shows that Mexico announced a gradual lowering of their MFN tariffs over the next few years. Although this action does not affect the US, since trade is mostly free between the countries due to NAFTA, it does represent a positive commitment to continue the push for market opening opportunities in the midst of a very difficult political climate.

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Pro and Con on Buy American Provision

Originally published on February 13, 2009

The NYT posted a pro and con debate about the Buy America provisions in the fiscal stimulus package. I can will add one point to the debate. First, it is important to note that many less developed countries have much more leverage to increase their protection of imported goods without violating their WTO commitments. That’s because many have their applied, or actual, tariffs set lower than their bound, or maximum, tariff rate agreed to in the WTO agreement. For example, in 2007 India imported $1.3 billion of palm oil, it’s largest agricultural import product. The applied tariff is currently set at zero. However, its maximum bound tariff is 300%. That means that India can raise its tariff significantly on this item and most other items too, without violating its WTO agreement. The US and EU in comparison have almost all of their applied tariffs set at the bound rates. That means there is almost no ability for the US to increase protection consistent with its WTO commitments.

Thus, if the Buy America provision provokes a response abroad it will be easy for many countries to raise tariffs against the US, and others since tariffs would have to be raised in an MFN consistent way, without violating the WTO agreement.

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Fiscal Stimulus – Part 4

Originally published on January 27, 2009

Let me return to the idea raised in Fiscal Stimulus – Part 1, namely the theory of the second best. This theory offers a guide that is widely applicable to many different situations. It says that policy interventions by government will be most efficient, and therefore work most effectively, if they are targeted most directly at the source of the current problems. Thus, we can ask, in terms of the current financial crisis, what are the problems and what types of solutions target the problems directly?

First, the crisis emanates in the financial sector. Overextension in the housing market lowered home prices leading to a wave of defaults and the eventual insolvency of many financial institutions. The US FED and Treasury acted quickly last year by lowering interest rates and injecting substantial money into the financial system. When a snowballing effect of financial meltdowns occurred in September, and as confidence in the financial system plummeted, the FED/TREAS sought Congressional funding and began to implement the Targeted Asset Relief Program. (TARP). Initially, the intention was to buy up the so-called “toxic” assets, primarily bad mortgages bundled up in mortgage backed securities (MBS) whose values were greatly uncertain. This action was appropriately “targeted” at the source of the immediate problem. Financial institutions had become extremely reluctant to lend to each other and this threatened to bring down the whole financial system, largely because no one knew who was safe and who not.

That uncertainty and the infection quickly spread to the non-financial, or real, sector, as manufacturing firms could no longer easily borrow, which then affected the stock market as financial managers began a flight to safer assets. The drop in the stock market coupled with the failure of some major institutions infected consumers who have responded by cutting back spending.

The current government stimulus plan is intended to substitute for the drop in consumer spending. There are two ways to do this, first by raising spending and second by cutting taxes. One could argue that this plan targets the problem of insufficient demand, however, it is not the most direct target since it doesn’t get to the source of insufficient demand, which presumably is the loss of consumer confidence. That loss of confidence, in turn, stems from the drop in asset values and the fear of insolvency among both business and households. At best the proposed stimulus package addresses a symptom of the economic problem.

There are a few ways for government intervention to get closer to the problems at hand. First, government money would be better directed to restore confidence in the financial sector. TARP-like proposals, such as the carving out of “bad” banks from goods ones with the bad ones run like the resolution trust company during the S&L crisis seem to be appropriate targets. Such a program might require much more than the current allocation of $750 billion, but it will be hard to add to this once the fiscal stimulus plan goes through. Second, supplemental and temporary government assistance to those who suffer a job loss would help ease the adjustment to those most directly affected. This is a better way to stimulate spending than tax cuts since many tax cuts will be to relatively more secure households who will save the refunds rather than spend them. Relatively insecure households are more likely to spend the extra cash. Thus general tax cuts are too blunt an instrument, not targeted enough at the source of the problem whereas additional benefits to the newly unemployed more directly targets and relieves one source of the fear.

Finally, one big problem with the fiscal stimulus plan is that it may substantially change the priorities of the economy from those chosen by the private sector to those mandated by the government. For example, there will be substantial increases in R&D spending for new energy technologies. Rest assured that every alternative energy company will be trying to get their hands on this money. Some companies may do good work in the end, but many undoubtedly will waste the money away. Since the decisions as to who will get the funding will be made politically, there is more reason to worry that those companies, or the technologies chosen will not be the most efficient way forward. Real competition assures that the most efficient and effective technologies will arise; government directives make it more likely that “influence” will determine the outcomes.

Also, although new spending initiatives will stimulate demand in some industries, it is not assured that the skills needed, say to produce solar energy, are the same set of skills among those workers recently laid off. Thus, while it seems reasonable that new jobs in new technologies industries will be created to offset the lost jobs elsewhere, it may not stimulate demand for the right types of workers. If a mismatch like this occurs, unemployment would not fall much (Circuit City employees will remain unemployed) while the workers who have the requisite skills (e.g., solar energy engineers) will see their relative wages rise.

In summary, there is much that can go wrong with the current stimulus proposal. It is unlikely to be the silver bullet that solves the problems at hand. Indeed, it is conceivable that the package makes things worse rather than better, largely because the lack of focus of the program may reduce the size of the more appropriate targeted interventions, and if the economy continues to stagnate will further reduce overall confidence.

This situation really is analogous to the Iraq war. In the case of Iraq it was argued (rightly or wrongly) that deposing Saddam Hussein was necessary to preserve the safety and security of the US. At the same time, the incursion into Iraq helped to promote other goals, like the spread of democracy. However, once Hussein was deposed it turned out that the long-term consequences were much harder to manage than was expected.

In a similar vein perhaps, today’s massive stimulus package is argued to be absolutely necessary to preserve the economic security of the country. At the same time the extra spending will help to promote other desired goals, like R&D into energy efficiency and infrastructure development. Nonetheless once the full effect of the spending occurs, we may well discover that the long-term consequences are much harder to mange than is being anticipated today.

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Fiscal Stimulus – Part 3

Originally published on January 21, 2009

Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s Monetary History of the US motivated the conventional wisdom about the Great Depression, that is, that it was caused primarily because of low money growth and exacerbated by several other things including attempts to balance the government budget, protectionism via Smoot-Hawley tariffs, and of course the tremendous loss of confidence in banks leading to numerous bank runs.

Nonetheless the solution to the depression was thought to be found in the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, namely a substantial increase in government spending to create jobs in the economy. Most everyone agrees that the depression wasn’t really “solved” until WWII, despite the increases in government spending with Roosevelt’s New Deal. However, these New Deal increases only raised government spending from $9 billion in 1929 to $15 billion in 1939. Due to declining output this represents an increase from 9% to 16% of GDP. Although this looks expansionary, it wasn’t until the advent of WWII that government spending really began to rise. Government spending almost doubled to $26 billion in 1941 and peaked at $105 billion in 1944 at a staggering 48% of GDP. By 1944 the US unemployment rate was finally brought down to 1.2% (from its peak of 24% in 1933 and from 17% in 1939)

Unfortunately though history does not allow us to (easily) run a counterfactual. For example, what would have happened in the ‘30s if there were no substantial increase in government spending but there was a substantial increase in the money supply at the very onset of the depression, perhaps tied together with regulations to restore confidence in banking? Today, economic historians like Barry Eichengreen, contend that it is highly unlikely for us to suffer another great depression because deposit insurance can effectively prevent banks runs and maintain confidence in the financial sector and central bank managers know full well to raise the money supply quickly in response to a crisis in confidence. Possibly if that were done in the 30s, the depression would have been a temporary recession.

In this financial crisis, the FED and Treasury did respond by substantially raising the money supply, extending deposit insurance, and taking control or facilitating the buyout of “too big to fail” financial institutions. So how do we know that these actions will not be sufficient?

Seemingly, the massive increases in government spending in WWII substituted for depressed consumer spending and helped put people back to work. However, there was one other characteristic then that doesn’t hold today, at least not to the same degree. In WWII the Japanese flagrantly attacked the US in the Pacific, while at the same time the advance of the Axis forces in Europe threatened our very existence. It wasn’t too hard under those circumstances to rally workers to support the war cause and to quickly ramp up the defense sector. Suddenly everyone in the country had a central purpose, namely preserve our existence. So today the question to ask is, would a massive increase in government spending, without a clear sense of purpose to galvanize the workforce, have the same stimulating effect on the economy? Or again, would allowing the increase in money supply to work its way through be sufficient to prevent a serious decline?

Truth is, we don’t know. I don’t know, …. nor do the experts proposing it.

Regardless, the economic crisis offers an excuse to greatly expand the role of government in the lives of its citizens. Without the crisis, the new administration could never have done this. With the crisis, all sorts of things become possible. Once a $700 billion bailout was passed this past Fall, it doesn’t sound preposterous to propose another $800 or $900 billion in extra government spending. (Some economists like Krugman propose the stimulus should be even bigger)

Indeed the new administration now has the same kind of blank check in fiscal policy that the last administration had in foreign policy. The 9-11 attack made it politically possible for the US to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these excursions have led to obligations that are difficult to disengage from and extend long after the initial actions. So similarly the expansion of government spending will lead to obligations that are difficult to reverse and will extend long after the initial actions.

Lastly, the popular impression is that the current economic crisis was caused in part by individuals and businesses overextending themselves and borrowing more than they could expect to repay in the future. Greed for prosperity led to insolvency. Now, we are proposing to fix the problem by greatly expanding government borrowing within a government that is already seriously overextended. (Had we entered the crisis with a tolerable level of government debt, the concerns would be greatly mitigated) In other words, government is about to do precisely what individuals and others were doing, overextending itself in the name of greed. Only this time it’s greed for social, environmental and presumed “good” government programs that will fuel the frenzy.

The Occupations of Free Women and Substitution with Enslaved Workers in the Antebellum United States

March 2022

Barry Chiswick (George Washington University)
RaeAnn Robinson (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2022-04

Abstract: This paper analyzes the occupational status and distribution of free women in the antebellum United States. It considers both their reported and unreported (imputed) occupations, using the 1/100 IPUMS files from the 1860 Census of Population. After developing and testing the model based on economic and demographic variables used to explain whether a free woman has an occupation, analyses are conducted comparing their occupational distribution to free men, along with analyses among women by nativity, urbanization, and region of the country. While foreign-born and illiterate women were more likely to report having an occupation compared to their native-born and literate counterparts, they were equally likely to be working when unreported family workers are included. In the analysis limited to the slave-holding states, it is shown that the greater the slave-intensity of the county, the less likely were free women to report having an occupation, particularly as private household workers, suggesting substitution in the labor market between free women and enslaved labor.

JEL Codes: N31, J16, J21, J82

Key Words: Women, Labor Force Participation, Occupational Distribution, Unreported Family Workers, Enslaved Workers, Immigrants, 1860 Census of Population

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Fiscal Stimulus 101 – Part 2

Originally published on 01/14/2009

Here’s the logic behind the fiscal stimulus. Because of falling wealth levels and rising unemployment, household and business demand for goods and services is falling. Instead of spending money as quickly as they once did, households save more, either keeping more currency at home or maintaining larger bank balances. In normal times, any money deposited in banks is lent out (mostly) to other households and businesses who wish to spend more for the moment. If there isn’t enough demand for bank loans, banks will lower the interest rate to stimulate the extra demand. However, today, banks are more afraid to lend to others because they are worried that many households and businesses will become insolvent and be unable to repay the loans in the future.

Thus, the circulation of money – what’s known as money velocity – from businesses to households and back to businesses is slowed. One way to get things moving again is to pump more money into the system. This is what the FED has already done with expansionary monetary policy and lower interest rates. However, if much of the extra money the FED has pumped in is simply held onto by households, businesses and banks then demand for goods and services continues to stagnate. It does no good.

However if the government comes along in a period of slowed private demand and substitutes for that demand with extra government demand for goods and services, then presumably GDP can be maintained at near current levels. In other words, suppose for every dollar that is not spent by households, the government demands one extra dollar of goods or services, then total demand in the economy is maintained. Businesses could then continue producing at previous levels and they would not need to lay off workers. Hence by quickly substituting government demand for the declining household demand, GDP and employment is kept near the original level and a severe recession can be prevented.

That’s the logic at least. The next post will highlight some problems that could make a fiscal stimulus possibly not so effective.

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Fiscal Stimulus 101 – Part 1

Originally published on 01/09/2009

In economics there is a theory that can help a policy maker determine the most efficient, or most effective, policy to solve a particular problem. The theory is known as the theory of the second-best. Without going into the details (you can read more about the theory here) it says that the best way to correct for an economic problem is to choose a policy that will attack the problem in the most direct way possible, one that really goes to the heart of the matter. Such a policy choice is called a first-best policy, while all other policies, which may correct the problem somewhat but less effectively, are called second-best policies.

For example, in a trading context, if the problem is rising unemployment because of surging imports, some policymakers might suggest a tariff to remove the competitive pressure caused by imports and thus save jobs. However, this policy would be a second-best policy since the source of the problem isn’t really the imports. Instead the real economic problem is the unemployment that is caused because workers cannot easily find new jobs once released from the import-competing firms. Given the changed trade circumstances, shifting workers quickly to the next most effective industry is the best way to realize the full potential of the country’s comparative advantage. Thus, a more effective policy, i.e., a first-best policy, would be one that targets worker mobility in the labor market and assists workers to find new jobs as quickly as possible.

In light of our current macroeconomic crisis, we can evaluate proposed policies in a similar way. For example, to decide whether the $775 billion fiscal spending package proposed by President-elect Obama yesterday, is the right policy for us to implement, we might ask to what extent it gets at the heart of the problem. In other words is a massive fiscal stimulus package a first-best or second-best policy option?

To answer this we need to first identify what the heart of the problem is. Although I’m sure some would disagree, it seems to me that the underlying cause of our current predicament is relatively simple. First, the crisis was surely set off because of the large number of mortgage foreclosures last year, which caused falling housing prices and a drop in construction activity. This in turn led to the crisis in confidence in the financial industry in September when financial institutions could not easily value their mortgage backed securities, forced several financial giants into bankruptcy or buyouts, and led to the curtailment of lending. The drop in confidence in the financial sector and the future economy led businesses and households to sell off stocks causing the plummeting market values and a loss of over $1 trillion in wealth – this on top of the losses everyone was experiencing in the real estate market. Faced with an impending and severe recession most households have become frugal, first because they all feel poorer, (despite the fact that many have no plans to spend their retirement funds or use the equity in their houses soon), and second because they fear a near-term job loss.

So next we can ask how well the proposed fiscal stimulus program will do to solve the underlying problems … but all that will have to wait for another post. Stay tuned.

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Disguised Protectionism

Originally published on 01/08/2009

A WSJ article today titled, Steel’s Buy America Ploy, discusses a simple method a US industry can use to get government support to sustain it against its competition without asking for a handout. By asking for Buy America clauses in the expected-to-be-gigantic infrastructure spending plan, the steel industry and other US materials supply companies will receive protection against foreign competitors. This amounts to a “pick the winners” strategy since US companies will receive contracts regardless of their efficiency (except vis-a-vis each other). Foreign suppliers would be locked out of this substantial business regardless of the quality and cost of their products. As a result, every project will cost more for the US taxpayer than is necessary.

What many don’t realize is that a Buy America clause, which sounds patriotic and perfectly reasonable to many observers, is equivalent to raising tariffs against these imported projects just like the notorious Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930. It is protectionism in another form. However, since it’s in another form, it may be possible that this action will attract substantial Congressional support since legislators can always proclaim afterwards that they didn’t raise tariffs like in the 1930s.

Will Congress and President Obama succumb to this protectionist pressure? We’ll have to wait and see. But for those convinced of the positive competitive effects of free markets, it is important to raise awareness that Buy America is just disguised protectionism.

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To Spend or Not to Spend

Originally published on 01/07/2009

In “Boost Private Investment to Boost the Economy,” Hal Varian provides an excellent, succinct description in today’s WSJ of the basic problems we face in the economy today. He starts by saying,

These days it seems like it is our patriotic duty to consume more. And if we don’t choose to spend more money ourselves, the government will do it for us.

But wait a minute. Isn’t it excessive spending that got us into this mess in the first place? Spending more now seems like drinking Scotch to cure a hangover.

This apparent paradox is straightforward to explain. The problem is that excessive spending by some individuals, facilitated by easy credit, put them under water in a market with declining property values. The subsequent defaults, and the prospect of future defaults, weakened the financial sector by substantially raising the risk of borrowing, and hence lending slowed precipitously last summer. The meltdown in finance in September inspired the FED/Treasury interventions designed to preserve confidence in the system but at the same time inspired fear across the world by revealing the likelihood that the economy would plummet into a recession.

The average household around the world is now faced with two financial problems, even if they have not previously overborrowed and are not underwater on their mortgage. First, household wealth has fallen with the drop in real estate and stock markets, thus everyone feels poorer – since on paper they are. Second, the prospect of a possibly severe recession, with rapidly rising unemployment, raises the chances that one will lose his or her job. The natural response to both of these realities is to protect what one has by spending less and saving more.

Unfortunately when everyone consumes less and saves more at the same time, the economy gets worse rather than better, especially, as Varian points out, when that savings does not flow into additional private investment as it would in normal times.

If only we could inspire all of the people who will not lose their jobs and who are not underwater on their mortgages (and this describes most people in the economy) to spend and consume like they have traditionally done, then the economy would not sink so deeply. Unfortunately, no one knows whose jobs will be safe – there is no way to predict that – and hence it makes individual sense to be cautious in spending.

But what I wanted to emphasize in this post is that we should be cautious about broad sweeping statements to describe the economy. For example, we should not say that Americans have borrowed excessively and spent too freely, because this describes only some Americans, not all. Many Americans are living within their means, although we never hear about this in the popular press because people always present the averages, or the popular impressions, as if that describes everybody equally.

Thus, it is true that some Americans have borrowed excessively and been forced into default and it is also true that the size and extent of these defaults have crippled our financial system for the moment. However, at the same time it would be best if those households who have not overborrowed would maintain their consumption at previous levels. Since that seems unlikely to happen naturally, for the reasons described above, massive government spending plans, with all their inherent complications and difficulties, are the policy choice of the day.

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Thoughts on the Economic Crisis

Originally published on 10/23/2008

Governments around the world moved quickly this month to shore up their economies by announcing major rescue plans for their banks. The intention by central banks everywhere is to restore confidence in the financial sector by guaranteeing a source of liquidity. Depositors will know that the protected banks will not be allowed to fail.

Although these actions will keep the major banks solvent, they cannot assure a continuation of business as usual. The real sector of the economy is only beginning to be seriously affected. After watching housing prices tumble over the past year, and share prices tumble even faster during the past month, consumers will naturally begin to reduce their spending. Demand for big screen TVs, new automobiles, and home renovations, to name just a few, will fall swiftly as consumers tighten their belts, in part because they are less wealthy than before, and in part because they will fear a possible job loss in the near future.

Reduced consumer spending will have several effects. The immediate effect is to put numerous firms at risk of failure. Not every TV, automobile or home renovation firm will fail, but some will. Workers in those firms will lose their jobs and unemployment will rise. These changes will reinforce the loss of consumer confidence even among consumers who keep their jobs. Thus, there is a reinforcing effect: a drop in demand causes job losses, which inspire a continued drop in demand.

Reduced spending by consumers may raise available savings in the financial sector. In normal times, the increase in deposits can lead to an increase in lending at reduced interest rates to businesses seeking to expand or to other consumers anxious to spend. Unfortunately though very few businesses will be able to expand with a deepening recession and there will be very few consumers eager to spend. In addition, normal lending is probably a thing of the past for a while. Even nationalized banks, with an assured source of liquidity, will not be quick to lend to others. Recall that the onset of the credit crunch developed because the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) disappeared. When the market prices of these securities fell to near zero, using mark-to-market accounting, numerous institutions were possibly insolvent, but no one knew which ones. In this case, even a short-term loan to a major company may not yield a positive return if the company is on the brink of bankruptcy. In addition, lending risks rise because the onset of a recession means that a greater percentage of these firms are going to fail – thus it may be best not to lend, or at the least to be very, very careful.

So what to do about the crisis? Is it appropriate to bail out the banks? Are the bank bailouts enough?

First, the bank bailouts are an unfortunate necessity. It is in everyone’s interest for the financial system to remain sound and to prevent significant bank runs. The conditions in the bailout plans are particularly onerous though, with high interest rates on preference shares, to restrictions on future dividends and caps on CEO salaries. These conditions, while necessary to make the plans politically palatable, also reduce the chances of success. For example, in the original US plan to buy MBS, the legislature added protections to reduce risk to the taxpayers. However, the whole point of intervention is for the government to “assume” the risk so the private sector can get back to business. That’s what is needed to restore confidence. Also, because of time delays, by the time the MBS purchase plan was approved the financial problem had cascaded to a liquidity problem and the US was forced to refocus on bank buyouts. For the moment the “toxic” debt remains on the books though, which means the insolvency problem continues.

Moving forward it is critically important for every political leader to speak confidently about the prospects for a quick recovery. The recession will be longer if policymakers keep squabbling over the details of the rescue plans or if prominent individuals announce that this or that proposal has no chance of working. Most importantly, leaders must assure its citizens that the quick and massive government interventions will prevent the recurrence of a Great Depression. After coordinating policies within and across countries, governments must then project a unified, consistent and positive message. If they do so, the world economy will be back on track within several quarters.

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Why Price Gouging is a Public Service

Originally published on 09/27/2008

The Southeast is experiencing a temporary gas shortage due to last week’s hurricane in the Gulf states. The effect has been long lines at the pumps, gas stations running out of gas, and a huge amount of anxiety for the residents of Georgia, Tennesee and the Carolinas.

Twitter is a-twitter with information about gasoline availabilities in the Atlanta area with messages like these:

“BP on Roswell Rd in Sandy Springs has gas, 40+ car line, cops and an ambulance present”

“Costco sandy springs is now out of gas”

“I was just told by phone Costco Dunwoody has gas. 90 mins wait. Members only”

“I’m searching for gas near cumberland mall or ponce and moreland or anywhere in between, Thanks!”

Bloggers have also related their experiences:

I have been looking all around for gas and I have already called my boss and told him that I might not be able to work tomorrow. I also might not get to see my daughter this weekend. Thanks Gov. Perdue! Your delayed reactions have costed you my vote. – Helpless

 

When this gas crisis first hit a week or so ago, I didn’t rush out and fill my tanks or engage in any of the so-called “panic” behavior. This past weekend, my small, rural hometown ran completely out of gas. Closest station with gas was 18 miles away. Luckily, I had some gas in a jug that I keep for my lawnmower. Lesson learned. Now, whenever I get below a half tank, I’m topping off. – Lee

Two hours, six gas stations, and two $25-fill-ups later, I have a full tank for the first time in two weeks. Now I understand why other people have been topping off every chance they get…. – concerned

Why does a shortage warrant raising of the prices??? I see where some stations are going to be investigated, but who is investigating why it is still over $4 a gallon?? – cin

The curious thing is that all of this waiting, panic, and anxiety is completely unnecessary if people could simply understand and accept the functioning of a free market. The market, however is not free in these states because the governments have imposed price gouging laws to prevent service stations from raising their prices when supplies are lower than normal. Indeed, in Georgia alone 1300 price gouging complaints have been filed and 130 service stations are under investigation.

The market solution is simple: allow service stations to charge whatever they want. Yes, allow them to “price gouge”! If they were allowed to do so, here’s what would happen.

First, as soon as service stations learned that they would not be receiving the same frequency of gas shipments, they would immediately raise their prices. Each station’s objective would be to reduce demand so that the supply they have remaining would last until their next shipment. They would also make more money per gallon, but given the shortage they will be selling less gas over the week too. And yes, it will maximize their profits.

When supply conditions change suddenly and unexpectedly the stations will not be sure what price to set. Ideally they would like to set a price such that the last gallon of gasoline in their storage tanks is sold just as the tanker truck arrives to fill them up again. But this will be difficult to do. A higher price will normally reduce demand, but by how much will be greatly uncertain. It will also depend on what the prices and supplies are among competing stations in the neighborhood. If other stations increase by more, one station may even see its demand increase despite a higher price. If this happens the station should respond by raising its price even more to moderate its sales. If demand falls too much they should adjust downward. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the volatility in the prices.

Some firms may overreact relative to their competitors. Maybe a station will raise its price to $8 a gallon. What to do about this? As the Beatles would sing: “Let it Be! Let it be-ee! Let it Be! Let it Be!” A station that greatly overprices will discover it has no demand, since there will be other stations open with cheaper gas. Eventually one of two things will happen. Either , this high priced station will recognize that a new gas shipment will soon arrive and to make any profit at all, will be forced to lower its price, perhaps below its competition for awhile. Or, this station will watch as those firms who underpriced run out of gasoline and people are forced to buy the $8 gas. If the latter happens this high priced station, and others like it, will be the ones that provide the greatest public service. That’s because if shortages are that significant, these stations will be the ones that assure that there will always be a service station open and everyone will always be free to go in and buy as much as they like.

What’s the effect for consumers. Well, undoubtedly they will pay more for gasoline and they won’t be happy. But, the higher price will cause many of them to reduce their consumption. Especially in this case, because the supply disruption is expected to be temporary, those who don’t absolutely need to fill up, won’t. Those who only need a little gas, will fill up a little, also waiting for later when the price will go down. But the most important effect for consumers is that if the stations are allowed to raise their prices to whatever they want, then there will always be open gas stations and there will be no lines. For everyone with an unexpected emergency, for example a person with a parent that suddenly becomes ill across the state, they will at any moment, day or night, be able to find a station that’s open and be able fill up their tank. With no lines consumers will not have to consider the what if question: namely what if there is no gas tomorrow or next week when I really need it?

