ROUNDTABLES

While the pandemic has affected all parts of Colombian society, there has been a significant rural-urban divide in impacts. The level of inequality in economic opportunity, state support, and healthcare resources between rural and urban areas in Colombian has increased dramatically during the pandemic. In rural areas, where people are less wealthy, the economic downturn from the pandemic has forced more people to turn towards armed groups.  Yet more, because rural areas are the areas which have most been affected by the civil war, the slowing down of the peace process due to the pandemic is having a disproportionate impact. At the same time, urban areas, particularly poor areas with many ex-combatants and victims of the civil war, have been the epicenter of the pandemic in Colombia due to poverty, lack of healthcare resources and sanitation, and weak government support.

Over the past few decades women's rights have advanced significantly in Colombian society. However, the pandemic is setting back this progress. One problem is that many of the gains women have made in the Colombian workforce have come in areas such as hospitality and tourism, which have seen massive layoffs due to the economic downturn associated with the coronavirus. Similarly, many women who had recently gained access to educational institutions, particularly in rural areas, have been forced to forego those opportunities for the time being. Furthermore, as many families have been forced to quarantine at home, levels of domestic violence and divorce are rising.

One group which roundtable participants identified as particularly vulnerable to the challenges of the pandemic is the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities face systemic challenges which have been exacerbated by the pandemic. For example, many members of these minority communities were being recognized for the first time during the peace process; however, as implementation of that process has been derailed, their unique challenges are not being addressed.

One of the most obvious ways the pandemic has presented a challenge to the peace process is the slowing down or cancellation of hearings, meetings, and procedures explicitly related to the peace process. For example, justice procedures and trials for members of armed groups have in many cases been cancelled or forced into less secure virtual forums which present a risk to anyone testifying against armed groups or the government. Just as well, the transitional justice system and reconciliation process for ex-combatants and victims has been stopped or forced online around the country, thus slowing down the reintegration process and leaving people exposed to armed groups. The government has also postponed many information gathering missions, which are crucial to undertaking a formal assessment of the peace process, the results of which are due in 2021.

The pandemic has caused a significant downturn in the Colombian economy, and massively increased unemployment, which poses a significant threat to the peace process. Many ex-combatants and young people who have lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic have been forced to turn to armed groups and criminal enterprises in order to survive. Yet more, the pandemic has massively increased inequality along many different levels, thereby fueling revolutionary armed groups. Lastly, the economic downturn and high cost of fighting the pandemic has left the government without enough money to fully fund the many institutions and programs of the peace agreement.

All of the challenges the pandemic has posed to the peace  process have led to overall decreases in trust in the Colombian government and peace-building institutions. For example, recent spates of assassinations have forced many activists to hide or go underground and decreased their trust that the state is capable of or willing to protect them. Yet more, as many come to believe that the government is not committed to implementing the peace, particularly considering pre existing scepticism of President Duque, the strength of non-state armed groups relative to the government has grown.  This is a particular challenge for institutions which already faced low levels of trust and high levels of corruption such as the police and the military. 

In regions of Colombia where the state does not have a strong presence the pandemic has increased the power of non-state actors, including armed groups. For example, in some of these underserved regions armed groups have taken on the responsibility of enforcing quarantine, social distancing guidelines, and even providing medical care. This sort of increase in the power of armed groups in these regions has also led to increased violence, and may have the long term consequence of entrenching their power. Yet more, this imbalance between state and non-state power in remote regions further erodes trust in the peace process and the central government overall. 

As the pandemic has begun to ravage Colombian state resources, including security forces, have been significantly reallocated from the peace process to fighting the pandemic. This change in focus has created space for armed groups who are resisting the peace process to increase their power without being checked by the government. Individuals feel that their government is responding solely to issues raised by COVID-19, and has forgotten its duty to address long-standing issues in the nation. Government responses to COVID-19 have been disproportional to the actual impacts, and many fear that the response has been a means to increase censorship and control over the masses. 

Just as in the rest of the world, the pandemic has forced millions of Colombian to learn and work from home, a situation which has caused a variety of problems for the peace process. As many children are spending more time at home instead of at school, armed groups have been able to increase their recruitment among young people, particularly in rural areas. As well, many activists and community leaders who are targets of armed groups have been forced to remain in one location, leaving them as easy targets for assassination. In fact, many prominent leaders have received death threats since the beginning of the pandemic and a few have been killed.

One particular casualty of the slowing down of the Colombian peace process as a result of the pandemic are victims of the civil war. Many programs to specifically support victims had been created by the Colombian peace process including educational and employment opportunities. Unfortunately, as the pandemic has forced significant contraction in the economy and reallocation of government resources these victim support programs have lost support. Yet more, many victims who received support are once again being victimized by resurging violence during the pandemic. 

There are increased levels of narco-trafficking as the government has been unable to spread its resources across a variety of issues. FARC ex-combatants are also being denied the programs guaranteed to them by the federal government. This presents a doubly troubling situation as the federal government is unable to exert its influence over its domain. 

Government inaction on a variety of issues means that many issues in Colombian are structural. Violence between different ethnic, cultural, gender, and class groups. Much of what is at the surface of Colombian public debate are merely symptoms of a larger, more salient, governmental inadequacies. The government’s inability to oversee a fair redistribution of land, support for rural workers, health programs, education, inclusionary efforts, and economic reform has presented a multidimensional systemic issue to the Colombian people.