Zara Escobar
The concept of ‘negative peace’, which is the theoretical understanding of peace that has historically dominated international affairs and political legislation, is the absence of large-scale conflict or war. Recently, however, a more comprehensive conceptualization of peace, called ‘positive’ peace, has gained prevalence in governmental discourse and policy. In contrast to negative peace, which is defined exclusively by the lack of a violence, positive peace is predicated on the “presence of justice.”[i] In other words, whereas negative peace can exist while issues such as poverty or gendered and racial inequities exist, so long as there is some semblance of stability, positive peace demands the transcendence of these forms of structural violence, which are understood as, in great part, the underlying causes of violence and war. From the conception of the major armed revolutionary groups, to the disputatious negotiations between the government and FARC, to the eventual deployment of projects such as the Truth Commission, questions of mitigation versus radical restructuring that differentiate positive and negative peace, have been central to Colombia’s national politics. The signing of the Colombian Final Accord in 2016 appeared to signal a major breakthrough in terms of governmental attendance to structural violences. Of the six major points laid out by the accord, several, such as comprehensive rural reform, political participation for FARC members, the development of alternative economic opportunities to illicit crop farming and trafficking, and victim reconciliation,[ii] established the Colombian government’s commitment towards positive peace in an effort to move beyond the country's history of conflict. However, four years after the signing of the accord, Colombia has found itself not only under a more conservative administration, but also in the midst of a global pandemic that has exposed and exacerbated a litany of threats to Colombia’s advancement, bringing the already precarious peace process to a teetering edge. The greatest issue facing Colombia and its peace process as a result of the pandemic is the government’s divergence from, and consequent regression of efforts towards establishing a positive peace.
Despite the fact that the Colombian conflict dominated the nation for decades, in today’s political realm, efforts towards establishing a positive peace, which seemed to be an integral pillar of the measures laid out by the agreement, have been overshadowed by more immediate threats resulting from the global pandemic. In response to COVID-19, the government shifted its attention in ways that reaffirmed the centrality of Bogotá and other urban areas and deprioritized peripheral populations. Resources were directed towards issues such as the suffering economy, mitigating the number of cases in urban areas where ICU bed occupancy was reaching critical numbers, and maintaining a strict lockdown in major cities. On March 15th, Colombia closed all borders, non-essential businesses, schools, and national events, and declared a national emergency.[iii] Soon after, the government instituted the longest lockdown in the world, lasting six months.[iv] In Bogotá, the lockdown was enforced and regulated by the rotation of sector-specific lockdowns, a movement regulation program based on ID number, and a gendered system that determined what days people were permitted to leave their homes. Those who failed to comply with lockdown regulations faced fines of up to $250. Further, in response to the predicted economic contraction of 8.2%, the Colombian government launched a $31 billion stimulus package.[v] While such measures may have been necessary to combat the spread of the virus and the collapse of hospital systems and the economy, the national government appeared to abandon, or at the very least neglect, efforts towards addressing the structural conditions of socioeconomic inequality in rural areas which not only made these populations more vulnerable to the pandemic, but also in large part fueled the conflict to begin with.
Not only did the exclusive focus on urban-centered issues emerging from COVID-19 result in the lack of a governmental presence in the most far-out regions, but it also hindered projects towards addressing poverty, lack of infrastructure, and insecurity in the most vulnerable areas. Many initiatives emerging from the Peace Accord, such as the FARC and disarmament camps that were created as safe zones to facilitate the reintegration process, as well as the National Land Agency and the Rural Development Agency which target rural reform and development, appeared promising in their initial implementation.[vi] However, the comprehensive and constructive visions of such efforts stand in stark contrast to the economic reality of Colombia today. Presently, around 7 million Colombians are starving, with 17 million living under the poverty line. While that is currently 34% of the population, that number is expected to go up to 47-49% of the Colombian population by the end of the year. Additionally, about 14% of the population is living off of $1.90 a day.[vii] The most impoverished populations reside in the rural areas most ravaged by the Colombian conflict and continue to be the ones left behind by the government. Moreover, in the face of an unforgiving pandemic, the agriculture industry which rural farmers depend on has been hindered by the decline in commerce and dangers posed by transportation, stripping those who are on the cusp of or are already in extreme poverty, of their major source of income. [viii] Consequently, in the face of destitution and food insecurity, there is an uptake in not only petty crime, but also an increase in organized crime such as illegal mining, coca production, and extortion because the government has left populations without other modes of survival. This does not come as a surprise when one examines the issue through the lens of positive peace—projects that look to develop rural communities in order to break down structural economic barriers contrast sharply with superficial measures, such as the emergency stimulus implemented by the Duque administration,[ix] which although provisionally beneficial, will not change the systemic conditions of poverty in rural communities beyond keeping people temporarily afloat.