Because of the lines and the closed stations, all the consumers in the southeast are asking that question today. And, because the market doesn’t work right, they are responding by filling up their tanks every chance they get and filling up gas cans on top of that … all of which makes the situation worse. They’re behavior, which is perfectly rational and reasonable given the situation, causes stations to run out of gas, creates lines at every station that is open, and raises the anxiety and in some cases the panic among the population.

So, the solution to the chaos is simple. Eliminate the price gouging laws and leave the firms free to charge whatever they want. By doing so, the government and the service stations would be providing a public service; namely the elimination of wasteful gas lines and its associated anxiety.

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How to Make America Stronger

Originally published on 08/04/2008

The failure of the Doha round talks last week is one sign among many that the conventional reciprocal concession approach to trade liberalization is becoming ineffectual. With so many issues on the agenda and so many countries involved, it may now be impossible to reach any meaningful agreement to substantially reduce trade barriers. Perhaps the time is ripe for a new approach.

If the American Presidential candidates are sincere about making a true break from the past and if they truly want America to shine as an example worthy of emulation then here is one idea worth considering.

American Unilateral Trade Liberalization

Rather than enduring the endless discussions of “we’ll give you a little , if you give us a little (i.e., liberalization)” perhaps it is time for America to lead by example. By announcing a plan for a gradual transition to complete free trade, over perhaps the next five years, the US could disengage from the entire negotiation process. We might immediately announce zero barriers on all goods coming from the least developed countries, (despite GSP and other trade concessions to the LDCs, we continue to maintain barriers on agricultural and textile products from many countries). These changes would induce substantial adjustment in some sectors and admittedly many businesses will disappear. But, as they do, new businesses will appear. And these new businesses will capture some of the new markets in this dynamic and ever changing world.

The one feature about the future that all should be able to accept is that it will be significantly different from the present. How it will differ no one knows. But for a country to be economically successful in this environment, it must get used to continual change and be prepared to adjust. Indeed the more we practice and endure economic adjustments, the better our businesses and workers will be at it.

But what about the unfair trade policies that US competitors will keep in place? What should we do about that? The answer; adjust to them. The US economy is the largest most innovative and dynamic economy in the world. If we want it to remain an economic superpower then we should respond to foreign economic practices with a “bring it on” kind of attitude. If foreign governments subsidize certain export products, then let’s buy up the cheaper goods and produce something else. If a country maintains a low valued exchange rate, then let businesses adjust to the prevailing prices and produce something else. If foreign countries repond and remove their own protections, then US firms should adjust to fill void. – Jack be nimble, Jack be quick. – If we establish an economy that thrives on adjustment, then the US will weather any economic storm, including the competitive pressures that will surely come from China, India and others.

Tony Blair, the former prime minister of Great Britain, once did an excellent job describing the appropriate worker and societal attitudes that are necessary to maintain a strong vibrant economy when he said,

“The character of this changing world is indifferent to tradition, unforgiving of frailty, no respecter of past reputations. It has no custom and practice. It is replete with opportunities, but they only go to those swift to adapt, slow to complain, open, willing and able to change. Unless we “own” the future, unless our values are matched by a completely honest understanding of the reality now upon us and the next about to hit us, we will fail. … in the era of rapid globalization, there is no mystery about what works — an open, liberal economy, prepared constantly to change to remain competitive.”

 

Blair’s, “slow to complain” remark is consistent with Phil Gramm’s concern that the US has become a nation of whiners. Complaining about foreign trade or wage or exchange rate practices, and forcing foreign countries into countless discussions about what they need to do to make us better off are not the actions of a strong leader. Rather they are the actions of a giant who feels threatened of being toppled.

But, to achieve anything as radical as a proposal to move to unilateral fee trade, requires a leader who is willing and able to present a vision of a future America that is based on strength, resilience, nimbleness and sacrifice. These are characteristics that are needed to make unilateral free trade a winning strategy. And these are the characteristics most Americans would be proud to rally around.

Now if we can only find a leader who can be so inspirational. I confess I haven’t seen it in this election.

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Tennis and Politics

Originally published on 07/08/2008

People love to watch a battle between fierce competitors and root for their side to win. To the victor goes the spoils. Sport is the modern equivalent of warfare, wherein battles can be waged every day to the delight of the competitors and the audiences. I suspect our desire for the spectacle is something that’s part of our evolutionary heritage; something so rooted within us that we cannot squelch it.

I watched the Wimbledon final last Sunday between Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal. It was the most intense tennis “battle” I have ever seen. Federer, the Tiger Woods of tennis, winner of 12 grand slam titles, the five time Wimbledon champion, looking to be the first in modern times to win six titles in a row. Nadal, his opponent for three years running at Wimbledon, the guy who dominates the French open as much as Federer does Wimbledon and who beat him handily in the French finals three years in a row, the guy whose game just keeps on improving and has looked invincible in all recent matches.

A tennis match is much like a battle between two gladiators. In this modern version no weapons are used and no blood is shed. Indeed, the players never even touch each other except for the final handshake. In some ways it’s also like a video game where each person has multiple lives. Each point that’s played is an attempt by one player to “kill” the other. Once the kill is complete, the score is noted, and the next battle ensues. When a player attains a sufficient number of kills, based on the odd scoring system, the winner is declared. In this match Nadal killed Federer 209 times to Federer’s 204 kills of Nadal.

The intensity is seen most clearly by the players and the audience when a rally rages for a long time and when one or both players make spectacular shots. Those shots are like unbelievable swipes of the sword or incredible defenses and close misses. These are the times when everyone’s adrenaline starts flowing. When a battle like that is won the victor instinctively screams and pumps his fist into the air. The audience does almost the same thing.

This instinctual desire to fight and kill an opponent carries over into many other venues beyond sport. One such place is politics, where the weapons are words. An example in the US today is the war of words in the media each day between conservative talk show hosts like Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity and Mark Levin versus liberal talk show hosts like Al Franken, Ed Schultz and Mike Malloy. As the verbal battle rages, each side does its level best to tear down the opposition.

Here’s a few examples,

Rush Limbaugh says,

“How many times have you sat here and heard me define liberalism as clearly and as explicitly as it can be? They hate the country.” [dead link]

and

“There is no rational explanation for liberalism, folks. One of the biggest mistakes we all make is trying to explain it rationally.” [dead link]

Rush Limbaugh also says he doesn’t want to win over liberals, he wants to DEFEAT liberals.

More colorfully Mark Levin call liberals “… a bunch of walking hemorrhoids!!!!”

On the other side Mike Malloy says about conservative Republicans,

“ … I defy you to locate a spark of humanity in their persona, their demeanor, their language, … they’re not human, they’re Republicans.”

I don’t know who started it, but there has lately been a book writing frenzy with titles designed to diss the opposition.

Al Franken, a comedian, liberal talk show host and now candidate for the US Senate, has written a series of books, one which is titled,

“Lies and the Lying Liars who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right.”

Ann Coulter responds with books titled,

Slander: Liberal Lies About the American Right

and

If Democrats Had Any Brains, They’d Be Republicans

As the war of words escalates, the attacks became more personal, perhaps beginning with Al Franken’s book titled,

“Rush Limbaugh is a Big Fat Idiot and Other Observations,”

Rush Limbaugh makes personal attacks of his own on his show. Recently he said,

“Brian Lehrer is a good card-carrying New York liberal, and he’s very dull as a result. He’s very boring and very dry. And as such, is regaled as very intelligent.” [dead link]

A few more personal attacks in book titles include Joe McGuire’s

Brainless: The Lies and Lunacy of Ann Coulter

and Clint Willis’s

The I Hate Ann Coulter, Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, Michael Savage, Sean Hannity. . . Reader

Natural human tendencies to battle each other carry over into politics as well as sport. Perhaps this is why talk show radio is so popular. Audiences likely respond to every verbal jab at the opposition in the same way they respond to a great passing shot. The sharper the criticism and the greater the personal invective, the more likely the audience will respond with an adrenaline rush and a fist pump in the air. This may be why the more outrageous the comments, the greater the audience. And of course, each attack by one side against the other invites a retaliatory response.

The question I have is whether turning politics into a sport is an effective way to discuss public policy issues. Does the choice process improve as the discussions become more competitive, or does it get worse? Do the discussions offer any hope of bringing people together, or do they merely continually fan the flames of contentiousness? Does any one side have any chance of defeating its opponent, or does the war go on forever? Should politics be waged like a competitive sport, or would it be better if people channeled their competitive natures on the tennis court, the football field, and the soccer pitch? (Or, possibly even in business?)

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Problems with Trade Rhetoric

Originally published on 06/26/2008

Popular opinion is clearly rising up against the idea that free trade is a good thing. For an account of all of the problems associated with free trade, and none of the benefits, see David Sirota’s piece in the Huffington Post. This is a good example of how rhetoric is used to raise fears. Notice the language used in this article to describe trade agreements:

Tearing down tariffs and protections without regard for the consequences…

… a wage-cutting, environment-destroying, union-busting race to the bottom.

… slash their own wages to compete …

… to reduce their pollution controls and human rights …

… these deals are managed to enrich the elite …

… helping murderous developing-world governments continue to brutalize workers

… quadrennial cycle of deception …

… deranged trade fundamentalists who cloak economic terrorism in the language of enlightenment. ….

This writing is very colorful. It is interesting and exciting because it suggests a terrible conspiracy. The author has written a book called Trade Uprising that explains the growing negative sentiments against “so-called” free trade agreements. (no, I won’t provide a link!)

As the debate over globalization intensifies, though, these kinds of writings are extremely divisive. Sirota states that “it’s hard to argue with NAFTA backers because they aren’t interested in facts.” That’s not true at all. It’s hard to argue with NAFTA backers because those with opposing views have just called NAFTA backers elite, deceptive, environment destroyers, complicit with murderers, and deranged. Why should anyone have a dialogue with someone who seems so sure of his own answers and is filled with hatred towards anyone with opposing views?

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US Agriculture Debacle

Originally published on 05/20/2008

It is business as usual in the US Congress. For years the US has preached to developing countries around the world the benefits of free and open markets, unfettered by government taxes and regulations. However, the US continues to practice distorted trade replete with government subsidization in the area of agriculture. Although the US tells other countries in the Doha trade liberalization discussions that they need to do more to open their markets to US exports, the US (along with the Europeans, the Japanese and others) continue to do less. For two good articles discussing the issues see Sebastian Mallaby’s article in the Post yesterday and David Brooks’ piece in the NYT today.

People around the world are being held hostage by an industry that employs less than 2% of the workforce in the US. The US people say they want change in many areas. And, now is a perfect time to commit to change in agriculture especially because with rising world prices for food, subsidies and other supports could be more easily cut back without inflicting as much harm to the US farm industry. And still two US Presidential candidates (Obama and Clinton) support business as usual. McCain supports vetoing the bill. But even though McCain supports change, even if he were President there is little he could do about it. The Farm bill has a super majority support so that any veto (like President Bush in proposing) will be overridden by Congress and passed into law anyway.

This issue raises an important concern that the Presidential candidates are unwilling and unable to answer. Even if a candidate has great ideas about how to protect jobs, or revamp the health care system, or stimulate economic development, he or she must still work within the political process to effectuate the change. That requires dealing with all the special interests who will come out of the woodworks when any new plan is proposed. How will the candidates deal with that reality? I surely don’t know. Do they know?

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Campaign Rhetoric

Originally published on 05/14/2008

Robert Samuelson has an article today noting that the presidential candidates say things that will be virtually impossible to implement. He writes,

Candidates make alluring promises (to “fix the economy,” “defeat special interests” or “achieve energy independence”) and offer freebies to voters (more tax cuts, health care, college aid). … There’s a vast gap between the country’s problems and the candidates’ agendas and rhetoric. The candidates dissemble because they believe that Americans don’t want the truth. It would be too upsetting. They’re probably right.

He continues by noting that Presidents have very little power to control the massive economy, that dealing with budget deficit problems will require reduced spending or higher taxes, that high oil prices are largely outside of the President’s control, and that energy independence is a pipedream.

Many people recognize the disconnect between rhetoric and reality and it’s one reason politicians are often considered untrustworthy. But what’s the reason behind the disconnect? Samuelson suggests that the public doesn’t want to hear the truth. There’s something to that since the public would surely prefer to hear that public spending will increase, taxes will be reduced and the budget deficit will fall all at the same time.

However, another reason politicians cannot be more forthright is because of political retaliations. For example, John McCain said that he know less about the economy than he does about foreign policy. Given McCain’s extensive experience in foreign policy issues this is clearly a truthful statement. However, it is one statement McCain never should have made since now his opponents regularly proclaim that McCain himself says he doesn’t know anything about the economy.

Since rhetorical retaliations are used by all political parties equally, this suggests that the only “politically safe” posture for a politician to take is to assure the voters that you have answers for everything, and that your policies will have only benefits and will cost next to nothing. Or, if a policy proposal does cost something, that cost will be borne by the wealthy and never by the middle class or poor. It is politically foolish to claim anything else. Perhaps this is one reason truthful and realistic politicians never rise to the top.

Clinton, Obama, Delegates and Fairness

Originally published on 03/16/2008

The current dispute in the Democratic party over what to do about the delegations from Michigan and Florida is an excellent case study demonstrating that choice on the basis of fairness is unsound.

The problem arose when the Democratic parties of Michigan and Florida decided to violate the Democratic national committee’s (DNC) rules and move their primaries forward to January. Under the rules only small states could hold primaries before mid February; this to prevent large states from gaining too much influence. However, Michigan and Florida wanted their states to play a bigger role in determining the next presidential candidate. These states were told at the time that the punishment for violating this rule would be that their delegate votes would not count at the Democratic convention to be held in August. But despite the warning, the states held early primaries anyway.

The Democratic candidates (with Clinton and Obama the only one’s now remaining), knew that the primary votes would not be counted, and agreed not to campaign in either of these two states. In fact Barack Obama did not even have his name on the Michigan ballot leaving Obama supporters to vote for “Uncommitted,” or perhaps not at all.

When the votes were counted in Michigan, Clinton won 55% of the almost 600,000 votes cast. “Uncommitted came in second place with 40%. In Florida, where Obama’s name was on the ballot, Clinton won 50% of the 1.75 million votes casts, whereas Obama won just 33%.

All of this wouldn’t matter much if one candidate took a strong delegate lead after Feb 5th’s Super Tuesday, as often happens. However, since Clinton and Obama are neck and neck in delegates late in the primary season (Obama has a small lead) and since neither candidate seems likely to earn a sufficient number of delegate commitments to assure a first round victory at the convention, both candidates are scrambling for every delegate. All of which leads to the current controversy.

The Clinton campaign argues that over two million voters in Michigan and Florida will be “disenfranchised” if the current DNC rules are upheld. They say this is unfair to the Michigan and Florida voters, many of whom had no idea that their votes would not count in the first round at the convention.

Democracy is based on the principle that each person’s vote should count equally. In an election, no one person should have more influence than another to decide the outcome. If Michigan and Florida’s votes are not counted at the Democratic national convention, then voters, who are not at all responsible for the breaking of the rules, will be discriminated against vis-a-vis the voters in other states whose votes will count. Clearly this smacks of injustice. This argument based on non-discrimination in a democracy is sound and reasonable.

On the other hand, one principle of fair game play is that the rules of any game should be set and agreed to before the game begins. If the rules are changed midway through a contest, that would likely change the probability of who wins. Furthermore, red flags of suspicion are immediately raised if the rule changes are suggested by someone with an interest in the outcome. In this case, rule changes are self serving and no one views that as fair.

This is the argument of the Obama campaign. They contend that the original election rules must be followed since the rules and the consequences of violations were well known and accepted not only by the state Democratic committees but by the candidates themselves. Voters in these states needed only to turn on the nightly news or read the newspapers to learn about the situation. This rules-of-the-game argument too, is sound and reasonable.

Herein lies the problem with fairness. Two reasonable conceptions of fairness or justice applied to the same electoral problem leads to diametrically opposed conclusions. It is simply impossible to say who’s right and who’s wrong. In a similar vein, the same problem applies in trade policy statements. Both candidates say they want trade to be fair, but what precisely do they mean by fairness? Not surprisingly, no one offers many details. But one has to admit, it certainly does sound good!

The electoral dilemma is complicated by one additional factor. Neither Clinton or Obama can obtain the necessary 2025 delegates to win the nomination with only the pledged delegates; they will also need help from the so-called superdelegates. The pledged delegates are those virtually committed to vote for a particular candidate on the basis of the state’s primary or caucus votes. In this way each candidate receives delegates in proportion to the percentage of votes they received. The superdelegates are the democratic party leaders – senate and house members, governors and other party affiliates – who may freely vote for whomever they like. Although many of them have voiced support for Clinton or Obama, they can change their vote at the time of the convention in August. The candidates have been reaching out for the support of these superdelegates but at the same time have been discussing their proper role.

If the Obama campaign were true to their fairness principles, they would accept that the rules of the game allow the superdelegates to vote for whomever they wish. Indeed these party leaders could decide in August, based on information that has come forward in the Spring and summer months and based on impressions at that time, that Clinton is the best candidate and in the best interests of the party. However, the Obama camp has been suggesting that the superdelegates have a moral obligation to represent the wishes of the voters of their state, presumably by assuring that the overall popular vote winner (Obama leads 13.3 to 12.5 million) or the pledged delegate leader (Obama leads 1390 – 1248) actually obtains the nomination. To do otherwise, presumably, would disenfranchise the voters.

In contrast, the Clinton campaign, which argues to include the voice of the voters in Florida and Michigan, is downplaying Obama’s proportionality argument and is moving aggressively to secure commitments from the superdelegates. Currently Clinton leads Obama in the superdelegates 244-208.

Herein lies the second problem with fairness. Each side picks the fairness principle that serves their own self interest, even if that means shifting inconsistently between different conceptions of fairness. Indeed this is one reason to be wary of fairness arguments – they may not represent true beliefs as much as convenient justifications.

So what is the answer to the delegate dilemma? As I’ve argued there is no clear winner. However, a slightly stronger case can be made in favor of consistency (this is DNC chairman Howard Dean’s position). In other words, since the nomination game is already in progress, it seems best to follow through with the rules as they were originally conceived. That means do not count the delegates from Michigan and Florida (even with a re-vote) and allow the superdelegates to use their own judgments to decide who to support. If the losing side in this process screams “unfair!” then perhaps the winners can revert to that standard parental rebuttal: “well, too bad, life’s not fair!”

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Economic and Social Collapse

Originally published on 07/14/2008

If one were to pick out a country in the world right now where economic conditions cannot get any worse, that country would have to be Zimbabwe. Every time I see a story about the country, I am overwhelmed. I can’t say I have ever heard of a country failing as miserably as Zimbabwe is now. And still it’s sad that such a terrible calamity doesn’t get more press in the Western world. Here’s some of their stats:

Zimbabwe is a country of 13.3 million people. It’s GDP is currently estimated at $1.6 billion. That’s about $120 per person at current exchange rates. In the last 5 years their annual GDP growth rates were -10.4%, -3.8%, -6.5%, -4.6% and -2.8% respectively.

The unemployment rate in now around 80%. Yes, that’s right! … only one in 5 people are working. (In comparison, when the US economy reached the depth of its Great Depression in the 1930s, unemployment was around 25%) According to a BBC news story, Zimbabweans are fleeing the country looking for work elsewhere and most of the economy is surviving on remittances from abroad.

The inflation rate is hard to pin down. A quick look around the internet finds inflation estimates anywhere from 50,000% to 100,000% per year (This is NOT a typo!) It means that something that costs 100 zimbabwean dollars today may cost 275 Z$ tomorrow and 760 Z$ the next day.

The government budget deficit is actually respectable (in comparison) at 8.6% of GDP. However, its national debt is 220% of its annual income. It’s international debt stands at 300% of its GDP. (Data courtesy of the Economic Intelligence Unit)

Oh and to add insult to economic injury, Zimbabwean’s life expectancy at birth is 39.5 years and at least 25% of its population is infected with the HIV/AIDS virus. (data from the US CIA world factbook) Clearly things can’t get much worse than this for a country.

However, luckily Zimbabwe is a democracy and they plan to hold elections on March 29. But, will elections be free and fair? This question strains credulity.

Imagine yourself a citizen of Zimbabwe. Could you imagine anyone living in these conditions voting for the current leader, Robert Mugabe, who has been in power since 1987? Mugabe has presided over one of the worst economic collapses in recent times. Second, could you imagine a leader in a free and fair democracy believing he even has a chance to win reelection with these kinds of economic conditions? Wouldn’t a leader in such a democracy have resigned in shame and perhaps even fled the country long ago? But, not Robert Mugabe! He intends to stand for reelection and believes he has a chance to win! This time he has a serious and credible opponent in Finance Minister Simba Makoni so maybe Mugabe will be ousted.

One last thought, wouldn’t it be irrefutable evidence that elections were NOT free and fair on March 29 simply if Robert Mugabe actually wins?

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The Presidential Candidates on Trade

Originally published on 02/07/2008

There was an article in the WSJ yesterday by David Ranson about the presidential candidates’ stated positions on trade, both Democrat and Republican. It is worth a look. He concludes that McCain seems most consistently free trade oriented. However, one comment McCain made in a recent debate was a little troubling; namely pointing out that Romney’s work at Bain & Assoc. resulted in lost jobs. Jobs will always be lost when markets are free to adjust to changing demands …. and consumers demands are always changing. It would be great if politicians would stop using every job loss as a reason to criticize others or an excuse to do something about it.

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Clinton, Obama and Change

Originally published on 01/17/2008

From campaign financing by special interest groups, to rising government budget deficits, to the mishandling of the Katrina disaster and the war in Iraq, to the utter distrust for anything politicians say, I think it is more than clear to everyone that the American populace is increasingly fed up with the antics in Washington. So a call for change is extremely appealing.

So on the Democratic side, which candidate is the candidate for change, Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama? (or one of the others?)

Barack Obama is clearly a fresh new appealing face. He speaks eloquently and is inspiring larger and larger groups of supporters. Hillary Clinton in the past week has been arguing that ‘talking about change’ is different from ‘making change happen’

The point is valid. I have read parts of Obama’s book, “The Audacity of Hope,” and as an example, he writes knowledgeably and convincingly about the problems with campaign financing and what it takes to be elected. He seems to understand precisely what many of the problems are. And yet, we really must question whether knowledge of the problem is sufficient to change the problems for the better. Certainly it is a necessary first step, but is it enough?

On the other hand, I sensed one thing this week that probably won’t change if Hillary Clinton is elected; that is the so-called “politics of personal destruction.” During every President’s tenure, he is assailed by the opposition. Investigations, charges of misconduct, extreme distrust has become the norm in politics … to most everyone’s dismay. President Bush has been put through the ringer in many respects, but it hasn’t been nearly as bad for Bush as it had been for the Clintons.

We have heard that Hillary Clinton has very high negatives among the general population. Indeed, after listening to right-wing talk show radio it’s probably accurate to say that many people despise her and her husband. The Clintons, after having been attacked and investigated for so long during the 1990s, continue to harbor great hostility towards their critics.

The hostility to opposition surfaces occasionally as it did this week in the discussion about race and gender between Obama and Clinton. On Monday, Bill Clinton, who would probably become a kind-of co-president if Hillary Clinton is elected, indicated that there were 80 instances of personal attacks by Obama against his wife in the past six months. He also ridiculed stories about Obama’s stance on the Iraq war, calling them “fairy-tales.”

What seems obvious is that the Clintons can both still be riled pretty easily by attacks against them …. and it is no wonder given what they’ve been through. That annoyance and anger towards opponents surfaces in many of our politicians, but it seems vitriolic in the Clintons.

If Hillary Clinton is nominated as the Democratic candidate, I think there is little doubt that personal attacks by the Republican opposition will be harsher than those towards another candidate who pretty much shares the same views. If Clinton is elected President, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the personal attacks continue for four more years. Now maybe there is no more dirt to dig up on the Clintons … but I doubt it … where there’s a will there’s a way in politics.

The politics of personal destruction may not disappear, (read about the antics in SC) but it would sure be nice if it could be toned down a little. I doubt if there’s any hope for change on that front if Clinton is elected. With Obama, there a better chance for change if only because he has not been attacked as much … at least not yet!

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McCain and Romney In Michigan

Originally published on 01/15/2008

John McCain and Mitt Romney have both been campaigning in Michigan this week for today’s presidential primary. It is interesting to hear what they say about the economic situation in Michigan which has one of the highest unemployment rates in the country at 7.5%. The discussion highlights the enormous pressure politicians face to say what people want to hear.

John McCain: (Quoted from this source)

“Some of the jobs that left the state of Michigan are not coming back,” McCain said, before talking about his ideas for economic recovery around the country. His plan includes educational programs developed and run through community colleges to train displaced workers.

That inspired the following remark by a reader in MI [dead link]:

Thats what i want John – a chance to go back to college to be trained for another job you will either outsource or hand over to some illegal.

Whats with these guys telling me to go back to school at 55? Maybe they gave up on american ingenuity but i’m not.

Hey – i’m 55 – i’m not goin back to school!!!

Mitt Romney responds with what threatened workers would probably want to hear:

“Now, I know that there are some people who don’t think that there’s a future for the domestic automobile industry. They think that the industry and its jobs are gone forever. And they’re wrong.

“Innovation and change present the opportunity for transformation. And the burdens on American manufacturing are largely imposed by government, and new leadership in Washington can lift the burdens and lift the industry.
…..

“The pessimist says that the hundreds of thousands of jobs that have been lost, have been lost forever. That logic of course says that the 200 jobs that were lost last week at Willow Run, they’re lost forever too. And by the way, that logic would also say that all the rest of the jobs in the auto industry will one day be gone forever, and there’s nothing that can be done about it.

“Well, the pessimists are wrong. The auto industry and all its jobs do not have to be lost. And I am one man who will work to transform the industry and save those jobs.

Both candidates are Republicans who say they favor free trade and free markets as long as its fair. McCain’s remarks seem more realistic because they recognize the ever changing dynamics of a free market economy. At the same time, if one accepts that dynamism, one must also accept the uncertainty of not knowing what the new jobs will be in the future for MI. For the workers who have to live that uncertainty, worker retraining is not music to their ears. The 55 year old worker is right. He’d prefer to have the President promise to bring back the good jobs
that were once there, just like Romney promises.

