Natural Resources

The presence of abundant natural resources, especially in poor, new, and underdeveloped states, is often perceived as a cause of or contributing factor to conflict. The disproportionate value of capturing or holding natural resources compared to other options incentivizes the use of illicit and violent means of achieving this.

Natural resource wealth as a driver of conflict is a major component of the Resource Curse. Also known as the paradox of plenty or the poverty paradox, the resource curse is the perceived phenomenon of countries with an abundance of natural resources (such as fossil fuels and certain minerals) having less economic growth, less democracy, or worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources.^[REF] There are many theories and much academic debate about the reasons for, and exceptions to, these adverse outcomes. Most experts believe the resource curse is not universal or inevitable, but affects certain types of countries or regions under certain conditions.^[REF1]^[REF2]

A 2019 meta-analysis of 69 studies found "that there is no aggregate relationship between natural resources and conflict."^[REF] According to a 2017 review study, "while some studies support the link between resource scarcity/abundance and armed conflict, others find no or only weak links."^[REF] According to one academic study, a country that is otherwise typical but has primary commodity exports around 5% of GDP has a 6% risk of conflict, but when exports are 25% of GDP the chance of conflict rises to 33%.^[REF] "Ethno-political groups are more likely to resort to rebellion rather than using nonviolent means or becoming terrorists when representing regions rich in oil."^[REF]

There are several factors behind the relationship between natural resources and armed conflicts.^[REF] Resource wealth may increase the vulnerability of countries to conflicts by undermining the quality of governance and economic performance^[REF] (the "resource curse" argument). Secondly, conflicts can occur over the control and exploitation of resources and the allocation of their revenues (the "resource war" argument). Thirdly, access to resource revenues by belligerents can prolong conflicts (the "conflict resource" argument).^[REF1][REF2] A 2018 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution found that rebels were particularly likely to be able to prolong their participation in civil wars when they had access to natural resources that they could smuggle.^[REF]

A 2004 literature review finds that oil makes the onset of war more likely and that lootable resources lengthen existing conflicts.^[REF] One study finds the mere discovery (as opposed to just the exploitation) of petroleum resources increases the risk of conflict, as oil revenues have the potential to alter the balance of power between regimes and their opponents, rendering bargains in the present obsolete in the future.^[REF] One study suggests that the rise in mineral prices over the period 1997–2010 contributed to up to 21 percent of the average country-level violence in Africa.^[REF] Research shows that declining oil prices make oil-rich states less bellicose.^[REF] Jeff Colgan observed that oil-rich states have a propensity to instigate international conflicts as well as to be the targets of them, which he referred to as "petro-aggression".^[REF] Arguable examples include Iraq’s invasions of Iran and Kuwait; Libya’s repeated incursions into Chad in the 1970s and 1980s; Iran’s long-standing suspicion of Western powers;^[REF] the United States' relations with Iraq and Iran. It is not clear whether the pattern of petro-aggression found in oil-rich countries also applies to other natural resources besides oil. A 2016 study finds that "oil production, oil reserves, oil dependence, and oil exports are associated with a higher risk of initiating conflict while countries enjoying large oil reserves are more frequently the target of military actions."^[REF] As of 2016, the only six countries whose reported military expenditures exceeded 6 percent of GDP were significant oil producers: Oman, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Algeria. (Data for Syria and North Korea were unavailable.)^[REF] A 2017 study in the American Economic Review found that mining extraction contributed to conflicts in Africa at the local level over the period 1997-2010.^[REF] A 2017 study in Security Studies found that while there is a statistical relationship between oil wealth and ethnic war, the use of qualitative methods reveals "that oil has rarely been a deep cause of ethnic war."^[REF]

A 2016 study argues that petrostates may be emboldened to act more aggressively due to the inability of allied great powers to punish the petrostate.^[REF] The great powers have strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons.^[REF]

A 2017 study found evidence of the resource curse in the American frontier period of the Western United States in the 19th century (the Wild West).^[REF] The study found that "In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income."^[REF]

A 2018 study in the Economic Journal found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries."^[REF] The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.^[REF]

Environment and Environmental Change

There are two directions the connection between conflict and the environment can take that influence security. The degradation of the environment can cause conflict and a reduction in security; or conflict can destroy the resources and services provided by the environment, which also compromises security.

Conflict influences the environment by direct damage as well as by disruption of productivity and responsible environmental and resource practices. Conversely, poor environmental and resource practices can increase vulnerability and the risk of conflict. In either case, the most severe expression of conflict is war.

