inequality

Tackling Inequality Dynamics in Colombia: A Shot at Stable Peace

GW Peace StudiesMarch 6, 2021June 18, 2021Leave a comment

by Marwa Harmeed

The challenges that Colombia faces, and more importantly how these challenges will be responded to collectively by its citizens and government, will define the status of Colombia for years to come. Whether it be issues that are unique to the coronavirus pandemic or old ones that have been exacerbated by these increasingly fraught times, both share two common things at their core. For them to be overcome, they cannot be fixed simply by putting another band aid over the bullet wound or by looking at problems from a national perspective. Rather, the source of the bleeding has to be found and addressed at the local level, instead of a national one. The most pertinent issue facing Colombia is its worsening state of inequality. Not only is it the uneven distribution of opportunities or resources in society, but also inequality in its most deep-rooted and human form— where people cast severe judgments on other people, creating a gridlocked stigma that manifests itself in society. This multifaceted inequality is an all-encompassing issue that has festered for far too long in Colombia. If what is causing it cannot be stopped, the want for peace will disintegrate, and with it, any tangible shot at a stable future for Colombia.

Socioeconomic Inequality: Barriers Holding Back a Future Middle-Class

Inequality has always been a part of Colombian life, but with the pandemic, the deep stratification of society has only become more set into place. The economy, which had started to trend upwards before the pandemic, has plunged back into a horrible state — this means that whatever hope people had of moving up or improving their living conditions has simply disintegrated.^[i] This hope for a better life was one of the main driving points of the peace deal as it allowed for ex-combatants to see a future where war was not the norm. This also applies to the public. If Colombians cannot see a future with a chance to better provide for themselves and their children, how can they even focus on achieving peace? In breaking down the barriers and deep stratifications of society, socioeconomic improvement can once again be grasped and ignite the hope that long has been missing in Colombian life—hope in a future where meeting one's needs is not just something known by the rich, but by all. Only then, in a society with equitable standing, can the wounds created by the civil conflict begin to heal, and then handled in a manner that doesn’t just involve temporary fixes.

Colombia is the third most populated country in Latin America with almost 52 million people as of this year. ^[ii] The poverty rate has considerably declined in the past 40 years, reaching its lowest ever point (around 27%) in 2017. ^[iii] Colombia has seen an expansion in its middle-class as a result— millions of people have been able to make it out of poverty, but just barely. The reality in Colombia is that economic growth does not translate into improvements that are truly proportional to the level of change in income or socioeconomic standing. ^[iv] This is because the “true” middle-class is concentrated in urban areas, such as in Bogota where the middle-class accounts for almost 52% of the population. [v] In comparison, the middle class accounts for less in rural areas, where extreme poverty was three times as high and moderate poverty 55% higher than in urban areas. ^[vi] This paradox is a result of the barriers in society, which are reinforced by the economy, that people run into when their standard of living has just started to improve. The existence of these barriers has long been something that people are aware of, but pinpointing what they are is an issue within itself because they are so broad. They range from the rural-urban divide, to differences in education, to difficulties getting adjusted to a new job, and so on. These socioeconomic barriers prohibit the social mobility that is necessary for people just above the poverty line to launch themselves into the “solid” middle-class, where improvements in living will truly begin to equal a steady and dependable income. Just when those who most desperately need it begin to slowly grasp the edges of an improved standard of living, they begin to slip back into the old difficulties they faced because they are not equipped with the tools necessary to succeed in the middle-class and be able to firmly stay there. Simply put, to break down the socioeconomic barriers in Colombia, means giving those just out of poverty the tools needed to stay there.

Swaying the Needle: Breaking Socioeconomic Barriers for All

Colombia’s middle-class has had rapid and continued growth, with more and more people able to move above the poverty line. However, those who have been able to move into the middle-class are having a hard time staying there, slipping back into poverty. The root of this socioeconomic inequality lies in the fact that those in poverty do not have the adequate resources necessary to sustain themselves once they become a part of the middle-class. To solve this, the government needs to recognize that their national approach needs to become a local approach, where the specific needs of each locality is heard and community approaches being the ones that are put into place. With that, the focus can be on getting an increase in adequate resources rather than trying to implement standard national initiatives (which have broad goals and tend to do little to combat specific issues ex-combatants face). These standard initiatives may help to put people in the middle-class, but they do not provide people with the training and skills necessary to keep them there. These adequate resources can be determined by each locality. They can include trainings (to help people adapt to new jobs that come with the middle-class or how to handle their finances, such as budgeting or savings) or educational courses (to help further skills in a manner that ex-combatants find useful — maybe it can deal with trade jobs or getting the aid necessary to go back to school). With more resources available, the process of economic change will seem less daunting, and will equip more people to stay in a position of economic stability (and once adjusted, have the chance to move themselves even further).