So here’s a big problem with the system; if a candidate is honest about the realities of a free market and open competition, he risks losing the support of those who ask, What will you do for me?” On the other hand, if you cater to the individual interests of voters around the country, who have many different special and particular interests, you risk committing oneself to a much larger role for government.

Romney tries to protect himself from promising too much by saying, “I am not open to a bail out, but I am open to a work out.” But will this be enough to bring back the lost jobs and protect the jobs that might be lost in the near future. No one can know for sure.

What ultimately happens is that Presidents who support free markets and less government ultimately face enormous pressures for competitive protection and they usually relent. Even Ronald Reagan caved in to protectionism by offering higher tariffs on motorcycle imports and negotiating voluntary export restraints with Japan even though he was a stalwart free trader. Unfortunately, principle rarely wins out over the political pressure of special interests.

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Mike Huckabee on Trade

Originally published on 12/21/2007

I was browsing through the candidates websites today to learn what they have to say about trade. Today here’s a few quotes and comments about Mike Huckabee’s position on trade.

First he says the following:

I believe in free trade, but it has to be fair trade. We are losing jobs because of an unlevel, unfair trading arena that has to be fixed. Behind the statistics, there are real families and real lives and real pain. I’m running for President because I don’t want people who have worked loyally for a company for twenty or thirty years to walk in one morning and be handed a pink slip and be told, “I’m sorry, but everything you spent your life working for is no longer here.”

The last sentence suggests that to be handed a pink slip after 20 or 30 years because of foreign competition makes everything the worker has worked for, for naught. I suspect this is a popular sentiment among workers. However, the sentiment is based, I think, on a presumption that workers and companies have formed a kind of family relationship. For thirty years the worker has offered his efforts in return for a weekly paycheck and his own family’s sustenance. The worker has counted on the company as much as the company has counted on him. But then when the company decides to move a plant overseas or must close down, the workers feel abandoned. It’s almost as if the family has thrown them out onto to street to fend for themselves.

While it is true that any group of people who work together for a long period of time build family-like connections, I would respectfully suggest that, this is not the purpose of a business or company. The reason workers are hired is to help a company produce the goods or services that its customers are buying. If one recognizes this as the central purpose of an organization, then one will also see that the worker who worked for 30 years did not do so for nothing. Instead every week and every month each worker contributed in some way to deliver a product to customers who purchased, consumed and derived well being in the process. Every day of work had value and should be commended. Each day was also rewarded because the worker received a wage.

“Fair trade” policies, like Huckabee proposes, would prevent companies from restructuring in order to save domestic jobs. Such policies, however, would inhibit companies from best serving their customers and thus thwart the primary objective of the business. Although this would seem fair to the workers whose jobs are saved, it would also reduce US competitiveness and raise prices for consumers. In other words, to be fair to these workers we would have to be unfair to the consumers of these products.

US trade policies should work to enhance US competitiveness as its primary objective to best serve it broadest and least represented constituents, namely consumers. To focus on job security instead, purportedly in the name of fairness, can only be done by harming and thus being unfair to a much larger group.

Interestingly, Huckabee seems to understand this in the next paragraph when he says,

As the Industrial Revolution raised living standards by allowing ordinary people to buy mass-produced goods that previously only the rich could afford, so globalization gives all of us the equivalent of a big pay raise by letting us buy all kinds of things from clothing to computers to TVs much more inexpensively.

But if he understands the importance of serving the consumers’ interests – which is everyone’s interests – then why does he also seem willing to provide more job security to import competing firms, contrary to consumer interests? Could he be trying to curry favor with different groups with diverging interests simultaneously? Hmmm, but then that would make him a politician!!

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Level Playing Fields

Originally published on 10/30/2007

An issue often raised is that some countries, like China, may have more lenient environmental and labor regulations than other countries. That could mean lower overall costs which could give them an advantage in international competition. Here’s a couple of thoughts.

1) We could think of government regulations like actions by a coach to get its team prepared for competition. Some coaches may require two-a-day practices or may pay for a trainer to come in and teach special skills. While that may give the team a competitive advantage it’s also true that all teams are free to use these tactics or not.

2) Second, if in a sports competition we required that all teams have players of the same size, strength and speed. If we required that practice times be exactly equal. If we required that coaches had the same level of experience and had precisely the same resources for team development, then there probably wouldn’t be much competition since every team would be equal in all respects. The same applies to international business. If every country paid the same wage rates, had the same internal laws and regulations, had the same resource bases, then there would be no advantage to trade. Trade allows both countries to take advantage of “differences,” so if we demanded that all differences be eliminated first, then trade disappears.

3) Third, to evaluate competition completely, one must consider all the conditions a country’s firms face, both positive and negative. Thus, although China and other developing countries may have lower environmental and labor costs, they also have primitive legal systems, poor contract enforcement, inexperienced workers, lack of access to capital, higher chances of labor unrest, etc. In other words, businesses face tremendous hurdles in developing countries that firms in the West do not face to the same degree. Many firms in developing countries can reasonably complain about all the “advantages” that developed country firms enjoy. Indeed these advantages account for the higher levels of productivity in the West. This is the reason developing countries give for needing higher tariffs, i.e., they believe they can’t compete with the more productive firms in the rest of the world.

Differences among sports teams are also a reality and this contributes to making competition more interesting. Sports analysts will spend hours discussing whether team A’s speed and agility will win out over team B’s power and strength. Every team has strengths and weaknesses. The secret of success in sports is to promote your team’s strengths and exploit your opponent’s weaknesses. In other words, figure out a way to win despite the obvious differences that exist. I suggest we do much the same in international business; firms should figure out how to compete and win against foreign competitors despite the obvious differences and stop crying foul so often.

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Fundamentals of Fairness

Originally published on 10/09/2007

Skeptics of trade liberalization often argue that the current international trading system is unfair. It is said: workers in developing countries are paid abysmally low wages and must endure dangerous working conditions; profit seeking corporations seek out production locations with lenient environmental regulations contributing to global warming and unsustainable development; and firms produce products threatening consumer safety. The proposed solution is to promote fairness and global social justice. Surely this is something everyone can agree on, since who could possibly be in favor of unfair trade and global injustice.

The fact that there is no agreement means either that people have different conceptions of fairness or that they see fairness in different places. This post will begin an exploration of what people mean when they express concern about fairness in trade.

Let me begin with a simple proposition: Unfairness must involve perceived losses to someone caused by someone else. Stated a bit more emphatically: Unfairness means someone is getting “ripped off”.

Consider the low wages paid to workers in developing countries. Anyone who considers the low wages unfair, will almost surely argue the point by highlighting the much higher incomes earned further up the supply chain. Thus we’ll see comparisons of CEO salaries or sports celebrity promoters to the average production worker. The implication is that high wage management is ‘ripping off’ the low wage production workers. A more fair salary distribution would provide income to the production workers sufficient to provide for themselves and their families by reducing the astronomical salaries earned by top executives in the company.

Or try another example. Proponents of a fair tax code generally argue that special exceptions provide opportunities to evade taxes. However, to take advantage of these opportunities one needs to be wealthy enough to hire competent tax accountants and attorneys who are experts in the complexities of the tax code. Average and low income households rarely can take advantage of these exceptions. The implication here is that wealthy individuals and corporations pay less than their fair share of taxes while the lower income groups pay a disproportionately larger share. In other words the tax code allows wealthy individuals to rip-off poorer people. One commonly suggested solution is a flat tax, whereby every household will pay a fixed percentage of their income in taxes with no special exceptions allowed.

If the above proposition is true it does not necessarily follow that the reverse implication is also true. Indeed I will argue it is not true. Stated formally: Losses to one person caused by someone else are NOT necessarily unfair. In other words, a loss caused by another does not always mean someone is being ripped-off.

The example that demonstrates the exception is a competitive sporting event; say a soccer match. If Manchester United and Chelsea come together in competition, play 90 minutes, adhere to the rules of the game as judged by the officials, suffer the consequences of any penalties (also according to the rules of the game), it is quite likely that one team (CFC) will win and the other lose (MU). (although of course, sometimes the teams will tie!) In this instance the loss by one team is clearly caused by the other, and yet we would not argue that the loss was unfair. That is unless one is a “sore loser.”

Sore losers are those who look for excuses to explain their loss; they are prone to argue that the loss was due to poor officiating such as botched calls and favoritism. They may even look further and contend that differences in player salaries give one team an unfair advantage.

Numerous fairness issues arise from this simple sports analogy. In a later post I’ll explore the interesting parallels between sports competition and economic competition.

A Lesson on Comparative Advantage

Originally published on 10/03/2007

In the Ricardian model, countries are assumed to differ only in their productive capacities. It was in this model that David Ricardo first formally demonstrated the principle of comparative advantage. When defined in terms of productivity differences, comparative advantage is regularly confused with a simpler concept that economists call absolute advantage. It is worth taking a few moments to illustrate the differences.

If the US has higher productivity in corn production compared to Switzerland, while Switzerland has higher productivity in watch production compared to the US, economists would say the US has an absolute advantage in corn production and Switzerland has an absolute advantage in watch production. In this case it is intuitive that if the US concentrates on corn production and Switzerland on watch production, then resources could be shifted from relatively lower productivity industries to higher productivity industries and the total combined output of corn and watches would rise. With greater output, and after an appropriate trading pattern is introduced, both countries could end up with more of both goods than before, meaning that both countries can gain from trade. For most who have studied economics this is what they remember as comparative advantage. However, they are only partially right.

It is correct that this example of trade is consistent with comparative advantage; however, CA also covers cases that are less obviously advantageous for countries. For example, one might ask what happens if the US had higher productivity in both corn and watches compared to Switzerland? This is the question that Ricardo tackled when he formalized CA. His answer to the question also substantially expanded the number of situations in which technology differences could result in advantageous trade.

Ricardo’s simple analysis demonstrated that even when one country is technologically superior in both goods, it could still be advantageous for countries to trade. In this circumstance, a comparative advantage is present for those products that the country can produce most-best in comparison to other countries, even if the most best product is produced less productively than in the other country. For example, suppose the US is 10X more productive in corn and only 2X more productive in watches compared to Switzerland. In this case the US is clearly most-best at producing corn (10x > 2x). At the same time though, Switzerland is ½X as productive in watches and (1/10)X as productive in corn. Thus, Switzerland’s most-best product and hence its comparative advantage is watches (since ½ > 1/10) even though it can’t produce them as effectively as the US.

The reason both countries can benefit in this case is because productivity is not the only determinant of industry advantage; instead it is the combination of productivity and average wages. In countries with lower productivity in all industries, they will also have lower average wages. However, average wages for similar workers will lie somewhere in the middle of the range of the country’s industry productivities. In the example above, wage differences between the US and Switzerland in the absence of trade will fall in the range between 10X and 2X; perhaps wages will be 5X higher in the US in this example (which implies they are 1/5 as high in Switzerland). This means that for the relatively highest productivity industry in Switzerland (watches), productivity (1/2 as productive) will sufficiently exceed the average wage (1/5 as high) to make production in watches profitable in comparison to the US.

Observers of this situation may well note that Switzerland’s advantage is due to low wages since wages are only 1/5 as high as in the US. However, it is a mistake to think that low wages gives an advantage in all industries. That’s because, as Ricardo showed, in the low wage country’s least productive industry (in this case corn), Switzerland’s wage advantage (1/5 as high) will be overwhelmed by its productivity disadvantage (1/10 as productive). This means that corn production will be unprofitable in Switzerland despite having lower wages.

Looking at this same situation from the US perspective, the US is most-best at producing corn (10X as productive) but its wages are only 5X higher. That implies it will be profitable for the US to produce corn and sell it in Switzerland. At the same time though, the US productivity advantage in watches is only 2X higher, which is not enough to compensate for its 5X higher wages. That’s why the US will find cheaper watches in Switzerland.

The most important conclusion from the Ricardian model is that advantages from trade do not disappear just because another country has lower wages; nor do they disappear just because another country is more productive in everything. Ricardo demonstrated that by specializing in producing the products that one has a comparative advantage (which MAY NOT be ones in which the country has an absolute advantage) the world can expand total world output with the same quantity of resources. The expansion of output is the realization of increased economic efficiency that economists always talk about. Finally, given the expanded output, international trade can assure that all countries in the model gain from the surplus that’s created. In other words, without raising the quantity of resources, the world economy would be able to produce greater output and generate higher living standards for everyone. Economic efficiency will rise both internationally and nationally. This is how all nations can benefit from free trade.

It is important to note at this stage that the Ricardian model does not say that countries WILL gain from international trade; only that countries CAN benefit from increased output and trade if production is reorganized between countries appropriately while all resources are kept fully employed. The model is a gross simplification compared to the real world though, and thus it clearly does not incorporate everything that might happen with trade. Nevertheless the model does provide an insight that quite likely carries over to more complex situations. For example, the model results should cause observers of international trade situations to hesitate when fears grow that low wage countries may soon take over production of the world’s output, or when developing countries protect their markets because of fears that they cannot compete with the more developed countries in the world. These commonly expressed fears about international trade are shown, by virtue of the Ricardian model, to be based on a misperception.

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US Tariffs

Originally published on 09/14/2007

One thing I’ll do with this blog is to periodically provide information that I present to students in my classes. One thing we looked at this week was the US Tariff Schedule. The whole schedule is available from the US International Trade Commission’s website here. For teachers and students, a look through the US tariff schedule offers a quick illustration of several important features of international trade and methods of protection.

First, Chapter 91 covers tariffs on clocks and watches. The list begins with several pages of definitions. Note how precisely the products are defined. On page 10 the tariff schedule begins. The standard MFN tariff, applied automatically to all WTO member countries, is shown in column 1 (General). Note the complexity of the tariff on the watch identified in category 9101.11.40. A 51 cent specific tariff is levied on each imported watch, together with a 6.25% ad valorem tariff on the case and strap, and a 5.3% tariff on the battery.

Column 1 (Special) shows the tariff rate for countries the US has negotiated special arrangements such as Free Trade Areas (FTAs), as with Australia (AU), Chile (CL), Canada (CA) and Mexico (MX), and other special arrangements like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (D), among others. Note that for all of these the tariff is “Free” meaning 0%. However, for watches in category 9101.11.80, Chile currently has a tariff applied that’s in between the General rate and zero. This reflects the transitional part of an FTA. Most of them involve a gradual reduction in tariffs over a 10-15 year period.

Finally, notice that column 2 tariff rates are significantly higher. These are sometimes referred to as the non-MFN tariff rates. These rates could be applied to all non-WTO countries, however, for important countries with whom the US wants to encourage trade, like Russia and Ukraine, MFN tariffs rates have been approved by the US Congress. The only countries that receive column 2 rates are those we have no special agreement with – currently only Cuba and North Korea.

Chapter 7 shows the tariff schedule for certain agricultural goods. Some things worth noting here are; 1) agricultural tariffs are more likely to be specific tariffs rather than ad valorem, this because specific tariffs are more protective when commodity prices fall; 2) as seen with cabbages in category 0704.10.20, some products have different tariffs depending on the time of entry, this to protect US producers more during the domestic harvest season, and 3) the rise in the tariff between category 0704.10.40 (10%) and 0704.10.60 (14%) is an example of tariff escalation, this to protect US food processing industries.

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Economic Costs of Combating Climate Change

Originally published on 07/18/2007

The Washington Post had a report on Sunday about the economic costs of climate change. It highlights several important points worth emphasizing.

1) Controlling climate change will be costly. The costs will have to include higher energy prices for traditional carbon based fuels. Tax increases are being proposed to help finance research into alternatives and to reduce consumption. This will make it more expensive to drive your car, heat your home, and warm your water. It will also add to the cost of all goods that need to be transported to you, the consumer. Cost of living will rise for everyone. Of course, this will affect poorer households more than richer ones.

2) It is a fiction to believe that creating new technologies to combat climate change will be good because it will create new industries and new jobs. This belief is based on a misunderstanding of “opportunity cost.” All of the money spent, and jobs created to produce more fuel efficient cars, carbon-capture technologies, wind and geothermal electricity plants, etc., etc., is money that will not be spent on other things, like food, clothing, health care and entertainment. In order to do one thing – i.e., clean the environment – we must not do other things – i.e., provide other goods and services that people want.

3) Currently people do not value environmental cleanup as much as they value the other goods and services they demand and buy. If they did, there would be no need for government to intervene to change what people choose. Government tax and regulatory policies to combat climate change will force people to change to what the government, or environmental advocates, want them to choose.

4) Most Americans, and probably most in the world, do not really want to change much of what they do to combat climate change. If they did, they would welcome higher gasoline prices. Higher oil and gas prices are perhaps the most effective way to reduce consumption of carbon-based fuels. To reduce carbon emissions to the levels suggested in the Kyoto protocol, for example, would require substantial increases in oil and gas prices. But in the US, when gasoline prices rise to levels that are significantly below what prevails elsewhere in the world, Americans scream!!

If we were addicted to gasoline, but recognized that this addiction were harmful, then Americans might respond to higher gas prices grudgingly, but with quiet acceptance. It would be much like a cigarette smoker who wishes to quit and realizes that higher cigarette prices will help him achieve what he really wants. However, Americans don’t respond to higher gas prices this way, at least not most of them. This means Americans, and probably most around the world, will accept climate change policies only if they don’t have to change their behavior very much.

5) The main reason there is so little concern about climate change is because the problem is invisible. Or, if it does affect us in an important way, it won’t be until much later in our lives. It might not even happen till we are long gone. Imagine trying to convince cigarette smokers (in a hypothetical alternative) that although no one has yet died from smoking there is growing evidence that people will die from smoking in the distant future. Do you think many people would quit smoking NOW under these speculative circumstances? I doubt it given that even when people know the full consequences of smoking, many continue to smoke. This is the kind of hurdle faced by climate change advocates. This is also why you will hear that hot summer days and Hurricane Katrina are the results of global warming even though these events are perfectly consistent with a no global warming scenario.

6) Ideally, it would be great if global warming were shown to be false or greatly exaggerated. Personally, I think we should all be rooting for this outcome. We should continue to evaluate how likely it is for catastrophic global warming to arise. Since if global warming were indeed exaggerated, we could go back to using the cheapest most efficient sources of energy available and devote our time and energies to providing more food, clothing, housing, health care, and entertainment services, especially to the people in the world who have not had the good luck to enjoy many of these things. If we have to redirect our best and brightest resources to climate change though, then maybe these folks will have to wait a little longer. Perhaps till their next life!

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Dealing with a Chinese Tsunami

Originally published on 05/16/2007

Alan Blinder, in an interview with Marketplace, suggests the following to deal with increased competition from China and with globalization more generally:

First, I would say don’t succumb to the allure of protectionism. It doesn’t work, and it certainly won’t work for electronic trade. I mean, how can we stop electrons? Secondly, as I was saying before, we just have to do a better job with the social safety net, so that job displacement doesn’t hold the ravages that it now holds to the typical American. Thirdly, I think we have to think, in terms of those kids you were talking about, about what we need to do with our educational system so that we’re training kids for the jobs that will actually be available in the United States when they leave the school system. Not the jobs that will have migrated overseas. And then finally, I think we have to get used to the idea that if we want to stay the richest country in the world — which I presume we do — we can’t try to hang on to sunset industries. We have to specialize in sunrise industries.

Succumbing to protectionism [dead link] is a very real possibility today. The US Congress, reflecting popular impressions, is becoming increasingly wary of freer trade. Legislators hear the anxiety of workers facing international competition and feel they must do something. Of course, since the benefits of international competition are so widely dispersed among the entire population, these benefits are less obvious and do not result in equal political pressure to resist protectionist actions. When the economy is humming along and growing briskly, the pressures to protect, which are always there, are easier to deflect. But if the US and other countries were to enter into even a mild recession sometime soon, given the current political atmosphere, I suspect we are destined to follow much the same protectionist path as in the 1930s. Since the system remains much the same now as then, legislators would likely respond similarly, despite the knowledge we now have of protectionism’s ineffectiveness.

One change that has occurred since the 1930s can act to reduce protectionist pressures on legislators. That change is the presence of a safety net. Although Blinder suggests the current US system “ravages” the typical American worker, it is worth pointing out several things. First, the social safety net available in the US today, with 26 weeks of unemployment compensation, tremendous educational opportunities at numerous levels, the widespread availability of credit and the presence of welfare programs as a last resort, are all programs that simply did not exist in the 1930s. Then, people had to rely on family or the kindness of strangers even to feed themselves at times. Now, it’s not nearly as bad. True, the protections for US workers are not as generous as in Europe, but they are available nonetheless. The second point to make is that the US safety net system for displaced and unemployed workers is much more generous than in most developing countries. Ask yourself if you’d rather be unemployed in the US, or in China or India, … or Zimbabwe? I think the answer is obvious. And yet, global competition is going to create as much turmoil in developing countries as it will in the US, if not more. Although China is growing rapidly, in time they too will need to give up some industries that contributed to their early success. They will suffer job losses as well as gains. They also must deal with hundreds of millions of underemployed workers stuck in the countryside with very little to do. Transitioning to the global marketplace without fanning the flames of social rebellion is a tremendously delicate balancing act that the Chinese government has so far been very successful maintaining. Similar problems exist in many other developing and globalizing countries.

Blinder adds that we need to train UIS kids for the jobs that will be available in the future, not the ones that people have now. This begs the question, which jobs will those be? As I wrote in a previous post, predicting the future jobs is virtually impossible. There is an alternative to prediction though. It involves developing the ability and mindset of flexibility.

Embracing flexibility and learning how to adapt rapidly is a very important attribute to develop. It means recognizing that learning is a lifelong endeavor, that some career paths will be deadends and there is very little way to know which ones beforehand, and that experimentation at the level of the individual firm and the individual is the source of sustained growth. It means accepting that bad outcomes are often not “someone’s fault” and that the best response to a lost job, or a closed business, is to focus on retooling and new opportunities, rather than trying to preserve the old.

Indeed this is Blinder’s final point. We need to move our energies into sunrise industries and be willing to let go of sunset industries … admittedly, easier said than done! Especially because, although politicians will pay lip service to the dynamism of a competitive economy and all of its virtues, nothing buys votes more effectively than protection. This is why the US has begun to point the accusatory finger at China lately. These actions are meant primarily for US domestic consumption, to show voters that the US government will help protect them.

A little pressure on China, India or others will do little harm, but if the pressure rises, the US risks weakening itself economically even though its intention is to strengthen. If the US wishes to remain the most important force for positive economic change in the future, it would do so more effectively by accepting the “unfair” trade practices in the world and striving to overcome them with higher quality, lower cost products nonetheless. Sure, the Chinese and Indians have certain competitive advantages – lower wages, more lenient standards – but at the same time they have enormous disadvantages as well – archaic legal systems and stultifying bureaucracies. When people in the developing world look at the US, all they see are overwhelming advantages for workers and firms. Isn’t this why so many people seek to emigrate to the US?

I see the problem like a basketball game between US and Chinese players. The US has a competitive professional National Basketball Association league and the Chinese have one notable strength – Yao Ming. We could complain, of course, arguing that the Chinese height advantage is “unfair” – we could try to force them to put height restrictions into place to “level the playing field.” Of course, the Chinese would react to this request incredulously. They would look at the discipline of the US players, the college feeder system that helps young players develop, the extensive competitive experience embodied in the coaching and would wonder why the US insists on taking away their only advantage.

It is much the same way in the economy. If the US wishes to remain influential in the world economy, it is best to look at the competitive advantages of other countries merely as challenges that need to be overcome. Head-on competition is the way to face those challenges in a way that empowers and strengthens. Protection, or finger pointing, is a way to face the challenges in a way that slowly zaps the strength and vitality of the economic system. The choice is there to make.

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What will the New US Jobs be?

Originally published on 04/19/2007

In an interview with Marketplace last week, Alan Blinder talks about the enormous loss of jobs that will arise in coming years because of competition with China, India and the rest of the world. Some jobs will be lost because imported goods will arrive at lower prices; others will be lost as production activities are offshored.

At the same time as jobs are lost, millions more will be created. This is the way a dynamic free market system works. Continual competition causes a kind of churning in the labor market [dead link].

In the past, the US could count on low skilled jobs being lost and higher skilled jobs being created (in general). More recently though, even high skill jobs such as computer programmers have been offshored to India and elsewhere due to the advances in telecommunications. I recall a recent news story where programmers who had lost their jobs to Indian workers said they had gone to college to learn these skills because these were “supposed” to be the jobs of the future, only to discover it wasn’t so. Their question: what will the new jobs or occupations be?

Economists often say something vague, like we should produce the goods and services in which we have a comparative advantage. Although an accurate statement, it doesn’t tell a worker much.

Unfortunately, if we accept a free market system we also need to accept that there really is no way to provide a good answer to that question. You see, one of the main strengths of a free competitive economy is that decisions about what to produce and how to produce it are left to individual small-scale decision makers. By this I mean households and the managers of businesses. The advantage of this system is that the people who have the most information (for example, about how to produce and market, say, insurance policies) are the people who decide the types of workers to hire for their business. As businesses compete with each other, they will make continual adjustments to their workforce, sometimes firing and sometimes hiring workers. They will also decide what type of worker to hire or fire, based on the skills they deem important or not for production at the moment. These firms will engage in a substantial amount of experimentation, trying to decide the right mix of worker skills, to capital equipment and other inputs. The firms whose experiments succeed, will stay in business. The others will fail. These small scale decisions made everyday by millions of businesses will result in an aggregate number of programmer jobs and financial analyst jobs, etc. Although it may be possible to track the changes in job composition in the economy over time, it will be impossible to predict which firms will succeed and what skills they will demand in the future.

This truth is clearly unsettling. It would be nice to be given information about what will happen, what to expect, what one should do. There are many people willing to provide that info, but unfortunately they are merely guessing (sometimes using sophisticated methods). Alternatively we could predict future jobs needs more accurately if we simply planned the economy more. If the government stepped in and guaranteed jobs in certain sectors then we could solve this messy problem.