The disappearance of governmental presence in and attention to rural territories also created a void which enabled the reassertion and strengthening of criminal groups and the illegal economy. Criminal armed groups have been behind many of the 55 massacres seen this year. Illegal armed groups have utilized massacres as a form of social control and fearmongering, for example to send messages to populations in rural, seemingly lawless areas that violate their authoritarian imposition of lockdown measures.[x] These criminal groups are able to take advantage of the authority void that is left by the demilitarization of FARC, coupled with the governmental neglect in these territories, and expand their territorial power. Additionally, assassinations of community leaders and social leaders are rampant and only increasing amid the pandemic, with 223 social leader killings this year, many of whom were indigenous and afro-Colombian activists. These killings follow a pattern of systematic negligence by the government of the targeting of activists by dissident FARC guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries; the government’s focus on the emergency that the pandemic poses allows them to shift the national narrative in order to obfuscate the structural violence against racial minorities and activists.[xi]The heightened danger and regional instability, in the face of poverty and armed criminal and dissident groups, demonstrates how the government’s failure to uphold its responsibility to structural peace has redressed the tangible, albeit incremental, progress made by prior peace projects. While the government was able to demobilize the majority of FARC combatants, they seemed content to stop there, reflecting an orientation towards negative peace that is proving to only cycle in new forms of regional crime and violence.
Not only have criminal groups increased in regional power during the pandemic, but we are also seeing an uptake in child recruitment by armed groups, as well as in petty crime because rural youth have been left especially vulnerable. Approximately as many children have joined armed groups in the first half of 2020, as did in all of 2019.[xii] This is in large part because youth in rural areas who do not have access to the same infrastructure and technology as their urban counterparts, are often unable to engage in school activities, and become especially susceptible to recruitment by armed groups. In rural areas, it is reported that less than 10% of homes have access to a computer, tablet or laptop. In some communities, teachers are being forced to resort to extreme measures, such as distributing radios to students’ homes and using them to conduct their lessons. The disparity between conditions faced by rural and urban youth is further exemplified by the fact that in rural zones, 48% of educators do not have access to the resources, nor training to be able to integrate mobile devices into their teaching, in contrast to the only 12% of urban private schools facing this challenge.[xiii] This disparity reflects a systemic negligence of rural communities and is especially concerning in relation to the aim towards positive peace, because not only does school offer many students a space away from unsafe home environments, but the lack of access to education that rural students face poses a structural barrier to opportunities of social mobility and economic advancement, further cementing the stratification between the urban elite and rural populations.
Lastly, the government is failing to uphold its obligations to provide security to ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups who have borne the brunt of the damage by the Colombian conflict. On a socioeconomic front, not only are former combatants facing a declining economy, but they are doing so from an especially disadvantaged position: many are without the guaranteed governmental aid and economic opportunities, leaving them ostracized from general society. Further, ex-FARC members living in supposedly safe zones have become, in essence, sitting ducks, and have suffered assassinations and threats of violence, leaving many displaced due to an utter lack of governmental protections during the pandemic. According to FARC, over 200 signatories of the peace agreement have been killed since 2016, with over a total of 1,000 assassinations, 53 of which occurred just this year.[xiv] This spike in violence and killings experienced by the vulnerable is not unique to former FARC, the assassination of indigenous community leaders and activists is rampant too. In 2020, there have been a recorded 79 assassinations of indigenous leaders in Cauca alone.[xv] The killing of social activists, especially from the indigenous and afro-Colombian communities is not a recent anomaly, but rather a systematic pattern. Recent killings are suspected to have been committed by dissident FARC guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, as well as criminal groups infringing upon indigenous and afro-Colombian territories in hopes of exploiting its geographical advantages for the illicit market.[xvi] The safety and rights of these populations have been continuously disregarded and the pandemic has magnified this neglect as the government has in large part retreated from these regions to centralize their efforts in combatting the pandemic. Because negative peace only tends to address large-scale conflicts that affect national stability, structural violence against racial minorities is consistently deprioritized, as is the reintegration of marginalized populations such as demobilized FARC members, because those forms of violence do not typically threaten the elite groups who typically occupy positions of power. This demonstrates the necessity of a governmental reorientation towards a conceptual framework of positive peace because otherwise, these marginalized populations will continue to be left behind.
