by James M. Osorio
Introduction
In the current scope of events, the COVID-19 pandemic brought about a sudden shift in the focus on the Colombian security dilemma. Concerns being voiced on security policy note the inefficiency of security forces in traversing the pandemic and the further withdrawal of forces from rural Colombia to enforce quarantine measures in major cities. Ultimately, the state of security forces has led to an uptick in violence and the failure to protect former guerilla fighters who have tried to reintegrate. The protection of these former fighters was a key part of the Colombian peace process, and its failure will likely drive some back to extremism, dissuade others from entering the process, and kill off its current support, both figuratively and literally. A general consensus in recent discussions is that COVID-19 and government mismanagement are at fault for this regression. While partially true, COVID-19 is more so kindling as opposed to a root cause. If the pandemic was a fundamental issue to Colombian peace, the current situation would then have been nonexistent, or at least greatly suppressed, under a different course for this year alone, and the effects of our current reality would then be at least somewhat reversible with the eventual reduction in the course of the pandemic. That does not seem to be the case. The pandemic has not, in essence, created issues in the peace process but instead escalated its decline by exacerbating issues at play since as early as the 1950s. One of the gravest issues in Colombia and threats to the peace process is what underlines the effects of the pandemic: the structure and failure of the military organization and security strategy.
This analysis of the Colombian conflict and peace is focused on military and security policy. Through that lens, there is a noticeable snowball effect that the Colombian military’s responsibilities and strategies have created in the country and the widespread implications seen today. If the structural failures of Colombian peace could be attributed to any one issue the most, it is the security policy over the last 20 years. First, the current effects of Coronavirus and other factors impacting the peace process should be noted. These main elements are the reestablishment of guerrilla and criminal groups, the withdrawal of security forces from rural
Colombia, the targeting and killing of dissidents, and the collapse of the Colombian economy. Every one of these elements is not an inherent outcome of COVID-19 or singularly responsible for the breakdown of peace efforts, nor is it likely they would be as drastic under a different military and security system.
Actors in the Colombian Conflict
The existence of guerrilla and criminal groups in recent years is not new because they have been established for decades already. Two major actors seen as the primary force behind Colombia's insurgency are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), with FARC laying its roots back to 1964, likely making it the longest active guerrilla group in the world until its disbandment. Even then its presence continues with dissident groups.[1] Since the beginning, Colombian security forces have engaged in counterinsurgency efforts against FARC and other fighters, which, shown by current realities, was an ultimate counterinsurgency (COIN) failure. Their continued presence and extensive reach points to a clear issue with the way these forces were combated. Following the Colombian Civil War, the military has been the sole force actively leading COIN operations in all cases, and the focus of the Ministry of National Defense has been divided between the armed forces and the police, both itself leading to less refined strategies and additionally compounding their mixed outcomes. Regardless of efforts, though, the focus given to military forces would diminish as they were slowly withdrawn from operations.
Colombian Force Withdrawal
Since the 1990s, Colombian security forces have been reduced in many parts of the country, focusing more than half its personnel on training or defense missions.[2] Guerilla and criminal groups have then been allowed to bolster and increase their activities. The loss of government control and presence in these regions due to the pandemic only led these groups to achieve regional control at a quicker rate than what was already on course. The situation in rural Colombia regarding recaptured territory seemed stable for a long time, but stability is not security or control. Withdrawing forces to deal with the pandemic also plays into the lack of security Colombia faces. As I mentioned, security forces had already been withdrawn since the de-escalation of direct action through the 2000s as an outcome of new policy. What was pulled out in response to COVID-19 was the skeleton crew left behind to maintain some semblance of security, which was already ineffective at this task as previously stated. The creation of a power vacuum was the culmination of years of inadequate strategy, not the pandemic’s sudden creation. The rise of these groups was accelerated along the path they were already taking. Examples globally clearly show that COVID-19 has not made police and military action impossible—government forces continue to maintain solid COIN efforts in Ukraine and
Afghanistan—and a difference in military and police systems is not drastic enough to solely explain this.[3] The only variable that changes greatly when comparing these examples is the strategy Colombia has taken, and that strategy was already failing to uphold the goal of peacekeeping. This strategy is the reason the government has failed to protect those who have laid down arms and generally every Colombian living in rural areas. Any year at which you look will show a string of massacres and high profile killings by well-armed and very active guerrilla fighters alongside the running of drugs and human trafficking. Colombian troops have launched numerous operations against them, such as a recent offensive after the murder of indigenous leader Cristina Bautista in October 2019. However, most acts have been a response and even then have not rooted out these groups from the regions they threaten.