However, this is precisely what was done once before in centrally-planned economies. In that system, formerly used in the Soviet Union and China, production and consumption decisions were “controlled” from above. Jobs were guaranteed, regardless of the skills the worker had. Of course, we all know that system failed. It failed because they didn’t allow the small scale experimentation that is stimulated by competition. It failed in part because jobs were secure.

The sad truth about globalization is that all sorts of jobs are now threatened because of international competition. It is very difficult to know precisely what skills will be most in demand in any particular country in the future. Thus, the only, and best strategy is first to be aware of this difficulty, and second, to prepare to be flexible. Be ready to reinvest as necessary in new and complementary skills. Make education a lifelong endeavor. It is no longer sufficient to stop with a BA or MA degree and assume it will last a lifetime. This, I think, is the best attitude to carry into the future. Adopting this attitude won’t guarantee success, but it will surely make it more likely.

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Chinese Tsunami

Originally published on 04/13/2007

Alan Blinder, in a radio interview on NPR a few days ago, warned that competition from China and India would be like a tsunami on American shores. That competition threatens jobs, either because of a flood of imported goods, or from the backwash of jobs lost to offshore entities. The US response to a competitive tsunami, a tsunami I think is almost inevitable, will greatly influence future US standards of living and its position in the world. The US has two options.

First, the US can build a barrier to the tsunami. This means taking actions to protect what the US currently has. Protection might involve placing restrictions on US firms who move factories or jobs to overseas facilities. It might mean placing higher tariffs on goods from China until they revalue their currency to our liking, or enforce intellectual property rights for our products. It could mean refusing to lower subsidies and other supports to agricultural products. It could mean refusing to negotiate free trade areas or other liberalization initiatives until we get assurances that other countries will strengthen their environmental and labor standards. It could mean conceiving of lots of other “excuses” to justify temporary, or even permanent, protections for US industries and US jobs in those sectors.

These are all actions the US Congress has contemplated, or implemented, in recent months. Each action, regardless of the motivation, represents another brick or two in a wall that will protect the US from the competitive tsunami.

Building a wall has both positive and negative effects. The positive effects are obvious; thousands of workers in thousands of jobs will keep those jobs for a little while longer. For the typical US worker age 45, 50, 55 or older, the protection may get them to retirement. That’s a big plus, … for THEM. However, the negative effects are simultaneously more subtle, longer lasting, and will touch more people. First, each brick of the wall we put up, makes it more likely other countries will add bricks to their walls as well. As countries protect from each other, they slowly lose the ability to export abroad and to enjoy cheaper imported products for all its consumers. The wall also slows down the dynamism of the local economy. Adjustments to new industries and the creation of new products is no longer as important as before. Thus, over the long term total output will not grow as rapidly. These effects hurt people much later, never right then when the wall is built. This is one reason why building a wall is often so popular.

But there’s an alternative approach that’s both harder and healthier. The alternative is to let the tsunami roll in. Of course, to do this effectively requires some adjustments to mitigate the destructive effects. But we can never eliminate the destruction entirely … that’s why accepting the tsunami is hard. However, if we let the destruction occur then just like a real tsunami on a virgin shore, the rebirth of life will proceed rapidly. The vegetation will return, perhaps hardier than before, and the whole ecosystem can change in light of new conditions.

So it can go for an economy. As the tsunami rolls in and jobs are lost, it opens up a whole new world of opportunities and possibilities. If a nation can arise from that destruction without its spirit being broken, then it can channel its energies into completely new creations. Brand new products, services and sectors can arise out of no where. And with these new industries come renewed vitality for the economy overall.

To make accepting the tsunami possible though, we need more people to recognize the kind of trade off we face. Short term salvation is possible by building a wall but we give up longer term vitality and opportunities by doing so. If we want to create as many opportunities as possible for the next generation then we need to suffer the short term destructive costs of the tsunami.

Where will the US go? I’m afraid the current trend is to build a wall. The chances it will build a high one are larger if the economy suffers a small recession sometime soon. If the US continues to grow reasonably well though, then it’s more likely the it will put up only a partial wall. However, because of politics, I don’t see much chance the US will choose to accept the tsunami. To me, the more resistant the US becomes to this change, the weaker it will be in the future, both economically and otherwise.

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Blinder on Trade

Originally published on 04/12/2007

Marketplace did a story about offshoring yesterday with Alan Blinder of Princeton. Here’s the introduction:

KAI RYSSDAL: Citigroup confirmed today it’s getting rid of 17,000 jobs. That’s about 5 percent of the workforce at the world’s biggest financial services company. Another 9,500 jobs are moving to quote “lower-cost locations” worldwide. Word on the street is a good number of them will land in India. Which puts today’s news smack in the middle of two major trends that are forcing economists to rethink some of their assumptions about free trade.

ALAN BLINDER: Electronics and India.

That’s Alan Blinder. He’s an economist at Princeton University. For years, he was an avid free-trader. Still is, actually. But, he says, announcements like Citigroup’s highlight the costs that come with the benefits of globalization.

The story begins by claiming economists are rethinking their assumptions about free trade. Apparently that’s because some, like Alan Blinder, are admitting that there are real costs to free trade and globalization. Apparently journalists LOVE to claim economists have had it all wrong and need to reevaluate. Of course, this isn’t so. Blinder is merely stating what trade theory has demonstrated from time immemorial.

The real problem has been one of communication. Advocates of free trade have tended to oversell the benefits by saying that all countries will gain. In an overall, or national sense, that may well be true, but that same statement does not imply that every individual person will enjoy a share of those benefits. Economists have known this for a long time, but for political reasons (i.e., to make the strongest case possible for free trade), they have exaggerated the benefits from trade while only quietly mentioning the costs. Finally, regular people are starting to hear from economists that there are costs!

In another radio interview with Blinder yesterday (together with Jagdish Bhagwati), I heard him warn of a tsunami coming in the form of competition from China and India. I think he is absolutely correct.

This story raises a series of issues that I’ll comment on over the next few days or weeks. Here are the topics:

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Comparative Advantage with Factor Mobility

Originally published on 04/05/2007

Q. I recently read an editorial from the New York Times [dead link] that was written in 2004 by Charles Schumer (senior senator from New York ) and Paul Craig Roberts (assistant secretary of the Treasury for economic policy in the Reagan administration). In it they argued that the case for free trade which is founded on the principle of comparative advantage is no longer valid since one of the assumptions made by Ricardo, that factors of production are immobile, is no longer valid. Does the fact that factors of productions are now easily mobile across national borders really ruin the whole logic of comparative advantage?

A. This article inspired quite a few quick responses. (1), (2) [dead link] Rather than covering the same ground, I’ll make just a few points. First of all, it is common for people to question the validity of a model or theory’s assumptions. Because models are simplifications of the world, the assumptions made are ALWAYS unrealistic in many ways. However, these unrealistic assumptions are made NOT because the model makers believe them to be true, but rather because it is the only way to make the mathematical or graphical model easy enough to work with. Introduce too many real world assumptions and a model becomes unintelligible due to complexity.

A common argument made by critics of economic theories is to say something like Schumer and Roberts did. Namely, the theory of comparative advantage assumes that factors don’t move across countries, but because that assumption is not true, the result of the model, that countries both benefit from trade, is therefore false. This is a logical fallacy. We cannot conclude that if one assumption is invalid the conclusion is false. We can, however, logically conclude that the result is uncertain, but not that the result is false. This is an important difference.

Indeed this highlights the way knowledge is developed using economic models. Many advances in economic theory have arisen because someone questions the validity of a model’s assumptions. But the way an economist develops such a criticism is to change the offending assumption to something more realistic and see if, in the context of the same type model, the results change. In this way we can understand whether and how the results are dependent on that one assumption.

Schumer and Roberts simply proclaim the results must be different but don’t actually show or explain why. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinavasan however, develop the more appropriate response by incorporating factor mobility into a Ricardian model to show that it doesn’t change the result that free trade is better for both countries. (see page 10 in this paper).

Understanding international trade theory requires one to understand the limitations of each model and to recognize how the results are affected as assumptions are changed. Sometimes the assumptions are critically important, many times they can be shown to be immaterial. For example, one Ricardian model result is that EVERYONE benefits from trade. But this result is dependent on the assumption of one factor of production. Change the assumption to include both capital and labor and this result changes. Thus, economists don’t believe (at least they shouldn’t) that free trade benefits all people even though the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage says so. On the other hand it has been virtually impossible to reverse the Ricardian insight that if all countries shift production to their comparative advantage goods, overall economic efficiency must increase.

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How the WTO works (Q&A)

Originally published on 03/22/2007

Q. On the issue of harmonious trading, the WTO has been tasked as the guardian of free trade and to promote and settle trade disputes in a fair manner. Yet there are many who oppose the WTO for being too powerful and it can compel sovereign states to change laws and regulations by declaring these to be in violation of free trade rules, it is run by the rich for the rich and does not give significant weight to the problems of developing countries among other complaints. What are your views on the WTO and how could it do better?

A. I suspect most who oppose the WTO don’t quite understand the way it works. The WTO is not an organization that can “compel sovereign states to change laws and regulations by declaring these to be in violation of free trade rules.” The free trade rules referred to here are really promises, or commitments, that countries have made to each other. After making these promises, last made at the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994, officials went home and had the commitments approved by their legislatures. Every democratic country had the privilege of saying no to these commitments – but no one did. Instead every country said we’ll promise to liberalize trade by this much, if you promise to liberalize by that much, or, we’ll open our markets a little to your products if you open your markets a little to our products.

What the WTO really is then is a place to complain about and investigate broken promises. If one country believes that another has broken a commitment, it can raise the issue at the WTO’s dispute settlement board (DSB). The DSB meets regularly and has one representative appointed by each WTO member country. The only kind of issue that can be dealt with here is one related to the WTO agreement.

Consider the 2nd dispute case brought to the DSB. Venezuela complained that US regulations to promote cleaner air violated the US national treatment promise because imported gasoline from Venezuela was required to be cleaner than domestic gasoline produced in the US. Any complaint sets in motion a well-defined legalistic procedure to settle the dispute. The first step is called consultations because countries are required to sit down with each other and try to work out the problem on their own. If that fails, and it did in this case, the DSB creates a panel of three to five people – drawn from a list of international legal experts – to assess whether the country violated its commitment. In this case, the panel determined that the US had violated its national treatment commitment. The next step allows the losing country to appeal the decision to another panel. The US did and lost again. Next, the DSB, which really means the group of WTO member countries look to the offender to change its laws so as to live up to its previous promise.

So when people say the WTO “compels a country to change its laws,” what it really means is that a country is “asked to change its laws to that which was previously promised.” That’s a little different. In the case of Venezuela and the US, the US did change its environmental regulations to comply with the ruling.

What if a country refuses to change its laws? That has happened occasionally. The first effect is that a country looks bad in front of the international community. It’s kind of like catching someone in a lie and the person refuses to come clean. Not good! Imagine if the US had done that with the 2nd DSB case. That would have looked especially bad given the US was one of the primary advocates of the WTO.

But if a country does refuse to change, the second recourse is for the other country to suspend its previous concessions. In other words, a country is allowed to rescind some of its promises of market access to the offending country. This is like saying, if you’ve only lived up to 95% of your promises to us, then we’ll only live up to 95% of our promises to you. This is the only “punishment” the WTO can sanction. But it’s really a quid pro quo.

The other part of the above question suggests the WTO agreement does not give “significant weight to the problems of developing countries.” This may well be true especially given that the current Doha round of trade liberalizing talks was designated to be a “development round.” That designation was made largely because the majority of WTO members are developing countries and they have felt that insufficient special treatment was given to the issue of development. However, in many instances developing countries have been given differential treatment. One example I’ll mention is that developing countries have not been expected to lower their trade barriers to the same degree as developed countries. See the info on Tariff Bindings [dead link].

Much more can be said on this issue, but it will have to wait. Suffice it to say, overall I think the WTO is a pretty fair system. One way to fix it is to teach more people why it is an effective institution, even the way it is. I also think the WTO agreement does not take advantage of developing countries as much as is often claimed. However, the evidence here is surely mixed. Also, as with anything, improvements are always possible.

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Fair Trade Analogy

Originally published on 03/20/2007

Q2. There are some nations who feel that free trade is not fair trade. What are your views on this?

A2. I think free trade is more fair than any proposed alternative. The problem is that free trade means more international competition for most firms which in turn will result in successes for some businesses and failures for others. Those that fail will lead to hardships for the workers, management, and investors in those industries. For those who suffer losses, a natural human response is to identify all the relative advantages the winners have and argue that it’s unfair. For example, workers who lose jobs to trade point to the greedy management who moved the factory abroad (unfair!) or the foreign workers with low wages (unfair!) or the lax labor and environmental policies abroad (unfair!) etc., etc.

I think competitive sporting events provide a good analogy. Consider basketball. When two teams come together and compete, one always wins, the other loses. That’s the nature of competition. But remember the teams are not the only participants; there are the fans too. And if there weren’t a winner and loser, the fans would never come and watch the game. Every losing team could easily find examples of unfairness if it wanted. The other team’s center was much taller, or they didn’t have an injured player, or the referees clearly favored them, etc., all of which is unfair(!). But think about it. Would we really want the teams to be equalized in every respect? Sure, we do expect the environment to be the same; the baskets the same height, one team can’t be forced to wear ice skates, etc.; but we expect there will be many other variations between the teams too.

Furthermore, the possibility of losing, or even persistent losing will lead to attempts to improve the team. Some players will be traded for others. The coach may be fired. The team may practice more frequently. These incentives mean the teams (even the winners) continually try to improve their performance. Without the chance of losing, teams would never progress or change very much. And since both teams keep innovating the fan continue to come to the game because you still never know who’s gonna win.

So it goes in international business. Firms that compete will continually seek ways to improve their product by reducing cost and raising quality. If they don’t do this effectively, they’ll lose. But just like in sports, that’s OK. Workers and management need to use the threat of losing to help strive for excellence. By stimulating competition, free trade serves the consumer (i.e., the sports fan) best. In this sense it is a fair system, despite the ups and downs.

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Trade Blocs

Originally published on 03/20/2007

I received an email with a series of questions about trade. I will answer some of them in a series of posts. Here’s the first.

Q. Could you explain what are the benefits of trade blocs? On the other hand, since trade blocs give preferential treatment to its member countries, does this inherently violate the principles of free trading or is this disguised protectionism?

A. Trade blocs and unions provide the same economic efficiency benefits as any movement to freer trade. The main distinction is that blocs are typically bilateral or regional and thus exclude all countries outside the bloc. As such, blocs are discriminatory since they give favorable treatment (i.e., zero tariffs) to some countries but not to others. In principle, blocs violate the MFN rule at the WTO which states that all WTO member countries should receive the very best (or most favorable) trade policy that any country offers. However, Article 24 of the original GATT agreement allowed for an exception in the case of free trade areas since these represented a movement in a trade liberalizing direction.

Nonetheless, because of the discrimination, blocs provide benefits to some industries while excluding or harming others. For example, one advantage of many export industries in Chile, Singapore, Australia, Costa Rica, and in other countries who have signed free trade agreements with the US, is that their products can enter the US market without paying tariffs (at least within a few years), whereas exporters from China, Vietnam, Pakistan and others outside these blocs must continue to pay the tariffs to sell products in the US. This gives firms in US trade partner countries a definite cost advantage and helps them to compete against the Chinese and others. This is an important reason why many countries are eager to join blocs especially with the US and the EU.

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Keeping International Contests Legal

Originally published on 03/15/2007

March Madness started today in the US as 65 college basketball teams vie for the National Championship in a single elimination tournament. Many Americans participate in office pools to see who can guess the most winners in the 63 games that will be played during the next few weeks. I put an entry in the Facebook pool for a chance to win $25,000 (a very small minuscule chance!!) When I looked today to see what the 1st prize was, I found an unusual requirement in the rules. It says,

Canadian participants must also correctly answer a mathematical skill-testing question, without human or mechanical assistance and within a specified time limit, before being declared a prizewinner.

A little investigation led me to this Wiki Page. It explains that “the Canadian Criminal Code bans for-profit gaming or betting,” but “the law does allow prizes to be given for games of skill, or mixed games of skill and chance. In order to make the chance-based contests legal, such games generally have mathematical skill-testing questions incorporated.”

The Canadian government is smart enough to realize, though, that groups may attempt to circumvent the skill test by asking ridiculously simple “skill” questions like, “What is 1 + 1?” A Canadian court ruling assures the skill test will not become a joke by requiring that any skill question “contain at least three operations to actually be skill testing; for example, a common question might be “(2 × 4) + (10 × 3)” (Answer: 38).” Interestingly, “getting the answer wrong is also often not an obstacle to claiming a prize.”

The Facebook rule is in place to keep the contest legal in Canada. Clearly Canadians are better protected from the dangers of contests than we are in the US!

Know any other bizarre government regulations and the creative ways they are circumvented? Post them here.

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Now That’s Protection!

Originally published on 03/09/2007

This week the US formally raised objections at the WTO to the high levels of protection offered to Indian wine and spirits manufacturers. This follows a similar complaint lodged by the EU last November.

“India’s basic import duties on wine and spirits — at 100 percent and 150
percent, respectively — are within WTO limits, but federal surcharges and state-
level taxes take the tariff protection much higher in some cases. A
European Commission report issued last year found that a combination of duties
and taxes in some states was as high as 550 percent on imported spirits and 264
percent on wines.” [Source]

The news reports are not very good at explaining the real nature of the dispute. The dispute is clearly not about the high import duties that are in place. [These are “within WTO limits”] The 100% and 150% rates are at or below the levels India has bound them in the WTO agreement. Instead the dispute appears to be about discriminatory taxes implemented by different states within India. WTO countries agree to apply national treatment, which means that imported goods, after clearing customs and paying dutes, will not be taxed differently than domestic goods. India is being charged with discrimination – because states are treating foreign goods differently than domestic goods – not with setting high tariffs.

The tone of the WTO articles often make it sound as if a country (India in this case) is violating “WTO rules.” A more accurate way to say this is that a country is violating a promise, or commitment, it made to the others in the WTO. Since all countries do not make the same promises, it is misleading to say they are violating WTO rules. To me, saying “WTO rules” makes it sound as if the source of the rule is the WTO, when in fact the source of the “promise” is the country itself.

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How to Build a Better Mousetrap

Originally published on 02/25/2007

It is generally accepted that competition encourages innovation. Many assume that innovation comes with expenditures on R&D. This makes sense – if a company directs some of its people to think up new ideas, it is more likely new ideas will arise. However, I have always suspected that many innovations come about in unexpected and unusual ways, often not with directed effort. Here’s a true story of one such innovation that literally(!) involves a better mousetrap.

I woke up early yesterday morning and as I walked into my kitchen I heard a strange clicking noise. Tentatively, I approached the stove, the source of the noise. At first, I thought the noise was from the range fan and vent since it was very windy outside, but that wasn’t it. I turned on the stove light, since dawn’s light was still dim. I looked down to find something remarkable.

It is important to know that I have an electric stove with a perfectly flat surface: the heating elements are built into the surface. I also have a pot with a clear glass top. Well, when I looked down I discovered the top of the pot laying flat on the stove surface …. with a vole, or field mouse, trapped inside!!! I couldn’t believe it! He kept moving around trying to escape but he could only lift the lid enough to rattle it. How did he get under there? I’ll tell you in a minute.

First, what does one do with a live, scared and frustrated mouse stuck under a pot top on your stove? Lift the lid and I know he’s gonna scurry away. Brave as I am, I don’t wanna try to catch a scared rapidly-moving mouse. The solution seemed pretty simple. I quickly searched for a thin piece of cardboard and found a small box. I flattened the box and slid it under the lid. My mouse wasn’t too happy, but had no choice but to hop aboard as the new floor slid beneath his feet. Then I picked up the mouse in my pot top and released him in the field outside. A successful and humane mousetrap was created!

But how did he get under there? It’s simple my dear Watson!

I regularly boil water in that pot for tea. Afterwards the pot top is wet from the steam. Sometimes after boiling water, I would leave the top flat on the stove but the condensation would never disappear even after a long time. Thus, I began to tilt the top and lean one edge on the countertop next to the stove. Since the lid was propped up a little the water quickly evaporated.

This also afforded easy access for my mouse. Clearly, as he squeezed under the lid, he pushed the edge away from the counter and trapped himself. To my knowledge I have never had a mouse in my kitchen before. If I knew I had a mouse in my house, I know I would never have thought up this mousetrap idea. Instead I would probably have reverted to the old-fashioned (and deadly) mousetraps we used when I was a kid. Luckily though, I quite unexpectedly discovered a better mousetrap.

And I will use this device again since I think I heard another mouse (or the same one returned) yesterday afternoon. So last night I set up my new mousetrap. On the floor of my kitchen I propped the pot top lid up on a breadboard and put some peanuts and cracker pieces on the floor at the far end of the lid. If a mouse tries to eat the snacks, he will push the lid off the board and trap himself harmlessly.

I didn’t catch another mouse last night but I will let you know if my new mousetrap works again. In the meantime, if you know any stories of interesting and unexpected discoveries or innovations, please post them here. I’d like to create a collection. Thanks.

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WTO Tariff Bindings

Originally published on 02/25/2007

By reading the popular press one might form the impression that the WTO has one set of trade rules for all countries. The truth is there is no common set of WTO trade rules. Instead each country has made a set of promises, or commitments, to reduce trade barriers from its earlier levels. In the area of tariffs on commodities, each country has committed itself to a maximum tariff rate – called a tariff binding – for each product category. The level of each country’s commitment varies, typically by level of development. For example, the bound tariff rates for developed countries are generally much lower than bound rates by developing countries. In addition many developing countries have many product categories on which there is no bound rate, or maximum tariff. For these products a developing country is free to set any rate it wishes.

In this Table, we can see some of the patterns. For example just 67% of the Philippines goods have a tariff binding. The average bound tariff rate is 21.3%. Notice also that their average applied rate is just 9.1% meaning that they choose to set many of their tariffs below the bound levels and thus are more liberalized than promised. On the other hand, they are also free to raise tariffs considerably without violating their WTO promises putting traders of these products at some risk.

Notice that Sri Lanka has bindings on only about 10% of product lines and the average tariff in these goods is 17.9%. Their average overall tariff is higher at 19.8% because so many products are unbound.

In contrast, developed countries have almost 100% of their tariff lines bound and applied rates are typically set at the bound level. Because developed countries also have much lower applied rates on average, this has become the basis for calls that developing countries should commit to liberalize trade much further to reciprocate for lower agricultural subsidies by the developed countries.

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More on Economic Churning

Originally published 2/23/2007

Another way to see the turnover, or churning, that takes place in an economy is to consider business startups and closures. In the US in 2005 there were about 672,000 new businesses (with employees) created while about 545,000 businesses shut their doors. The total number of businesses in the US with employees are about 5.8 million. (only 17,000 businesses have more than 500 employees) Thus, about 10% of the business stock is refreshed each year with a small net gain each year being the norm. (See this SBA FAQ [dead link]).

In the UK, the churning is similar. In 2005 there were 178,000 new businesses and 153,000 closures. This is also about a 10% turnover each year. (See this SBS report)

I would be curious to know what these numbers, and the employment churning looks like in other countries, especially in France and some of the Scandanavian countries. If anyone knows these please post.

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Economic Turbulence

Originally published 2/23/2007

Freer trade and globalization will surely mean firms will face more competition. Some of these firms will lose out in competition to others and be forced to layoff workers or close their doors. On the business pages of newspapers it is common to see reports of this or that company laying off 50 or 500 or 5000 workers. (CLICK HERE to see the latest news stories on layoffs. ) The more these layoffs are associated with companies facing import competition, the more likely support for free trade will wane.

However, it is very important to put layoffs in perspective. For every news story reporting layoffs, it is unlikely there’s another one next to it reporting job hires. (In fact when you search for “job hire” stories you see stories about individual hires).

Every month the Labor Department reports the aggregate employment changes by industry. In this report we learn that in January 2007 employment fell in many industries: motor vehicles and parts lost 23,000 jobs, furniture and textile mills both lost 4,000 jobs and computer and peripheral equipment lost 6,000 jobs. However, in the same one month period health care employment rose by 18,000 jobs, professional and business services was up 25,000 jobs, while food services employment rose by 21,000 jobs. The net effect for the month was a gain of 111,000 jobs. This follows a net increase in December 2006 of 206,000 jobs. The total number of payroll jobs in the US economy is 137.3 million.

The point here is that the layoff stories are dwarfed by the typical churning of job gains and losses in the entire economy. Even these statistics don’t report all of the churning taking place within an industry. Every industry loses many workers each month and immediately replaces them with new hires. These numbers only report the net effect in each industry.

 

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A Simple Argument for Free Trade

Originally published 2/22/2007

The logic of free trade is little more than the extension of logic of the division of labor to an international level. Adam Smith discussed the productivity improvements that can arise by dividing labor into distinct tasks when he wrote about the pin factory. This example may not resonate very well with people today, since most know very little about manufacturing pins. The same idea can be expressed in a slightly different way though.

Suppose tomorrow the US implements a ban on all imported goods and services. Let’s ignore the immediate transition effect of empty shelves and lost jobs for those people dealing with imports and ask a more basic question. Can the US produce on its own all of the goods and services it currently imports? The answer to this is probably (or mostly) yes. The US is a very large country filled with people of all sorts of different skills and expertises. It has considerable untapped resources of oil, gas, minerals. It has a variety of climates stretched across the continent. With time, and if we put our mind to it, the US could surely produce almost everthing we currently import.

Now suppose tomorrow your state implements a ban on imports from every other state (and country). Ask the same question: can your state produce everything the country can produce? Maybe yes if you are from California or Texas, but probably no if you live in Washington DC or Rhode Island.

Now suppose your city or town implements a ban on all imports coming from outside. Can your city produce everything your state could? What about food? How much city land will need to be converted to raise crops and chickens and pigs? How much land is there for that?