Ultimately, the government’s abandonment of the most at-risk populations, in the most far-out regions, is the greatest issue facing Colombia as it seeks to move forward amidst the pandemic because it is endangering the already fraying conditions of the peace process. The socioeconomic stratification and lack of coherent national stability, resulting from the government’s failure to address the structural issues I have identified, is already undoing the progress made by projects emerging from the peace agreement. If those in most need are continuously left to fend for themselves and come to adopt the view that the government will never serve to protect them, then we may not only see ex-combatants return to arms, but we may also see a whole new wave of youth and rural Colombians join guerrilla or criminal groups. Moreover, the government’s neglect of peace projects has influenced the national orientation towards the peace process by either furthering the perception that it is no longer a pressing issue, or even by propelling the notion that the conditions of the peace process are undesirable. Negative peace, what I would consider the current administration’s mitigation efforts, both in terms of disarmament and reducing violence, is fundamentally useless when the structural inequalities that drive violence and crime pervade Colombia. The government must restore a telos of positive peace, otherwise, Colombia might suffer a sociopolitical fracturing and devolve into instability and violence that could collapse the peace agreement in its entirety.
Establishing a national orientation and concrete steps towards positive peace cannot happen overnight, nor can it be carried out by a singular institution. A fundamental issue with Colombia’s peace process in past and current efforts is that the national government is unable to fully understand and engage the existing structural violence marginalized Colombians face. Given the geographic, economic, and racial makeup of the national government—for the most part urban, wealthy, and white[xvii]—Colombian politicians cannot fully understand the positions of rural farmers, indigenous or afro-Colombians, or other vulnerable groups such as former FARC members because they have not endured the same experiences. Negative peace may initially seem sufficient to the elite that occupy the government since as long as there is no massive national conflict, they can enjoy economic, physical, and social security within their cities; even as peripheral violence is rampant, it does not directly affect them. However, as was proven by the Colombian conflict, which was not of much concern to the urban elite until the terrorization and destruction experienced by rural communities reached major cities, peace is not sustainable unless the structural inequalities that drive conflict and violence are addressed.
Because of the existing communicative and experiential disconnect, the national government will not be able to address these originating inequalities that have fueled Colombia’s history of conflict without heeding the perspectives of the groups that experience these originating violences. In order to bridge this divide, the government must work to bring in the voices of the most vulnerable and historically marginalized populations. Dialogue to identify where Colombia stands, not just in terms of national statistics, but also with regard to how the peace process and the pandemic are affecting different populations uniquely, is a prerequisite to the delineation of any specific policy reform because it is necessary to inform government action that will actually address the root causes of conflict in Colombia. Only by re-establishing a commitment toward national and intercommunal discourse and restoring efforts towards addressing structural disparities and violence, can the government change the national orientation towards the peace process, and make the paradigmatic shift towards a positive and sustainable peace that is vital to rupture Colombia's historically cyclical violence. Whether it be the indigenous Minga that took to the capital to call for Duque to engage tribes in political dialogue,[xviii] or former FARC combatants leading the March for Life and Peace in protest of governmental neglect of violence,[xix] marginalized Colombians have been trying to make their voices heard. Now the government’s first step must be to choose to listen.
[i] David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 6-7, ProQuest Ebook Central.
[ii] “State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord,”Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, April
2019, 2-3, especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf.
[iii] Luke Taylor, “How Colombia’s Armed Groups Are Exploiting COVID-19 to Recruit Children,” The New
Humanitarian, September 10, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/09/10/Colombia-conflict-armed-groups-child-recruitment.