Water stress areas of the world. Figure from Smakhtin, Revenga and Döll, 2004. Map by Philippe Rekacewicz, 2002.

Despite international prohibitions, defoliant spraying, poisonous gas, drones, carpet bombing and firebombing continue to be used in conflict. Their proliferation and use is an immediate and long-term threat to civilian populations.

The destructive potential of modern conflict often extends well beyond any geographic or political boundary. Globalization and trade have formed partnerships where even a minor conflict in a small area can involve more powerful players and lead to far greater regional destabilization.

By the 1960s, conflict scholars and Departments of Defense began assessing the risk of a quick death by nuclear holocaust as well as the slow, but inexorable death from pollution, population dynamics, and disruption of critical planetary systems like global warming and subsequent climate change.

In the 1990s, a few scholarly studies began to consider the opposite of conflict impact on the environment. Their research focused on the impact of environmental degradation in creating conflict. Environmental degradation and disruption began to be recognized as a significant cause or magnifier of conflict and breaches in security, including:

Soil Erosion
Water scarcity
Overfishing
Deforestation
Pollution (air, water, land)
Resource depletion (Natural Capital)
Species Diversity (6th Mass Extinction)

via Millennium Alliance for Humanity and the Biosphere

Economic Development

Greed and Grievance

The phrase "greed versus grievance" or "greed and grievance" refers to the two baseline arguments put forward by scholars of armed conflict on the causes of civil war, though the argument has been extended to other forms of war, such as violent conflict in general, rebellion and insurgency, for example.

"Greed" is shorthand for the argument that combatants in armed conflicts are motivated by a desire to better their situation, and perform an informal cost-benefit analysis in examining if the rewards of joining a rebellion are greater than not joining. "Grievance" stands for the argument that people rebel over issues of identity, e.g. ethnicity, religion, social class, etc., rather than over economics. In practice, even proponents of strong versions of these arguments admit that the opposing argument has some influence in the development of a conflict.

Whether the cause of war is attributed to 'greed' or 'grievance' the common factor is the perception of a certain deprivation. If it is an economic deprivation, the inequality will be a 'vertical inequality' and the cause of war will be 'greed'. If the deprivation is caused by ethnicity, age, religion or gender, it will be a 'horizontal inequality' and the cause of war will be due to the 'grievances'.

Collier-Hoeffler Model

The strong case for the "greed" argument was made by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in a study they performed for the World Bank in 2000. Since then, the Collier-Hoeffler Model has been the focus of much of the greed-grievance debate.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler wrote one of the seminal pieces defending greed over grievance. They found that factors that increase the military or financial viability of rebellion correlated with more instances of conflict than factors leading to grievances. They argue that certain natural resources such as oil are tied to increased likelihood of conflict onset, and other natural resources such as diamonds are tied to increases in conflict duration. This is because natural resources may lower the startup cost of war, and provide rebels with an easy way of financing prolonged conflicts. Natural resources may also make the state a more lucrative prize for capture, further decreasing the opportunity cost of insurgency. For the same reason, Collier and Hoeffler also conclude that states with low per capita GDP are more likely to experience civil war, because low average income makes wage earning through conflict a more lucrative prospect.^[REF] Collier and Hoeffler also make an important distinction between preferences and constraints in terms of circumstances that favor rebellions. Societies can be more prone to conflict because preferences for rebellion are unusually strong or because constraints on rebellion are unusually weak – the former being aligned with grievance and the latter with greed. Measures such as democracy or political repression are hard to draw conclusions from because they may increase grievances among some groups, but empower other groups to repress potential insurgents. While most states harbor some level of grievance with the sitting regime, few states experience civil war. This is because although not everyone is content with the established order, rebellion only occurs when conflict is a viable option for dissatisfied parties.^[REF] Therefore, Collier and Hoeffler conclude that on their own, most variables that seek to explain civil war onset through measurements of grievance alone prove insufficient. Instead Collier and Hoeffler advocate using the looking at greed, that is to say the opportunity cost of initiating and sustaining conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) offer a contrasting view. They see opportunity structures created by weakness state capacity to be a cause of civil war onset. They find evidence in favor of the technology of insurgency as a mechanism. Further, they find that ethnicity, religion or any cultural or demography characteristic do not seems to have a positive relationship with civil war onset.^[REF]