Finally suppose tomorrow you implement a self-imposed ban on all “imports” that were not produced by yourself. Simply look around you and ask how many of the things you see you could produce yourself. For me the answer is virtually nothing. I can’t produce anything effectively except information about international economics, and that’s not gonna feed and clothe me in this new world.

The example shows that as we imagine going backwards towards greater and greater self-sufficiency, our abilities to produce the same collection of goods and services that we enjoy on a typical day disappears completely. If I did have to rely on producing everything myself, I would have to move to the country, learn to fish and farm, build a makeshift shelter, who knows what else. I know I would not enjoy anywhere near the standard of living I currently enjoy.

Now let’s run the story in reverse. As I open up to potential trade with more and more people, with my community first, then my region, then my country, and finally the world, my ability to focus my expertise on just one tiny body of knowledge (like international economics) expands. As my specialization becomes finer, so does everyone else’s. The result is a increasing quantity of goods and services produced with the same collection of resources (labor, capital, and land). It also means that virtually everyone can enjoy a much higher standard of living than they would if they were required to engage in subsistence agriculture.

That standard of living improvements arise from the division of labor is NOT simply a quaint theory. It’s obvious that it works in reality too. This is the basic reason why living standards are so much higher now than they were 300 years ago. The theory of comparative advantage is also based on this simple idea. Supporting free trade simply means pushing the principle of the division of labor to its logical extreme.

There are a few notable implications:

1) The story implies that smaller countries (like Jamaica, or Kenya) have more to gain from open trade than larger countries (the US and EU). Large countries can be self-sufficient and produce everything for themselves, however even they will suffer a drop in living standards because resources will not be divided as finely as possible. Small countries are more like the individual trying to be self-sufficient – it is possible, but not without a substantial reduction in living standards.

2) If you are concerned about the the sustainability of the economic system, or about the degredation of the environment, you should support policies that allow us to achieve the highest standard of living with the limited resources we have. Free and open trade helps to achieve that. Restrictions to trade will mean the same standard of living requires more resources, which in today’s energy-driven economy means more oil and gas and coal.

Economic Planning in India: Did We Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater?

February 2022

Ajay Chhibber (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2022-03

Abstract: India has a long and a somewhat checkered history of planning – with some success but also many failures. Despite India’s federal structure India’s approach to planning has been top-down with the union government controlling many levers – financial and otherwise to determine the direction of the economy and social programs. India has tried 3 different types of planning – “directed planning”, “indicative planning” and now just a “strategy but no planning”. India needed to replace the Planning Commission but not give up on planning altogether. Just as the rest of the world was going back to a “new planning” surge to handle climate change and the desire to meet the SDG’s India abolished planning altogether. The successor to the planning commission – the Niti Aayog needs to get back to “new planning”, that is now being adopted by many countries with stronger leadership, a legitimized authorizing environment and effective use to plan for helping India achieve the SDGs by 2030 and become a prosperous country by 2047.

JEL Codes: O1, O2

Key Words: Economic Planning, Niti Aayog, Planning Commission, SDG’s

Looking for Balanced Growth in China: Insights from the latest IMF Staff report

Friday, March 4th, 2022
9:30 – 11:00 a.m. ET
via Zoom

The Institute for International Economic Policy was pleased to invite you to the fourth event in the 14th annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations. This year, the conference will take place as a virtual series. This conference is co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the GW Center for International Business Education and Research (GW-CIBER).

China’s recovery is well advanced—but it lacks balance and momentum has slowed, reflecting the rapid withdrawal of fiscal support, lagging consumption amid recurrent COVID-19 outbreaks despite a successful vaccination campaign, and slowing real estate investment following policy efforts to reduce leverage in the property sector. Regulatory measures targeting the technology sector, intended to enhance competition, consumer privacy, and data governance, have increased policy uncertainty. China’s climate strategy has begun to take shape with the release of detailed action plans. Productivity growth is declining as decoupling pressures are increasing, while a stalling of key structural reforms and rebalancing are delaying the transition to “high-quality”—balanced, inclusive and green—growth.

China rebounded strongly from the pandemic, but growth is losing momentum while remaining overly dependent on support from investment and exports. This imperils the nation’s long-sought transition to sustained high-quality growth that’s balanced, inclusive and green.

While China’s many challenges have no easy answer, the key message of the IMF’s annual Article IV review of the economy is that rebalancing toward a more consumption-based model will boost growth prospects in the short term and deliver high-quality expansion in the long run. Importantly, it will also help bring the country closer to achieving its climate goal of carbon neutrality before 2060.

About the Speakers:

Picture of Helge BergerHelge Berger is an Assistant Director in the IMF’s Asia and Pacific Department. He is also an adjunct professor of monetary economics at Free University of Berlin. He was educated in Munich, Germany, where he received his Ph.D. and the venia legendi for economics. Previously, he taught at Princeton University as a John Foster Dulles Visiting Lecturer, helped to coordinate the Munich-based CESifo network as its research director, and served as full professor (tenured) at Free University Berlin. At the IMF, he has worked in the Research and European Departments.

 

Picture of Wenjie ChenWenjie Chen is a senior economist on the IMF’s China team. Prior to that, she worked in the Research Department, where she was part of the World Economic Outlook team. She has also worked in the African Department on South Africa and South Sudan. Before joining the IMF, Wenjie worked as a professor at George Washington University School of Business and Elliott School of International Affairs. She received her MA and PhD in Economics from the University of Michigan.

 

About the Discussant:

Picture of Chao WeiChao Wei is an associate professor of economics at the George Washington University who previously taught at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She was the 2010-2011 Economic Policy Fellow at the Congressional Budget Office. Her primary research areas are: Macroeconomics, Labor Economics, Financial Economics, China Economy, and Energy and Environmental Economics. She has published papers, including at the top journal of the economics field, on the impact of energy price shocks on the stock market, the effect of personal and corporate income taxes on asset returns, and the endogenous determination of gasoline use and vehicle fuel efficiency. Her recent research focuses on the relationship between family structure and parental human capital investment, marital and labor supply behaviors of older adults, and the trade-off between stimulus and environmental objectives in the green stimulus programs. She holds degrees from Fudan University (BA), Columbia University (M.A.) and Stanford University (Ph.D.).

About the Moderator:

Picture of Jay ShambaughJay Shambaugh is Professor of Economics and International Affairs, and Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. His area of research is macroeconomics and international economics. He has had two stints in public service. He served as a Member of the White House Council of Economic Advisors from 2015-2017. Earlier, he served on the staff of the CEA as a Senior Economist for International Economics and then as the Chief Economist. He also spent 3 years as the Director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. Jay is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER and Non-Resident Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. Prior to joining the faculty at George Washington, Jay taught at Georgetown and Dartmouth and was a visiting scholar at the IMF. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. from the Fletcher School at Tufts, and a B.A. from Yale University.

Trade Shocks and Supply Chains: What is Happening to the WTO and Globalization?

Tuesday, February 22nd, 2022
12:30 – 1:30 p.m. EST/6:30 – 7:30 p.m. CET
via Zoom

We were pleased to invite you to join the Insitute for International Economic Policy for a webinar featuring the Chief Economist of the WTO Bob Koopman discussing “Trade Shocks and Supply Chains: What is Happening to the WTO and Globalization?” Prof. Michael Moore moderated and IIEP Director Jay Shambaugh provided welcoming remarks. This event was in partnership with the GW Department of Economics Trade and Development Workshop organized by Yingyan Zhao and Remi Jedwab.

Since 2016 international trade has been subjected to increased geo-political uncertainty and more recently a major global health shock.  How has the WTO and globalization responded?  The initial Trump administration policy shocks resulted in mainly higher prices and trade diversion.  The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a number of restrictive trade policies mainly due to health policy restrictions, but also substantial fiscal and monetary policy responses in the advanced economies.  The combination of economic and health policies brought about a dramatic compositional shift in demand from in-person services to tradeable goods stressing global and national supply chains.  How has the global trading system responded?  What role, if any, will globalization play in the future on the Phillips curve and inflation?  These are important questions for the global trading system given the prospect of continued global health challenges and rising climate challenges.

 

About the Speaker:

Picture of Bob KoopmanBob Koopman is currently the Chief Economist of the World Trade Organization and an Adjunct Professor of International Economics at the Graduate Institute, Geneva.  At the WTO Bob serves as Chief Economic Counsellor to the Director-General, and provides the WTO Secretariat and Member Countries with analysis and information that promotes a deeper understanding of trade and trade policy’s role in economic growth and development. At the Graduate Institute Bob teaches courses on international trade.  Bob also serves as the WTO representative to the G20 Trade and Investment Working Group and the G20 Framework Group.  He is a research associate of CEPR, London, and an editor of the Springer Series on Advances in Applied General Equilibrium Modeling.

Prior to joining the WTO and the Graduate Institute Bob was Chief Operating Officer at the United States International Trade Commission and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Georgetown University.  Bob has also previously served as Chief Economist at the USITC, Deputy Administrator for social sciences at what is now the National Institute for Food and Agriculture, USDA, and various leadership and analyst positions at the Economic Research Service of USDA.

About the Moderator:

Picture of Michael MooreMichael Moore received his B.A. in liberal arts from the University of Texas at Austin and his M.S. and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is Director of the Masters of Arts in International Economic Policy program and has been a faculty member at the Elliott School since receiving his doctorate in 1988. Professor Moore teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in international trade theory and policy as well as international macroeconomics. He also has taught international economics to US diplomats at the Foreign Service Institute and students at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Sciences-Po) in Paris. He has published in numerous academic journals including the Journal of International Economics, International Trade Journal, Canadian Journal of Economics, Review of International Economics, European Journal of Political Economy, and Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, and has been a contributor to five books. His commentary has appeared in numerous media outlets, including The Washington PostThe Financial Times, CNN, CBC, NPR, and NBC.

Professor Moore has served as Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy, Director of the International Trade and Investment Policy Program, and Associate Dean at the Elliott School.

Professor Moore served as Senior Economist for international trade on the President’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2002 to 2003.

Welcoming Remarks:

Picture of Jay ShambaughJay Shambaugh is a Professor of Economics and International Affairs, and Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. His area of research is macroeconomics and international economics. He has had two stints in public service. He served as a Member of the White House Council of Economic Advisors from 2015-2017. Earlier, he served on the staff of the CEA as a Senior Economist for International Economics and then as the Chief Economist. He also spent 3 years as the Director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. Jay is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER and Non-Resident Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. Prior to joining the faculty at George Washington, Jay taught at Georgetown and Dartmouth and was a visiting scholar at the IMF. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. from the Fletcher School at Tufts, and a B.A. from Yale University.

 

 

Extending Multidimensional Poverty Identification: From Additive Weights to Minimal Bundles

Monday, February 14th, 2022
11:00 – 12:15 p.m. ET
via Zoom

We were pleased to invite you to a joint virtual event with the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office (HDRO) on Monday, February 14th, 2022. This event featured Sam Jones (UNU-WIDER) presenting “Extending Multidimensional Poverty Identification: From Additive Weights to Minimal Bundles.”

In this event, Sam Jones presented his paper which examines how in the popular class of multidimensional poverty measures introduced by Alkire and Foster (2011), a threshold switching function is used to identify who is multidimensionally poor. This paper shows that the weights and cut-off employed in this procedure are generally not unique and that such functions implicitly assume all groups of deprivation indicators of some fixed size are perfect substitutes. To address these limitations, he shows how the identification procedure can be extended to incorporate any type of positive switching function, represented by the set of minimal deprivation bundles that define a unit as poor. Furthermore, the Banzhaf power index, uniquely defined from the same set of minimal bundles, constitutes a natural and robust metric of the relative importance of each indicator, from which the adjusted headcount can be estimated. He demonstrates the merit of this approach using data from Mozambique, including a decomposition of the adjusted headcount using a ‘one from each dimension’ non-threshold function.

About the Speakers:

Sam Jones is a Research Fellow at UNU-WIDER based in Mozambique, on extended leave from his position as an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. He is a versatile economist with expertise in microeconomic empirical methods, education, labour markets, development finance (including foreign aid) and policy macroeconomics. Sam’s work has been published in leading journals, such as Journal of Development Economics, World Bank Economic Review, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Food Policy, Social Science & Medicine, Journal of Economic Inequality, World Development, Journal of Development Studies, African Development Review, and Journal of African Economies. Much of Sam’s academic research has focused on sub-Saharan Africa and he has previously worked extensively in Mozambique, spending over ten years as an advisor in the Ministry of Finance.

About the Discussant:

Picture of James FosterJames Foster is the Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Economics, and Co-Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the George Washington University. He is also a Research Associate at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University. Professor Foster’s research focuses on welfare economics — using economic tools to evaluate and enhance the wellbeing of people. His work underlies many well-known social indices including the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) published annually by the UNDP in the Human Development Report, dozens of national MPIs used to guide domestic policy against poverty, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) at USAID, the Gross National Happiness Index of Bhutan, the Better Jobs Index of the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Statistical Performance Index of the World Bank. Prof. Foster received his PhD in Economics from Cornell University and has a Doctorate Honoris Causa from Universidad Autónoma del Estado Hidalgo (Mexico).

 

About the Series:

The Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP) at George Washington University and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), with the support of the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report office (UNDP HDRO), are pleased to host a special seminar series on the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (global MPI). Goal 1 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to end poverty in all its forms and dimensions. The global MPI offers a tool to make progress towards this goal.

Bringing together the academic and policy spheres, this series of seminars will highlight topics such as race, ethnicity, gender, and caste, the statistical capacity of nations, social protection, the use of geospatial mapping in tracking poverty, poverty and refugees, and evaluating whether we’re on track to meet UN SDG Goal #1. The sessions will also include work that applies the global MPI methodology, the Alkire Foster method, to innovative measures.

The seminars are taking place online on Mondays at 11 a.m. EST. They will be hosted by IIEP Professor James Foster and are open to everyone focused on improving the lived experience of those who are deprived.

Scars of Pandemics from Lost Schooling and Experience: Aggregate Implications and Gender Differences Through the Lens of COVID-19

January 2022

Remi Jedwab  (George Washington University)
Roberto Samaniego (George Washington University)
Paul Romer (NYU Stern)
Asif M. Islam (World Bank)

IIEP working paper 2022-02

Abstract: Pandemic shocks disrupt human capital accumulation through schooling and work experience. This study quantifies the long-term economic impact of these disruptions in the case of COVID-19, focusing on countries at different levels of development and using returns to education and experience by college status that are globally estimated using 1,084 household surveys across 145 countries. The results show that both lost schooling and experience contribute to significant losses in global learning and output. Developed countries incur greater losses than developing countries, because they have more schooling to start with and higher returns to experience. The returns to education and experience are also separately estimated for men and women, to explore the differential effects by gender of the COVID-19 pandemic. Surprisingly, while we uncover gender differences in returns to education and schooling, gender differences in the impact of COVID-19 are small and short-lived, with a loss in female relative income of only $2.5$ percent or less mainly due to the greater severity of the employment shock on impact. These findings might challenge some of the ongoing narratives in policy circles. The methodology employed in this study is easily implementable for future pandemics.

JEL Codes: O11; O12; O15; E24; J11; J16; J17; J31

Key Words: Pandemics; Human Capital; Returns to Education; Returns to Experience; Gender; Female Relative Income; Labor Markets; Development Accounting; COVID-19

Killer Cities and Industrious Cities? New Data and Evidence on 250 Years of Urban Growth

January 2022

Remi Jedwab (George Washington University)
Marina Gindelsky (Bureau of Economic Analysis)

IIEP working paper 2022-01

Abstract: In the historical literature, cities of the Industrial Revolution are portrayed as having a demographic penalty: killer cities with high death rates and industrious cities with low birth rates. To econometrically test this, we construct a novel data set of almost 2,000 crude demographic rates for 142 large cities in 35 countries for 1700-1950. Mortality actually decreased faster than fertility during the Industrial Revolution era and rates of natural increase rose in the cities of industrializing countries, especially large cities. This implies a declining, not rising, demographic penalty thanks to the Industrial Revolution. To explain the puzzle, we posit that negative health and industriousness effects of industrial urbanization might have been outweighed by positive effects of increased income and life expectancy.

JEL Codes: N90, N30, N10, R00, J10

Key Words: Urban Demographic Penalty, Killer Cities, Industrious Cities, Mortality, Fertility, Natural Increase, Industrial Revolution, Urban Growth

Economic Effects and Policy Responses to Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Thursday, December 2nd, 2021
9 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. EST

The objective of this conference was to discuss recent policy research related to the economics of climate change. One set of studies analyzes the global economic and spatial effects of climate change and different policy options to mitigate its negative economic consequences, especially those related to migration, trade, taxation and innovation policy. Another set of studies focuses on the localized economic impacts of climate change and natural disasters in Africa, and corresponding policy options to promote mitigation and resilience, including technologies, infrastructure and fiscal policy. The conference was divided into two sessions. First there was be a round table discussion with two 25-minute presentations by two keynote speakers, followed by 10-minute feedback by a discussant, and 20 minutes of Q&A. Second, authors presented their research papers for 18 minutes, followed by 5-minute feedback by a discussant, and 7 minutes of Q&A.

This event was jointly organized by the World Bank Poverty and Equity Global Practice, the Office of the Director for Regional Integration for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Northern Africa of the World Bank, and the Institute for International Economic Policy at George Washington University.

Welcome Remarks

Picture of Boutheina GuermaziBoutheina Guermazi (Director, Regional Integration in Western & Central Africa, Eastern & Southern Africa, and Middle East & North Africa Regions) is the World Bank Director for Regional Integration for Africa, the Middle East and Northern Africa. Prior to her current appointment, Ms. Guermazi was the Director of Digital Development (DD) Department of the Infrastructure Practice Group from August 2018 to October 2021, heading a global team that worked on building digital economies in developing countries, to drive shared prosperity and reduced poverty. She also served as the Practice Manager of Digital Development covering Africa and the Middle East regions, and  as Lead Operations Officer in the Regional Integration Unit of the Africa region. During her tenure, she has written and published articles and book chapters on trade law, telecommunications policy, and regulatory reform. Before joining the World Bank, Ms. Guermazi was Assistant Professor at the University of Law and Political and Social Sciences of Tunis, and a Telecommunications consultant to the Sector Reform Unit at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Ms. Guermazi holds a Ph.D. in Telecommunications Law and Policy from the Faculty of Law at McGill University, Canada; an L.L.M. in International Law from Indiana University, USA; and a Bachelor’s Degree in Public Law from the University of Tunis, Tunisia. She held a Fulbright Scholarship and was a research scholar at the University of Michigan (USA), the Social Science Research Council (USA), and the Center of Studies for Regulated Industries (Canada).

Roundtable

Moderator:

Picture of Carolina Sánchez-PáramoCarolina Sánchez-Páramo (Global Director, Poverty and Equity Global Practice, World Bank), a Spanish national, is currently the Global Director of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice (GP) at the World Bank. Prior to this assignment, she was the Poverty and Equity GP Practice Manager in the Europe and Central Asia region. Carolina has worked on operations, policy advice and analytical activities in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia, and was part of the core team working on the WDR2012, “Gender Equality and Development”. Her main areas of interest and expertise include labor economics, poverty and distributional analysis, gender equality and welfare impacts of public policy. She has led reports on poverty and equity, labor markets and economic growth in several countries, as well as social sector operations. She has published articles in refereed journals and edited books on the topics described above. Carolina has a PhD in Economics from Harvard University.

Keynote Speakers:

Picture of Solomon HsiangSolomon Hsiang (Berkeley) directs the Global Policy Laboratory at Berkeley, where his team is integrating econometrics, spatial data science, and machine learning to answer questions that are central to rationally managing planetary resources–such as the economic value of the global climate, how the UN can fight wildlife poaching, the effectiveness of treaties governing the oceans, and whether satellites and AI can be combined to monitor the entire planet in real time. Hsiang earned a BS in Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Science and a BS in Urban Studies and Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he received a PhD in Sustainable Development from Columbia University. He was a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Applied Econometrics at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy at Princeton University. Hsiang is currently the Chancellor’s Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, a Co-Director at the Climate Impact Lab, Research Associate at the NBER, a National Geographic Explorer, and an Andrew Carnegie Fellow. Hsiang is currently the Lead Author of the Economics chapter for the Fifth National Climate Assessment. In 2020, he was awarded the President’s Medal by the Geological Society of America. View his slides here.

Picture of Esteban Rossi-HansbergEsteban Rossi-Hansberg is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor in the Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics at the University of Chicago (since 2021). Previously, he was the Theodore A. Wells ’29 Professor of Economics at Princeton University. Prior to Princeton, he was an Assistant Professor at Stanford University. He earned a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 2002. His research specializes in international trade, regional and urban economics, as well as growth and organizational economics. He has published extensively in all the major journals in economics. In 2007, he received the prestigious Alfred Sloan Research Fellowship and in 2010, he received the August Lösch Prize and the Geoffrey Hewings Award. He is an elected fellow of the Econometric Society since 2017 and won the Robert E. Lucas Jr. Prize in 2019. View his slides here.

Discussant:

Picture of Richard DamaniaRichard Damania (Chief Economist in the Sustainable Development Vice Presidency, World Bank) is the Chief Economist of the Sustainable Development Practice Group.  He has held several positions in the World Bank including as Senior Economic Advisor in the Water Practice, Lead Economist in the Africa Region’s Sustainable Development Department, in the South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean Regions of the World Bank.  His work has spanned across multiple sectors and has helped the World Bank become an acknowledged thought-leader on matters relating to  environment, water and the economy.  Prior to joining the World Bank he held positions in academia and has published extensively with over 100 papers in scientific journals. View his slides here.

Academic Presentations

Moderator:

Picture of Rémi JedwabRémi Jedwab (GWU) is an associate professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Elliott School and the Department of Economics of George Washington University and an Affiliated Scholar of the Marron Institute of Urban Management at New York University. Professor Jedwab’s main fields of research are development and growth, urban economics, labor economics and political economy. Some of the issues he has studied include urbanization and structural transformation, the relationship between population growth and economic growth, the economic effects of transportation infrastructure, and the roles of institutions, human capital and technology in development. He is the co-founder and co-organizer of the World Bank-GWU Urbanization and Poverty Reduction Conference and the Washington Area Development Economics Symposium. His research has been published in the American Economic Review, the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Economic Journal, and the Journal of Urban Economics. Finally, he is an Associate Editor at the Journal of Urban Economics and Regional Science and Urban Economics. 

Speakers:

Picture of Román David ZárateRomán David Zárate (World Bank) is an economist at the Trade and Integration unit of the World Bank’s Development Research Group (DEC-RG). He received a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley. His research interests are in international trade, urban economics, and development economics. He primarily focuses on how different forms of market integration impact aggregate welfare and productivity in developing countries. View his slides here.

 

 

 

 

Picture of Kelsey JackKelsey Jack (UCSB)’s research is at the intersection of environmental and development economics, with a focus on how individuals, households, and communities decide to use natural resources and provide public goods. Much of her research uses field experiments to test theory and new policy innovations. She has done research in numerous countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and has ongoing work in South Africa, Ghana, Zambia and Niger. Kelsey co-chair’s the Environment and Energy sector at the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT (J-PAL), directs the Poverty Alleviation group at the Environmental Markets Lab at UCSB (emLab), and is an associate editor at the American Economic Review. View her slides here.

Picture of Jonathan DingelJonathan Dingel (Chicago) is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research agenda focuses on the spatial distribution of economic activities across neighborhoods, cities, and countries. He tries to understand the substantial variation in the amount and nature of economic activity across space. Recently, he examined the scope for telecommuting, using satellite images to define cities, and how the global climate affects agricultural trade. View his slides here.

 

 

Picture of Marshall BurkeMarshall Burke (Stanford) is associate professor in the Department of Earth System Science and Deputy Director at the Center on Food Security and the Environment at Stanford University, and Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research focuses on social and economic impacts of environmental change, and on measuring and understanding economic livelihoods across the developing world. His work regularly appears in both economics and scientific journals, including recent publications in NatureScience, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and The Lancet.  He holds a PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics from UC Berkeley, and a BA in International Relations from Stanford. He is also co-founder of AtlasAI, a start-up using satellites and machine learning to measure livelihoods. View his slides here.

Discussants:

Picture of Klaus DesmetKlaus Desmet (SMU) is the Altshuler Professor of Cities, Regions and Globalization at Southern Methodist University, Research Associate at NBER and Research Fellow at CEPR. He holds an MSc in Business and Engineering from the Université catholique de Louvain and a PhD in Economics from Stanford University. Before moving to SMU, he was Professor at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. His research focuses on regional economics, economic growth, political economy and international trade. His work has appeared in journals such as the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Economic Theory and the Journal of Development conomics. In 2019 he was the co-recipient of the Robert E. Lucas Jr. Prize. View his slides here.

Picture of Sheetal SekhriSheetal Sekhri (UVA) is a tenured associate professor in the department of Economics at the University of Virginia. She received her PhD from Brown University. As a development economist, most of her research is in two thematic areas. She uses theoretical insights and data to answer questions related to causes and consequences of water scarcity and pollution. She also addresses issues related to gender-based violence. Her other interests are higher education, skilled labor markets, and state capacity in developing countries. Her work often uses primary datasets that she generates based on surveys she conducts and is informed by insights from various disciplines. She has conducted extensive field work in India.

Picture of Mariaflavia HarariMariaflavia (Nina) Harari (Penn – Wharton) is an Assistant Professor of Real Estate at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, specializing in urban economics and development economics. Her research agenda is centered on urbanization in developing countries. Her research was featured on the American Economic Review. Dr. Harari holds a B.A. and a M.Sc. in Economics and Social Sciences from Bocconi University and a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. View her slides here.

 

 

 

Picture of Paulina OliviaPaulina Oliva (USC) is an Associate Professor in the Economics Department of the University of Southern California. She received my PhD in Economics from UC, Berkeley in 2009. She specializes in the fields of Environmental Economics and Development; and specifically, on the relationship between air pollution and health and on environmental policy effectiveness in the developing world. Her work uses a variety of microeconometric techniques to study individual incentives and human impacts of air pollution. View her slides here.