Socioeconomic Inequality: Barriers Facing Ex-Combatants

The breaking of socioeconomic barriers with the creation of a sustainable middle-class is highly important in making a stable future for those hovering below or slightly above the poverty line. Arguably, this is even more important for ex-combatants. It is the key to keeping peace alive, as it gives them something to uphold, and which would serve as an incentive to truly and fully give up arms. The challenges for them are further exacerbated by a whole other set of issues. First, ex-combatants still mainly live in rural areas. The levels of poverty are higher in rural areas of Colombia because funding from the government is not enough to stimulate the same level of socioeconomic change that occurs in more urban areas. This is mainly connected to shortfalls in education or training. [vii] Second, even if ex-combatants under the poverty line are able to move slightly above it, as a result of government initiatives, that push into the fringe of the middle-class still poses challenges. Being middle-class in a rural area is different from being middle-class in an urban area. Even if people reach the middle-class in rural areas, the income and resources fall short of what is expected with that type of change in economic status because rural areas do not receive the same level of resources as urban areas. Furthermore, they are not as accustomed as urban areas are at being able to facilitate that level of economic change. [viii] With the middle-class amounting to different things in rural and urban areas, any work or contributions of ex-combatants needs to amount to just as much as those in (an urban) society in order to give ex-combatants a fair shot at making it. To do that means giving rural areas the investment necessary to be just as well off as urban areas. Maybe then ex-combatants will start bearing the fruits of their labor and become working members of society once again.

Swaying the Needle: Ensuring Ex-Combatants Have a Shot at the Middle-Class

Ex-combatants find themselves in rural areas, struggling to make a living that provides for themselves and their families. To give ex-combatants a chance at a better life (something practically synonymous with decreasing the want for violence) means ensuring that rural areas are treated the same — given the same amount of help, funding, and resources— as urban areas. Once again, this also goes back to a local approach rather than a national approach. With an increase in money (just enough to equal that given to more urban areas), as well as more support from non-governmental organizations and other local organizations, tailored plans can be made pertaining to the rural areas that ex-combatants live in. This way, shortfalls in the support of ex-combatants can be identified and addressed, so that their work towards a better life can begin to amount to something tangible, instead of a sense that any work they accomplish will leave them right where they started. That progress they are then able to make, as a result of more rigorous support (support that had only been reserved for urban areas before), can be just the push they need to get into the middle-class. A push into the middle-class can also help to change the public perception of ex-combatants as criminals or idle people who are not working to help themselves. This would further enable them to successfully reintegrate into the communities they are in (highlighting the strong link between economic and social integration, discussed in terms of stigmatization below). ^[ix]

Social Inequality: Reintegration & the Stigma Around Ex-Combatants

Another piece of the inequality puzzle is the conflicting opinions that came from the referendum and the revised peace deal that followed, as well as the two different outlooks of those who were for the peace deal and those who were not. These opinions played a large role in the willingness of citizens to accept ex-combatants back in society— as a part of the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion) policy put into place. ^[x] Ex-combatants have trouble reintegrating into society because citizens hold a prejudiced view of them that fosters a stigma. ^[xi] This polarizing form of inequality can strike down any notion of lasting peace. This is in no way saying that those who have been directly affected by the conflict and have lost loved ones due to the actions of the ex-combatants should forgive and forget. But in order for there to be even the smallest hope of a future without violence, the public’s perception of ex-combatants needs to change. This is the only way for all sides to coexist in a civil society— where ex-combatants can build a life without the taking up of arms, the government can begin to build lasting foundations for a state that serves the people, and citizens(those directly affected or not) can begin to heal and hold productive discussions that do not just involve pointing fingers.

About half of the people who voted in the referendum election voted against the peace agreement, in part because of the moral questions surrounding ex-combatants. Some even said that such an agreement would be letting people, whom they viewed as rebels, get away with murder. ^[xii] These notions present in Colombian society, ranging from the extreme to more mild, helped to create this stigma and ultimately a pushback against the acceptance of ex-combatants into society. The stigma surrounding ex-combatants plays to the stereotypical views that people may have of them, which helps to insight fear and build barriers that further hinder the reconciliation process. ^[xiii] If this constant fear of ex-combatants persists , people’s perceptions will never be challenged. To be broken down means taking a step back and looking at the communities that the ex-combatants live in. Addressing the stigma at the community level could set the stage for a ripple effect that could influence societal thinking on a much larger level.