Financing combatants is crucial to the success of any rebellion. Extortion and donations from diasporas are two possible financial sources used by rebellion groups. The extortion of primary commodity resources is especially suited to the operations of rebel groups, as they are often made up of unskilled labor and given whatever weapons are available. As rebel organizations need to be fairly large to have a significant impact and incite a civil war, the looting of primary commodity resources is the best way for them to maintain financial viability.^[REF]Examples of this include diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, timber in Cambodia, coca in Colombia, and poppy in Afghanistan. Another factor that relates to lower constraints on rebellion is that primary resources are often found in rural locales. Thus, they often require an army to defend a large area, something that is much less likely in weak states that cannot sustain a military apparatus.^[REF] Diaspora populations are also likely funding sources for rebel groups, as was the case with the Tamil population in North America funding the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Diaspora populations, who are usually wealthier than their native counterparts, are able to mobilize for collective action, and do not directly suffer the consequences of a conflict. While the potential for diasporas to be financial backers of rebel groups was noted, Collier and Hoeffler found that diasporas themselves do not increase the risk of conflict.^[REF]

Overall, Collier and Hoeffler's study drew multiple conclusions in support of the greed model. Faster economic growth reduces risk, likely because it raises the opportunity costs of joining a rebellion. The higher a state's dependence on primary commodities, the greater the risk of conflict; this is due to the resources being a main financial component of rebel groups and a weak governmental structure. However, they observed that if there is a particularly high dependence on primary commodity resources, conflict risk declines as states find ways to protect their resources and deter looting.^[REF]

Criticism of the model

Probably one of the most coherent rebuttals of Collier's work on greed vs. grievance comes from the political economist David Keen. Keen elaborates on the economic incentives for warfare and argues that there is more to war than simply "winning." In some instances, it could be more beneficial for certain parties to prolong war, so long as they are in control of economic resources or power positions. This can become common in states with weak rule of law where violence becomes privatized. Elite groups within weak states attempt to harness economic agendas and resources within a given civil society and are motivated to create private profit by mobilizing violent means. Keen continues by citing various possible economic functions of violence.

His first example of violent means to promote economic gain is pillaging, whether to gain resources or to supplement or supply wages of soldiers. Another function is extortion of protection money from people who can afford it so they can be spared violence inflicted upon them. A third economic function is the monopolistic control of trade. When state control breaks down, trade that was previously prohibited is more easily facilitated and has the potential to generate substantial amounts of profit for those involved. Primary examples of this are weapons and drugs. A fourth function of conflict is the possible exploitation of labor. The threat of violence can be used to coerce cheap or free labor, with extreme cases resulting in forms of slavery. A fifth short-term function is the ability to stake a claim to land and its resources. Similar to Collier and Hoeffler's argument that weak states cannot easily maintain control over their natural resources due to their rural location and potentially wide dispersion, it is economically beneficial to assert control over minimally defended, resource-rich areas. Extracting benefits from aid that is sent to a conflict area is also beneficial for rebel groups as there are often possibilities to raid resources sent from abroad. Appropriation of aid becomes difficult in a weak state.^[REF]

Unlike Collier, Keen does not attribute conflict to be driven more by greed than by grievance; he stresses how the two forces interact so that greed generates grievances and rebellion, which in turn legitimizes further greed.^[REF^] Keen uses the conflict perpetuated by Milosevic in Serbia as an example of how an extended, endless conflict is preferable to one with a definitive end and a clear winner. Milosevic controlled the media to create grievances among the Serbian population, rally them together, and create a common enemy following NATO bombing. The small group of elites surrounding Milosevic perpetuated conditions that warranted international sanctions in order to better control trade and loot resources. Milosevic realized sanctions were necessary to facilitate the profitable black market transactions that were being made by those closest to him. Had he demobilized or embraced a more peaceful policy, the sanctions would have been lifted and his economic advantage would have disintegrated.^[REF] This is what Keen was referring to in his argument that greed and grievance are often tied together and interact with one another. In this way, Milosevic's initial desire for power spurred him to create grievances amongst the Serbs that created the popular support for his sanction-warranting policies to further his economic and political power – the use of grievances to produce further greed.