Latin America: The Pandemic, Poverty, and Policy

Latin America Event Banner

Wednesday, November 17th, 2021
4:30 p.m. – 5:30 p.m. EST
via Zoom

This was a panel discussion on Wednesday, November 17th on “Latin America: The Pandemic, Poverty, and Policy.” The event featured panelists Mauricio Cárdenas (Columbia University and former Minister of Finance, Colombia), Benigno López Benítez (Inter-American Development Bank and former Minister of Finance, Paraguay), Nora Lustig (Tulane University), and William Maloney (The World Bank). Danny Leipziger (GWU) moderated the event.

This panel discussion aimed to review the issues related to the direct impact of pandemics on the poor in Latin America. The discussion focused on the urgent need to design policies to lessen the negative impact on the most vulnerable in a region most affected by recent events.

This event is co-sponsored by the Growth Dialogue, the GW Center for International Business Education and Research (GW-CIBER), the Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program at the George Washington University, and the Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP).

About the Panelists

Picture of Mauricio Cárdenas SantamaríaDr. Mauricio Cárdenas Santamaría is a former Minister of Finance and Public Credit of Colombia and Visiting Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. An economist and politician, he served as the 69th Minister of Finance and formerly as Minister of Mines and Energy of Colombia in the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón. Prior to this, he was a Senior Fellow and Director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution.

In a long and distinguished career in the Government of Colombia, he has also served as Minister of Economic Development, as Minister of Transport, and as Director of the National Planning Department. In the private sector, he has served as Director of the Higher Education and Development Foundation (Fedesarrollo) and as the 7th President of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA).

Since leaving government, Dr. Cardenas joined various academic institutions. In 2019, he became a Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Since 2020, Dr. Cardenas has been serving in the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPR), a group examining how the World Health Organization (WHO) and countries handled the COVID-19 pandemic. He received his doctorate in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley.

Picture of Benigno López BenítezBenigno López Benítez is Vice-President for Sectors and Knowledge at the Inter-American Development Bank since his appointment in November 2020. Prior to joining the IDB, he served as Minister of Finance of Paraguay. In that role, he led a comprehensive tax-reform initiative aimed at improving the progressive capacity of the tax system, increasing government revenue to finance health and education reforms, and incentivizing labor formalization.

Prior to his public service, Mr. Lopez served as Chairman of the Social Security Institute, Paraguay’s employer-based health insurance and pensions system. During his tenure, he aimed to restructure the institution’s debt, professionalize its administration and structure and diversify its investment portfolio. In 2013, Mr. Lopez was appointed Executive Legal Director and member of the board of Itaipú Bi-nacional, which administers the world’s largest hydroelectric dam on the Paraguay-Brazil border. From 2012-2013, Mr. Lopez served as Senior Advisor to the Executive Board of the IMF, Washington D.C. Previously, he worked for more than two decades at the Central Bank of Paraguay as Board Director from 2007 to 2012 and as head of the legal department.

Mr. Lopez holds a law degree from Paraguay’s Catholic University and a Master of Laws (LL.M) from Georgetown University.

Picture of Nora LustigDr. Nora Lustig is Samuel Z. Stone Professor of Latin American Economics and the founding Director of the Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQ) at Tulane University. She is also a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, the Center for Global Development and the Inter-American Dialogue.

Professor Lustig’s research is on economic development, inequality and social policies with emphasis on Latin America. Among her recent publications, the Commitment to Equity Handbook: Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty is a step-by-step guide to assessing the impact of taxation and social spending on inequality and poverty in developing countries.

Prof. Lustig is a founding member and President Emeritus of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) and was a co-director of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty. She serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Economic Inequality and is a member of the Society for the Study of Economic Inequality’s Executive Council. Prof. Lustig served on the Atkinson Commission on Poverty, the High-level Group on Measuring Economic Performance and Social Progress, and the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance. She received her doctorate in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley.

Picture of William MaloneyDr. William Maloney, a U.S. national, is Chief Economist for the Latin America and Caribbean Region at the World Bank. He joined the World Bank in 1998 as Senior Economist for the Latin America and Caribbean Region. He held various positions including Lead Economist in the Office of the Chief Economist for Latin America, Lead Economist in the Development Economics Research Group, Chief Economist for Trade and Competitiveness and Global Lead on Innovation and Productivity. He was most recently Chief Economist for Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions (EFI) Vice Presidency. From 2011 to 2014 he was Visiting Professor at the University of the Andes in Bogotá and worked closely with the Colombian government on innovation and firm upgrading issues.

Dr. Maloney received his doctorate in Economics from the University of California Berkeley (1990), his BA from Harvard University (1981), and studied at the University of the Andes in Bogota, Colombia (1982-83). His research activities and publications have focused on issues related to international trade and finance, developing country labor markets, and innovation and growth, including several flagship publications about Latin America and the Caribbean, including Informality: Exit and Inclusion and Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny. Most recently, he published The Innovation Paradox: Developing-Country Capabilities and the Unrealized Promise of Technological Catch-Up.

About the Moderator

Picture of Danny LeipzigerDr. Danny Leipziger is Professor of International Business and International Affairs at the George Washington University and Director of the Growth Dialogue. He is a faculty affiliate of the Institute for International Economic Policy. Prior to joining GW, Prof. Leipziger was Vice President for Poverty Reduction and Economic Management at the World Bank (2004-2009). Dr. Leipziger held senior management positions in the East Asia and Latin America Regions. He was the World Bank’s Director for Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure for Latin America (1998-2004). He served previously in the U.S. Department of State and was a Member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff. Dr. Leipziger was Vice Chair of the Spence Commission on Growth and Development and he served on the WEF Council on Economic Progress.

An economist with a Ph. D. from Brown University, he has published widely in development economics, finance and banking, and on East Asia and Latin America. He is the author of several books, including Lessons of East Asia (U. of Michigan Press), Stuck in the Middle (Brookings Institution), and Globalization and Growth, and more than 50 refereed and published articles in journals and other outlets.

IMF World Economic Outlook: Recovery During a Pandemic – Health Concerns, Supply Disruptions, and Price Pressures

Friday, October 29th, 2021
10:00 a.m. – 11:30 a.m. EDT
via Zoom

The Institute for International Economic Policy hosted a discussion of the International Monetary Fund’s October 2021 World Economic Outlook titled “IMF World Economic Outlook: Recovery During a Pandemic – Health Concerns, Supply Disruptions, and Price Pressures.” This event featured John Bluedorn (IMF), Christoffer Koch (IMF), Tara Sinclair (GWU), Jean-Marc Natal (IMF), and Benjamin Jones (Northwestern University). This event was moderated by IIEP Director Jay Shambaugh.

The global economic recovery is continuing, even as the pandemic resurges. The fault lines opened up by COVID-19 are looking more persistent—near-term divergences are expected to leave lasting imprints on medium-term performance. Vaccine access and early policy support are the principal drivers of the gaps.

The IMF World Economic Outlook — the flagship publication of the IMF — details the state of the global economy and its prospects going forward. It also includes two analytical chapters considering key policy issues facing the world economy. Chapter 2 considers the appropriate policy mix as many countries face elevated or rising inflation. Chapter 3 examines how countries could use science and innovation policy to boost long run economic growth. This event presents an opportunity for policymakers and academics to consider these crucial issues.

 

Event Agenda

Welcoming Remarks
Jay Shambaugh, George Washington University

Chapter 1: Global Prospects and Policies
Presenter: John Bluedorn, International Monetary Fund

Chapter 2: Inflation Scares
Presenter: Christoffer Koch, International Monetary Fund
Discussant: Tara Sinclair, George Washington University

Chapter 3: Research and Innovation: Fighting the Pandemic and Boosting Long-Term Growth
Presenter: Jean-Marc Natal, International Monetary Fund
Discussant: Benjamin Jones, Northwestern University

General Q&A and Concluding Remarks
Moderated by Jay Shambaugh, George Washington University

 

About the Speakers:

Picture John BluedornJohn Bluedorn is a deputy division chief on the World Economic Outlook in the IMF’s Research Department. Previously, he has been a senior economist in the Research Department’s Structural Reforms Unit, a member of the IMF’s euro area team in the European Department and worked on the World Economic Outlook as an economist, contributing to a number of chapters. Before joining the IMF, he was a professor at the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom, after a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Oxford. Mr. Bluedorn has published on a range of topics in international finance, macroeconomics, and development. He holds a PhD from the University of California at Berkeley.

 

Picture of Christoffer Koch

Christoffer Koch works in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. Prior to that he had spent a decade as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. His policy and research interests are in macroeconomics, money and banking. He obtained his undergraduate degree from the University of St Andrews, and his PhD from the University of Oxford where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

 

 

 

Picture of Jean-Marc NatalJean-Marc Natal is Deputy Division Chief in the World Economic Studies Division in the IMF’s Research Department. Prior to joining the IMF, he was Deputy Director of Research at the Swiss National Bank where he advised the Board on quarterly monetary policy decisions and communication. Mr Natal has taught Monetary Theory and Policy at the University of Geneva and has published in various economics journals, including the Economic Journal and the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. His research covers the study of monetary and exchange rate regimes, policy transmission, inflation dynamics and macroeconomic modeling. He holds a PhD in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

About the Discussants:

Picture of Tara M. SinclairTara M. Sinclair is a faculty affiliate of the Institute for International Economic Policy and professor of economics and international affairs at the George Washington University, where she has been on faculty since earning her PhD in economics from Washington University in St. Louis in 2005. Professor Sinclair is a senior fellow at job search site Indeed, the co-director of the H. O. Stekler Research Program on Forecasting, a member of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Technical Advisory Committee, a research professor at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) in Germany, and a research associate at the Center for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA). She has been a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, a visiting associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin, and an academic visitor at the Australian National University and the University of New South Wales. Professor Sinclair also serves as the moderator for the monthly inflation meet-ups for the National Association for Business Economics. Professor Sinclair’s research focuses on developing new tools and data sources to improve decision making. Her early research built empirical models to study economic fluctuations and trends, and these models remain a continuing thread in her publications. As part of the Indeed Hiring Lab, Professor Sinclair uses Indeed’s unique labor market data to develop new economic indicators. As co-director of the H. O. Stekler Research Program on Forecasting, she evaluates real time economic data and forecasts with a focus on their role in policy. Professor Sinclair regularly speaks at conferences and with the press on issues related to forecasting, recessions, labor markets, big data, macroeconomics, and policy issues.

Picture of Benjamin F. JonesBenjamin F. Jones is the Gordon and Llura Gund Family Professor of Entrepreneurship, a Professor of Strategy, and the faculty director of the Kellogg Innovation and Entrepreneurship Initiative. An economist by training, Professor Jones studies the sources of economic growth in advanced economies, with an emphasis on innovation, entrepreneurship, and scientific progress. He also studies global economic development, including the roles of education, climate, and national leadership in explaining the wealth and poverty of nations. His research has appeared in journals such as Science, the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the American Economic Review, and has been profiled in media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal, the Economist, and The New Yorker. A former Rhodes Scholar, Professor Jones served in 2010-2011 as the senior economist for macroeconomics for the White House Council of Economic Advisers and earlier served in the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Professor Jones is a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

About the Moderator:

Picture of Jay ShambaughJay Shambaugh is Professor of Economics and International Affairs, and Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. His area of research is macroeconomics and international economics. He has had two stints in public service. He served as a Member of the White House Council of Economic Advisors from 2015-2017. Earlier, he served on the staff of the CEA as a Senior Economist for International Economics and then as the Chief Economist. He also spent 3 years as the Director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. Jay is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER and Non-Resident Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. Prior to joining the faculty at George Washington, Jay taught at Georgetown and Dartmouth and was a visiting scholar at the IMF. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. from the Fletcher School at Tufts, and a B.A. from Yale University.

 

IMF WEO Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1: Global Prospects and Policies

The global economic recovery continues amid a resurging pandemic that poses unique policy challenges. Gaps in expected recoveries across economy groups have widened since the July forecast, for instance between advanced economies and low-income developing countries. Meanwhile, inflation has increased markedly in the United States and some emerging market economies. As restrictions are relaxed, demand has accelerated, but supply has been slower to respond. Although price pressures are expected to subside in most countries in 2022, inflation prospects are highly uncertain. These increases in inflation are occurring even as employment is below pre-pandemic levels in many economies, forcing difficult choices on policymakers. Strong policy effort at the multilateral level is needed on vaccine deployment, climate change, and international liquidity to strengthen global economic prospects. National policies to complement the multilateral effort will require much more tailoring to country-specific conditions and better targeting, as policy space constraints become more binding the longer the pandemic lasts.
Chapter 2: Inflation Scares
Despite recent increases in headline inflation in both advanced and emerging market economies, long-term inflation expectations remain anchored. Looking ahead, headline inflation is projected to peak in the final months of 2021 but is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels by mid-2022 for most economies. But given the recovery’s uncharted nature, considerable uncertainty remains, and inflation could exceed forecasts for a variety of reasons. Clear communication, combined with appropriate monetary and fiscal policies, can help prevent “inflation scares” from unhinging inflation expectations.
Chapter 3: Research and Innovation: Fighting the Pandemic and Boosting Long-Term Growth
How can policymakers boost long-term growth in the post–COVID-19 global economy? This chapter looks at the role of basic research—undirected, theoretical, or experimental work. Using rich new data that draw on connections from individual innovations and scientific articles, this chapter shows that basic research is an essential input into innovation, with wide-ranging international spillovers and long-lasting economic impacts.

Did U.S. Politicians Expect the China Shock?

Friday, October 15th, 2021
9:30 a.m. – 11 a.m. EDT
via Zoom

 

The Institute for International Economic Policy was pleased to invite you to the 14th annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations. This year, the conference takes place as a virtual series. This conference is co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the GW Center for International Business Education and Research (GW-CIBER).

In the two decades straddling China’s WTO accession, the China Shock, i.e. the rapid trade integration of China in the early 2000’s, has had a profound economic impact across U.S. regions. It is now both an internationally litigated issue and the casus belli for a global trade war. Were its consequences unexpected? Did U.S. politicians have imperfect information about the extent of China Shock’s repercussions in their district at the time when they voted on China’s Normal Trade Relations status? Or did they have accurate expectations, yet placed a relatively low weight on the subconstituencies that ended up being adversely affected?

In this inaugural event, HKU’s Bingjing Li discussed how information sets, expectations, and preferences of U.S. politicians are fundamental, but unobserved determinants of their policy choices in regards to the China Shock. Prof. Li applies a moment inequality approach designed to deliver unbiased estimates under weak informational assumptions on the information sets of members of Congress. Employing repeated roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives on China’s Normal Trade Relations status, she formally tests what information politicians had at the time of their decision and consistently estimates the weights that constituent interests, ideology, and other factors had in congressional votes. She will show how assuming perfect foresight of the shocks biases the role of constituent interests and how standard proxies to modeling politician’s expectations bias the estimation. She cannot reject that politicians could predict the initial China Shock in the early 1990’s, but not around 2000, when China started entering new sectors, and find a moderate role of constituent interests, compared to ideology. Overall, she will show how U.S. legislators appeared to have had accurate information on the China Shock, but did not place substantial weight on its adverse consequences.

Boston University’s James Feigenbaum served as a discussant and IIEP’s Maggie Chen moderated with an introduction from IIEP Director Jay Shambaugh.

About the Speaker:

Picture of Bingjing LiDr. Bingjing Li is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Hong Kong. Her main research fields are international trade and applied microeconomics. Using both micro data and quantitative models, her works focus on understanding the interactions of international trade with development and political economy factors, and their consequences.

 

 

About the Discussant:

Picture of James FeigenbaumJames Feigenbaum is an Assistant Professor in the Boston University Department of Economics. He is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER in the Development of the American Economy program and a Junior Faculty Fellow at BU’s Hariri Institute for Computing. James studies economic history, labor economics, and political economy. His research interests include understanding the effects of economic shocks on politics and politicians. Prof. Feigenbaum received his PhD in Economics from Harvard University and his B.A. with High Honors in Economics and Mathematics from Wesleyan University.

About the Moderator:

Picture of Maggie ChenMaggie Chen is Professor of Economics and International Affairs at George Washington University. She has served as Director of GW’s Institute for International Economic Policy and worked as an economist in the research department of the World Bank and a consultant for the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Professor Chen’s research areas include multinational firms, international trade, and regional trade agreements. Her work has been published in academic journals such as the Review of Economics and Statistics, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Journal of International Economics, and Journal of Development Economics. She is a co-editor of Economic Inquiry and an associate editor of Economic Modeling.

Introduction by:

Picture of Jay ShambaughJay Shambaugh is Professor of Economics and International Affairs, and Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. His area of research is macroeconomics and international economics. He has had two stints in public service. He served as a Member of the White House Council of Economic Advisors from 2015-2017. Earlier, he served on the staff of the CEA as a Senior Economist for International Economics and then as the Chief Economist. He also spent 3 years as the Director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. Jay is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER and Non-Resident Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. Prior to joining the faculty at George Washington, Jay taught at Georgetown and Dartmouth and was a visiting scholar at the IMF. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. from the Fletcher School at Tufts, and a B.A. from Yale University.

China Conference Sponsors

Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement, Banks, and the Real Economy

June 2021

Senay Agca (George Washington University)
Pablo Slutzky (University of Maryland)
Stefan Zeume (UIUC)

IIEP working paper 2021-20

Abstract: We exploit a tightening of anti-money laundering (AML) enforcement that imposed disproportionate costs on small banks to examine the effects of a change in bank composition on real economic outcomes. In response to intensified enforcement, counties prone to high levels of money laundering experience a departure of small banks and increased activity by large banks. This results in an increase in the number of small establishments and real estate prices. Consistent with a household demand channel, wages and employment increase in the non-tradable sector. Last, we document secured lending as a potential driver of this outcome.

JEL Codes: G21, G28

Key Words: Money laundering, Financial Institutions, Real economy, Deposits and lending, Financial crime

The Impact of COVID-19 on Supply Chain Credit Risk

June 2021

Senay Agca (George Washington University)
John R. Birge (University of Chicago)
Zi’ang Wang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Jing Wu (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

IIEP working paper 2021-19

Abstract: Global supply chains expose firms to multi-regional risks, but also provide benefits by creating a buffer against local shocks. The COVID-19 pandemic and its differential impact on different parts of the world provide an opportunity for insight into supply chain credit risk, and how operational and structural characteristics of global supply chains affect this risk. In this paper, we examine supply chain credit risk during different phases of the COVID-19 pandemic by focusing on Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and US-China supply chain links. CDS spreads reflect both the probability of default and expected loss given default, and are available with daily frequency, which allows the assessment of supply chain partners’ credit risk in a timely manner. We find that CDS spreads for firms with China supply chain partners increase with the economic shutdown in China during the pandemic, and the spreads go down when the economic activity resumed with the re-opening in China. We consider Swift, Even Flow (SEF) and Social Network Theories (SNT) within our context. Supporting SEF theory, we find that the impact of pandemic-related disruptions to even flow of goods and materials reflected in supply chain credit risk is mitigated for firms with lower inventory turnover and those with better ability to work with longer lead times and operating cycles. Examining supply chain structural characteristics through SNT reveals that spatial and horizontal complexity, as well as network centrality (degree, closeness, betweenness, information) mitigate the impact of supply chain vulnerabilities on supply chain credit risk.

JEL Codes: E21, E51, F23, G12, G14, G23, G32, L11

Key Words: Supply Chains, Credit Risk, CDS, COVID-19, Pandemic

Credit Shock Propagation Along Supply Chains: Evidence from the CDS Market

June 2021

Senay Agca (George Washington University)
Volodymyr Babich (GeorgetownUniversity)
John R. Birge (University of Chicago)
Jing Wu (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

IIEP working paper 2021-18

Abstract: Using a panel of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and supply chain links, we observe that both favorable and unfavorable credit shocks propagate through supply chains in the CDS market. Particularly, the three-day cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC) is 63 basis points for firms whose customers experienced a CDS up-jump event (an adverse credit shock). The value is 74 basis points if their suppliers experienced a CDS up-jump event. The corresponding three-day CASC values are −36 and −38 basis points, respectively, for firms whose customers and suppliers, respectively, experienced an extreme CDS down-jump event (a favorable credit shock). These effects are approximately twice as large for adverse credit shocks originating from natural disasters. Credit shock propagation is absent in inactive supply chains, and is amplified if supply-chain partners are followed by the same analysts. Industry competition and financial linkages between supply chain partners, such as trade credit and large sales exposure, amplify the shock propagation along supply chains. Strong shock propagation persists through second and third supply-chain tiers for adverse shocks but attenuates for favorable shocks.

JEL Codes: E43, E51, G12, G14, G23, G24, G32, L11, L22

Key Words: supply chains, credit risk, CDS, propagation, supply networks

A New Approach to Measuring Intercity Differences in Housing Costs

July 2021

Hyung Joon Chung (George Washington University)
Nathaniel Harris (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2021-17

Abstract: Intercity housing price indexes that rely on median house price or pooled hedonic regressions adjust imperfectly for differences in housing characteristics. In addition, intercity house price indexes that rely on asset value are a biased measure of differences in the rental price of housing, because capitalization rates vary dramatically across cities. To mitigate these shortcomings, we create Fisher Ideal intercity housing price indexes for both rental and asset prices using a two-way Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Our method improves upon current house price indexes by using rental rather than asset prices, controlling for location and housing characteristics, and allowing implicit prices to vary across locations.

JEL Codes: C1, R1, R3

Key Words: intercity house price indices, blinder-oaxaca decomposition, Fisher Ideal index, interarea cost of living differences

Economics and American Judaism in the 21st Century

August 2021

Carmel U. Chiswick (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2021-16

Abstract: American Judaism is viewed from an economic perspective. Non-traditional family units and non-traditional religious practices are now persistent features of American Jewry. Incentives affecting the education, family formation and consumption patterns of American Jews are shown to have implications for patterns of Jewish observance and for the American Jewish community. Comparing US religious pluralism with Israel’s state-sponsored Rabbinate suggests stresses as well as complementarities between the two largest Jewish communities, including a rise in anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. Forecasting the future of American Judaism is based on trends in economic conditions and changes in religious institutions affecting its cultural context. 

JEL Codes: Z12, J19, D10

Key Words: economics, demography, religion, Judaism, pluralism, consumption, value of time, cost of Judaism, Israel, anti-Semitism

Cities Without Skylines: Worldwide Building-Height Gaps and their Possible Determinants and Implications

August 2021

Remi Jedwab (George Washington University)
Jason Barr (Rutgers University)
Jan Brueckner (University of California)

IIEP working paper 2021-15

Abstract: There is a large literature on U.S. cities measuring the extent and stringency of land-use regulations and how regulatory and geographical constraints affect important outcomes such as housing prices and economic growth. This paper is the first to study the global extent and impact of regulatory and other constraints by estimating what we call building-height gaps. Using a novel data set on the year of construction and heights of tall buildings around the world, we compare the total height of a country’s stock of tall buildings to what the total height would have been if supply was more elastic, based on parameters from a benchmark set of countries. These gaps are larger for richer countries and for residential buildings than for commercial buildings in such countries. The gaps are driven by under-building in central areas of larger cities. These gaps are not compensated by tall building construction in peripheral areas of cities or less stringent limits on outward expansion beyond the existing boundaries of the cities. Countries with older, historic structures have larger gaps, likely due to more stringent height regulations and dispersed ownership that inhibits land assembly. Lastly, the gaps correlate strongly with international measures of housing prices, sprawl, congestion, and pollution.

JEL Codes: R3, R5, O18, O50

Key Words: International Buildings Heights; Land Use Regulations; Geographical Constraints; Housing Supply; Housing Prices; Sprawl; Congestion; Pollution

Educational Responses to Migration-Augmented Export Shocks: Evidence from China

May 2021

Yao Pan (George Washington University and Aalto University)
Jessica Leight (International Food Policy Research Institute)

IIEP working paper 2021-14

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of positive shocks to export-oriented industries following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization on human capital investment in urban and rural areas. Exploiting cross-county variations in the reduction in export tariff uncertainty both locally and at plausible migration destinations, we find that youth reaching matriculation age post-accession in counties experiencing a larger export shock show a lower probability of enrolling in high school. In urban areas, this effect is driven by local shocks, while in rural areas, it is primarily driven by shocks at migration destinations. Urban youth show evidence of a deterioration in labor market outcomes linked to declining matriculation rates, while there is no evidence of significant labor market effects for rural youth.

JEL Codes: F14, F16, J24, O15, O18, O19

Key Words: Export Shock, Human Capital Attainment, Urban-rural Inequality, China

Poverty, Climate, and Unemployment: Towards a World of Three Zeros

Thursday, September 16, 2021
10:00 a.m. – 11:00 p.m. EDT
via Zoom

We were pleased to invite you to a conversation with Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh who created a model for combating poverty through microlending. He is the author of three books, including Banker to the Poor. The event was moderated by Prof. James Foster, Oliver T. Carr Jr Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Economics, and Vice Dean at the Elliott School of International Affairs. Prof. Foster is known for developing the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) along with Dr. Sabina Alkire. Elliott School Dean Alyssa Ayres provided welcome remarks.

About the Speaker:

Picture of Muhammad YunusNobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus is the founder of Grameen Bank, pioneering the concepts of microcredit and social business, founding more than 50 Social Business companies in Bangladesh. For his constant innovation and enterprise, the Fortune Magazine named Professor Yunus in March 2012 as “one of the greatest entrepreneurs of our time.” At the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020 Professor Yunus was conferred with the Olympic Laurel award for his extensive work in sports for development, bringing the concept of social business to the sports world.

In 2006, Professor Yunus and Grameen Bank were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Professor Muhammad Yunus is the recipient of 63 honorary degrees from universities across 26 countries. He has received 143 awards from 33 countries including state honours from 10 countries. He is one of only seven individuals to have received the Nobel Peace Prize, the United States Presidential Medal of Freedom and the United States Congressional Gold Medal. He has appeared on the cover of Time Magazine, Newsweek and Forbes Magazine.