Swaying the Needle: Changing the Stigma Around Ex-Combatants

An important aspect of breaking down this stigma deals with how ex-combatants view transitional justice. The acceptance of transitional justice by ex-combatants was found to be linked to the actions of the civilian population. If ex-combatants believed that the communities they found themselves in after demobilizing accepted and did not reject them, they were more likely to accept responsibility for the violence committed. Additionally, they were more in favor of reparations to victims. ^[xiv] The same study also concluded that if ex-combatants were reintegrated to a place closer to their zone of deployment, they were more likely to face what they took part in by way of community-based interactions. This resulted from a greater push for self-accountability in areas they directly affected. If they were placed in areas farther from their zone of deployment, they were less likely to take place in community reintegration projects or agree with the mechanisms of transitional justice. Combined, this shows the importance of local community dynamics over national conflict ones. Additionally, it proves that where ex-combatants go is important, and if the stigma is decreased in those local communities, there might just be a shot at constructive talks. Victims and those who hold negative views of ex-combatants will have a mindset more open to reconciliation, and ex-combatants will prove that they can be working members of society again because— now with a community who sees less of the harmful stigma that had constantly surrounded them before— they are more likely to accept the consequences of their actions. This will enable both parties to together take the first step necessary for reconciliation: forgiveness.

Looking more closely at the success rate of community reintegration, it has been found to be more successful when there is co-responsibility present in community reintegration projects, meaning that the community must show as much interest in the project as the ex-combatants themselves. ^[xv] Additionally, community reintegration efforts can help to balance the rights of the community with the assistance provided to ex-combatants, promoting higher levels of inclusion and co-mingling among ex-combatants and community members, while helping to increase the legitimacy of DDR programs. ^[xvi] A study done of relevant literature pertaining to community reintegration efforts, strategic documents of Colombia’s Reintegration Agency (ACR), and insights gained from interviews conducted with ex-combatants in Bogota in 2017 helps to paint a fuller picture of what larger effects community integration can have on the breaking down of stigma and reconciliation efforts. ^[xvii] Many local projects have implemented a model where participants do not know that there are ex-combatants in their midst, which has successfully served at breaking down stigma. It is only after all stages of dialogue have been completed that their identities are revealed, building a level of equality among participants and allowing for citizens to see that ex-combatants do share some of their ideologies. Moreover, success rates of integration efforts have been found to be higher if the beneficiaries of a project include victims of the conflict and marginalized members of the community, rather than just ex-combatants. [xviii] The Surcando Caminos Project uses this idea by making sure that clothing and other resources are given to not only ex-combatants, but the vulnerable members of the community as well. Another highly successful strategy for local projects has been the identification of a common interest. The local project Victus works with theatre, a medium that can bring communities and former combatants together and unite them through a common passion, while providing exercises promoting reconciliation. The Surcando Caminos Project has also based their efforts on common passions, such as organizing sports events for ex-combatants and community members.

To have a real shot at removing the stigma rooted in society, ideas based on promoting dialogue, shared passions, and the allocation of benefits should be implemented in all local communities (as done in some parts of Colombia as discussed above). Additionally, ex-combatants should be placed in areas close to their combat zones to foster a sense of accountability, which will then convey a sense of seriousness about reconciliation to the community that they are living in. This will motivate ex-combatants to work hard and push communities to talk to and work out their differences with ex-combatants. It is only then, with a push for local communities to become the main actors in reconciliation and reintegration (as opposed to national guidelines dictating the process), that the stigma surrounding ex-combatants can be broken, and with it, the building of a shared understanding between ex-combatants and citizens that will foster a lasting peace.

Conclusion: A Shot at Lasting Peace

What has become distinctly clear about the socioeconomic inequality that plagues all people in Colombia is this: it is not something that can be solved concretely, nor is it something that can be resolved with the standard sort of policy making that the government has been doling out since the peace agreement was put into place. To begin to tackle this inequality, the root causes of these issues need to be examined, and not only that, but examined specifically at the local level. Not only does this mean a chance for meaningful change to occur, but it will get citizens and ex-combatants working together again in the interest of a common goal. When talking about tackling the challenges that South Africa faced, Nelson Mandela said: “If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.” Getting to the root of this multifaceted inequality in Colombia means ensuring that all people get the best shot at a better life, and in working on those issues together— as Nelson Mandela said— citizens and ex-combatants can become partners, and eventually, one people again. It is with this two-layer approach (tackling the roots of the issues at the local level) that the needle can be swayed on these deeply ingrained problems that touch all aspects of society, and gradually, can make this now precarious peace one that finally lasts.