Assassinations and Massacres
The lack of security personnel has made these massacres and assassinations easier to conduct and easier to get away with, leading to a surge of an already prevalent phenomenon. Since the 2016 peace agreement referendum, more than two hundred former fighters have been murdered.[4] The Colombian military, largely due to the limited scope assigned to the National Police as a product of being under the Ministry of National Defense, is the entity tasked with securing at-risk individuals and communities such as former fighters and high-traffic regions. The increased need for these personnel away from primary military operations led to the limited allocation of resources towards these crucial tasks and thus limited protection from groups reflected in the consistent stream of massacres and assassinations. COVID-19 policy enforcement also increased the divided need for military personnel as the primary force of public order instead of police, requiring that personnel be pulled from the already limited deployment in protective missions. The structure of military organization has ultimately created a military required to supplant traditional police in everything outside day-to-day law enforcement from a duality of military leaders naturally preferring military deployment when in charge of both services. The expectation of a military response is a result of compounding responsibilities assigned through the development of the Colombian conflict. Former members of FARC have recently begun seeking private security to find some form of protection against current fighters and traffickers, which is a development no longer unique to the highest profile individuals.[5] The demand for such private security is comparable to only a few counterparts, such as the boom in private security contractors in South Africa following the purge and ultimate degradation of their police and military hierarchy after 1994. Not only has the lack of security led to the instability and devastation of rural communities, the lack of economic support has equally attributed to their current state.
The Colombian Economy
The Colombian economy has been frail for a while. With slower growth up until and significant shrinking after 2014, it’s clear that the economic impact of COVID-19 has been that of a multiplier. While there was an increase 2017-18, this was brought down again in 2019, and there is no certainty as to what the future of the Colombian economy would have looked like into the new decade.[6] At least now, it’s almost certain to look grim, possibly on the same scale of decline as 1999. Further, funding for necessities in the armed forces wasn’t given the amount of credence needed. Some concerns were already raised in regards to the funding of certain stipulations in the peace process, such as the education and reintegration of former FARC members, and the allocation of funds for the armed forces seem to be based on an idea of regional competitiveness in South America instead of maintaining dominance within Colombia. Such an approach to modernizing conventional military capabilities, e.g. fighter aircraft, has left other parts of the Colombian Armed Forces underfunded. This does not simply result in less efficient internal warfighting. Among the military's responsibility now also falls a responsibility to manage economic projects in rural Colombia, including infrastructure. Budget mismanagement resulting from misguided policy and the structural instintance for military involvement in multiple aspects jointly stresses the major entity responsible for economic development where it’s needed meaning economic development slows, possibly even to a standstill. In regards to the expected task of warfighting, moving these funds towards modernization projects instead of addressing more immediate deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and COIN have allowed illegal groups to face weaker government responses. Thus communities face worsened violence, and that becomes more intense in an economic climate where even less funds will be available to fill the capability gap, much less now any gap present in the armed forces.