Professor Yunus has been stressing the need for a basic decision of ‘No Going Back’ to the old ways of thinking and doing. He proposes to create new roads to go to a new destination by creating a World of 3 Zeros – zero net carbon emission, zero wealth concentration for ending poverty once and for all, and zero unemployment by unleashing entrepreneurship in everyone.

His recent focuses are:

a. Professor Yunus has been campaigning for making the Covid 19 Vaccine as a Global Common Good since June, 2020, urging the World Trade Organization to place a temporary waiver on Intellectual Property rights on vaccines to free up the global capacity to produce vaccines at all locations around the world.

b. Professor Yunus has launched a programme of creating a network of 3ZERO Clubs, each club to be formed by five young people. The programme aims to engage the global youth in initiating actions for creating solutions for global problems.

About the Moderator:

Picture of James FosterJames E. Foster is the Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Economics, and Vice Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is also a Research Associate at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University. Professor Foster’s research focuses on welfare economics — using economic tools to evaluate and enhance the wellbeing of people. His joint 1984 Econometrica paper (with Joel Greer and Erik Thorbecke) is one of the most cited papers on poverty. It introduced the FGT Index, which has been used in thousands of studies and was employed in targeting the Progresa CCT program in Mexico. Other research includes work on economic inequality with Amartya Sen; on the distribution of human development with Luis Felipe Lopez-Calva and Miguel Szekely; on multidimensional poverty with Sabina Alkire; and on literacy with Kaushik Basu.

Professor Foster’s work underlies many well-known social indices including the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) published annually by the UNDP in the Human Development Report, dozens of national MPIs used to guide domestic policy against poverty, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) at USAID, the Gross National Happiness Index of Bhutan, the Better Jobs Index of the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Statistical Performance Index of the World Bank.

Alyssa Aryes will provide welcome remarks.

Picture of Alyssa AryesAlyssa Ayres is Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Dean Ayres is a foreign policy practitioner and award-winning author with senior experience in the government, nonprofit, and private sectors. She was Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where she remains an adjunct senior fellow. From 2010 to 2013 Ayres served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in the Barack Obama administration, where she covered all issues across a dynamic region of 1.3 billion people at the time (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) and provided policy direction for four U.S. embassies and four consulates. Her work focuses primarily on India’s role in the world and on U.S. relations with South Asia in the larger Indo-Pacific. Her last book is, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World (OUP, 2018). She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

Global Contagion and IMF Credit Cycles: A Lender of Partial Resort?

July 2021

Stephen B. Kaplan (George Washington University)
Sujeong Shim (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

IIEP working paper 2021-13

Abstract: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has an incomplete governance architecture characterized by insufficient resources to fulfill its global financial stability mandate. We argue this institutional incompleteness influences how the IMF balances tensions between systemic risks and moral hazard, and when it surprisingly exits lending relationships. During high global contagion periods, the IMF targets stabilizing systemic risks to fulfill its mandate, granting large loans and overlooking non-compliance with conditionality. However, when the IMF perceives minimal contagion risk, it focuses on moral hazard, extending smaller loans with stricter conditionality, and willingly cuts financial ties to preserve its reputation and resources for future crises. Employing a comparative case analysis of IMF decision-making for Argentina (1998-2001) and Greece (2010-2015), we find evidence supporting our theoretical priors from content analysis of IMF executive board meeting minutes, complementary archival evidence, and field research interviews. These findings have important implications for the IMF, institutionalism, and development.

JEL Codes: O1, O16, O19, 052, 054, F21, F33, F34, F42, F49, F50, F55, F60, F65

Key Words: IMF, lender of last resort, financial crises, international financial risk, contagion risk, Argentina, Greece 

The Spatial Economic Effects of Conflict

Wednesday, June 9, 2021
9 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. EDT
via Webex

This workshop showcased the most recent advances in the field of economics on conflict with a particular focus on the local and spillover effects of conflict, conflict and spatial poverty traps, and policies to mitigate potential negative effects of conflict such as infrastructure investment. While the policy focus of this workshop was on Africa, the presentations included a larger geographical coverage. The workshop was divided into two sessions. First there was a round table discussion with two presentations by the main keynote speakers, followed by a Q&A session. Second, authors presented their research papers, followed by feedback by a discussant and a Q&A session.

This event was jointly organized by the World Bank Poverty and Equity Global Practice, the Office of the Director for Regional Integration for Africa of the World Bank, and the Institute for International Economic Policy at George Washington University.

Welcome Remarks

Deborah Wetzel, a U.S. national with more than 25 years of experience in development work around the world, is the World Bank Director for Regional Integration for Africa, the Middle East and Northern Africa. Prior to her current appointment, Wetzel was the Senior Director for Governance from April 2016 to April 2019. She also served as the Director of Strategy and Operations for the Middle East and North Africa Region, as well as Country Director for Brazil, from March 2012 until July 2015. Previous roles include World Bank Group’s Chief of Staff to the World Bank President from 2010 to 2012, and Director for Governance and Public Sector, where she directed the Bank’s work on taxation, public expenditures, decentralization, public sector reform and strengthening, governance and anti-corruption. From 2006 to 2009, she led the World Bank’s Economic and Public Sector Programs in Brazil, based in Brasilia. During that period, she developed numerous programs with state and federal governments to help improve the effectiveness of public expenditures and achieve better results. Wetzel has a Doctorate in Economics from the University of Oxford and a Masters in International Studies from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies. Her BA is from Smith College. She is the author of publications on fiscal decentralization, public finance, governance, and sub-national affairs.

 

Roundtable

Moderator:

Carolina Sánchez-Páramo, a Spanish national, is currently the Global Director of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice (GP) at the World Bank. Prior to this assignment, she was the Poverty and Equity GP Practice Manager in the Europe and Central Asia region. Carolina has worked on operations, policy advice and analytical activities in Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia, and was part of the core team working on the WDR2012, “Gender Equality and Development”. Her main areas of interest and expertise include labor economics, poverty and distributional analysis, gender equality and welfare impacts of public policy. She has led reports on poverty and equity, labor markets and economic growth in several countries, as well as social sector operations. She has published articles in refereed journals and edited books on the topics described above. Carolina has a PhD in Economics from Harvard University.

Keynote Speakers:

Chris Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The University of Chicago’s Pearson Institute and Harris Public Policy. He is an economist and political scientist who studies poverty, violence and crime in developing countries. He has designed and evaluated strategies for tackling poverty, including cash transfers to the poorest. Much of his work is with the victims and perpetrators of crime and violence, testing the link between poverty and violence. His recent work looks at other sources of and solutions to violence. These solutions range from behavioral therapy to social norm change and local-level state building. He has worked mainly in Colombia, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Chicago’s South Side. Dr. Blattman was previously faculty at Columbia and Yale Universities, and holds a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley and a Master’s in Public Administration and International Development (MPA/ID) from the Harvard Kennedy School. He chairs the Peace & Recovery sector at Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and the Crime, Violence and Conflict initiative at MIT’s Poverty Action Lab (JPAL).

Dominic Rohner (PhD, University of Cambridge) is a Professor and co-director of the economics department at HEC Lausanne, the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne. He is also Associate Editor at the Economic Journal, the PI of a European Research Council grant, the leader of the CEPR Research and Policy Network on “Policies for Peace”, a member of the Swiss National Research Council, and co-leader of the E4S group on “Evidence-based environmental policies”. Prior to joining UNIL, he held positions at the universities of York and Zurich. His research focuses on political and development economics, has won several prizes and has been widely published in journals such as American Economic Review, Econometrica, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, and PNAS.

 

Academic Presentations

Speakers:

Nathan Nunn is Frederic E. Abbe Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Professor Nunn’s primary research interests are in political economy, economic history, economic development, cultural economics, and international trade. He is an NBER Faculty Research Fellow, a Research Fellow at BREAD, a Faculty Associate at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (WCFIA), and a Fellow of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) in the Boundaries, Membership & Belonging program. One stream of Professor Nunn’s research focuses on the historical and dynamic process of economic development. In particular, he has studied the factors that shape differences in the evolution of institutions and cultures across societies. He has published research that studies the historical process of a wide range of factors that are crucial for economic development, including distrust, gender norms, religiosity, norms of rule-following, conflict, immigration, state formation, and support for democracy. His current research interests lie in better understanding the importance of local culture and context  for economic policies, particularly in developing countries.

Rémi Jedwab is an associate professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Elliott School and the Department of Economics of George Washington University and an Affiliated Scholar of the Marron Institute of Urban Management at New York University. Professor Jedwab’s main fields of research are development and growth, urban economics, labor economics and political economy. Some of the issues he has studied include urbanization and structural transformation, the relationship between population growth and economic growth, the economic effects of transportation infrastructure, and the roles of institutions, human capital and technology in development. He is the co-founder and co-organizer of the World Bank-GWU Urbanization and Poverty Reduction Conference and the Washington Area Development Economics Symposium. His research has been published in the American Economic Review, the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Economic Journal, and the Journal of Urban Economics. Finally, he is an Associate Editor at the Journal of Urban Economics and Regional Science and Urban Economics.

Maria Micaela Sviatschi is currently an Assistant Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University. She is also an affiliate at the CESifo Research Network, NBER development and political economy group, the African School of Economics and the International Crisis Group. Her research interests are labor and development economics, with a focus on human capital, gender-violence and crime.  One strand of her research explores how children start a criminal career in drug trafficking and gangs as well as the consequences of organized crime on economic development and state capacity. In particular, she has worked on the development of criminal skills in drug trafficking organizations in Peru and gangs in El Salvador. In addition, she studies how criminal organizations such as gangs and drug trafficking groups affect household’s behavior and state presence in the areas they control. Another strand of her research studies the role of state capacity to deter and improve service-delivery to reduce gender-based violence. In particular, studying the effects of women police officers in Peru and police street patrolling in India. In addition to this research, she has ongoing collaborative research projects in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Colombia, Mozambique, Jordan, Bangladesh and the US.

Mathias Thoenig is a Professor of Economics at the School of Business and Economics (HEC) at the University of Lausanne, a CEPR Research Fellow in the international trade and macro programs and an elected Council Member of the European Economic Association. He is a Distinguished Scholar at IMD Business School and a Professorial Fellow at Queen Mary University of London. Mathias Thoenig received his Ph.D. from University Paris-1 Sorbonne and his B.A. in engineering from Ecole Polytechnique. He has held visiting appointments at International Monetary Fund, MIT, SciencesPo Paris, University of British Columbia and University Pompeu Fabra. He also served on the editorial boards of Journal of European Economic Association and International Economics. His research interests include development, international trade and political economy of conflicts and migration. He has published and forthcoming papers in several international journals, including, among others: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Harvard Business Review, Journal of European Economic Association. He has been awarded an ERC Starting Grant in 2013 for his work on the role of distrust and grievances in ethnic conflicts.

Discussants:

Roland Hodler is Professor of Economics at the University of St.Gallen and Research Fellow at CEPR, CESifo and OxCarre. His research covers topics in development and political economics. His interests include how ethnic diversity, natural resources and foreign aid influence economic and human development as well as conflict, corruption and favoritism. His research has been published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, the Journal of Development Economics, the Journal of Public Economics, and the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; and covered by the BBC, the Economist, the Guardian, Le Monde, NZZ, and the Washington Post. He is also a member of the Bayelsa State Oil & Environmental Commission.

Mathieu Couttenier has obtained his PhD in Economics in 2011 at the University Paris 1 Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics. Before to join the Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon as Professor, he was post-doc at the University of Lausanne and assistant professor at the University of Geneva. He was also visiting researcher at the department of political sciences at Stanford and at the economic department at Sciences Po Paris. His research is filled with interactions between economics and political sciences but also cultural, institutional and geographical issues. He focuses on microeconomic questions, in particular in the fields of applied political economy and economic development. His main research interests are in the understanding of violence and civil wars. He has published many academic papers on the role played by income shocks, natural resources or climate on the diffusion of conflicts over space and time. Some of his present research agenda also studies the role of natural resources in the local economic development. He has published in many leading peer-refereed journals, such as the American Economic Review, the Journal of the European Economic Association, the Economic Journal, the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Journal of Development Economics and the Journal of Comparative Economics.

Elena Esposito is Assistant Professor at HEC Lausanne, University of Lausanne. She is an applied economist with research interests in the fields of development economics, economic growth, political economy, and economic history. Elena Esposito earned a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bologna in 2014 and she joined the department of Economics at the European University Institute (Italy) as “Max Weber Fellow”. She spent research periods at the departments of economics at universities in the USA. She also worked as an economic researcher and consultant for several international organizations, participating to projects with UNICEF, the European Commission and the World Bank, among others.

Eoin McGuirk is an Assistant Professor of Economics and Neubauer Faculty Fellow at Tufts University. His research interests are in development and political economics, with a particular focus on the causes and consequences of political violence and social divisions. In his research, he has examined how variation in world food prices can affect the type and location of conflict events in Africa, and how politicians are more likely to perpetuate conflict when they are sheltered from its costs. Most of his research employs natural experiments in order to identify causal relationships. He has Ph.D. in Economics from Trinity College, University of Dublin, and was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley.

Can Trade Agreements Solve the Wicked Problem of Disinformation

April 2021

Susan Aaronson (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2021-12

Abstract: Disinformation is a wicked problem. Increasingly, disinformation comes from overseas. Many nations have adopted a wide range of strategies to mitigate disinformation. This patchwork may not be effective in mitigating cross-border disinformation. Moreover, the lack of coherent approaches could also lead to trade distortions and spillover effects upon internet openness and generativity. This paper shows how policymakers might use trade agreements to govern the cross-border data flows that at times fuel disinformation. 

JEL Codes: 038, 039, F68, F53

Key Words: trade, disinformation, spam, trust 

India’s Trade Policy: Past, Present, Future

Wednesday, June 2nd, 2021
9:00am – 10:30 am EDT
via Zoom

This was the ninth webinar in the “Envisioning India” series, co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the Institute for International Economic Policy. This is a platform for dialogue and debate. We invited you to engage with us in this series of important discussions.

The “Envisioning India” series is organized under the stewardship of IIEP Co-Director James Foster, Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs and Professor of Economics, and IIEP Distinguished Visiting Scholar Ajay Chhibber. The ninth event featured Harsha Vardhana Singh, Chairman, IKDHVAJ Advisers LLP and Former Deputy Director-General at WTO, discussing “India’s Trade Policy: Past, Present, Future.” Dean Alyssa Ayres (GWU), Judith Dean (Brandeis), and Rajeev Kher provided discussant remarks. IIEP Co-Director Jay Shambaugh moderated.

India liberalised its trade regime in 1991 as part of a larger reform initiative. India’s trade surged and the economy grew to become the world’s 5th largest in 2019. Since 2018, India’s trade regime has become more protectionist with an aim to stem the trade deficit and promote domestic industry. India’s concern with a high trade deficit, in particular with China and ASEAN, has also impacted its approach to trade agreements. More recently, India opted out of RCEP. In 2020, India announced a new program of self-reliance (Atmanirbharta). Some fear that this is a signal of turning further inward. Yet India’s stated goals are to attract more FDI – especially as an alternative to China, enter global value chains, and encourage exports. How should we assess India’s recent policy changes and reconcile these shifts? What are the likely pathways for India’s future trade stance? Will India seek to substantively enhance growing US-India trade ties? Will its renewed interest in trade agreements with others such as the EU move forward giving some substantive results? Is it permanently out of RCEP? What steps by other nations could facilitate India’s increased trade engagements with major economies? What choices India makes will affect India and the world. Our distinguished speakers addressed these and related issues in this 9th talk on Envisioning India.

About the speakers:

Picture of Harsha SinghHarsha Vardhana Singh is Chairman, IKDHVAJ Advisers LLP, a consulting firm working on trade policy, industrial policy and regulatory issues. He has been a member of High-Level Expert Groups within India and abroad that inter alia address policy concerns related to trade policy, industrial policy, competition and regulatory policy. Earlier, he has worked at the GATT/WTO for 20 years (eight years as Deputy Director General, WTO), was Secretary Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Executive Director of Brookings India, Senior Fellow at Think Tanks in Switzerland and Canada, taught at Universities in the US and China, and been Chair/secretary of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Panels. He has a Ph.D. in Economics from University of Oxford, where he went as a Rhodes Scholar from India in 1979.

As WTO Deputy Director General, he had direct responsibility for Trade in Services, Trade in Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Trade and Environment, Technical Barriers to Trade, Chairman of the Groups on E-Commerce Program and the Cotton Development Agenda. As Economic Advisor and Secretary of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, he was part of the small group of officials that conceptualized and implemented a number of telecom sector policy reforms, resulting in large growth in the sector.

His recent engagements include: Senior Fellow, Council on Emerging Market Enterprises, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, USA (ongoing); Member of the Advisory Board of UNCTAD’s “Transnational Corporations Journal” (ongoing); Member of the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) International Trade Policy Council (ongoing); Non-Resident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council (ongoing); Senior Research Affiliate, Berkeley APEC Study Center, US (ongoing); Member, High Level Advisory Group on International Trade, established by Government of India; Member, Competition Law Review Committee to revise the Competition Act, established by Government of India;  Member, Expert Enquiry Committee Set Up by UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Trade Out of Poverty on “Can the Commonwealth help countries trade out of poverty?”; Member, High Level Board of Experts on the Future of Trade Governance, set up by Bertelsmann Stiftung; Senior Adviser to the Global Commission on Internet Governance on the topic, “Governance of International Trade and the Internet: Existing and Evolving Regulatory Systems”; Senior Advisor, Asia Society Policy Institute, on the topic “India and APEC: Charting a Path to Membership.”

Picture of Alyssa AyresAlyssa Ayres was appointed Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University effective February 1, 2021. Ayres is a foreign policy practitioner and award-winning author with senior experience in the government, nonprofit, and private sectors. From 2013 to 2021, she was senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where she remains an adjunct senior fellow. From 2010 to 2013 Ayres served as deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia. During her tenure at the State Department in the Barack Obama administration, she covered all issues across a dynamic region of 1.3 billion people at the time (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) and provided policy direction for four U.S. embassies and four consulates.

Her work focuses primarily on India’s role in the world and on U.S. relations with South Asia in the larger Indo-Pacific. Her book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, was published by Oxford University Press in January 2018 and was selected by the Financial Times for its “Summer 2018: Politics” list. An updated paperback edition was released in 2019. She served as the project director for the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S.-India relations, and, from 2014 to 2016, as the project director for an initiative on the new geopolitics of China, India, and Pakistan supported by the MacArthur Foundation.

Judith Dean is the Professor of International Economics in the Brandeis International Business School. Her research focuses on international trade and economic development. Much of her work examines the relationship between trade and the environment. In a series of empirical studies using Chinese data, she has been exploring the possibility that trade growth, foreign investment and production fragmentation may have beneficial effects on the environment. In other work, she studies global value chain trade, non-tariff barriers. and trade preferences for developing countries. Her new work on India explores the impact of trade liberalization on Indian poverty. Judy came to Brandeis from the US International Trade Commission (USITC) where she was a Senior International Economist in the Research Division of the Office of Economics. Prior to joining the USITC, Judy was Associate Professor of Economics at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, and Assistant Professor at Bowdoin College. She has been a consultant to the World Bank and the OECD, and a Visiting Scholar at the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. She has also helped facilitate research collaboration for the USITC with Tsinghua University and the India Development Foundation. Judy was named one of six Visiting Scholars in the Clayton Yeutter International Trade Program, University of Nebraska, 2012-13. In 2018, she gave the 4th Annual John Mason Lecture at Gordon College in 2018. Judy recently completed many years of service on the Board of Directors of World Relief, and the Board of Trustees of Gordon College.

Picture of Rajeev KherRajeev Kher superannuated as Commerce Secretary, Government of India in 2015 after a career of 35 years in the Indian Administrative Service. He then worked as a Member in the Competition Appellate Tribunal for two years. He has now associated himself with some leading think tanks. He also advises a Private Equity. His field of experience includes broad areas of International Trade and Commerce, Competition Law and Policy, Sustainable Development Policy, Environmental Management, Global Governance, particularly with reference to trade and environment and Decentralised Governance. He has held several important assignments in the Central Government and the State Government of UP. Some of the more prominent once include a tenure of 9 years in the Department of Trade and Commerce, a stint of 8 years in the Ministry of Environment and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in Delhi and senior level assignments in the Departments of Renewable Energy, Finance, Planning and Science and Technology, besides administering two very challenging charges of District Magistrates. He is credited with bringing in the first comprehensive Foreign Trade Policy for India. His vision on international trade issues has been well respected by the stakeholder community within India and abroad. He led negotiations on behalf of his country for Trade Agreements with major blocks such as EU, EFTA, RCEP and ASEAN. His initiatives to bring discourse on India’s competitiveness in Trade in Services, evolution of Policy on Technical Regulations and Standards and India’s position on the Global and Regional value chains in the forefront of Policy making are much recognised by the stakeholder community. He is also credited with hand holding the Pharmaceutical sector in its pursuit to become global leader in Generic Medicine and his work is highly appreciated by the industry. He has published work on India’s Patent Policy, Trade Policy, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Product standards and Technical Regulations and several other related areas.

About the Moderator:

Picture of James E. Foster

James E. Foster is the Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Economics, and Co-Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the George Washington University. He is also a Research Associate at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University. Professor Foster’s research focuses on welfare economics — using economic tools to evaluate and enhance the wellbeing of people. His work underlies many well-known social indices including the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) published annually by the UNDP in the Human Development Report, dozens of national MPIs used to guide domestic policy against poverty, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) at USAID, the Gross National Happiness Index of Bhutan, the Better Jobs Index of the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Statistical Performance Index of the World Bank. Prof. Foster received his PhD in Economics from Cornell University and has a Doctorate Honoris Causa from Universidad Autónoma del Estado Hidalgo (Mexico).

This event and seminar series was jointly organized with the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) and the UNDP Human Development Report Office.

 

India’s Demographic Dividend or Disaster? Mismanaged Factors of Production – Land, Labor, Infrastructure, Cities

April 2021

Ajay Chhibber (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2021-11

Abstract: India entered its so-called demographic dividend around 2005 – expected to last until 2055. India has already utilized almost a third of the period of its demographic dividend– it saw a period of explosive growth from 2003-2012 – but has not been able to sustain that growth. And since 2012 growth has generated less and less employment, as it has turned inward, so it is not helping the working age population get usefully employed. The Labor force participation rate for women has been low and is now falling. To understand where India stands in this transformation we ask – why is India’s so dualistic? Why is so much of Indian labor not employed in the organized sector? Why does India with limited capital – and vast quantities of surplus labor invest so much in relatively capital intensive sectors? Why is land which is scarce so badly allocated ? why do most of its cities develop in an unplanned manner ? What can be done to use India’s underlying factors of production better to generate greater, more inclusive and sustained prosperity for its citizens?

JEL Codes: J0, J1, J2, J5, J6, J8, R0, R4, O1, O2

Key Words: Demographic Dividend, Labor Laws, Urban Development, Infrastructure, Logistics, Land Mis-allocation

Disaggregating the Global MPI by Ethnicity

Monday, May 17, 2021
10 a.m. – 11:15 a.m. EDT
via Zoom

Alkire and Kovesdi discussed how the painful topic of race relations, discrimination, and disparities across ethnic groups are in the public eye. Far earlier, Amartya Sen drew attention to the disparity in life expectancies between Costa Rica, Kerala India, and African-American men. Can we study ethnic inequalities quantitatively at a larger scale? This presentation disaggregates the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) by ethnicity for 24 countries and 650 million people, using the recognized ethnic groups for which data were representative. Striking disparities are visible – ranging from pockets of poverty among groups such as the Roma, to yawning gaps between the average poverty levels. This paper illustrates the methodology – and the importance – of disaggregating global poverty measures by ethnic groups.

Jiménez discussed how part of the historic and ambitious nature of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is its pledge to leave no one behind, including a specific goal to reduce inequality between and within countries. This move beyond national averages to look at the unequal distribution of resources, opportunities and voice within countries includes the target to empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.

This presentation provided an overview of how the UN’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) has operationalized the pledge to “leave no one behind,” with a specific focus on trends in inequality by race and ethnicity. It is based on the OPHI Briefing on global MPI ethnicity disaggregations.

Meet the Presenter:

Maren Jiménez is a Social Affairs Officer in the United Nation’s Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). At DESA, Ms. Jiménez forms part of the writing team of the World Social Report (previously the Report on the World Social Situation), the United Nation’s flagship publication on social development issues. Prior to joining DESA, Ms. Jiménez held several positions at United Nations’ regional commissions in Addis Ababa, Bangkok and Santiago de Chile. Ms. Jiménez holds a M.A. in Sociology from The University of Texas at Austin. 

 

Picture of Sabina AlkireSabina Alkire directs the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), a research centre within the Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford. Dr Alkire works on a new approach to measuring poverty and well-being that goes beyond the traditional focus on income and growth. This multidimensional approach to measurement includes social goals, such as health, education, nutrition, standard of living and other valuable aspects of life. She devised a new method for measuring multidimensional poverty with her colleague James Foster (OPHI Research Associate and Professor of Economics at George Washington University) that has advantages over other poverty measures and has been adopted by the Mexican Government, the Bhutanese Government in their ‘Gross National Happiness Index’ and the United Nations Development Programme. Dr Alkire has been called upon to provide input and advice to several initiatives seeking to take a broader approach to well-being rather than just economic growth, for example, the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (instigated by President Sarkozy); the United Nations Human Development Programme Human Development Report Office; the European Commission; and the UK’s Department for International Development.