[i] “Coronavirus: What Is the Impact in Colombia?” Justice for Colombia, November 5, 2020, https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/coronavirus-what-is-the-impact-in-colombia/.

[ii] “Colombia: National Socio-Demographic Profile,” CEPALSTAT, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Accessed November 2, 2020, http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/Perfil_Nacional_Social.html?pais=COL.

[iii] Adriaan, Alsema. “Poverty Rate in Colombia Decreases, but Continues to Grow in Bogota,” Colombia News | Colombia Reports, March 23, 2018, https://colombiareports.com/poverty-in-colombia-decreases-but-continues-to-grow-in-bogota/.

[iv] Consuelo Uribe Mallarino and Jaime Ramirez Moreno, “Clase Media y Movilidad Social En Colombia,” Revista Colombiana de Sociología5 42, no. 2 (2019): 229–55, https://doi.org/10.15446/rcs.v42n2.50749.

[v] Mallarino and Moreno, 234

[vi] “Poverty and Shared Prosperity in Colombia.” The World Bank, June 2019. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32009

[vii] Mallarino and Moreno, “Clase Media y Movilidad Social En Colombia,” 242.

[viii] OECD, “Colombia Policy Priorities for Inclusive Development,” Better Policies OECD Publishing, January 2015, https://www.oecd.org/about/publishing/colombia-policy-priorities-for-inclusive-development.pdf

[ix] Rens Willems and Mathijs Van Leeuwen, “Reconciling Reintegration: the Complexity of Economic and Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Burundi,” Disasters 39, no. 2 (November 28, 2014): 316–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12102.

[x] Larissa Rhyn, “Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation: Mechanisms for Community Reintegration in Colombia,” Conflict, Security & Development 19, no. 2 (March 25, 2019): 195–222, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1586157.

[xi] Oliver Kaplan and Enzo Nussio, “Community Counts: The Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Colombia,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 2 (March 2018): 132–53, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215614506.

[xii] “Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Farc Peace Deal,” BBC News, BBC, October 3, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.

[xiii] Rhyn, “Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation: Mechanisms for Community Reintegration in Colombia,” 201.

[xiv] Sarah Zukerman Daly, “Determinants of Ex-Combatants’ Attitudes toward Transitional Justice in Colombia,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 6 (August 14, 2018): 656–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218788084.

[xv] Alpaslan Özerdem, “A Re-Conceptualisation of Ex-Combatant Reintegration: ‘Social Reintegration’ Approach,”Conflict, Security & Development 12, no. 1 (March 15, 2012): 51–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.667661.

[xvi] “The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” The International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR), June 2009, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/276761468028451619/pdf/695120ESW0P0940artagenacontribution.pdf

[xvii] Rhyn, “Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation: Mechanisms for Community Reintegration in Colombia,”197.

[xviii] Rhyn, 207.

Bibliography

Alsema, Adriaan. “Poverty Rate in Colombia Decreases, but Continues to Grow in Bogota.” Colombia News | Colombia Reports, March 23, 2018. https://colombiareports.com/poverty-in-colombia-decreases-but-continues-to-grow-in-bo gota/.

“Colombia: National Socio-Demographic Profile.” CEPALSTAT. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/Perfil_Nacional_Social.html?pais=COL.

“Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Farc Peace Deal.” BBC News. BBC, October 3, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.

“Coronavirus: What Is the Impact in Colombia?” Justice for Colombia, November 5, 2020. https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/coronavirus-what-is-the-impact-in-colombia/.

Daly, Sarah Zukerman. “Determinants of Ex-Combatants’ Attitudes toward Transitional Justice in Colombia.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 6 (August 14, 2018): 656–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218788084.

Kaplan, Oliver, and Enzo Nussio. “Community Counts: The Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Colombia.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 2 (March 2018): 132–53. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215614506.

Mallarino, Consuelo Uribe, and Jaime Ramirez Moreno. “Clase Media y Movilidad Social En Colombia,” Revista Colombiana de Sociología 42, no. 2 (2019): 229–55, https://doi.org/10.15446/rcs.v42n2.50749.