Factors of Conflict

Cold War Peace Process

Afghan Peace Process

The Afghan Peace Process can refer to several peace initiatives that have taken place in Afghanistan, which has been in a continuous state of internal conflict since the Soviet-Afghan War began in 1979. Afghan conflicts have generally seen an externally-supported central government defending itself against rural, traditionalist and fundamentalist insurgency groups, such as the Taliban. The most recent conflict began with the U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and subsequent overthrow of the Taliban, which had ruled the country as the Islamic State of Afghanistan since 1996. For nearly two decades, the United States and the Afghan government (via the Afghan National Army) with NATO support fought to reclaim territory outside the capital, Kabul. In February 2020, the United States and Taliban signed an agreement that paved the way for direct talks between the Taliban and representatives of the Afghan republic. A successful peace process would not only allow Afghanistan to begin addressing its deep-rooted problems but would also allow the United States to finally end its military presence.^[REF]

War in Afghanistan (2001-Present)

The Afghan peace process comprises the proposals and negotiations in a bid to end the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Although sporadic efforts have taken place since the war began in 2001, negotiations and the peace movement intensified in 2018 amid talks between the Taliban, which is the main insurgent group fighting against the Afghan government and American troops; and the United States, of which thousands of soldiers maintain a presence within the country to support the Afghan government.^[REF] Besides the United States, major powers such as China, India, Russia, as well as NATO play a part that they see as facilitating the peace process,^{[REF1][REF2][REF3]} while the Afghan peace group People's Peace Movement sees regional and global powers as a cause of continued war.^[REF1][REF2] Pakistan was also invited as a long term ally in the war on terror.

Talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban began in September 2020. As part of the peace process, two peace treaties have been signed so far. On September 22, 2016, the first treaty was signed between the Afghan government and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin militant group.^[REF] The second peace treaty was signed between the U.S. and the Taliban on February 29, 2020,^[REF1][REF2] which called for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan within 14 months if the Taliban upheld the terms of the agreement.^[REF1][REF2]

After the agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban, there was a surge in insurgent attacks against Afghan security forces.^[REF] Peace talks between officials from the Afghan state and the Taliban started in September 2020 in Doha, Qatar, but there has been a rise in civilian casualties in Afghanistan since then. In November 2020, the number of civilian casualties was the highest of any year that month since the United Nations began systematically documenting Afghan casualties in 2009.^[REF]

This wave of violence and the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. withdrawal had stalled negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan Government. In May of 2021, talks resumed again in Doha. In mid-June, an EU envoy reported that little progress had been made. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the group did have a written plan but would not share it publicly or with foreigners and would save it for substantive negotiations.

Also involved in the current peace process is the government of neighboring Pakistan. Pakistan's ties to the Taliban have been criticized in the past by the West but foreign capitals including Washington have in recent years acknowledged Pakistan for working to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table.

Pakistan's foreign minister has said in recent days that Pakistan was fully supporting the Afghan peace process but did not want to be considered the "scapegoat" and blamed if negotiations fell apart.^[REF]

Afghan Civil War (1992-1996)

This article covers a part of the contemporary Afghan history that started between 28 April 1992, the day that a new interim Afghan government was supposed to replace the Republic of Afghanistan of President Mohammad Najibullah, and the Taliban's conquest of Kabul establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on 27 September 1996.^[REF]

On 25 April 1992, a civil war had ignited between three, later five or six, mujahideen armies, when Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) refused to form a coalition government with other mujahideen groups and tried to conquer Kabul for themselves. After four months, already half a million residents of Kabul had fled the heavily bombarded city.

The following years, several times some of those militant groups formed coalitions, and often broke them again. By mid 1994, Kabul's original population of two million had dropped to 500,000. In 1995–96, the new militia Taliban, supported by Pakistan and ISI, had grown to be the strongest force. By late 1994, the Taliban had captured Kandahar, in 1995 they took Herat.

In 1995, the battle in all Afghanistan raged between at least four parties: the Burhanuddin Rabbani 'interim government' with Ahmad Shah Massoud and his Jamiat-e Islami forces; the Taliban; Abdul Rashid Dostum with his Junbish-e Melli-ye Islami forces; and the Hezb-i Wahdat; some of those last three at times formed (informal) alliances.^[REF] The Taliban captured Ghazni (south of Kabul) and Maidan Wardak Province (west of Kabul) and in February approached Kabul. The Taliban then continued shelling Kabul and attacking Massoud's forces in Kabul.

In 1996, the Taliban grew stronger, as analysts say with decisive support from Pakistan.^[REF] This induced some other warring factions to form new alliances, starting with the Burhanuddin Rabbani 'interim government' and Hekmatyar with his Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin in early March. In July, a new government was formed by five factions: Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami, the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad-e Islami, the Harakat-i-Islami, and Hezb-i Wahdat's Akbari faction. Such alliances did not stop the advance and victories of the Taliban. On 27 September 1996, the Taliban, controlling already considerable parts of western, southern and eastern Afghanistan, conquered Kabul and pronounced their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.^[REF]

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