Origins of the Contemporary Armed Forces
Having asserted that the preceding issues are linked to the Colombian military’s structure and strategy throughout the conflict, it should be asked why this is the case. To fully understand this question requires an understanding of the military’s foundational aspects both physically and socially, and this further requires knowledge on its roots. Much of the modern Military Forces of Colombia was formed in 1904 through deep restructuring under the military reform of then-President Rafael Reyes.[7] While his administration was short-lived, his reform was cemented, shaping the Colombian military in the image of professional European armies. Only two years prior, the country ended three years of civil conflict in the Thousand Days' War, the most devastating conflict in Colombia’s history to date. During this, the mostly conservative officer corps of the Colombian Army sided with the Conservative Party of Colombia to little surprise, ensuring the party’s victory in the civil conflict through heavy military backing. The reform of 1904, self-imposed by the conservative Rafael Reyes, sought to autonomize the military, and more specifically the officer corps, from involvement in domestic politics through the training of professionalism.[8] Instead, the military would serve a nationalistic role as opposed to previous partisan action.
A new stage was set for the military’s position as a symbol of national unity and defense with the Leticia Incident of 1932. Initially a disastrous war effort against Peru due to poor planning, logistics, and terrain, Colombia achieved a military victory. The conflict had pushed peasants and nobles to fight bitterly alongside each other, elevating the professional fighting force over any social or political divisions. The new military institution was stressed repeatedly under the 1934 and 1942 administrations of liberal President Alfonso López who enacted radical social reforms much to the disdain of the largely conservative officer corps. A coup d’etat was attempted two years into López’s second term but was halted by the resistance of other officers in the corps.[9] Such a move could have likely led to a violent reaction from the Liberal Party and its rural peasantry support. Instead, the restraint led to praise from the other side of the aisle and the temporary solidification of a nonpartisan force.
The nature of the military would last less than half a decade with the onset of La Violencia. Two major shifts in the role and composition of the Armed Forces of Colombia resulted from the turmoil: a new mission to maintain public order and inclusion of the National Police. Firstly, the 1953 coup d’etat that removed conservative President Laureano Gómez from power by dissenting conservative Gustavo Rojas saw the military’s divergence from an apolitical harboror of national defense to a politicized entity capable of interfering in civil matters. This was especially true in the subsequent political conflict and coup plots between Rojistas , military officers who backed Gustavo Rojas, and the National Front government following Rojas’ deposition.[10] Such acts have resulted in the development of expectations that the military is no longer responsible solely for issues of foreign affairs. Secondly, Gómez’s short tenure and the military dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas that followed saw the Armed Forces be used aggressively during La Violencia and the immediate integration of the National Police into the Armed Forces respectively.[11] The extended use of the military during this period cemented the fate of the military’s relegation to the primary enforcer of public order. Consuming the National Police only furthered this fate, forcing the responsibility of policing onto the military as a whole through the reality of dependency that integration causes. While the navy and airforce are not entities explicitly dependent on each other as a simple fact of overarching command, both the National Army and National Police were ultimately undertaking the same roles for the same goals, and military leaders are bound to choose military options when given a new mission.