OECD. “Colombia Policy Priorities for Inclusive Development.” Better Policies OECD Publishing, January 2015. https://www.oecd.org/about/publishing/colombia-policy-priorities-for-inclusive-develop ment.pdf

Özerdem, Alpaslan. “A Re-Conceptualisation of Ex-Combatant Reintegration: ‘Social Reintegration’ Approach.” Conflict, Security & Development 12, no. 1 (March 15, 2012): 51–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.667661.

“Poverty and Shared Prosperity in Colombia.” The World Bank, June 2019. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32009

Rhyn, Larissa. “Overcoming Stigma and Fostering Participation: Mechanisms for Community Reintegration in Colombia.” Conflict, Security & Development 19, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 195–222. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1586157.

“The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.” The International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR), June 2009. http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/276761468028451619/pdf/695120ESW0P0 940artagenacontribution.pdf

Willems, Rens, and Mathijs Van Leeuwen. “Reconciling Reintegration: the Complexity of Economic and Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Burundi.” Disasters 39, no. 2 (November 28, 2014): 316–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12102.

The Decline of Positive Peace Building in Colombia

GW Peace StudiesFebruary 26, 2021June 17, 2021Leave a comment

Zara Escobar

The concept of ‘negative peace’, which is the theoretical understanding of peace that has historically dominated international affairs and political legislation, is the absence of large-scale conflict or war. Recently, however, a more comprehensive conceptualization of peace, called ‘positive’ peace, has gained prevalence in governmental discourse and policy. In contrast to negative peace, which is defined exclusively by the lack of a violence, positive peace is predicated on the “presence of justice.”^[i] In other words, whereas negative peace can exist while issues such as poverty or gendered and racial inequities exist, so long as there is some semblance of stability, positive peace demands the transcendence of these forms of structural violence, which are understood as, in great part, the underlying causes of violence and war. From the conception of the major armed revolutionary groups, to the disputatious negotiations between the government and FARC, to the eventual deployment of projects such as the Truth Commission, questions of mitigation versus radical restructuring that differentiate positive and negative peace, have been central to Colombia’s national politics. The signing of the Colombian Final Accord in 2016 appeared to signal a major breakthrough in terms of governmental attendance to structural violences. Of the six major points laid out by the accord, several, such as comprehensive rural reform, political participation for FARC members, the development of alternative economic opportunities to illicit crop farming and trafficking, and victim reconciliation,^[ii] established the Colombian government’s commitment towards positive peace in an effort to move beyond the country's history of conflict. However, four years after the signing of the accord, Colombia has found itself not only under a more conservative administration, but also in the midst of a global pandemic that has exposed and exacerbated a litany of threats to Colombia’s advancement, bringing the already precarious peace process to a teetering edge. The greatest issue facing Colombia and its peace process as a result of the pandemic is the government’s divergence from, and consequent regression of efforts towards establishing a positive peace.

Despite the fact that the Colombian conflict dominated the nation for decades, in today’s political realm, efforts towards establishing a positive peace, which seemed to be an integral pillar of the measures laid out by the agreement, have been overshadowed by more immediate threats resulting from the global pandemic. In response to COVID-19, the government shifted its attention in ways that reaffirmed the centrality of Bogotá and other urban areas and deprioritized peripheral populations. Resources were directed towards issues such as the suffering economy, mitigating the number of cases in urban areas where ICU bed occupancy was reaching critical numbers, and maintaining a strict lockdown in major cities. On March 15th, Colombia closed all borders, non-essential businesses, schools, and national events, and declared a national emergency.^[iii] Soon after, the government instituted the longest lockdown in the world, lasting six months.^[iv] In Bogotá, the lockdown was enforced and regulated by the rotation of sector-specific lockdowns, a movement regulation program based on ID number, and a gendered system that determined what days people were permitted to leave their homes. Those who failed to comply with lockdown regulations faced fines of up to $250. Further, in response to the predicted economic contraction of 8.2%, the Colombian government launched a $31 billion stimulus package.^[v] While such measures may have been necessary to combat the spread of the virus and the collapse of hospital systems and the economy, the national government appeared to abandon, or at the very least neglect, efforts towards addressing the structural conditions of socioeconomic inequality in rural areas which not only made these populations more vulnerable to the pandemic, but also in large part fueled the conflict to begin with.