[iv] “Colombia Surpasses 1 Million COVID-19 Cases,” Aljazeera, Aljazeera Media Network, October 25, 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/25/colombia-surpasses-1-million-covid-19-cases.
[v] Avery Dyer, and Sara Torres, “Argentina and Colombia, a Tale of Two Lockdowns,” Wilson Center, October 2,
2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/argentina-and-colombia-tale-two-lockdowns.
[vi] Tetra Tech ARD, Colombia Land Rural Development Program Annual Report October 2015-September 2016, US Agency for International Development, October 2019, https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/USAID_Land_Tenure_LRDP_Annual_Report_Oct_2015-Sept_2016.pdf.
[vii]Adriaan Alsema, “How Long Will 7 Million Starve before Hell Breaks Loose in Colombia?” Colombia Reports, November 3, 2020, https://colombiareports.com/how-long-will-7-million-in-colombia-starve-before-hell-breaks-loose/.
[viii] “Effects of COVID-19 on Agribusiness in Colombia,” Agroberichten Buitenland, Ministerie van
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, May 7, 2020, https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/05/07/effects-of-covid19-on-agribusiness-in-colombia.
[ix] The Duque administration’s US $31 billion fiscal stimulus package includes the covering of up to 40% of minimum wages for formal workers, cash transfers to vulnerable families, small business subsidies, tax breaks for small businesses, tax deferrals for companies, and loan guarantees. While this may seem significant at face value, it has only temporarily mitigated the economic effects felt by Colombian citizens, as it has not been sufficient to prevent the massive increase in poverty rates and food insecurity, primarily impacting rural populations.
“The Effect of COVID-19 on the Economic Inclusion of Venezuelans in Colombia,” Refugees International, October 28, 2020, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/10/26/the-effect-of-covid-19-on-the-economic-inclusion-of-venezuelans-in-colombia.
[x] Thomas Power, “Massacres in Colombia Lay Bare Next Phase of the Conflict,” NACLA, September 18, 2020, https://nacla.org/colombia-massacres-duque.
[xi] Joe Parkin Daniels, “‘We’re Being Massacred’: Colombia Accused of Failing to Stop Murders of Activists,” The Guardian, sec. Global development, October 8, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/08/colombia-activists-murde-amnesty-international?ref=upstract.com&curator=upstract.com&utm_source=upstract.com.
[xii] Taylor, “How Colombia’s Armed Groups Are Exploiting COVID-19.”
[xiii] Natalia Duque Vergara, “Menos Del 10% de Los Niños En El Campo Tienen Computador Para Recibir Clases Durante La Cuarentena,” Cerosetenta, Centro de Estudios de Periodismo de la Universidad de los Andes, April 22, 2020, https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/por-alla-no-llega-ni-dios-la-educacion-rural-en-tiempos-de-pandemia/.
[xiv] Popayán, “Asesinan a Otro Excombatiente de Las Farc En El Cauca,” El Tiempo, October 26, 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/noticias-del-cauca-nuevo-asesinato-contra-un-excombatiente-de-las-farc-545246.
[xv]Adriaan Alsema, “Indigenous Take Colombia’s Main Airport to Demand End to ‘Genocide,’” Colombia News Colombia Reports, October 23, 2020, https://colombiareports.com/indigenous-take-colombias-main-airport-to-demand-end-to-genocide/.
[xvi] “An Indigenous Protest Movement Emerges in Colombia,” The New Humanitarian, October 21, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/10/21/Colombia-conflict-Indigenous-protest.
[xvii] Jacobo Cortes, Andrés Felipe, and Marcela Escandón Vega, Political Representation and Social Inclusion: Colombia Case Study, ed. Richard André, Americas Society and Council of the Americas, Ford Foundation, April 24, 2012, https://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ColombiaFINAL.pdf.
[xviii] Adriaan, “Indigenous Take Colombia’s Main Airport.”
[xix] Redacción Colombia 2020, “No Se va a Repetir Exterminio de La Unión Patriótica: Gobierno Sobre Marcha de FARC,” El Espectador, November 3, 2020, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/no-se-va-a-repetir-exterminio-de-la-union-patriotica-gobierno-sobre-marcha-de-farc/.