Prolonged Military-Police Functions
As a natural outcome of prolonged violence and direct conflict, it is not strange or even impractical that the military be tasked with police functions or overseeing the police itself to ensure stability. However, with such a prolonged conflict as the one Colombia has faced, diminishing returns are at play. Replacing the police or police leadership with military forces—that is, a true replacement in function and not simply support typically seen during crises—for a short period of unrest creates a disruption unjustifiable by the short-term change in security that may be gained. Equally, though, such a replacement for too long of a period will eventually lead to a burnout in the military and deterioration of policing, unjustifiable by the loss to the maintenance of public order. By the turn of the millennium, the National Police, which had been at the forefront of internal security, was completely absent from a quarter of all municipalities in Colombia.[12] Additionally, in the years leading up to the millennium, homicides in Colombia were nearly or over twice the rate of the next highest ranker in Latin America, averaging between 60 and 84 homicides per 100,000 people, only overshadowed by El Salvador.[13]
This data does not differentiate between motives and region, but it would be cursory to simply attribute this to the Colombian conflict. Most of these homicides are reported as isolated instances often in major cities, not the massacres at the hands of armed guerrillas that typically make headlines. There have been some efforts to fill the gap in Colombia’s police operations, notably the creation of self-defense forces, or autodefensas , in rural communities to combat crime. However, they too are political and are criticized on multiple fronts like human rights violations, collusion, and even some perpetrating massacres themselves.[14]
The Failure of the Colombian Strategy (1960-1990)
It is clear that the structural issues of the Armed Forces of Colombia, including those societally imposed, are fundamental to the development of the continuing state of the country. It is because the military has been pushed into the role of internal defense and the police reduced in its standing that both the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense increased and the capabilities to address them diminished. However, such issues were exacerbated by the initial military strategy in the early stages of the Colombian conflict. Plan Lazo was formulated in 1962 by leading officials in the armed forces as a proper counterinsurgency strategy to regain territory lost to various revolutionary groups. Two important aspects of the plan were integrating the command of all forces partaking in operations related to the counterinsurgency as so that the military was ultimately responsible for all operations conducted, and directing the military to head civic action programs in conflict-affected areas.[15] Now, after already taking control of the National Police, the Colombian military was responsible for all government activity, even including national detectives and internal revenue agents, and civil projects which were largely for boosting the military’s public image and regaining its pre-conflict reputation. Many aspects of Plan Lazo—the creation of specialized COIN units, retraining of the armed forces, and new combat doctrines—were positive and led to tactical victories against guerilla groups as reported by the Ministry of Defense.[16] Despite this, the plan had many fallbacks and the victories achieved were not decisive as guerilla activity continued. With actors in the Colombian conflict being ideologically driven, major defeats would not simply lead insurgents to surrender as a conventional force might. Failing to strike these groups hard enough that their physical capabilities to fight were compromised and securing the territory these groups used to empower themselves meant the Colombian conflict would only continue on the same path through the 1970s and 1980s. If it was possible for the armed forces to achieve this had their strategy been implemented differently is unclear, but it remains feasible and the real implementation only lowered the military’s ability to.
The Outcome of the Colombian Strategy (1990-2010)
The effects of allowing FARC and similar groups to remain intact became clear throughout the 1990s. The decade was marked by some of the deadliest violence related to the Colombian conflict with a series of attacks and bombings against Colombian military forces and installations, even spilling into the streets of major cities like Bogota, which had been relatively peaceful. Deaths related to combat soared to 1,479 people in 1992 and was matched throughout the rest of the decade before reaching an astronomical 2,263 deaths in 2002.[17] A sudden explosion in activity by FARC and others was unequivocally the innate result of failing to pacify the insurgency. Additionally, the reemergence of these groups in direct combat was largely supported by the drug trade which prevailed for two reasons: the reliance on impractical counter-drug measures and the lack of force employment. To this day, the Colombian military continues the practice of glyphosate aerial spraying over major coca regions as a means of disrupting their cultivation.[18] This practice does not work. Much of the profit in the drug trade does not come from the crops themselves but the product made from them, cocaine. Aerial spraying does little to affect the money gained by traffickers and guerilla groups involved, instead crippling the income of rural communities.[19] The Colombian military also, possibly from the reliance on spraying, had not allocated enough personnel to secure the Venezulan border where the drug trade really takes place. As of 2002, only five percent of the armed forces were deployed to secure the border.[20] This translates to an estimated 8,000 troops covering a