Not only did the exclusive focus on urban-centered issues emerging from COVID-19 result in the lack of a governmental presence in the most far-out regions, but it also hindered projects towards addressing poverty, lack of infrastructure, and insecurity in the most vulnerable areas. Many initiatives emerging from the Peace Accord, such as the FARC and disarmament camps that were created as safe zones to facilitate the reintegration process, as well as the National Land Agency and the Rural Development Agency which target rural reform and development, appeared promising in their initial implementation.^[vi] However, the comprehensive and constructive visions of such efforts stand in stark contrast to the economic reality of Colombia today. Presently, around 7 million Colombians are starving, with 17 million living under the poverty line. While that is currently 34% of the population, that number is expected to go up to 47-49% of the Colombian population by the end of the year. Additionally, about 14% of the population is living off of $1.90 a day.^[vii] The most impoverished populations reside in the rural areas most ravaged by the Colombian conflict and continue to be the ones left behind by the government. Moreover, in the face of an unforgiving pandemic, the agriculture industry which rural farmers depend on has been hindered by the decline in commerce and dangers posed by transportation, stripping those who are on the cusp of or are already in extreme poverty, of their major source of income. ^[viii] Consequently, in the face of destitution and food insecurity, there is an uptake in not only petty crime, but also an increase in organized crime such as illegal mining, coca production, and extortion because the government has left populations without other modes of survival. This does not come as a surprise when one examines the issue through the lens of positive peace—projects that look to develop rural communities in order to break down structural economic barriers contrast sharply with superficial measures, such as the emergency stimulus implemented by the Duque administration,^[ix] which although provisionally beneficial, will not change the systemic conditions of poverty in rural communities beyond keeping people temporarily afloat.

The disappearance of governmental presence in and attention to rural territories also created a void which enabled the reassertion and strengthening of criminal groups and the illegal economy. Criminal armed groups have been behind many of the 55 massacres seen this year. Illegal armed groups have utilized massacres as a form of social control and fearmongering, for example to send messages to populations in rural, seemingly lawless areas that violate their authoritarian imposition of lockdown measures.^[x] These criminal groups are able to take advantage of the authority void that is left by the demilitarization of FARC, coupled with the governmental neglect in these territories, and expand their territorial power. Additionally, assassinations of community leaders and social leaders are rampant and only increasing amid the pandemic, with 223 social leader killings this year, many of whom were indigenous and afro-Colombian activists. These killings follow a pattern of systematic negligence by the government of the targeting of activists by dissident FARC guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries; the government’s focus on the emergency that the pandemic poses allows them to shift the national narrative in order to obfuscate the structural violence against racial minorities and activists.^[xi]The heightened danger and regional instability, in the face of poverty and armed criminal and dissident groups, demonstrates how the government’s failure to uphold its responsibility to structural peace has redressed the tangible, albeit incremental, progress made by prior peace projects. While the government was able to demobilize the majority of FARC combatants, they seemed content to stop there, reflecting an orientation towards negative peace that is proving to only cycle in new forms of regional crime and violence.

Not only have criminal groups increased in regional power during the pandemic, but we are also seeing an uptake in child recruitment by armed groups, as well as in petty crime because rural youth have been left especially vulnerable. Approximately as many children have joined armed groups in the first half of 2020, as did in all of 2019.^[xii] This is in large part because youth in rural areas who do not have access to the same infrastructure and technology as their urban counterparts, are often unable to engage in school activities, and become especially susceptible to recruitment by armed groups. In rural areas, it is reported that less than 10% of homes have access to a computer, tablet or laptop. In some communities, teachers are being forced to resort to extreme measures, such as distributing radios to students’ homes and using them to conduct their lessons. The disparity between conditions faced by rural and urban youth is further exemplified by the fact that in rural zones, 48% of educators do not have access to the resources, nor training to be able to integrate mobile devices into their teaching, in contrast to the only 12% of urban private schools facing this challenge.^[xiii] This disparity reflects a systemic negligence of rural communities and is especially concerning in relation to the aim towards positive peace, because not only does school offer many students a space away from unsafe home environments, but the lack of access to education that rural students face poses a structural barrier to opportunities of social mobility and economic advancement, further cementing the stratification between the urban elite and rural populations.