Fanni Kovesdi is a Research Analystat the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), where she is supporting research focused on the global MPI, moderate poverty and wellbeing, and technical work with national governments. Prior to joining OPHI, she has worked on research projects at the University of Oxford, the Centre for Social Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the regional office of Terre des Hommes in Central and South East Europe. Previously, she worked on the “Changes over Time” project which harmonized global MPI data across 80 countries to analyze trends in poverty. She has also supported previous releases of the global MPI through data work and report writing along with leading the ethnicity disaggregation of the measure in 2019. Kovesdi holds a bachelor’s degree in Politics and Sociology from the University of Bristol, and a Master’s degree in Sociology from the University of Oxford. Her primary research interests are in multidimensional poverty measurement and analysis, wellbeing, and ethnicity and migration, particularly in the European context.

Meet the Discussant:

Rachel M. Gisselquist, a political scientist, is a Senior Research Fellow with the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) and a member of the institute’s senior management team. She works on the politics of developing countries, with particular attention to inequality, ethnic politics, statebuilding and governance and the role of aid therein, democracy and democratization, and sub-Saharan African politics. At UNU-WIDER, she currently leads the projects Addressing Group-based Inequalities and The State and Statebuilding in the Global South – International and Local Interactions, and co-leads the projects The Impact of Inequality on Growth, Human Development, and Governance @EQUAL, Clientelist Politics and Economic Development – Theories, Perspectives, and New Directions, and Effects of Swedish and International Democracy Support. She serves as Helsinki-based research focal point for the Southern Africa – Towards Inclusive Economic Development (SA-TIED) programme, and is a core member of the UNU-WIDER team in the African Cities Research Consortium. Under the institute’s previous research programmes, she was a focal point for The Politics of Group-Based Inequalities: Measurement, Implications, and Possibilities for Change (2014–18), and the Governance and Fragility theme of the Research and Communication on Foreign Aid (ReCom) programme (2011–13). Her work is published in various journals and edited volumes, including World Development, Journal of Development Studies, Oxford Development Studies, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Social Indicators Research, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Democratization, and International Peacekeeping. She is editor/co-editor of a dozen journal special issues and collections, and co-author of the first two editions of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, which has become a standard reference on governance. Before moving to Helsinki, she spent three years at Harvard University as Research Director, Index of African Governance. She has also spent time at the London School of Economics and with the World Bank. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Master’s degree in Public Policy from Harvard University.

Meet the Moderator: 

Picture of James FosterJames E. Foster is the Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Economics, and Co-Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the George Washington University. He is also a Research Associate at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University. Professor Foster’s research focuses on welfare economics — using economic tools to evaluate and enhance the wellbeing of people. His work underlies many well-known social indices including the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) published annually by the UNDP in the Human Development Report, dozens of national MPIs used to guide domestic policy against poverty, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) at USAID, the Gross National Happiness Index of Bhutan, the Better Jobs Index of the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Statistical Performance Index of the World Bank. Prof. Foster received his PhD in Economics from Cornell University and has a Doctorate Honoris Causa from Universidad Autonoma del Estado Hidalgo (Mexico).

Counterfactual Dissimilarity: Can Changes in Demographics and Income Explain Increased Racial Integration in U.S. Cities?

March 2021

Paul E. Carrillo (George Washington University)
Jonathan L. Rothbaum (U.S. Census Bureau)

IIEP working paper 2021-10

Abstract: Urban areas in the U.S. have experienced important changes in racial/ethnic distributions over the last two decades. In the average urban area today black-white racial integration has increased by 10.6 percent between 1990 and 2010. Changes in racial and ethnic distributions and gentrification are often associated with changes in residents’ demographic characteristics, such as income, education and age. This paper applies a non-parametric spatial decomposition technique using complete (restricted-use) microdata files from the 1990 Decennial Long Form Census and 2008-2012 American Community Surveys to assess what portion of the changes in racial distributions can be attributed to changes in individual characteristics. We find that that, on average, a little over a third of the observed increase in integration can be accounted for by changes in observed individual characteristics.

JEL Codes: C14, R23, R30

Key Words: Counterfactual Distribution, Decomposition, Spatial Econometrics

Why is India’s Financial Sector in Such Trouble: A Whodunnit?

August 2021

Ajay Chhibber (George Washington University)

IIEP working paper 2021-09

Abstract: India’s financial system has never collapsed – unlike many other emerging economies. But it suffers from a deep and expanding silent crisis, which has made it one of the most inefficient and non-inclusive financial systems in the world. This paper unravels the reasons for this deep crisis – who is responsible – the regulators, populist politicians, crony capitalists and India’s fiscal dominance. It shows that all the above are culpable. It lays out the major reforms needed and argues that if deep surgery is not performed India cannot emerge as a global economic powerhouse in the 21st century and will remain stuck in a low middle-income trap.

JEL Codes: G00, G01, G18, G21, G32, G33

Key Words: Financial Crisis; Public Sector Banks; Financial Inclusion; Banking Reform

Deepening or Diminishing Ethnic Divides? The Impact of Urban Migration in Kenya

March 2021

Eric Kramon, George Washington University
Joan Hamory, University of Oklahoma
Sarah Baird, George Washington University
Edward Miguel, University of California, Berkeley

IIEP working paper 2021-08

Abstract: The impact of urban migration on ethnic politics is the subject of long-standing debate. “First-generation” modernization theories predict that urban migration should reduce ethnic identification and increase trust between groups. “Second-generation” modernization perspectives argue the opposite: Urban migration may amplify ethnic identification and reduce trust. We test these competing expectations with a three-wave panel survey following more than 8,000 Kenyans over a 15-year period, providing novel evidence on the impact of urban migration. Using individual fixed effects regressions, we show that urban migration leads to reductions in ethnic identification; ethnicity’s importance to the individual diminishes after migrating. Yet urban migration also reduces trust between ethnic groups, and trust in people generally. Urban migrants become less attached to their ethnicity but more suspicious. The results advance the literature on urbanization and politics and have implications for the potential consequences of ongoing urbanization processes around the world.

JEL Codes:

Key Words:

The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime: Evidence from the Great Migration

March 2021

Bryan A. Stuart, George Washington University

Evan J. Taylor University of Arizona

IIEP working paper 2021-07

Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of social connectedness on crime across U.S. cities from 1970 to 2009. Migration networks among African Americans from the South generated variation across destinations in the concentration of migrants from the same birth town. Using this novel source of variation, we find that social connectedness considerably reduces murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts, with a 1 standard deviation increase in social connectedness reducing murders by 21% and motor vehicle thefts by 20%. Social connectedness especially reduces murders of adolescents and young adults committed during gang and drug activity

JEL Codes: K42, N32, R23, Z13

Key Words: crime, social connectedness, Great Migration

Measuring Human Development for the Anthropocene

March 2021

Ajay Chhibber, (Distinguished Visiting Scholar , IIEP and Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council)

IIEP working paper 2021-06

Abstract: This paper makes the case for an adjusted Human Development Index (HDI) that adds sustainability, vulnerability and human security to the existing HDI components of income, health and education. It shows that these additional elements were part of the discourse in many original writings on human development. They are also central in any discourse on development today. The HDI has made progress by adding gender and inequality in its formulations, but is more reflective of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda than the more comprehensive Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed in 2015. The paper reviews existing indicators and suggests a way towards an adjusted HDI. It shows that above an HDI level of 0.8, the cut-off for very high human development, major trade-offs emerge with ecology. It argues for incorporating ecological and human security variables into the HDI, and creating a vulnerability-adjusted HDI that measures resilience to ecological, health and economic shocks, akin to the Inequality-adjusted HDI.

JEL Codes:

Key Words:

Data is Divisive: A History of Public Communications on E-commerce, 1998–2020

February 2021

Susan Ariel Aaronson and Thomas Struett

IIEP working paper 2021-04

Abstract: For 22 years, the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been discussing how to govern e-commerce and the data that underpins it. In 2019, some 74 (now 86) nations began to negotiate e-commerce. These talks are conducted in secret and little is known about how they are progressing. However, WTO members issued a wide range of public comments on both the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce and the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on Electronic Commerce from 1998, when the work program began, to the present. These communications provide context as well as a window into the negotiations. Using qualitative techniques to analyze these communications, the authors found that throughout the 22-year period, member states were divided by their understanding, capacity and willingness to set rules governing e-commerce or digital trade. Members had divergent views on: whether or not to extend the moratorium on customs duties (although they have consistently extended it); how best to nurture the digital economy and what role trade agreements should play in governing it; and the ability of all WTO member states to participate effectively in these talks. Many countries had e-commerce expertise, but they did not have a wide range of firms with digital prowess. Moreover, many of the WTO member states did not have expertise governing various types of data. In short, data, digital prowess and data governance expertise were creating division among members. To bridge this divide, this paper offers three suggestions: First, donor nations should provide funds and expertise to help developing and middle-income nations build a data-driven economy. Second, digital trade/e-commerce agreements should be designed to enable more people to benefit from data-driven growth while simultaneously setting rules to govern digital trade that facilitate trust and predictability among market actors. To that end, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), an agreement among New Zealand, Chile and Singapore, provides a good model of such collaboration and rule-setting. Third, as data governance has become a key issue for development, development organizations should define what comprehensive data governance looks like at the national level. Development organizations should next examine how they can help developing countries achieve flexible and technologically neutral governance. These organizations should also provide financial and technical assistance to help developing countries build data governance skill. 

JEL Codes: 

Key Words: trade, digital trade, data, development

What Do Hedonic House Price Estimates Tell Us When CAP Rates Vary?

February 2022

Paul E. Carrillo and Anthony Yezer

IIEP working paper 2021-03

Abstract: This paper demonstrates theoretically and empirically that estimated implicit prices from hedonic equations using house value do not reflect implicit willingness to pay for housing attributes unless very strong conditions are present. The argument is simple. Implicit prices obtained from rental hedonics, consistent with theory, can potentially be used to reveal the willingness to pay for current housing services. Therefore hedonic equations relating asset prices to current characteristics only reveal willingness to pay for structure and neighborhood services if cap rates (rent to value ratios) are constant. In some cases, the sign of the bias inherent in using asset rather than rental prices can be anticipated. Some rules and tests for situations where cap rates are constant are developed. At a minimum some of these checks for variation in cap rates should be implemented before using asset price hedonics to measure the current flow of housing services.

Key Words: Hedonic models, implicit markets, capitalization rate, environmental valuation

Hidden Wealth

Wednesday, April 28, 2021
12:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.
via Zoom

This was the 12th webinar of the “Facing Inequality” series, hosted by the Institute for International Economic Policy. This virtual series focuses on current and emerging inequality issues in the U.S. and around the globe – especially those revealed by the current COVID-19 pandemic. It brings together historians, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and epidemiologists, within the academy and without, to present work and discuss ideas that can facilitate new interdisciplinary approaches to the problem of inequality. This is a platform for dialogue and debate. We invite you to engage with us in this series of important discussions.

The “Facing Inequality” series is organized under the stewardship of IIEP Director James Foster, Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs and Professor of Economics, and IIEP Faculty Affiliate Trevor Jackson, Assistant Professor of History. The series is co-sponsored by the GW Interdisciplinary Inequality Series, co-organized by Prof. Jackson from the Department of History and Prof. Bryan Stuart from the Department of Economics.

In this webinar, Neil Cummins discussed his current research. Using individual level records of all wealth-at-death in England, 1892-1992, together with new estimates of the wealth-specific rate-of-return on wealth, he estimates a plausible minimum level of the amount of inherited wealth that is hidden. Elites conceal around 20% of their inheritance. Among dynasties, this hidden wealth, independent of declared wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013-6, house values in 1999, and Oxbridge attendance, 1990-2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates at least 40% of the observed decline of the top 10% wealth-share over the past century. Cummins finds 8,549 dynasties that are hiding £7.7 Billion.

Marina Gindelsky (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Jonathan Rothbaum (U.S. Census Bureau) served as discussants. IIEP Co-Director James Foster will moderate.

About the speaker:

Neil Cummins is an Associate Professor of Economic History at the London School of Economics, where he also received his PhD in 2009. His research themes are “life, love and death”; Neil uses Historical Big Data to answer fundamental questions about economics, demography and history. Previously he has published papers on the decline of fertility in Europe, the effects of bubonic plague in London, the dynamics of the Malthusian economy, in France, and the lifespans of European Elites since the 9th century. Together with Greg Clark, he has documented the glacial rate of social mobility over the past 1,000 years in Britain. Currently he is using the individual information of hundreds of millions of English, 1838 to today, to describe and characterise wealth inequality, the hidden wealth of the English elite, assortment in the marriage market, and ethnic assimilation in England. This research will add new micro-evidence, on a population scale, for the historical development of, and the causal forces creating, inequality in contemporary Britain. His methods combine economic logic and historical sources with big data analytics. His research papers are available at neilcummins.com.

About the discussants:

Picture of Marina GindelskyMarina Gindelsky is a Research Economist at the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Office of the Chief Economist. Her current research focuses on income distributions, including the newly launched Distribution of Personal Income, which distributes U.S. macro national accounts totals to households, and participation in the OECD Expert Group on Disparities in a National Accounts Framework. She has a wide range of research interests in labor, urban and development economics, and a diverse set of ongoing and published projects including forecasting and measuring multidimensional inequality, analyzing historical urban growth in developing countries, assessing immigrant assimilation outcomes, and estimating housing using Zillow data. Before joining the BEA, she consulted at the World Bank and completed a Masters in International Economics and Finance from Brandeis University and a Ph.D. in Economics from GW.

Picture of Jonathan RothbaumJonathan Rothbaum is a research economist in the Social, Economic and Housing Statistics Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. He works on the integration of administrative data into the production of income, resource, and wellbeing statistics. His research has focused on nonresponse, measurement error, and data quality in income surveys and on using surveys to study intergenerational mobility in the United States. Prior to joining the Census Bureau in 2013, Rothbaum received his doctorate in economics from George Washington University.

 

About the moderator:

Picture of James FosterJames E. Foster is the Oliver T. Carr, Jr. Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Economics, and Co-Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the George Washington University. He is also a Research Associate at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University. Professor Foster’s research focuses on welfare economics — using economic tools to evaluate and enhance the wellbeing of people. His work underlies many well-known social indices including the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) published annually by the UNDP in the Human Development Report, dozens of national MPIs used to guide domestic policy against poverty, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) at USAID, the Gross National Happiness Index of Bhutan, the Better Jobs Index of the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Statistical Performance Index of the World Bank. Prof. Foster received his PhD in Economics from Cornell University and has a Doctorate Honoris Causa from Universidad Autonoma del Estado Hidalgo (Mexico).

International Monetary Fund’s Spring 2021 World Economic Outlook

Friday, April 23, 2021
1:30 pm – 3:00 pm EDT
via Zoom

Agenda

1:30 – 1:35 p.m.     Welcoming Remarks:

Jay Shambaugh, George Washington University 

1:35 – 2:05 p.m.     Chapter 1: Global Prospects and Policies 

Presenter: Malhar Nabar, International Monetary Fund

Discussant: Karen Dynan, Harvard University and Peterson Institute

2:05 – 2:30 p.m.     Chapter 2: After Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Prospects for Medium-Term Economic Damage

Presenter: Sonali Das, International Monetary Fund

Discussant: Danny Leipziger, George Washington University

2:30 – 2:55 p.m.     Chapter 3: Recessions and Recoveries in Labor Markets: Patterns, Policies, and Responses to the COVID-19 Shock

Presenter: Francesca Caselli, International Monetary Fund

Discussant: Kristen Broady, Hamilton Project, Brookings and Dillard University

2:55 – 3:00 p.m.      General Q&A and Concluding Remarks

Read the full World Economic Outlook here.

Chapter 1: Global Prospects and Policies

Although the contraction of activity in 2020 was unprecedented in living memory, extraordinary policy support prevented even worse economic outcomes. Global growth is projected at 6% in 2021, moderating to 4.4% in 2022, revised up from the October 2020 WEO. The upward revision reflects additional fiscal support in a few large economies, the anticipated vaccine-powered recovery in the second half of 2021, and continued adaptation of economic activity to subdued mobility. High uncertainty surrounds this outlook, related to the pandemic’s path, the effectiveness of policies as a bridge to vaccine-powered normalization, and the evolution of financial conditions. Much remains to be done to beat back the pandemic and avoid persistent increases in inequality within countries and divergence across economies.

Chapter 1 Presenter:

Picture of Malhar NabarMalhar Nabar heads the World Economic Studies division in the IMF’s Research Department, which produces the World Economic Outlook (WEO). In previous roles in the IMF’s Asia and Pacific Department he covered China and Japan, and was mission chief for Hong Kong, SAR. Malhar’s research interests are in financial development, investment, and productivity growth. Before joining the IMF in 2009, he was an Assistant Professor of Economics at Wellesley College. He holds a Ph.D. from Brown University.

 

Chapter 1 Discussant:

Picture of Karen DynanKaren Dynan is a Professor of the Practice in the Harvard University Department of Economics and at the Harvard Kennedy School. She previously served as Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy and Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of the Treasury from 2014 to 2017. From 2009 to 2013, Dynan was vice president and co-director of the Economic Studies program at the Brookings Institution. Before that, she was on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board, leading work in macroeconomic forecasting, household finances, and the Fed’s response to the financial crisis. Dynan has also served as a senior economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers (2003-2004) and as a visiting assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University (1998). Her current research focuses on fiscal and other types of macroeconomic policy, consumer behavior, and household finances. She is also currently a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Dynan received her Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University and her A.B. from Brown University.

Chapter 2:  After-Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Prospects for Medium-Term Economic Damage

This chapter examines the possible persistent damage (scarring) that may occur from the COVID-19 recession and the channels through which they may occur. Expected medium-term output losses from the pandemic are substantial, at about 3 percent lower than pre-pandemic anticipated output for the world in 2024. The degree of expected scarring varies across countries, depending on the structure of economies and the size of the policy response. To limit scarring, policymakers should continue to provide support to the most-affected sectors and workers while the pandemic is ongoing. Remedial policies for the setback to human capital accumulation, measures to lift investment, and initiatives to support reallocation will be key to address long-term GDP losses.

Chapter 2 Presenter:

Picture of Sonali DasSonali Das is a senior economist in the World Economic Studies Division in the IMF’s Research Department. Previously, she worked in the IMF’s Asia and Pacific Department, where she covered China, India, Nepal, and Fiji. Her research interests include monetary policy, investment, and financial stability. She holds a PhD in economics from Cornell University.

 

Chapter 2 Discussant:

Picture of Danny LeipzigerDr. Danny Leipziger is Professor of International Business and International Affairs at George Washington University, where he is concurrently the Managing Director of the Growth Dialogue. Professor Leipziger has been a faculty member in the highly-ranked International Business Department since 2009, where he has taught both undergraduate and graduate courses on macroeconomics, applied development, financial crises, and international economics, and he has taught in the GW/IFC/Milken Capital Markets Graduate Program for mid-career government officials since its inception. He has been advisor to the governments of South Korea, Vietnam, Ivory Coast, Uzbekistan, Argentina, and South Africa, among others.

A former Vice President for Poverty Reduction and Economic Management at the World Bank (2004-2009), he served three World Bank Presidents and held senior management positions in the East Asia and Latin America Regions. While at the World Bank, he led the team preparing the emergency financial bailout loan to Korea in 1997. He was the World Bank’s Director for Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure for Latin America (1998-2004). He served previously in the U.S. Department of State, and was a Member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff.

Dr. Leipziger was Vice Chair of the Spence Commission on Growth and Development and he served on the WEF Council on Economic Progress. An economist with a Ph. D. from Brown University, he has published widely in development economics, finance and banking, and on East Asia and Latin America. He is the author of several books, including Lessons of East Asia (U. of Michigan Press), Stuck in the Middle (Brookings Institution), and Globalization and Growth and more than 50 refereed and published articles in journals and other outlets. He is frequent contributor to VoxEU, Project Syndicate, and other media, and he has appeared on Bloomberg, BBC, an CCTV and Korean TV as expert commentator.

Chapter 3:  Recessions and Recoveries in Labor Markets: Patterns, Policies, and Responses to the COVID-19 Shock

The labor market fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic shock continues, with young and lower-skilled workers particularly hard-hit. This chapter examines the labor market consequences of the crisis, how it compares with previous shocks, and how policies can help. Preexisting employment trends favoring a shift away from jobs that are more vulnerable to automation are accelerating. Policy support for job retention is extremely powerful at reducing scarring and mitigating the unequal impacts from the acute pandemic shock. As the pandemic subsides and the recovery normalizes, a switch toward worker reallocation support measures could help reduce unemployment more quickly and ease the adjustment to the permanent effects of the COVID-19 shock on the labor market.

Chapter 3 Presenter:

Picture of Francesca CaselliFrancesca Caselli is an economist in the World Economic Studies Division of the IMF Research Department. Previously, she worked in the Systemic Issues Division of the Research Department and in the European Department, participating to Article IV missions to Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Before joining the IMF, she worked at the OECD and visited the Bank of Italy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Economics from the Graduate Institute in Geneva.

 

Chapter 3 Discussant:

Kristen Broady is a Fellow with the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program.  She is the Barron Hilton Endowed Full Professor of Financial Economics on leave at Dillard University in New Orleans.  She previously served as Visiting Professor of Economics at Howard University, Alabama A&M University, Department Chair of Business and Economics at Fort Valley State University, Vice Provost for Graduate Studies at Kentucky State University and as a visiting faculty member at Jiangsu Normal University in Xuzhou, China. Dr. Broady served as a consultant for the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in Washington, D.C.; a senior research fellow for the Center for Global Policy Solutions in Washington, D.C.; a consultant for the City of East Point, Georgia and as an HBCU consultant for season two of The Quad on Black Entertainment Television (BET) in Atlanta. Her areas of research include racial wealth disparities, mortgage foreclosure risk, labor and automation, and racial health disparities. She earned a BA in criminal justice at Alcorn State University and an MBA and PhD in business administration with a major in economics at Jackson State University.

Minimum Performance Targets, Multitasking and Incentives: Theory and Evidence from China’s Air Quality Controls

Friday, April 9, 2021
9:30 a.m.-11 a.m. EDT
via Zoom

The Institute for International Economic Policy is pleased to invite you to the 13th annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations. This year, the conference will take place as a virtual series. This conference is co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the GW Center for International Business Education and Research.

As the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, China has launched serious efforts to tighten its environmental regulation and curb air pollution in the past decade. A distinctive feature of Beijing’s approach is the critical role played by local governments in complying with central directives. China’s local officials are currently facing the dual tasks of pursuing local economic development and curbing air pollution, which are potentially conflicting with each other. To resolve this multitasking challenge, China has recently introduced minimum targets for air quality controls to discipline local officials while continuing to link their promotion prospects to local economic performance (such as GDP growth).

In the event, Peking University’s Li-An Zhou discussed how local Chinese officials respond strategically to minimum air quality control targets when they care more about pursuing regional economic development, which is closely linked to their career prospects. Using a novel prefecture-day-level dataset on air quality, Zhou finds strong evidence that air quality tends to improve when the air quality target is doomed to fail, but deteriorates significantly after the early fulfillment of the target is guaranteed. These “asymmetric” strategic responses are mainly driven by “outsiders” – local officials with no previous exposure to the regions to which they are assigned. Greater pressure to promote local economic development reinforces outsiders’ asymmetric responses. For “non-outsiders” who have been promoted from the local area and who are more likely to intrinsically value the local environment, air quality performance is stable in both cases of target fulfillment. The study sheds light on how minimum air quality targets have worked in China’s context and highlights the role of intrinsic motivations in mitigating strategic responses to minimum performance targets in a multitasking environment.

JHU’s Matthew Kahn served as a discussant and IIEP Co-Director Jay Shambaugh served as a moderator, with a brief introduction from IIEP’s Chao Wei.

Co-sponsors:
Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the GW Center for International Business Education and Research.

Meet the Speakers: 

Li-An Zhou Li-An Zhou is is Professor of Economics and Associate Dean of Guanghua School of
Management at Peking University. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Stanford
University. His research interests include political economy, industrial organization,
economic development, and Chinese economy. Dr. Zhou has published papers in
leading international journals of economics and management including American
Economic Review, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, Journal of
Public Economics, Journal of Development Economics, and Strategic Management Journal.

Meet the Discussant: 

Matthew E. KahnMatthew E. Kahn is the Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Economics and Business at Johns Hopkins University and the Director of JHU’s 21st Century Cities Initiative. He is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a research fellow at IZA. He has taught at Columbia, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, UCLA and USC. He has served as a Visiting Professor at Harvard and Stanford and as the Low Tuck Kwong Distinguished Visiting Professor at the National University of Singapore. He is a graduate of Hamilton College and the London School of Economics. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago. He is the author of Green Cities: Urban Growth and the Environment (Brookings Institution Press 2006) and the co-author (joint with Dora L. Costa) of Heroes and Cowards: The Social Face of War (Princeton University Press 2009). He is also the author of Climatopolis (Basic Books 2010) and Blue Skies over Beijing: Economic Growth and the Environment in China (joint with Siqi Zheng published by Princeton Press in 2016). He has also published three other Amazon Kindle books on urban economics and microeconomics. His research focuses on urban and environmental economics.

Meet the Moderators: 

Jay Shambaugh is Professor of Economics and  International Affairs, and Co- Director of the Institute for International Economic Policy at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. His area of research is macroeconomics and international economics. He has had two stints in public service. He served as a Member of the White House Council of Economic Advisors from 2015-2017. Earlier, he served on the staff of the CEA as a Senior Economist for International Economics and then as the Chief Economist. He also spent 3 years as the Director of the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. Jay is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER and Non-Resident Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. Prior to joining the faculty at George Washington, Jay taught at Georgetown and Dartmouth and was a visiting scholar at the IMF. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. from the Fletcher School at Tufts, and a B.A. from Yale University.

Chao WeiChao Wei received her PhD in Economics from Stanford University in 2001. She also holds an MA in economics from Columbia University and a BA in economics from Fudan University in China. She worked at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for two years before joining the George Washington University in 2003. Her research interests focus on the intersection of macroeconomics and financial economics, with an emphasis on the asset pricing implications of production economies with and without nominal rigidities. Her current research examines the impact of personal and corporate income taxes on asset returns. She teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in Money and banking, and Macroeconomic Theory.