1,378-mile border. The figures are quite indicative of the count prior to the escalation, and are far from an anomaly or a singular deficiency in the way troops were allocated. Throughout the height of COIN operations into the late-1960s, around seventy percent of Colombia’s military personnel were actively participating in operations.[21] As noted in the withdrawal of Colombian troops, that figure stood at less than fifty percent simply being available in 2001.[22]
Both conditions—a reliance on ineffective counter-drug tactics and a low number of deployed troops—bred a situation in which the rise of illegal groups was not only possible, but largely unchallenged. The failure of the past decades to eradicate guerilla groups, coupled with the opportunity to fund them in an almost uncontested landscape, made these groups so formidable in the 1990s that they began to fight conventionally against the Colombian military for a short time. Insurgencies often fail due to the lack of bargaining room for extreme demands, such as the replacement of a government, and the targeting of civilians which strain any negotiations still possible.[23] Conventional forces have a larger capacity for success as shown by the results of FARC attacks and negotiations under the administration of Andrés Pastrana. Undoubtedly, finding new ways to disrupt coca cultivation and properly secure the Colombia-Venezuela border would have been a critical hit to the drug trade and guerilla capabilities. Proposing that the drug trade could have been eliminated or even suppressed to the point of no concern is naive. Even after 40 years of a militaristic approach, the United States has failed in the War on Drugs. However, proposing that the drug trade’s profit capabilities in Colombia could have been limited enough to prevent the rapid growth and armament of illegal groups is grounded. Equally grounded is the idea that allocating more units to offensive operations, either against our reality’s strong groups or hypothetical weak groups, would have quelled much of the violence inflicted on urban centers and held back the guerillas’ capture of territory. Whether or not this would have benefited the eventual peace process is debatable, as an argument could be made that the peace process we see now is the result of FARC’s success.
Equally, it could be argued that peace would have been directly achieved with the dismantling of FARC and other groups as a whole. It should be noted, though, that these conclusions were not imperceptible. The 2000s saw a drastic change in the Colombian government’s passive approach to the conflict. Firstly, and possibly more importantly, was the enlargement of the Colombian military by more than 50 percent to 267,000 personnel in 2009.[24] The issue of military overstretch, one of the greatest issues with Colombian security policy, became somewhat more manageable. At the very least, security forces were able to establish a presence in every municipality by 2004 and increased military capabilities through United States support in Plan Colombia.[25]
Plan Colombia (2000-2015)
The implications of the US’ involvement in the Colombian conflict are numerous, both positive and negative. Military aid made it possible for the Colombian Army and National Police to gain better mobility with more UH-1 and UH-60 helicopters, alongside other systems that improved Colombian intelligence gathering. The reason behind the plan—US counternarcotics operations—meant that the scope in which this new equipment was used focused on counternarcotics. More than that, counternarcotics became the primary focus of the Colombian military as a whole, eliminating any advantage that security forces gained through increased personnel by tasking them to drug enforcement. This claim may seem contradictory when noting that prior ineffective drug enforcement and the ability of traffickers to perpetuate the drug trade were a critique of Colombia’s strategy. While Plan Colombia was meant to address this, the US’ involvement pushed too heavy of a focus on drug enforcement and ultimately achieved lackluster results. The cultivation of coca in the region stabilized, the drug trade continued, and security forces placed counterinsurgency as a secondary objective, once again allowing for the continued existence of major guerilla groups and their recent ascent under the turbulent climate of 2020.[26] The structural and policy fault in the joint operation of the Colombian Army and National Police for public order missions meant the armed forces became deeply involved in the traditional police activity of drug enforcement within the country, as Plan Colombia assigned both of them the equipment and mission to do so. Some successes were made until 2015 when the plan ended, but equally many failures arose that have placed Colombia in a unique and dangerous position.