Lastly, the government is failing to uphold its obligations to provide security to ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups who have borne the brunt of the damage by the Colombian conflict. On a socioeconomic front, not only are former combatants facing a declining economy, but they are doing so from an especially disadvantaged position: many are without the guaranteed governmental aid and economic opportunities, leaving them ostracized from general society. Further, ex-FARC members living in supposedly safe zones have become, in essence, sitting ducks, and have suffered assassinations and threats of violence, leaving many displaced due to an utter lack of governmental protections during the pandemic. According to FARC, over 200 signatories of the peace agreement have been killed since 2016, with over a total of 1,000 assassinations, 53 of which occurred just this year.^[xiv] This spike in violence and killings experienced by the vulnerable is not unique to former FARC, the assassination of indigenous community leaders and activists is rampant too. In 2020, there have been a recorded 79 assassinations of indigenous leaders in Cauca alone.^[xv] The killing of social activists, especially from the indigenous and afro-Colombian communities is not a recent anomaly, but rather a systematic pattern. Recent killings are suspected to have been committed by dissident FARC guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, as well as criminal groups infringing upon indigenous and afro-Colombian territories in hopes of exploiting its geographical advantages for the illicit market.^[xvi] The safety and rights of these populations have been continuously disregarded and the pandemic has magnified this neglect as the government has in large part retreated from these regions to centralize their efforts in combatting the pandemic. Because negative peace only tends to address large-scale conflicts that affect national stability, structural violence against racial minorities is consistently deprioritized, as is the reintegration of marginalized populations such as demobilized FARC members, because those forms of violence do not typically threaten the elite groups who typically occupy positions of power. This demonstrates the necessity of a governmental reorientation towards a conceptual framework of positive peace because otherwise, these marginalized populations will continue to be left behind.

Ultimately, the government’s abandonment of the most at-risk populations, in the most far-out regions, is the greatest issue facing Colombia as it seeks to move forward amidst the pandemic because it is endangering the already fraying conditions of the peace process. The socioeconomic stratification and lack of coherent national stability, resulting from the government’s failure to address the structural issues I have identified, is already undoing the progress made by projects emerging from the peace agreement. If those in most need are continuously left to fend for themselves and come to adopt the view that the government will never serve to protect them, then we may not only see ex-combatants return to arms, but we may also see a whole new wave of youth and rural Colombians join guerrilla or criminal groups. Moreover, the government’s neglect of peace projects has influenced the national orientation towards the peace process by either furthering the perception that it is no longer a pressing issue, or even by propelling the notion that the conditions of the peace process are undesirable. Negative peace, what I would consider the current administration’s mitigation efforts, both in terms of disarmament and reducing violence, is fundamentally useless when the structural inequalities that drive violence and crime pervade Colombia. The government must restore a telos of positive peace, otherwise, Colombia might suffer a sociopolitical fracturing and devolve into instability and violence that could collapse the peace agreement in its entirety.

Establishing a national orientation and concrete steps towards positive peace cannot happen overnight, nor can it be carried out by a singular institution. A fundamental issue with Colombia’s peace process in past and current efforts is that the national government is unable to fully understand and engage the existing structural violence marginalized Colombians face. Given the geographic, economic, and racial makeup of the national government—for the most part urban, wealthy, and white^[xvii]—Colombian politicians cannot fully understand the positions of rural farmers, indigenous or afro-Colombians, or other vulnerable groups such as former FARC members because they have not endured the same experiences. Negative peace may initially seem sufficient to the elite that occupy the government since as long as there is no massive national conflict, they can enjoy economic, physical, and social security within their cities; even as peripheral violence is rampant, it does not directly affect them. However, as was proven by the Colombian conflict, which was not of much concern to the urban elite until the terrorization and destruction experienced by rural communities reached major cities, peace is not sustainable unless the structural inequalities that drive conflict and violence are addressed.

Because of the existing communicative and experiential disconnect, the national government will not be able to address these originating inequalities that have fueled Colombia’s history of conflict without heeding the perspectives of the groups that experience these originating violences. In order to bridge this divide, the government must work to bring in the voices of the most vulnerable and historically marginalized populations. Dialogue to identify where Colombia stands, not just in terms of national statistics, but also with regard to how the peace process and the pandemic are affecting different populations uniquely, is a prerequisite to the delineation of any specific policy reform because it is necessary to inform government action that will actually address the root causes of conflict in Colombia. Only by re-establishing a commitment toward national and intercommunal discourse and restoring efforts towards addressing structural disparities and violence, can the government change the national orientation towards the peace process, and make the paradigmatic shift towards a positive and sustainable peace that is vital to rupture Colombia's historically cyclical violence. Whether it be the indigenous Minga that took to the capital to call for Duque to engage tribes in political dialogue,^[xviii] or former FARC combatants leading the March for Life and Peace in protest of governmental neglect of violence,^[xix] marginalized Colombians have been trying to make their voices heard. Now the government’s first step must be to choose to listen.

^[i] David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 6-7, ProQuest Ebook Central.

^[ii] “State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord,”Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, April

2019, 2-3, especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf.

^[iii] Luke Taylor, “How Colombia’s Armed Groups Are Exploiting COVID-19 to Recruit Children,” The New

Humanitarian, September 10, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/09/10/Colombia-conflict-armed-groups-child-recruitment.

^[iv] “Colombia Surpasses 1 Million COVID-19 Cases,” Aljazeera, Aljazeera Media Network, October 25, 2020,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/25/colombia-surpasses-1-million-covid-19-cases.

^[v] Avery Dyer, and Sara Torres, “Argentina and Colombia, a Tale of Two Lockdowns,” Wilson Center, October 2,

2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/argentina-and-colombia-tale-two-lockdowns.

^[vi] Tetra Tech ARD, Colombia Land Rural Development Program Annual Report October 2015-September 2016, US Agency for International Development, October 2019, https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/USAID_Land_Tenure_LRDP_Annual_Report_Oct_2015-Sept_2016.pdf.

^[vii]Adriaan Alsema, “How Long Will 7 Million Starve before Hell Breaks Loose in Colombia?” Colombia Reports, November 3, 2020, https://colombiareports.com/how-long-will-7-million-in-colombia-starve-before-hell-breaks-loose/.

^[viii] “Effects of COVID-19 on Agribusiness in Colombia,” Agroberichten Buitenland, Ministerie van

Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, May 7, 2020, https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/05/07/effects-of-covid19-on-agribusiness-in-colombia.

^[ix] The Duque administration’s US $31 billion fiscal stimulus package includes the covering of up to 40% of minimum wages for formal workers, cash transfers to vulnerable families, small business subsidies, tax breaks for small businesses, tax deferrals for companies, and loan guarantees. While this may seem significant at face value, it has only temporarily mitigated the economic effects felt by Colombian citizens, as it has not been sufficient to prevent the massive increase in poverty rates and food insecurity, primarily impacting rural populations.

“The Effect of COVID-19 on the Economic Inclusion of Venezuelans in Colombia,” Refugees International, October 28, 2020, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/10/26/the-effect-of-covid-19-on-the-economic-inclusion-of-venezuelans-in-colombia.

^[x] Thomas Power, “Massacres in Colombia Lay Bare Next Phase of the Conflict,” NACLA, September 18, 2020, https://nacla.org/colombia-massacres-duque.

^[xi] Joe Parkin Daniels, “‘We’re Being Massacred’: Colombia Accused of Failing to Stop Murders of Activists,” The Guardian, sec. Global development, October 8, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/08/colombia-activists-murde-amnesty-international?ref=upstract.com&curator=upstract.com&utm_source=upstract.com.

^[xii] Taylor, “How Colombia’s Armed Groups Are Exploiting COVID-19.”

^[xiii] Natalia Duque Vergara, “Menos Del 10% de Los Niños En El Campo Tienen Computador Para Recibir Clases Durante La Cuarentena,” Cerosetenta, Centro de Estudios de Periodismo de la Universidad de los Andes, April 22, 2020, https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/por-alla-no-llega-ni-dios-la-educacion-rural-en-tiempos-de-pandemia/.

^[xiv] Popayán, “Asesinan a Otro Excombatiente de Las Farc En El Cauca,” El Tiempo, October 26, 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/noticias-del-cauca-nuevo-asesinato-contra-un-excombatiente-de-las-farc-545246.

^[xv]Adriaan Alsema, “Indigenous Take Colombia’s Main Airport to Demand End to ‘Genocide,’” Colombia News Colombia Reports, October 23, 2020, https://colombiareports.com/indigenous-take-colombias-main-airport-to-demand-end-to-genocide/.

^[xvi] “An Indigenous Protest Movement Emerges in Colombia,” The New Humanitarian, October 21, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/10/21/Colombia-conflict-Indigenous-protest.

^[xvii] Jacobo Cortes, Andrés Felipe, and Marcela Escandón Vega, Political Representation and Social Inclusion: Colombia Case Study, ed. Richard André, Americas Society and Council of the Americas, Ford Foundation, April 24, 2012, https://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ColombiaFINAL.pdf.

^[xviii] Adriaan, “Indigenous Take Colombia’s Main Airport.”

^[xix] Redacción Colombia 2020, “No Se va a Repetir Exterminio de La Unión Patriótica: Gobierno Sobre Marcha de FARC,” El Espectador, November 3, 2020, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/no-se-va-a-repetir-exterminio-de-la-union-patriotica-gobierno-sobre-marcha-de-farc/.