Conclusion
There is likely to be little in the way of recovery for Colombia in the short-term future. That is a tragic thing to say, but one that seems realistic. Many of the issues arising from the strategy Colombia took and now implications of COVID-19 on the country’s population may be irreversible due to the sheer level that they have been elevated to. Anti-government and criminal groups may become the strongest they have been in two decades, the assimilation of former FARC is more complicated and dangerous, there looks to be little change in the government’s approach who actually may seem to favor the failure of the peace process, and the economy may very well collapse under the pressure of the current situation. These are compounding effects to the structure and security policy analyzed in this paper. That is not to say that efforts can not be made towards a long-term solution.[27] The results of the past 70 years cannot be erased, but certain foundational changes are possible; primarily, the independence of the National Police as a function of the Ministry of Justice and Law. The police, largely militarized as a result of the Colombian conflict, would be capable of partly or fully self-sufficient enforcement, a quality shown to be missing with the deployment of military units during recent protests for reform. A clear severance in leadership could see the National Police forced to take up both a less dependent role in major cities and an active role in rural communities, reinstating genuine law and order throughout the country and taking on responsibilities carried by the National Army, both freeing the military up to combat guerrilla fighters and cross-border smugglers, as well as both parties doing it better. This is not outside the realm of plausibility. The Ministry of Law and Justice itself is the result of a restructure of two previous ministries during a slew of reforms in 2011. Additionally, the creation of more civil police units as an outcome of civil control may have some effect on police relations with the community. There is some link between militarization and aggression. The ultimate demilitarization, or at least segregation, of the National Police is bound to lead to a greater peace in the day-to-day lives of Colombians. Because of this, there may be a light at the end of this very long and very dark tunnel. There hasn’t been much reassurance as of late, but there is certainly hope.
[1] Angel Rabasa et al., Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations (RAND, 2007), https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP185.html.
[2] Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (RAND, 2001), 103, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html.
[3] Colombia, Ukraine, and Afghanistan feature similar military organizations and all formed a singular national police. The latter two operate their police forces under the Ministry of Interior. This was formerly done in a similar manner in Colombia which is addressed in this paper.
[4] Luis Jaime Acosta, “Former FARC Guerrillas March in Colombia to Demand End to Killings,” (Reuters, November 1, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/former-farc-guerrillas-march-in-colombia-to-demand-end-to-kill ings-idUSKBN27H1W0.
[5] Manuel Rueda, “Colombia Farc: The Former Rebels Who Need Bodyguards to Stay Safe,” BBC News (BBC, November 3, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-54778291.
[6] According to World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
[7] Richard L Maullin, Soldiers, Guerillas and Politics in Colombia (RAND, 1971), 4, https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R0630.html.
[8] Maullin, Soldiers, Guerillas and Politics in Colombia , 2-5.
[9] Maullin.
[10] Timothy S Cake (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2009), pp. 1-18, 11.
[11] Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (RAND, 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z2.html.
[12] Colombian Armed Forces briefing, March & April 2000. This briefing was unattainable by myself and the information was gathered through citing by other sources presented in this paper.
[13]According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics database.
[14] More information on why self-defense forces are not an effective complement to the National Police can be found on Chapter 5 of Colombian Labyrinth .
[15] Maullin, Soldiers, Guerillas and Politics in Colombia , 52-53.
[16] Maullin, 59.
[17] According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
[18] Valerie Cortés, “La Aspersión Aérea No Ha Frenado Las Masacres En Colombia,” (El Espectador, September 2020), https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/la-aspersion-aerea-no-ha-frenado-las-masacres-en-colombia/.
[19] Cortés, “La aspersión aérea no ha frenado las masacres en Colombia”.
[20] Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 103.
[21] Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, 55.
[22] Rabasa and Chalk, 103.
[23] Insurgencies typically do not possess the military capabilities to overthrow or replace a government, relying on negotiations to have demands met as is the case in the Afghan peace process. Colombia is a similar example.
[24] Angel Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability , (RAND 2011), 46, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z2.html
[25] Angel Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability, 46.
[26] Plan Colombia is only briefly covered as the US’ involvement in the Colombian conflict propagated core issues in the nature of the Armed Forces of Colombia. This paper focuses on the internal aspects that have shaped the current situation in Colombia. For detailed analysis of failures of Plan Colombia, refer to Chapter 3 of Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia: Successes, Failures, and Wrong Turns.
[27] For a detailed report on measures the Colombian Ministry of National Defense plans to enact as of 2017, refer to Defense Governance and Management: The Colombian Ministry of National Defense’s “Transformation and Future Initiative”.
